

256
*Theological Seminary
Princeton N.J.
Green Library*

LIBRARY
OF THE
Theological Seminary,
PRINCETON, N. J.

Case, SCC Dec 1890
Shelf, 7340
Book, _____

Theological Seminary
at Princeton N. J.

University of Cambridge

Library





A

COURSE OF LECTURES,

CONTAINING A

DESCRIPTION AND SYSTEMATIC ARRANGEMENT

OF THE SEVERAL

BRANCHES OF DIVINITY:

ACCOMPANIED WITH

AN ACCOUNT, BOTH OF THE PRINCIPAL AUTHORS, AND OF

THE PROGRESS, WHICH HAS BEEN MADE AT

DIFFERENT PERIODS

IN

Theological Learning.

BY HERBERT MARSH, D. D. F. R. S.

MARGARET PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY.

PART I.


CAMBRIDGE:

PUBLISHED BY WILLIAM HILLIARD.

.....

Hilliard & Metcalf printers.

1812.



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
Princeton Theological Seminary Library

PREFACE

TO THE FIRST EDITION.

WHEN these Lectures were written, they were not designed for publication, at least not for *present* publication. I proposed to follow the example of other Lecturers, and, when I had completed the Course, to make the same Lectures serve again and again for every successive audience. For so doing I had this additional inducement, that three years at least must elapse before the whole series of Lectures can be completed, during which time the Young Men of the University, for whom they were principally intended, will have been succeeded by a new generation. And as soon as I had performed the task of *writing* the Lectures, I could have divided them into a triennial course, commensurate with the usual period of academical study. After all, if I thought it expedient, I had the publication of them in reserve, whenever sickness, or the infirmities of age might prevent me from continuing to deliver them.

Such was my original plan, which I have been induced to abandon by the solicitation of my friends; and it is now my intention to publish every year the Lectures, which have been delivered in that year. I

shall thus lose the advantage, when the present Course is finished, of being provided with a fund for future uses, since Lectures once published can never be delivered again. But this private inconvenience will be amply compensated, if the printing of them affords any benefit to the public. *One* advantage at least will arise from the present publication of them, namely, that the Young Men, who are *now* entering on their academical studies, will be thus enabled, before the Lectures are resumed, to make themselves acquainted with the subjects already explained. And even they, who had an opportunity of *hearing* the Lectures now printed, may find it convenient to have their memories assisted in the recollection of many points, which it is necessary to know, in order to understand the subjects of inquiry in *future* Lectures. For as the whole Course is intended to form a *systematic* arrangement, the connexion of the several parts must be constantly kept in view, or the purport of that arrangement will be defeated. These considerations have had the chief influence on my present determination. Nor must I neglect either to mention, or to acknowledge with gratitude, the additional inducement in the liberal offer of the Syndies of the Press to defray the expense of publication.

As these Lectures were delivered in the University Church, it was necessary to adapt the *mode* of composition to the place and the audience, for which they were intended. In writing a book, which is designed for private meditation, an author cannot easily be too minute, either in his *own* researches, or in refer-

ences to the works of *other* authors. In a private Lecture-room, where a Lecturer can occasionally wait while his pupils are taking notes, and where other circumstances compensate for the dryness of his manner, he may likewise be minute in his references, or even produce the authors as he quotes them. But when a Professor is speaking from the University Pulpit, and is addressing a numerous audience, it would be difficult to obtain unremitted attention, if the fluency of his discourse were interrupted by particular references to chapter and section, to volume and page. This inconvenience however is in a great measure remedied by the circumstance, that it is an essential part of my plan to give an account of the principal books in Theology; and these are at the same time the sources, from which I myself have derived the information contained in the Lectures. Thus, the authors enumerated at the end of the fourth Lecture are the vouchers for that history of Sacred Criticism, during the early and the middle ages, which is given in the third and fourth Lectures. In like manner, when the Criticism of the Greek Testament is finished, an account will be given of the principal authors on *that* subject, and the same will be done in every *other* branch. It is true, that many of the quoted works are of considerable size: but since for the most part they are methodically arranged, since many of them are provided with indexes, and others with tables of contents, the particular subjects, for which it may be necessary to consult them, will generally be found without difficulty. Little or no bene-

fit therefore would have been derived from *printing* the Lectures in any other form, than that, in which they were *delivered*. And even *without* this consideration, it would probably be less agreeable to those who so lately heard them, if on reading them there should appear any material difference. Trivial alterations, in regard to single expressions, such as occur to *every* author, while he is correcting the proof sheets of his work, were of course admitted, as it would be blameable to reject them. But in *substance* nothing has been altered. I had even printed, at the beginning of the third Lecture, that enumeration of the branches of Divinity, with which I closed the second Lecture, and which were *repeated* at the beginning of the third, because it was necessary to impress them on the minds of every hearer. But in correcting the proof sheet at p. 49, and on perceiving that the same enumeration, which appears in p. 47, was repeated on the opposite page, I erased the repetition as unnecessary for the *reader*, though it was necessary for the *hearer*.

For the reasons already assigned I have retained the exordium of the first Lecture, though it relates to two deviations from the custom of my predecessors, for which only my immediate hearers could require an apology. I have retained also the English translation of French title-pages, which could not with propriety have been given in the original from an English pulpit. French proper names are likewise written, as they are commonly used in England, which is the more necessary, as a departure from this rule would

frequently create confusion. For instance, the French name of the celebrated editor of the Greek Testament was Robert Estienne ; but as he is always called in English Robert Stephens, it would have led the reader into error, if I had called him by any other name. A similar motive has induced me to call the well-known Oxford editor of the Greek Testament by the name of Dr. Mill : for though it was not his real name, but was formed from the omission of the termination in his Latin name Millius, yet as he is generally known by the name of Mill, it might have perplexed the reader if I had used any other.

As the Lectures for the present year were finished, before the description of the first branch of Divinity was completed, I thought it necessary at the end of the last Lecture to make some general observations in respect, both to that, and to some other branches of Divinity not yet described. The reasons for so doing are assigned in their proper place, and therefore it is unnecessary to mention them at present. There is only one point, on which I must say a few words, in order to prevent misconstructions, or false inferences from what I have asserted. On taking leave of my audience, I noticed, among other subjects, which will be matter of future discussion, the conformity of the doctrines of the Church of England with the doctrines of Scripture. And hence was deduced the inference (which *necessarily* follows, if those premises are true) that to dissent from those doctrines, was to dissent without a real cause. From this declaration no can-

did Dissenter will conclude, that the speaker was animated by a spirit of persecution, or wished that religion should be combated by force. Though I am myself convinced, that the doctrines of the Church of England are agreeable to Scripture; though I am likewise convinced (what I did not express in the Lecture, as the subject did not require it) that there is nothing in the *discipline* of our Church, which is inconsistent with Scripture, I should be very sorry that any man, who quietly and conscientiously dissented from either, should be interrupted in the exercise of his own *worship*, or his own *opinions*. But if a Professor of Divinity in an English University, standing in the University pulpit, and addressing himself immediately to the members of that University, *all* of whom are educated in the Church, and *most* of them as *ministers* of the Church, cannot declare, that the doctrines of the Church are agreeable to Scripture, and consequently that there is no real cause to dissent from them, if under such circumstances, and before such an audience, he cannot make this declaration, without giving *offence* to those, who are of a different persuasion, the persons so offended must expect something more than the free exercise of their *own* opinions; they must be unwilling to grant to the Establishment the same toleration of religious sentiment, which they claim and enjoy themselves. These remarks are so obvious, that I should have thought it unnecessary to introduce them, if I had not received a

letter containing reproaches for making the declaration in question.*

When, according to the plan proposed in the second Lecture, the time shall arrive for the description of that branch of Divinity, which relates to the *Doctrines* of the Bible, it will be examined with all the attention, which the importance of the subject requires. But to enter upon this branch, before those, which precede it, have been fully described, would defeat the

* This letter, as appears from the post mark, was put into the post-office at Cambridge. It was sent on Sept. 15, more than three months after the Lectures were finished, but only three days after the manuscript had been sent to the printing-office for publication. There are various indications of its being written in a disguised hand. No name is affixed to it : but it appears to have been composed by a person not unacquainted with the subject, though upon the whole it is an incoherent rhapsody. The writer begins with expressing his surprise at the "false assertion," as he calls it, contained in the above mentioned declaration. He then immediately proceeds to correct an error, which in his opinion I had committed on a *former* occasion, in maintaining that the Articles of our Church are *not* Calvinistic, though "every person, who has read, knows (as he asserts) that the authors of them were Calvinists." But the letter is *chiefly* distinguished by the spirit of intolerance, which it uniformly breathes, and by the views of the writer, which it too manifestly discovers. In *these* respects it is so remarkable, that I at first intended to publish it : but, as it is too long for insertion in this Preface, I will quote only one sentence. Having previously extolled the present state of religious toleration in France, which I am sure no English Dissenter, who had read the *Articles organiques des Cultes Protestans* in the late French Concordat, would wish to see adopted in this country, he proceeds, with manifest reference to the Church of England, in the following manner : "*Antichrist must fall : the late events on the Continent prove, that the blood of the Saints must be avenged.*"—From this single sentence a tolerable judgment may be formed, both of the *temper*, and of the *wishes* of the writer. It is to be hoped, that there are not many, who with the same sentiments unite equal zeal.

very object of that theological *order*, without which it is impossible to form such a system of Theology, as shall exempt us from the danger of arguing in a circle.

The Lectures now published were delivered in the University Church on six successive Saturdays, in the Easter Term. And it is my intention to give the same number in every Easter Term, till the Course is finished.

Cambridge,

Oct. 14, 1809.

PREFACE

TO THE SECOND EDITION.

IN this second edition very few alterations have been made, and those only such as occur to every author on a revisal of his work. It was printed before the first edition had been noticed in any Review. But in the interval between the impression and the writing of this Preface, the fifth number of the Quarterly Review, (where honourable mention is made of the Lectures, for which I beg leave to express my thanks) has noticed (p. 210) as inaccurate, a paragraph at the beginning of the second Lecture, which my respect for that Review would certainly induce me to cancel, if I did not entertain a hope, that I could give such an explanation, as would satisfy the Reviewer himself.

At the beginning of that Lecture, before I introduced my *own* theological arrangement, which the Quarterly Reviewer approves, I observed, "Theological writers are far from being unanimous, either in regard to the *number*, or in regard to the *kind* of divisions, into which Theology should be resolved. In England especially so little has been determined on this point, that few writers agree in their divi-

sions : and in some of them the difference is such, that one should hardly suppose they were analysing the same subject." In support of this observation, I referred to two writers, no less distinguished by their learning than by their rank, one of whom divides Theology into *four*, the other into *fourteen* classes. Here the Reviewer remarks, " It appears to us that he (the author) misunderstands the design of both these Prelates. They seem to have had no other object in view, than the recommendation of books, and to have made their distribution, not for the direction of the Student in arranging the order of his studies, but solely for their own convenience and that of their readers." Now if the opinion be *correct*, that those learned writers " had *no other* object in view, than the recommendation of books," they at any rate present *one* species of theological division, and as in *this* species they are so *unequal*, they afford a fair instance of the observation, that theological writers are *not unanimous* in respect to the divisions of Theology, an observation which was made in such general terms, as to be capable of including *every* species of theological division. But I really did suppose that they had *another* object in view : I supposed, that the distribution of the classes, under which the books were arranged, was not wholly *fortuitous* : and being unable, when a classification is once introduced, to discover *why* the books of *one* class should be placed before the books of *another* class, unless the author of the classification intends that those of the former should be *read* before those of the latter, I con-

cluded, that whatever might be their primary object, they at least intended to *unite* “a plan of study” with “a classification of books.” In this conclusion I was confirmed by the *fact*, that the learned Prelate, who makes the four-fold division, really *has* observed, and *accurately* observed the principle just mentioned: and on this very account I *commended* his theological arrangement, with the exception of the last class, in which a *sub*-division would have rendered the classification more complete. With respect to the other learned Prelate, though I could not discover the *fact*, that he had observed the principle in question, and therefore described his arrangement as less judicious (which implies no disrespect to his general learning,) I supposed, that he at least *intended* to make his classification of books in some manner subservient to that course of study, which he himself approved. And though in my own opinion the course of study, resulting from this classification, is less judicious, than the course of study resulting from the other classification, I thought that I was not unjust in concluding, that he really had such a course of study in contemplation, because he himself says at the end of the Preface, “I subjoin the following questions with the references annexed, in order to shew how far the heads “or chapters under which *the books are classed*, may “be useful toward forming *a regular course of study*.”

Cambridge,
April 25, 1810.

CONTENTS.

LECTURE I.

	Page
<i>Introductory Remarks on the Study of Theology</i> -	16

LECTURE II.

<i>On Theological Arrangement. The Author's Analysis, and Division of Theology into Seven Branches</i> -	31
--	----

LECTURE III.

<i>An account of Introductions to the Old and New Testament. History of Sacred Criticism in the early and middle Ages</i> - - - - -	49
---	----

LECTURE IV.

<i>This History continued and concluded</i> - - -	70
---	----

LECTURE V.

<i>The Criticism of the Greek Testament</i> - - -	85
---	----

LECTURE VI.

<i>This Subject continued to the formation of the Textus Receptus</i> - - - - -	98
---	----

(173500)

1847

1847

1847

1847

1847

1847

1847


1847

1847

1847

1847

1847



LECTURE I.

BEFORE I commence my intended Course of Lectures, it may be proper to apologize to the University for giving them in English, since former Margaret Professors gave Lectures, namely, the few which they did give, in Latin. When this Professorship was founded, all Lectures were given in Latin. But this custom, in regard to other Lectures, has been long abolished: and even in the foreign Universities, at least in the Protestant Universities with which I am acquainted, it is now usual for Professors of Divinity to lecture, not in Latin, but in the language of the country. No reason therefore can be assigned, why an exception should be made in the solitary instance of Lady Margaret's Professor of Divinity, especially as the Foundress herself, in the deed of foundation, has prescribed no rules in respect to the language of the Lecture. It is not with the view of saving myself trouble, that I propose to depart from this custom of my predecessors: for, if we may judge from their experience, two or three lectures, if written in Latin, would suffice for the whole time of holding the Professorship. A Latin Lecture in Divinity is a sort of *Concio ad Clerum*: and we all know that, whoever

be the preacher, a *Concio ad Clerum* is delivered to an empty pit, and to empty galleries. The mere garb of learning has long ceased to be imposing: it is information, and not parade, which men now require, and they require it through that medium, which conveys it to them with the greatest ease and perspicuity. It is no wonder therefore that Latin lectures are deserted, or that former Margaret Professors have read without an audience. Now, if no one attends the lectures of the Margaret Professor, it cannot be his duty, indeed it would be absurd, to continue to deliver them. In this manner the most valuable Professorship in the gift of the University has been gradually converted into a sinecure. But as I do not desire that it should remain so, as I would rather perform the duties of my office, than seek for a pretext to evade them, I hope the University will excuse my addressing them in a language, which alone can enable me to obtain an audience, alone therefore enable me to do my duty.

Another deviation from the custom of my predecessors I should have left unnoticed, were it not that every deviation from former practice is liable to give offence. It is well known, that my predecessors, when they gave lectures, read them from the professorial chair; and without doubt it was originally intended, that divinity lectures should be given in the divinity schools. It was also intended that lectures in law and physic should be given in the schools, which are appropriated to those faculties. But who would ever censure a Professor of law or physic for giving lectures elsewhere? And with respect even to divinity,

who has ever censured either the late or the present Norrissian Professor for choosing some other place for the delivery of theological lectures? Why then should the Margaret Professor be censured, who, in leaving the schools, only follows their example? In fact, the divinity schools, whatever may have been their original destination, are calculated, according to their present construction, for the mere purpose of public disputations. They have not the requisites of a public lecture room. The doctors and professors, indeed, are well provided with seats, and some few seats are provided for the masters of arts; but in the space, which is allotted to the undergraduates, not a single seat is provided. If any one complains then, that I have deserted the schools, let him say why the younger part of the University should be exposed to the inconvenience of standing during a whole lecture, of standing on a cold pavement, when convenient benches are provided for them in another place? It is true, that I have not exchanged the schools for that place, where one of my learned colleagues gives divinity lectures; but I have exchanged them for a place, to which the subjects of discussion are certainly appropriate. Nor is the selection of this place a matter of choice only; it is a matter of necessity. For where is the lecture room, where are the schools in this University, which, however inconvenient, or however crowded, could contain the audience, which is now before me? I shall proceed therefore, without further apology, to the business, for which we are here assembled.

The Lectures, which I propose to deliver, will re-

late to every branch of Theology. Such is their connexion, that without some knowledge of the whole, it is hardly possible to form a due estimate of any part. Indeed, whatever be the business of our study, we should previously ask what are the objects of inquiry ; for till this question has been answered, we know not its real meaning. In the first place therefore the several parts of Theology must be described.

In the next place, they must be properly arranged. A course of Lectures may contain all the divisions and sub-divisions, into which Theology is capable of being resolved ; but unless it contains them in a luminous order, it never can produce conviction ; it can never lead to that, which is the ultimate object of all theological study, the establishment of the great truths of Christianity. To effect this purpose, the several parts must be so arranged, that the one may be deduced from the other in regular succession. The evil consequences which follow the violation of this rule, may be best explained by an example. Suppose, that a Professor of Divinity begins his course of lectures with the doctrine of Divine Inspiration ; this doctrine, however true in itself, or however certain the arguments, by which it may be established, cannot possibly, in that stage of his inquiry, be proved to the satisfaction of his audience, because he has not yet established other truths, from which this must be deduced. For whether he appeals to the promises of Christ to his Apostles, or the declarations of the Apostles themselves, he must take for granted, that those promises and declarations were really made ; that is, he

must take for granted the authenticity of the writings, in which those promises and declarations are recorded. But how is it possible, that conviction should be the consequence of postulating, instead of proving, a fact of such importance? This example alone is sufficient to shew the necessity of method in the study of Theology, the necessity of arranging the several parts in such a manner, that no argument be founded on a proposition, which is not already proved. For if (as is too often the case in theological works) we undertake to prove a proposition by the aid of another, which is hereafter to be proved, the inevitable consequence is, that the proposition in question becomes a link in the chain, by which we establish that very proposition, which at first was taken for granted. Thus we prove premises from inferences, as well as inferences from premises; or, in other words, we prove—nothing.

Nor is it sufficient merely to describe and to arrange the several parts of Theology. The *grounds* of arrangement, the *modes* of connexion, must also be distinctly stated. For hence only can be deduced those general principles, without which the student in Divinity will never be able to judge of the proofs, which are laid before him.

When we have proceeded thus far, our next object must be to learn *where* we may obtain information on the manifold subjects, which will gradually come under discussion; that is, we must obtain a knowledge of the best authors, who have written on those subjects. But for this purpose it is not sufficient to have a mere catalogue of theological books,

arranged alphabetically, or even arranged under heads, unless the heads themselves are reduced to a proper system. Nor is it sufficient to inform the hearer of the titles only of those books which it may be proper for him to read: he should be informed, at least to a certain degree, of their contents: he should be informed also of the different modes, in which the same subject has been treated by different authors, and of the particular objects, which each of them had in view. Further, since many excellent treatises have been produced by controversy, and many by other occasions, which it is always useful, and sometimes necessary to know, in order to view the writings themselves in their proper light, a knowledge of theological works should be accompanied with some knowledge of the persons who wrote them, a knowledge of their general characters, of the times in which they lived, and of the situations in which they were placed.

Lastly with this knowledge of authors, if it be properly disposed, may be united a knowledge equally instructive and entertaining, a knowledge of the advancement or decline of theological learning, a knowledge of how much or how little has been performed in the different ages of Christianity.

A course of Lectures so comprehensive in its plan, as to embrace the manifold objects, which have been just enumerated, may appear too much for one lecturer to undertake, especially for the lecturer, who is now addressing you. And, even if he had ability for the undertaking, it might still be apprehended, that, before he had done, the patience of the most indulgent

auditory would be exhausted. But it would be foreign to the very plan of these Lectures to deliver copious dissertations on single points of Divinity, in which case they might never be brought to a conclusion. They relate indeed to all the branches of Divinity, however minute; they describe, as well the fruits which have been gathered, as the store-houses in which the fruits are preserved; but they do not contain the fruits themselves. Or they may be compared with a map and a book of directions, from which the traveller may learn the road which he must take, the stages which he must go, and the places where he must stop, in order to arrive with the greatest ease and safety at his journey's end. Descriptions of this kind are no less useful in travelling through the paths of knowledge, than in travelling over distant lands. And it is a description of this kind, which will be attempted in these Lectures.

Here it may be asked, *What is* the end of the journey, to which these Lectures are intended to lead? Is it the object of elements, thus general and comprehensive, to generalize Christianity itself, to represent it in the form of a general theorem, from which individual creeds are to be deduced as so many corollaries? Or is it their object to maintain one particular creed to the exclusion of all others? The latter may appear to be less liberal than the former, but it is only so in appearance; while the advantages ascribed to the former, are as imaginary, as those possessed by the latter are substantial. It is difficult to conceive any thing more painful or more injurious to the stu-

dent in divinity, than to be left in a state of uncertainty, what he is at last to believe or disbelieve. Where no particular system of faith is inculcated, where a variety of objects is represented without discrimination, the minds of the hearers must become so unsettled, they must become so bewildered in regard to the choice of their creed, as to be in danger of choosing none at all. The attempt to generalize Christianity, in order to *embrace* a variety of creeds, will ultimately lead to the *exclusion* of all creeds; it will have a similar effect with Spinosa's doctrine of Pantheism; it will produce the very opposite to that, which the name itself imports. And, as Pantheism, though nominally the reverse, is in reality but another term for Atheism, so Christianity, when generalized, is no Christianity at all. The very essentials of Christianity must be omitted, before we can obtain a form so general, as not to militate against any of the numerous systems, which in various ages have been denominated Christian. Some particular system therefore must be adopted, as the object and end of our theological study. What particular system must be the object and end of our theological study, cannot be a question in this place: it cannot be a question with men who are studying with the very view of filling conspicuous stations in the Church of England. That system then, which was established at the Reformation, and is contained in our liturgy, our articles, and our homilies, is the system, to which all our labours must be ultimately directed.

If it be objected, that the student will thus be pre-

judiced in favour of a particular system before he has had an opportunity of comparing it with others, one answer to the objection has been already given, namely, that, however specious the plan of teaching Christianity on a broad basis, it is incapable of being reduced to practice ; that, if various systems be taught, they must be taught, not in union, but in succession ; and consequently, that at least in point of time some one system must have the precedence. Further, as a comparison of the doctrines of the Church of England with the doctrines of other churches, will form a part of these very lectures ; as a review will be taken of other systems, when our own has been examined, and no advice will be given to shrink from inquiry, I hope I shall not be accused of attempting to fetter the judgment of my hearers in a matter of such importance as religious faith.

After all, should the selection of a particular system as the object of our primary consideration be attended with the unavoidable consequence, that a predilection be formed in regard to that system, which may render us less disposed to listen to the claims of any other, than perhaps strict impartiality might require, it may be asked, whether such consequence is really a matter of regret ? Is it a thing to be lamented, that members of the Church of England are educated with prepossessions in favour of the national church ? Or is it want of candour in a Professor, who, after an examination of other systems, can discover none, which he thinks so good as his own, to shew more regard to this system than to any other ?

Can it be blameable at a season, when every exertion is making by the very means of education, by education conducted both openly and privately, to alienate the rising generation from the established church, can it be blameable, or rather is it not our bounden duty, at such a season, to call forth all our energies, in making education on our part *subservient* to the established church?

That theological learning is necessary to make a good divine of the Church of England, is a position, which a learned audience will certainly be disposed to admit. And this position will appear still more evident, when we consider, what it is, which constitutes the chief difference between the learned and the unlearned in Theology. It is not the ability to read the New Testament in Greek, which makes a man a learned divine, though it is one of the ingredients, without which he cannot become so. The main difference consists in this, that while the unlearned in divinity obtain only a knowledge of what the truths of Christianity *are*, the learned in divinity know also the *grounds*, on which they rest. And that this knowledge ought to be obtained by every man who assumes the sacred office of a Christian teacher, nothing but the blindest enthusiasm can deny. If St. Peter, in addressing himself to the numerous converts of Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia, Bithynia, required that they should be always ready to give a reason of the hope that was in them, how much more necessary must he have thought this ability in those, who were set apart to be teachers of the Gospel? But

ask any one of those illiterate teachers, with which this country unfortunately abounds, ask him why he is a Christian and not a Mahometan ; ask him why he believes that Christianity is a real revelation, and Mahometanism only a pretended one ? He would answer, either with a vacant stare, or with a reproach at the impiety of the question, as if it had been proposed with any other view than to try his knowledge. Not so the learned divine : he would enter into those historical and critical arguments, of which the unlettered enthusiast has no conception, but by which alone the authenticity of the Gospel history can be established, by which alone the miracles recorded in it can be confirmed, by which alone the claims of Christianity to a divine origin can be proved legitimate.

There is no ground then for that distinction between science and religion, that the one is an object of reason, the other an object of faith. Religion is an object of both ; it is this very circumstance, which distinguishes the unlearned from the learned in divinity ; while the former has faith only, the latter has the same faith accompanied with reason. The former believes the miracles and doctrines of Christianity, as being recorded in the New Testament ; the latter also believes the miracles and doctrines recorded in the New Testament, and he believes them, because by the help of his reason he knows, what the other does not, that the record is true.

But is not religion, it may be said, a matter of general import ? Does it not concern all men, the unlearned, as well as the learned ? Can it be true then,

that such a literary apparatus is necessary for the purpose of religion? And would not at least nine-tenths of mankind be, in that case, excluded from its benefits? Certainly not from its *practical* benefits, which alone are wanted, as they alone are attainable, by the generality of mankind. Men, whose education and habits have not prepared them for profound inquiry, whose attention is wholly directed to the procuring of the necessities of life, depend, and must depend, for the truth of the doctrines which are taught them, on the authority of their teachers and preachers, of whom it is taken for granted, that they have investigated, and really know the truth. But is this any reason why men, who are set apart for the ministry, should likewise be satisfied with taking things upon trust? Does it follow, because a task is neglected by those, who have neither leisure nor ability to undertake it, that it must likewise be neglected by those, who possess them both? Ought we not rather to conclude, that in proportion to the inability of the hearers to investigate for themselves, in proportion therefore to the confidence which they must place in their instructor, their instructor should endeavour to convince *himself* of the truth of his doctrines? And how is this conviction, this real knowledge of the truth to be attained without learning?

But investigation, it is said, frequently leads to doubts, where there were none before. So much the better. If a thing is false, it ought not to be received. If a thing is true, it can never lose in the end, by inquiry. On the contrary, the conviction of that man,

who has perceived difficulties and overcome them, is always stronger, than the persuasion of him who never heard of their existence. The danger, which is apprehended, arises from *superficial* knowledge, which carries a man just far enough, to enable him to perceive difficulties, and there leaves him. In fact, it is not learning, but want of learning, which leads to error in religion. It was the want of learning which occasioned the abuses of religion in the middle ages ; it was the learning of our early reformers, by which those abuses were corrected. Nor is that variety of religious sentiment, by which this nation is distracted, to be ascribed to learning. On the contrary, the leaders of that sect, which is now the most numerous, rather reprobate, than encourage learning ; and that, in this respect, their practice agrees with their principles, is known to every man, who has once listened to their harangues. Let no one therefore apprehend, that theological learning will create divisions in the Church of England ; let no one apprehend, that it will now undo what it did at the Reformation. It is in fact the only method of ensuring to us the advantages of the Reformation, by guarding against enthusiasm on the one hand, and infidelity on the other.

That knowledge puffeth up, may be true of some kinds of knowledge ; and it might certainly be affirmed of that kind, to which St. Paul alludes in the passage so often misapplied by unlettered teachers, in vindication of their own defects. St. Peter commands us to add to our virtue knowledge ; and St. Paul himself complains elsewhere of those, who, in re-

ligious matters, have zeal which is not according to knowledge. The more we advance in the study of Divinity, the more likely are we to learn humility; the most profound Divines are generally men of modest manners; and spiritual pride and vanity is chiefly to be found among those, who are the least distinguished for theological learning.

We have every reason therefore to persevere in the study of Divinity; there is none whatever to dissuade us from it. We have every reason to applaud the wisdom of our illustrious founders, who were not of opinion, that it is easier to become a good divine, than a good mechanic; who were not of opinion, that the head requires less exercise than the hands; or that, if a seven years' apprenticeship is necessary, to learn the manual operations of a common trade, a less time is requisite for the intellectual attainments of a Christian teacher. No. They required a two-fold apprenticeship to Divinity; a seven years' study of the liberal arts, as preparatory to the study of Divinity, and another seven years' study of Divinity itself, before the student was admitted to a degree in that profession.

In conformity with the principles which directed our ancestors, in obedience to the commands of the Foundress of this Professorship, and, I hope, with the approbation of my audience, I shall proceed therefore next Saturday, at the same hour, to develop the plan, already announced in this Lecture.

H 11
21

LECTURE II.

IN the preceding Lecture it was observed, that on our entrance to the study of Divinity, we should endeavour in the first place to obtain a knowledge of the parts or branches, of which it consists ; and in the second place, a knowledge of the manner, in which those parts or branches should be arranged.

Theological writers are far from being unanimous, either in regard to the number, or in regard to the kind of divisions, into which Theology should be resolved. In England especially, so little has been determined on this point, that few writers agree in their divisions ; and in some of them the difference is such, that one should hardly suppose they were analysing the same subject.

A learned Prelate in our sister University, who has published a list of books recommended to the younger clergy, has made not less than fourteen divisions in Theology, which he has arranged in the following order : I. The first division relates to Practical and Pastoral Duties. II. Devotion. III. Religion in general. IV. Revealed Religion. V. The Scriptures. VI. Comments on the Scriptures. VII.

Concordances, &c. **viii.** Doctrines. **ix.** Creeds, Articles, Catechism, and Liturgy. **x.** Sacraments and Rites, (subdivided into Baptism, the Lord's Supper, and Confirmation). **xi.** Constitution and Establishment of the Church of England. **xii.** Ecclesiastical History. **xiii.** Ecclesiastical Law. **xiv.** Miscellaneous subjects.—Then comes a second list, in which these fourteen divisions are repeated; and lastly a third, in which they are exchanged for another set, amounting to seventeen, which it would be really tedious to enumerate. Indeed throughout the whole of this theological arrangement there is nothing like system to be discovered: no reason is assignable for the peculiar position of any one head: nor does their disposition in any way contribute to that, which should be the primary object of every writer—perspicuity.

A more judicious Prelate of our own University, in his Preface to his *Elements of Christian Theology*, divides the subject into four parts. The first relates to the Exposition of the Scriptures; the second to the Divine Authority of the Scriptures; the third to the Doctrines and Discipline of the Church of England; the fourth to Miscellaneous subjects, including Sermons and Ecclesiastical History.—In this arrangement there is method. For the Bible must be understood, before we can prove its divine authority; and both of these tasks must be performed, before we can proceed to deduce articles of faith. Sermons, it is true, should not be placed in the same class with Ecclesiastical History; and in all systematic arrangements, the term “miscellaneous” should be wholly

avoided. Where a classification is complete, the classes must be such, that every individual article may, in some one of them, find its proper place.

A four-fold division of Theology is a division, which has been long in use among the German divines. With them likewise the first division relates to the exposition of the Scriptures, and is termed Expository Theology. The second is called, by way of eminence, Systematic Theology: it includes both evidences and doctrines. The third division is called Historical Theology: it comprises the internal, as well as external history of the Church. The fourth and last division is called Pastoral Theology, comprehending such subjects, as relate especially to the duties of a parish priest.

This division, though not universal among foreign divines, is at least the prevailing one, and the best, which has been hitherto introduced.

To attempt therefore the introduction of any other may appear to savour of presumption. But as the inconveniences, which I have felt from all former arrangements, during a twenty years' study of this particular subject, have suggested such modifications, as seem at least to answer the purpose of theological order, the sole object of which either is, or should be, to represent the several parts of Theology according to their connexions and dependences, a theological arrangement, formed on this principle, will be attempted in the present Lecture.

That we should commence our theological studies with the study of that Book, from which all Christian

Theology is derived, is a proposition, which can hardly require demonstration. That book, by which every Christian professes to regulate his religious creed, that book, of which our own Church declares, that “whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man, that it should be believed as an article of the faith,” is of course the primary object of religious inquiry. It is a fountain, at which every man must draw in preference even to the clearest of the streams, which flow from it. Indeed, if we neglect to draw there, we shall never know, whether the streams, which flow from it, are pure or turbid.

But the Bible may be studied in such a variety of ways, there are so many points of view, from which it requires to be examined, and the accuracy of our conclusions depends so much on the *order*, in which these several surveys are taken, that it is of the utmost importance to determine where we should begin. We must establish the Authenticity of the Bible, the Credibility of the Bible, the Divine Authority of the Bible, the Inspiration of the Bible, the Doctrines of the Bible. Now that we cannot begin with the Inspiration of the Bible appears from what was said in the preceding Lecture. Nor can we begin with the Doctrines of the Bible; for till we have proved its divine authority, its doctrines have not the force of obligation. Nor can we begin with its Divine Authority, or, in other words, with the Evidences for the divine origin of our religion. For these evidences are arguments deduced from the Bible itself, and of course presup-

pose that the Bible is true. The authenticity of the Bible therefore must be previously established, or the evidences, as they are called, have no foundation, whereon to rest. But no man can undertake to prove the authenticity of the Bible, till he thoroughly understands it. The interpretation of the Bible therefore is manifestly one of the first parts or branches of Theology.

It deserves however to be considered, whether a branch of Theology, hitherto unnoticed in these Lectures, is not entitled to a still higher rank. I mean the Criticism of the Bible. In that four-fold division, which I have already stated, both the criticism and the interpretation of the Bible are included in the first division. But the operations of criticism, and the operations of interpretation are so distinct, that they ought not, however subdivided, to be placed in the same class. But if we refer them to separate classes, parts, or branches, we must be careful to refer them in such a manner, as not to violate the principle, which we apply to the other branches. Now the criticism of the Bible is a branch of such extent, it so encircles the interpretation of the Bible, that, however different their operations, it is difficult to determine where the separation shall begin. There is one department of sacred criticism, in which at least its application would be very inefficient, if the Bible were not already understood. But there is another department, which we may apply, as well as learn, even before we begin to interpret the Bible. And we shall find that it is necessary so to do.

When we attempt to expound a work of high antiquity, which has passed through a variety of copies, both ancient and modern, both written and printed, copies which differ from each other in very numerous instances, we should have some reason to believe, that the copy or edition, which we undertake to interpret, approaches as nearly to the original, as it can be brought by human industry, or human judgment. Or, to speak in the technical language of criticism, before we expound an author, we should procure the most correct text of that author. But in a work of such importance as the Bible, we should confide in the bare assertion of no man, with respect to the question, in what copy or edition either the Greek or the Hebrew text is contained most correctly. We should endeavour to obtain sufficient information on this subject, to enable us to judge for ourselves: and the information, which is necessary for this purpose, may be obtained, even before we are acquainted with any other branch of Theology. For when a passage is differently worded in different copies, or, to speak in technical terms, when it has various readings, the question, which of those readings is probably the original or genuine reading, must be determined by authorities, and by rules, similar to those, which are applied to classic authors. The study of sacred criticism therefore, as far as it relates to the obtaining of a correct text, *may* precede the study of every other branch: but, if it *may*, there are obvious reasons, why it *should*. And, if that department of it, which relates to the genuineness of whole books, belongs on one

account to a later period of theological study, it may still on another account be referred even to the first. Though the application or the practice of it requires the assistance of another branch, yet a knowledge of its principles may be previously obtained. Now the study of sacred criticism produces an habit of accurate investigation, which will be highly beneficial to us in our future theological inquiries. Its influence also is such, that it pervades every other part of Theology: and, as our notions in this part are clear or obscure, our conclusions in other parts will be distinct or confused. In short, it is a branch, which affords nutriment and life to all the other branches, which must become more or less vigorous, in proportion as this branch either flourishes or decays. To Sacred Criticism then the foremost rank is due.

The reproaches, which have been made, and the dangers, which have been ascribed to it, proceed only from the want of knowing its real value. It is not the object of sacred criticism to expose the Word of God to the uncertainties of human conjecture: its object is not to weaken, and much less to destroy the edifice, which for ages has been the subject of just veneration. Its primary object is to shew the firmness of that foundation, on which the sacred edifice is built, to prove the genuineness of the materials, of which the edifice is constructed. It is employed in the confutation of objections, which, if made by ignorance, can be removed only by knowledge. On the other hand, if in the progress of inquiry excrescences should be discovered, which violate the symmetry of the original

fabric, which betray a mixture of the human with the divine, of interpolations, which the authority or artifice of man has engrafted on the oracles of God, it is the duty of sacred criticism to detect the spurious, and remove it from the genuine. For it is not less blameable to accept what is false, than to reject what is true : it is not less inconsistent with the principles of religion to ascribe the authority of Scripture to that which is *not* Scripture, than to refuse our acknowledgment, where such authority exists. Nor should we forget, that, if we resolve at all events to retain what has no authority to support it, we remove at once the criterion, which distinguishes truth from falsehood, we involve the spurious and the genuine in the same fate, and thus deprive ourselves of the power of ever ascertaining what is the real text of the sacred writings.

But so far is sacred criticism from exposing the word of God to the uncertainties of conjecture, that there is no principle more firmly resisted in sacred criticism than the admission of conjectural emendation, of emendation not founded on documents. In the application of criticism to classic authors, conjectural emendations are allowable. *There* such liberties can do no harm either to the critic, or to his readers : they affect no truth, either religious or moral. But the case is widely different, when conjectural emendation is applied to the *sacred* writings. It then ceases to be merely an exercise of ingenuity : it becomes a vehicle for the propagation of religious opinion : and passages have been altered, in defiance of all authority, for the sole purpose of procuring support to a partic-

ular creed. It is true, that we have many at least ingenious conjectures on the Greek Testament, which come not within this description. But even such conjectures should never be received in the text. If one kind were admitted, it might be difficult to exclude another, since the line of discrimination is not always apparent. Thus the Bible would cease to be a common standard; it would assume as many forms, as there are Christian parties. Now that edition of the Greek Testament, which above all others deserves the name of a critical edition, is founded on this avowed principle, *Nil mutetur e conjectura*.

I have been more diffuse on this subject, than the present Lecture would otherwise require, lest any one should have imbibed a prejudice against that branch of Theology, to which I have assigned the foremost rank.

Having thus properly prepared ourselves for the study of the Bible, and having procured the best critical editions of it, we may then proceed to its exposition, or interpretation. For this purpose we must obtain a knowledge of various subjects, which have reference either to the Old or to the New Testament. We must study what may be comprised under the general name of Jewish Antiquities: nor must we neglect to obtain similar information in regard to other nations, who are recorded in the Bible, whether it relate to their civil, or to their religious establishments. The state of literature, the peculiar modes of thinking, the influence of false philosophy, either on the Jews, or on their neighbours, are likewise subjects, which demand

our attention. A knowledge of history, as far as it regards the Bible, is also necessary, not merely to elucidate the historical, but to explain the prophetic parts. And, in aid of history, it is further necessary that we should understand biblical chronology, and biblical geography. On all these subjects we are so well provided with information, through the industry of our predecessors, in works hereafter to be mentioned, that a knowledge of these subjects is more easily attainable, than the apparent extent of them might induce us to suppose.

But the qualification, next to be mentioned, as necessary for a good interpreter of the Bible is not of so easy attainment, namely, the knowledge of some fixed rule or principle, by which we may direct our judgments, amid the discordant interpretations of biblical commentators. That all men should agree in adopting one rule of interpretation, is no more to be expected, than that all men should agree in one religious creed. The very first principle of interpretation, namely that the real meaning of a passage is its literal or grammatical meaning, that, as the writer himself intended to apply it, so and no otherwise the reader must take it, this principle, from which no expounder of any other work would knowingly depart, is expressly rejected by many commentators on the Bible, not only among the Jews, who set the example in their Targums, but also among Christians, who have followed that example in their comments and paraphrases. It would be foreign to the present Lecture to discuss the question, whether it is allowable in our interpretation

of the Bible, to depart in some cases from the principle, just mentioned. But if it be allowable, this departure must be made at least with consistency; it must not be made, till the divine authority of the Bible is already established, for on that ground only can we defend the adoption of other rules.

Now we must learn to understand the Bible, before we can judge of its pretensions to divine authority. But if, while we are ascertaining the justice of these pretensions, we apply rules of interpretation, which, if applicable at all, can be applicable only, when those pretensions are confirmed, we are continually moving in a circle, and never find an end. It is not sufficient, that a proposition be true, to warrant our arguing from the truth of it: we must not only know it to be true, but we must be able to prove it independently of the proposition, to which we apply it. If in geometry the proposition, that the square of the hypotenuse equals the squares of the sides, would, though indisputably true, be thought absurdly applied to demonstrate the properties of parallel lines, because these properties must be established before that proposition can be proved, shall we argue less logically in our religious inquiries, shall we think it allowable, where our eternal welfare is concerned, to proceed less rigidly in our researches, than in cases of temporal moment, or in matters of mere speculation? If it be true then (what no one will deny), that internal evidence is necessary to establish the divine authority of the Bible, if that internal evidence is nothing more, than the application of its contents to a particular ob-

ject, and this application requires, that those contents should be understood, it is manifest, that we must learn to interpret them, at least in the first instance, by the rules, which are applied to the interpretation of other works. Even if we admit that every word, as well as every thought, was inspired, yet as the object of revelation is not to perplex but to enlighten, we must still conclude, that the words, which are used in Scripture, are there used in the acceptance, which was common in the intercourse between man and man.

When by the means above-mentioned we have acquired due information in respect to any portion of Scripture, for instance, the Five books of Moses, or the Four Gospels, we are then qualified, if not to investigate for ourselves, at least to study the investigations, which have been made by others, in respect to the authenticity of those books, that is, whether they were written by the authors, to whom they are ascribed. This is the plain question, which we must ask before we go further, Did such a person write such a book, or did he not? It is a mere historical question, which must be determined, partly by external, and partly by internal evidence. But great confusion has taken place on this subject, by intermixing matter, with which it has no necessary connexion. When the fact, that the first of our four Gospels, for instance, was written by St. Matthew, has been once established by historical and critical arguments, (which historical and critical arguments must be applied precisely as we would apply them to a profane author) it will

follow of itself, that the Gospel was inspired, when we come to the subject of inspiration, and shew, that the author, whose work we have already proved it to be, had received the promise of the Holy Spirit. But if we investigate the two subjects at the same time, if we intermix the question of inspiration with the question of authenticity, we shall probably establish neither. In fact, the two questions are so distinct, that we cannot even begin with the one, till we have ended with the other. Before the point has been ascertained, whether this Gospel was written by St. Matthew, or by an impostor in his name, there is no ground even for asking, whether it was written by inspiration; for in the latter case it would not be Scripture. It is obvious therefore, that in our inquiries into the authenticity of the sacred writings, the subject of inspiration must be left for future discussion.

When we have established the authenticity of the sacred writings, that is, when we have established the historical fact, that they were written by the authors, to whom they are ascribed, the next point to be ascertained is, the credit due to their accounts. And here we must be careful to guard against a *petitio principii*, to which very many writers on this subject have exposed themselves. If we assert, that the narratives, for instance, in the New Testament are therefore entitled to credit, because the writers were prevented by divine assistance from falling into material error, we assert indeed what is true; but it is a truth, which we can no more apply in the present stage of our inquiry, than we can apply the last propo-

sition of a book of Euclid to the demonstration of the first. For what other arguments can we produce, to shew that those writers *had* such assistance, than arguments deduced from the writings themselves? And does not this argumentation imply, that the *truth* of those writings is already established? It must be established therefore without an appeal to inspiration, or it cannot be established at all. For as long as this truth remains unestablished, so long must inspiration remain unproved. The credibility therefore of the sacred writers must be estimated, in the first instance, as we would estimate the credibility of other writers. We must build on their testimony as human evidence, before we can obtain the privilege of appealing to them as divine.

The branches of Theology, which have been hitherto described, are those, which require the same kind of treatment, as we apply to the investigation of ancient writings in general. We now come to a more important part of our duty, on which we shall be qualified to enter, (and then only,) when we have obtained a competent knowledge of the preceding branches. When the authenticity and credibility of the Bible have been established in the manner, and by the steps above-mentioned, we are then enabled to collect evidence for the divine origin of our religion. When a prophecy, so descriptive of a particular event as to warrant the belief, that this event was meant to be described, when such a prophecy is recorded in a book, which we have proved to have been written some centuries before the event, we have the strong-

est evidence, that the person, who delivered the prophecy, was endowed with more than human wisdom. Or, if a miracle, ascribed to a particular person, is recorded in a book, which we have already proved to be worthy of credit, we have again the strongest evidence, that the person, to whom the miracle is ascribed, was endowed with more than human power. If then such persons deliver doctrines, which from their internal excellence are *worthy* of being communicated from God to man, we may argue to the *reality* of such communications, and regard the prophecies and miracles, as credentials of a divine commission. Thenceforward we may view the Bible, as a work containing the commands of God : thenceforward we may treat it as the fountain of religious faith.

Such are the steps, by which we must gradually advance toward the evidence for the divine origin of our religion.

From evidences we might proceed immediately to doctrines. But as this interval is the proper place for examining the subject of inspiration, we must assign this place to it in our plan of study. The arguments, which are used for divine inspiration are all founded on the previous supposition that the Bible is *true* : for we appeal to the contents of the Bible in proof of inspiration. Consequently those arguments can have no force till the authenticity and credibility of the Bible have been already established. Nor is the establishment even of these points sufficient for our purpose. We must likewise have established

the divine origin of our religion, before we can prove inspiration. For nothing but either *divine* testimony, or fulfilled prophecy can confirm it. These general observations are sufficient to shew how far we must have advanced in our study of Theology, before we are qualified to enter upon this branch of it.

The next branch of Theology relates to Doctrines. When we have learnt to interpret the Bible, and have gone through the evidences for our religion, we are qualified to study its doctrines. Our knowledge of the former will enable us to judge, whether doctrines are warranted or not warranted by Scripture: and if they are, our knowledge of the latter will enable us to perceive the force of their obligation, and convince us, that it is our interest, as well as our duty, to adopt them.

As the creeds, which have been professed in different ages, and by Christians of different denominations, are not only various, but sometimes contradictory, yet all agree in claiming the Bible for their support, their respective claims must be examined with all the attention, which is due to so important a subject. But as those claims require, each of them, a separate examination, and therefore some one religious creed must be the first object of consideration, there cannot be a doubt in regard to the question, where it is *our* duty to begin. When we have obtained a knowledge, and have learnt the value, of our own system, we may undertake to compare it with others, and again examine those points, in which one or more of them shall be found to differ from it.

Lastly, when we have thus acquired a knowledge both of the doctrines themselves, and of the foundations, on which they are built, we shall find it as useful, as it is entertaining, to trace the progress of religious opinion through the different ages of the Christian world. And, as this progress of religious opinion cannot easily be traced, nor satisfactorily explained, without knowing likewise the external causes, which operated in promoting the adoption of them, we must sum up our theological studies with the study of ecclesiastical history.

Let us now recapitulate the branches of Theology, thus formed and arranged according to the principle laid down at the beginning of the Lecture.

1. The first branch relates to the Criticism of the Bible.
2. The second to the Interpretation of the Bible.
3. The third to the Authenticity and Credibility of the Bible.
4. The fourth to the Divine Authority of the Bible, or the Evidences for the Divine Origin of the religions recorded in it.
5. The fifth branch relates to the Inspiration of the Bible.
6. The sixth to the Doctrines of the Bible, which branch is subdivided into
 - (a) Doctrines deduced by the Church of England.
 - (b) Doctrines deduced by other Churches.
7. The seventh and last branch relates to Ecclesiastical History.

Having thus given a general description of the several branches of Theology, and having arranged them in such a manner, that a knowledge of the one may lead to a knowledge of the other, I shall proceed in the next and following Lectures to give a more minute description of them, as they successively come under particular review.

17/11
17/21

LECTURE III.

THE principle on which the proposed arrangement was made, and the reasons for the position of each branch, were so fully detailed in the preceding Lecture, that it cannot be necessary to give any further explanation. I will only therefore observe in general terms, that they are placed in such a manner as gradually to lead toward the establishment, the firm establishment, of Christianity.

But in order to obtain both a firm conviction, and a clear perception of the Christian doctrines, we must be content to travel through the paths of Theology, without departing from the road, which lies before us. We must not imagine, that any particular branch may be selected at pleasure, as it may happen to excite in us a greater degree either of interest or of curiosity; for if this were allowable, where would be the utility of theological *order*? We must study the Criticism of the Bible, before we can be qualified, at least before we can be *well* qualified, to study the Interpretation of the Bible. And we must obtain a knowledge of the Bible, before we can even judge of the argu-

ments, which are alleged for its Authenticity and Credibility. But till these points have been established, we have established nothing in a religious view : and consequently if we undertake the latter branches of Theology, before we have gone through the former, we shall not only build the doctrines of Christianity, but Christianity itself on a foundation of sand. In short, whoever undertakes to study Theology without preparing himself for the latter branches by a knowledge of the former, undertakes as desperate a task, as a student in mathematics, who should venture upon Newton's Principia, before he had learnt, *either* the properties of Conic Sections, or even the Elements of Plain Geometry.

I am well aware, that a numerous sect of Christians in this country have a much more easy and expeditious mode of studying Divinity. No literary apparatus is there necessary, either for the interpretation of the Bible, the establishment of its truth, or the elucidation of its doctrines. Inward sensation supplies the place of outward argument ; divine communication supersedes theological learning. But as I am not able to *teach* Divinity in any other way than I have been able to *learn* it, as my own conviction of the truth of Christianity is the result, not of sudden impulse, but of long and laborious investigation, as I have no other knowledge of its doctrines, than that which is founded on the Bible, interpreted by *human* learning, my hearers must be satisfied, if they continue their attendance, to follow with patience and perseverance in all the portions of Theology, through which it is proposed to lead them.

As a reason for recommending so laborious a pursuit, which perhaps to many persons will appear unnecessary, it may be observed, that the object of these Lectures is to form a theologian, who shall be thoroughly acquainted with his ground from the commencement to the close of his theological career, who, in the interpretation of the Bible, shall never refer to a fact in the criticism of the Bible, with which he is not previously acquainted, nor be compelled, when he is searching the doctrines of the Bible, to adopt a rule of interpretation, without perceiving the foundation, on which it rests.

To those especially, who seek for conviction in certain inward feelings, which the warmth of their imaginations represents to them as divine, I would recommend the serious consideration of this important fact, that the foundation, which *they* lay for the Bible, is no other, than what the Mahometan is accustomed to lay for the Koran. If you ask a Mahometan, why he ascribes divine authority to the Koran, his answer is, Because, when I read it, sensations are excited, which could not have been produced by any work, that came not from God. But do we therefore give credit to the Mahometan for this appeal? Do we not immediately perceive, when the *Mahometan* thus argues from inward sensation, that he is merely raising a phantom of his own imagination? And ought not this example, when we hear a similar appeal from a Christian teacher, to make us at least distrustful, not indeed with respect to Christianity itself, but with respect to *his* mode of proving it? He may

answer indeed, and answer with truth, that his sensations are produced by a work, which is *really* divine, while the sensations excited in the Mahometan, are produced by a work, which is only *thought* so. But this very truth will involve the person, who thus uses it, in a glaring absurdity. In the first place he appeals to a criterion, which puts the Bible on a level with the Koran : and then to obviate this objection, he endeavours to shew the superiority of his own appeal, by *presupposing* the fact, which he had undertaken to *prove*. Let us leave then to the enthusiast these imaginary demonstrations, while we are seeking for proofs, which will bear the test of inquiry, and satisfy the demands of reason. Such proofs there are. But they are attainable only by him, who will resolve to enter on those paths of knowledge, which alone can conduct him to the place, where Christianity is confirmed.

As the Criticism of the Bible is the *first* object of our study, and as without it no man can become a sound divine, it must not only be described before all other branches, but must be described at considerable length. Nor can it be necessary to apologize to this audience for being diffuse on such a subject. If the critical inquiries into the poems of Homer, which have been lately instituted by Wolf and Heyne, are justly read with avidity by every real scholar, surely the same scholar, when he transfers his attention to the Bible, cannot listen with indifference to a recital of whatever has been attempted to place its criticism on a firm foundation.

But before we proceed to this recital, it is necessary, according to the plan prescribed in the first Lecture, to give some account of those very useful works, which are known by the name of Introductions to the Bible. These Introductions will furnish the theological student with such *general* information on the subjects of criticism and interpretation, as will be highly useful to him, before he undertakes these branches in detail. The works, which relate to *special* objects of criticism, will be mentioned hereafter, in their proper places.

Among the introductory works, which we are now to consider, there are some, which have particular reference to the *languages* of the Sacred Writings. Of this description is Hottinger's *Thesaurus Philologicus*. In this work Hottinger, who was Professor at Zurich in Switzerland, about the middle of the seventeenth century, treats of the Targums or Jewish Paraphrases, of the Masora or Jewish Criticism, and other branches of Jewish literature, with the view of illustrating the Hebrew Bible. Works of similar tendency are the *Philologus Hebræus*, and the *Philologus Hebræo-mixtus* of Leusden, who was Professor at Utrecht in the latter half of the seventeenth century. Leusden wrote likewise a similar introduction to the Greek Testament, entitled *Philologus Hebræo-græcus*.

Other introductions to the Sacred Writings contain information explanatory of their contents, without entering so particularly into the language, in which they were written. Of this description is the *Opus Analyticum* of Van Til, who was Professor at Ley-

den, at the beginning of the last century. This work, which is the substance of Van Til's lectures, and to which Heidegger's *Enchiridion Biblicum* served as a syllabus, contains an introduction to the several books, both of the Old and New Testament, relative to the authors of them, to the times when, and the places where they were written, and to their general contents.

Of greater value are the Introductions of Carpzovius and Pritius, the one to the Old, the other to the New Testament. Carpzovius, or, as he was called in his own country, Carpzov, was Professor at Leipzig in the former part of the last century, and published, in the year 1721, the first edition of his *Introductio ad Libros Canonicos Bibliorum Veteris Testamenti*, which was reprinted in 1731, and again in 1741. Carpzov was a man of profound erudition, and indefatigable industry. His work contains the principal materials, which have been afforded by his predecessors, perspicuously arranged, and augmented by his own valuable observations. It is also partly employed in the confutation of Hobbes, Spinoza, Toland, and other antiscriturists.—The service, which Carpzov rendered to the Old Testament, was rendered by Pritius to the New Testament, who in 1704 published at Leipzig, his *Introductio ad Lectionem Novi Testamenti*, which went through several editions with notes and additions by Kapp and Hofmann. Hofmann's edition was printed at Leipzig in 1737, and reprinted in 1764. Its improvements on the original edition are so considerable, that whoever purchases

the Introduction of Pritius (and it deserves to be purchased by every student in Divinity) must be careful in regard to the date of the title-page.

With respect to French writers of Introductions to the Bible, we may mention in the first place Du Pin's Preliminary Dissertation, or Prolegomena to the Bible, which was prefixed to his work, called The Library of Ecclesiastical Authors, and was reprinted both at Paris and at Amsterdam in 1701, with considerable additions, in two quarto volumes. It explains various subjects relative both to the Old and to the New Testament; and is a very useful work, notwithstanding the severity, with which it was treated by Richard Simon.

The *Apparatus Biblicus* written by Lamy, a priest of the Oratory, published first in Latin, then in French, and translated into English in 1723, contains likewise much useful introductory information, particularly in respect to Jewish Antiquities.

More extensive and more profound are Calmet's Dissertations, in the form of Prolegomena to the Sacred Writings. Calmet, a very learned Benedictine at the beginning of the last century, first published these dissertations in his Commentary on the Bible, where they were severally prefixed to the books, to which they were intended as introductions. They were afterwards collected into one work by Calmet himself, and published with considerable additions, in three quarto volumes, at Paris in 1720. This work, I believe, has likewise been translated into English: but as I have never seen the translation, I can give no account of it.

L'Enfant, a French Clergyman of the Reformed Church, who, in conjunction with Beausobre, translated the New Testament into French, which was first published at Amsterdam in 1718, wrote a Preface to the translation, which makes a good historical introduction to the New Testament. Of this Preface there has been published an English translation, which some years ago was reprinted at Cambridge.

Nor have our own countrymen, especially within the last sixty years, been deficient in writing Introductions to the Bible. One of our earliest publications of this kind is Collier's Sacred Interpreter. The author of this work, who must be distinguished from the author of the Ecclesiastical History, lived in the former part of the last century. It not only went through several editions in England, but in 1750 was translated into German. It is printed in two octavo volumes, and relates both to the Old and to the New Testament. It is calculated for readers in general, and is a good popular preparation for the study of the Holy Scriptures. The last edition was printed in 1796.

Lardner's History of the Apostles and Evangelists, which was first printed in three volumes in 1756 and 1757, but makes the sixth volume of Kippis's edition of Lardner's works, is an admirable Introduction to the New Testament. It is a storehouse of literary information collected with equal industry and fidelity.

In 1761 the first edition of Michaelis's Introduction, which had been published in Germany in 1750,

was translated into English : and three years afterwards Dr. Owen published his *Observations on the Four Gospels*.—From the three last mentioned works, Dr. Percy, the present Bishop of Dromore, compiled that very useful manual called *A Key to the New Testament*, which has gone through many editions, and is very properly purchased by most candidates for Holy Orders.

In imitation of this *Key to the New Testament*, as the author himself says in his Preface, Mr. (now Dr.) Gray, formerly of St. Mary Hall in Oxford, published in 1790, *A Key to the Old Testament and Apocrypha*. But it is a much more elaborate performance, than the *Key to the New Testament*. It is a compilation from a great variety of authors, whose writings are generally quoted : and, as the materials are methodically arranged, it furnishes at one view what must otherwise be collected from many writers. But the author seems to have been unacquainted with some of the most valuable foreign writers. Not even Carpzov is noticed, whose *Introduction to the Old Testament* contains a treasure of biblical learning, though it had been then published above half a century, and being written in Latin was accessible to every scholar. Nor does the author appear to have been very conversant with that department of sacred criticism, which relates to the manuscripts of the Bible, or he would not have supposed, in a note toward the end of his work, that the celebrated *Codex Alexandrinus* was at present in any other place, than the British Museum. But, notwithstanding these defects

it is on the whole a valuable publication. A later edition, I believe, was published in 1803: but I cannot say in what respects it differs from the former.

Dr. Harwood's Introduction to the Study and Knowledge of the New Testament, of which the first volume was published in 1767, the second in 1771, I mention at present more on account of its title, than on account of its contents. Though entitled an Introduction to the New Testament, it is not so in the sense, in which the abovementioned works are Introductions. It does not describe the several books of the New Testament, but contains a collection of dissertations, relative partly to the characters of the Sacred Writers, partly to the Jewish history and customs, and to such parts of heathen antiquities, as have reference to the New Testament. But, as these dissertations display great erudition, and contain much information illustrative of the New Testament, Dr. Harwood's Introduction is certainly to be recommended to the theological student.

The last English publication, containing an introduction to the Sacred Writings, is the present Bishop of Lincoln's Elements of Christian Theology, the first volume of which contains an Introduction both to the Old and to the New Testament, and has been since published for that purpose in a separate volume. Having already in another place delivered my opinion on this work, I will here repeat it in the same words: "It is the result of extensive reading; the materials of it are judiciously arranged; the reasonings in it are clear and solid; it is well adapted to the purpose,

for which it was intended, as a manual for students in Divinity, and it may be read with advantage by the most experienced divine."

I now come to a class of introductory writers, who have particularly distinguished themselves by their profound *critical* researches. The author, who took the lead in this branch of learning, was Richard Simon, a priest of the congregation of the Oratory at Paris. In 1678 he published his *Critical History of the Old Testament*, which was reprinted in 1685 with considerable additions. It consists of three parts, the first containing a *Critical History of the Hebrew Text*, the second a *Critical History of the Translations*, the third a *Critical History of the Interpretation of the Old Testament*. In 1684 he published his *Critical History of the Text of the New Testament*, which corresponds to the first part of the former work : and in correspondence with the second and third parts of that work, he published, in 1690, his *Critical History of the Versions of the New Testament*, and in 1693 his *Critical History of the principal Commentators on the New Testament*. Lastly, in 1695 he published his *New Observations on the Text and Versions of the New Testament*. The criticism of the Bible being at that time less understood, than at present, the researches, which were instituted by Simon, soon involved him in controversy, as well with Protestant as with Catholic writers, particularly with the latter, to whom he gave great offence by the preference which he shewed to the Hebrew and Greek texts of the Bible above that, which is regarded as the oracle of the

Church of Rome, the Latin Vulgate. Though I would not be answerable for every opinion advanced by Simôn, I may venture to assert, that it contains very valuable information in regard to the criticism, both of the Hebrew Bible, and of the Greek Testament.

The same critical acumen, which Simon displayed in France, has been since displayed by Michaelis and Eichhorn in Germany ; by the former in his Introduction to the New, by the latter in his Introduction to the Old Testament. Both of these Introductions are formed on the same plan : they are each divided into two parts, the one containing a critical apparatus necessary for the understanding of the original, the other an introduction to every single book. It is that critical apparatus, which distinguishes these Introductions from all other Introductions, either to the Old, or to the New Testament. But the Introduction of Michaelis is too well known in this place, to require a particular description : and were it otherwise, the translator, whose notes are closely connected with the text of the author, is not qualified to make a due estimate of the publication.* Nor can it be necessary to say any thing more at present of Eichhorn's Introduction, which has never been translated,

* As the *first* edition of Michaelis's Introduction, which was published in Germany in 1750, and translated into English in 1761, still appears in catalogues of books, it is necessary to warn the reader of the material difference between *that* edition, and the *fourth* edition published in 1788, which was translated by the Author of these Lectures. To say nothing of the notes and additions by the translator, the *fourth* edition in the original consists of two quartos, the *first* of a single octavo.

and from the difficulties both of the language and of the subjects, cannot be understood by many English readers.

After this account of the principal Introductions, we may undertake a *particular* examination of Sacred Criticism, and proceed, agreeably to the plan prescribed in the first Lecture, to a review of what has been done in different ages, with respect to this primary branch of Theology.

It will appear perhaps to those, who are less conversant with the subject, that a recital of this kind should rather be a sequel, than a preface, to the study of criticism. Now this observation would certainly apply to science properly so called: and no one who was not a mathematician, for instance, should undertake to read such a work, as Montucla's History of Mathematics. But the principles and the history of sacred criticism bear to each other a very different relation, from that of the principles and the history of mathematics. In the latter, a knowledge of principles is necessary to understand the history: in the former, the history is necessary to understand the principles. Sacred criticism has for its object an aggregate of literary labours, undertaken at different periods, and for different purposes; and its *principles* are general *conclusions* deduced from those literary labours. Consequently, though we may *comprehend* the laws of criticism without a previous knowledge of what has been done in this branch of Theology, yet without this previous knowledge we shall never comprehend the *reason* or *foundation* of those laws. On

the other hand, a knowledge of those laws is not necessary for the understanding of the plain facts, which a history of criticism has to record. A review therefore of the progress, which has been made in this branch of Theology, even from the earliest to the present age, may be given in such a manner, as to be intelligible to every man of liberal education. And the advantages arising from such a review are obvious, not only because it will enable us to judge of the rules, which modern critics have adopted, but because we shall thus become acquainted with the several stages, through which the criticism of the Bible has passed, and with the means, by which it has acquired its present form. We shall perceive how the general stock of knowledge has gradually increased, to whom we are indebted for each augmentation, with what rapidity or slowness these augmentations accumulated, what causes accelerated or retarded, what influence gave to each of them its peculiar direction. That these things are worthy of notice, will surely be allowed by all men, to whom literature is an object of regard. Let us proceed then to the intended review.

The first writer, who appears to have paid attention to the Criticism of the Bible, is the celebrated Origen, who was born in Egypt toward the end of the second century; and died at Tyre soon after the middle of the third century. His criticism was directed to the emendation of the Septuagint, a Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible, made at Alexandria in the time of the Ptolemies, for the benefit of the Greek Jews, who were established there, and which derived

its name from the now-exploded story of seventy or seventy-two translators being employed for that purpose. Origen himself relates in his Commentary on St. Matthew, that in the manuscripts of the Septuagint, which was become the Bible of the Greek Christians, such alterations had been made, either by design, or through the carelessness of transcribers, as to make the manuscripts materially differ from each other, and of course, even if no other cause prevailed, from the Hebrew Bible. Of this difference the Jews availed themselves in their controversies with the Christians, who, with a very few exceptions, were ignorant of Hebrew, while the Jews, especially since the establishment of the school at Tiberias in Galilee, had begun again to cultivate the original language of the Old Testament. This knowledge enabled them, in their controversies with the Christians, to detect the differences between the Hebrew and the Greek Bible: and, as it frequently happened, that the passages quoted by the Christians against the Jews, were either not contained at all in the Hebrew, or contained there in a different shape, the arguments, which were founded on such quotations, fell immediately to the ground. It was sufficient to reply, “the words, which you quote, are not in the original.” It is true, that an *original* may be corrupted as well as a *translation*: and that the Jews were guilty of such corruptions, has been asserted both in ancient and in modern times. But when we consider the rules, which were observed by the Jews in transcribing the sacred writings, rules which were carried to an accuracy that bordered

on superstition, there is reason to believe, that no work of antiquity has descended to the present age so free from alteration, as the Hebrew Bible. Nor does Origen appear to have suspected, that the differences between the Hebrew and the Greek arose from any other cause, than alterations in the latter.

He made therefore the Hebrew text the basis of those corrections, which he proposed to introduce in the Septuagint. For this purpose he formed a kind of Polyglot: and, as this was not only a work of immense labour, but has served as a model, even to the signs or marks of criticism, for later editors, it may not be improper to give a detailed account of it.

It contained the whole of the Old Testament, divided into columns, like our modern Polyglot Bibles. The first column was occupied by the Hebrew. But, as very few of those persons, to whose immediate benefit his labours were directed, were acquainted even with the letters of that language, he added, in a second column, the Hebrew words in Greek letters, that his readers might have at least some notion of the form and sound of the Hebrew words. To express their meaning, he added, in a third column, a Greek translation from the Hebrew, which had been lately made by a Jew, of the name of Aquila, and which adheres so closely to the original, as frequently to violate the common rules of Greek construction. The fourth column was occupied by another Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible, likewise lately made, but probably after the translation of Aquila. The author of this second Greek translation was Symmachus, whose ob-

ject was to give, not so much a *literal* translation of the Hebrew, as a translation expressive of the sense, and free as possible from Hebraisms.

Having thus prepared the way for his proposed emendation of the Septuagint, Origen placed in the fifth column the amended text of the Septuagint; and in the sixth column another Greek translation, which had been lately made by Theodotion.

In this revision of the Septuagint, the first part of Origen's labour was to collate it throughout with the Hebrew; and wherever he found any word or words in the former, to which there was nothing correspondent in the latter, such word or words he did not expunge from the Septuagint, but he inclosed them within certain marks expressive of their absence from the Hebrew, namely with an obelus, or mark of *minus* prefixed, and a crotchet at the end to express how far the obelus or mark of *minus* was meant to extend. On the other hand, where the Hebrew had any word or words, to which there was nothing correspondent in the Septuagint, there he inserted such word or words, as were necessary to supply the deficiency. And, that the reader might always know where such insertions were made, he prefixed to them an asterisk, or mark of *plus*, again denoting by a crotchet at the end, what words the asterisk was meant to include. And, as the version of Theodotion held a middle rank between the closeness of Aquila and the freedom of Symmachus, the additions in question were chiefly made in the words which were used by Theodotion. For this preference there was also

another reason, namely, that the style of Theodotion more nearly resembled the style of the Septuagint, than either of the other translations, and therefore was better adapted to the purpose, to which Origen applied it. Hence also the translation of Theodotion very properly occupied the column adjacent to the corrected version of the Septuagint. In some instances, either where Theodotion's translation was defective, or for other reasons at present unknown, Origen used the words of Aquila or Symmachus. But in all cases he expressed by the initials A, Θ, Σ, the translations from which he copied. These were the sources, from which Origen drew in every part of the Old Testament. But in some books he used two other Greek translations, of which the authors are unknown: and in certain passages even a seventh Greek version, of which the author is likewise unknown.

The name, which is commonly given to this work of Origen, is *Biblia Hexapla*, or Bible in six columns, which it contained throughout, namely, the Hebrew, the Hebrew in Greek characters, the version of Aquila, the version of Symmachus, the Septuagint version, and that of Theodotion. In those books, which contained likewise two anonymous versions, and filled therefore eight columns, it was called *Biblia Octapla*: and in the passages, where the third anonymous version occupied a ninth column, it received the name of *Enneapla*. On the other hand, as out of the six columns, which went through the whole work, only four were occupied with Greek translations, the same work,

which most writers call Hexapla, has by others been denominated Tetrapla. They are only different names of the same work, viewed in different lights, though some authors have fallen into the mistake of supposing, from the difference in the names, that they denoted different works.

The labour, which was necessary for a work of such magnitude, can be estimated only by those, who have been engaged in similar undertakings. Eight and twenty years are said to have been employed in making preparations for it, independently of the time, which was employed in the writing of it. It was begun at Cæsarea, and probably finished at Tyre. The text of the Septuagint, as settled by Origen, is called the Hexaplarian text, to distinguish it from the text of the Septuagint, as it existed before the time of Origen, which is therefore called the Ante-hexaplarian.

On the *value* of the Hexapla modern critics are divided; and it has been considered by some very recent writers, rather as a mechanical, than as a critical undertaking. It is true, that great as the labour was, much was still wanting to make it a perfect work. It does not appear, that Origen at all collated manuscripts of the Hebrew Bible: and, though he compared different manuscripts of the Septuagint, without which he could not have known the variations, of which he speaks, it does not appear, that he applied those collations to the purpose of correcting the text. A comparison between his own copy of the Hebrew Bible and his own copy of the Septuagint seems alone to have determined the places, in which he deemed it

necessary to introduce corrections. It was his design, to render the Bible of the Christians in all respects the same with the Bible of the Jews, that in future controversies there might be a common standard, to which both parties might appeal. And if in the execution of this work, the rules, which modern critics have learnt from longer experience, are not discernible, it must be remembered that this was the first effort, which was ever made to amend a corrupted text, either of the Old or of the New Testament.

The work, in its entire state, has long ceased to exist; and we are indebted, for our knowledge of it, to Eusebius and Jerom, both of whom had seen it in the library of Cæsarea, whither the original itself was removed from Tyre, where Origen died, by Pamphilus, the founder of the Cæsarean library. But as the magnitude of the work was such, that it could not be transcribed without an heavy expense, no copy, as far as we know, was ever taken of the whole: and the original perished in the flames, which consumed the library of Cæsarea on the irruption of the Saracens.

But that column of the Hexapla, which contained the corrected text of the Septuagint, with its critical marks, was transcribed by Eusebius and Pamphilus with occasional extracts from the other versions. If we had this column entire, it might make some reparation for the loss of the rest; but even this column has descended to us only in fragments, which have been collected by the industry of the learned, particularly of Montfaucon, the author of the *Palæographia Græca*, who published them at Paris, in 1714, in two

91. Lect 12.
12105-

folio volumes, by the title *Hexaploram Origenis quæ supersunt*.

Such is the history of one of the most celebrated among the literary undertakings of antiquity. In the next Lecture, this review of sacred criticism, as far as it relates to the early and the middle ages, will be continued and concluded.

LECTURE IV.

IN the preceding Lecture was given some account of the labours of Origen to amend the corrupted text of the Septuagint version. At the end of the third, and at the beginning of the fourth century, similar, though less laborious tasks, being founded probably on the prior labours of Origen, were undertaken by Lucian, a Presbyter of Antioch, and by Hesychius, an Egyptian Bishop. Their *revisions*, or, as we should say of printed books, their *editions* of the Septuagint, were held in such high estimation, that the edition of Hesychius was generally adopted by the churches of Egypt, and that of Lucian was commanded by Constantine the Great to be read in all the churches from Antioch to Constantinople.

Nor was the criticism of the Hebrew Original neglected in those ages. Tiberias in Galilee was then the seat of Jewish learning: it was the residence of the best Hebrew scholars, the repository of the best Hebrew manuscripts. The two great works of Jewish literature are the Talmud, and the Masora. The commencement of the Talmud may be dated from the third century: but, as it chiefly relates to doc-

trines, a description of it would be foreign to the present Lecture. The materials of Jewish criticism are contained in the Masora, which received its title from the mode of forming it, the primary parts of it being a collection of literary notices, which had been preserved by tradition, not indeed from the time of Moses, as some of the Jews pretend, nor even from the time of Ezra, as others assert, but probably during several centuries before they were committed to writing, or rather before they were collected into one general mass. This collection was formed at Tiberias. In what century it was begun is not positively known, but certainly not sooner than the fourth, and probably not sooner than the fifth century. It was considered in the light of a common-place book, to which new materials were continually added, till at length it became as large as the Bible itself. The subjects, of which it treated, were, the great and small divisions of the Hebrew text, the words with various readings, the letters, the vowel points, and accents. It is true, that the Masora, in addition to the materials, which it afforded for Hebrew criticism, contained such fanciful and absurd remarks, as might excite a prejudice against the whole. But we must not therefore reject the good with the bad: for we are indebted to those learned Jews, who began and continued the Masora, for the accuracy, with which the manuscripts of the Hebrew Bible have descended to the present day; an obligation, which should never be forgotten, however great in other respects might have been the prejudices of those, to whom the obligation is due.

The history of sacred criticism now conducts us into Italy, and directs our attention to the labours, which Jerom bestowed on the Latin version, at the end of the fourth, and the beginning of the fifth century.

The old Latin version was a translation from the Greek, in the Old Testament, as well as in the New, the Hebrew not being understood, except in rare instances, by the members of the Latin Church. It was probably made in the early part of the second century: at least it was quoted by Tertullian before the close of that century. But before the end of the fourth century, the alterations, either designed or accidental, which had been made by transcribers of the Latin Bible, were become as numerous, as the alterations in the Greek Bible, before it was corrected by Origen. Indeed, if we may judge from the strong expressions, which were used on this subject by Augustine, as well as by Jerom, they were even more numerous. For Augustine, in one of his epistles to Jerom, calls the Latin version “*tam varia in diversis codicibus, ut vix tolerari possit;*” and Jerom himself says, “*cum apud Latinos tot sint exemplaria, quot codices, et unusquisque, pro arbitrio suo, vel addiderit vel subtraxerit quod ei visum est.*”

It has been doubted, whether these numerous varieties arose from alterations in *one* Latin translation, or whether from the beginning there were not *several* Latin translations. A discussion of this question would employ more time, than the present Lecture can admit. But the probable result of such a discus-

sion is, that before the time of Jerom there was only *one* Latin translation of the *Old* Testament but *more* than one of the *New*, whence the variations in the Latin manuscripts of the New Testament, were augmented by the additional cause, that different translations were sometimes blended in the same copy. But whatever causes might have operated in producing the evil, both Augustine and Jerom were of opinion, that it was such, as required an immediate remedy. And as no one was so well qualified for a critical revision of the Latin version as Jerom himself, he was commissioned to undertake the task by Damasus, who then presided over the See of Rome.

In correcting the Latin version of the New Testament, he every where compared the translation with the original. In the Old Testament, as the Latin version was *there* only the translation of a translation, he compared it with that translation; for he was not commissioned to make a new translation from the Hebrew, but to correct an existing translation, which had been made from the Greek. But he determined to select, for the basis of his emendations, the most accurate text of the Septuagint, which he could procure; and a journey to Palestine afforded him an opportunity of consulting the Hexapla preserved in the Library of Cæsarea. Though his revision therefore of the Latin version, was only in the New Testament a revision according to the original, yet the emendations, which he made in the Old Testament, were founded on a copy of the Septuagint, which Origen himself had corrected from the Hebrew.

But whatever defects, or whatever excellencies might have existed in Jerom's revision of the Old Testament, only two books of it, the Psalms and the book of Job, have descended to the present age. In fact, these two books, with the Chronicles, the Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Solomon's Song, were the only parts of it, which were ever published. The manuscripts, which contained his revision of the other books of the Old Testament, were entrusted by him to some person, who either secreted or destroyed them. Of this enemy to sacred criticism, who, like certain modern writers, appears to have preferred a corrupted to a genuine text, we know nothing more than what Jerom has incidently said of him in a letter to Augustine, *Pleraque prioris laboris fraude cujusdam amisimus*.

The loss sustained by this treachery served only to stimulate Jerom to fresh exertions. He determined no longer to revise an old translation from the Greek, but to make a new translation from the Hebrew. And this translation from the Hebrew he finished in the year 405.

But nearly two hundred years elapsed before this translation received the sanction of the church. The contemporaries of Jerom regarded a translation from the Hebrew, as a dangerous innovation: for, strange as it may appear, the Septuagint version was more respected in the Latin church, than the Hebrew original. At that time, the now-exploded story of seventy-two interpreters, all translating by divine inspiration, all translating independently, yet each of them

producing the same translation, was firmly believed, in the Latin as well as in the Greek church. And this belief, united with a hatred of the Jews, and an ignorance of Hebrew, gave to the Septuagint version an higher rank, than to the original itself. Hence Augustine, in other respects a friend and admirer of Jerom, who concurred with him in opinion, as to the state of the old version, and promoted his revisal of it from the *Greek*, yet, when Jerom undertook his translation from the *Hebrew*, inveighed bitterly against it, as if Christianity itself were affected by the undertaking. At length, however, Pope Gregory the Great, at the end of the sixth century, gave to Jerom's translation the sanction of Papal authority. From that period the old translation from the Greek was gradually abandoned for Jerom's translation from the Hebrew, except in the Psalms, where the daily repetition of them in the church service, and their being adapted to church music, made it difficult to introduce alterations.

Such is the history of the Latin Vulgate in the Old Testament. In the New Testament the Latin Vulgate is the old translation, corrected by Jerom, as already related. With respect to the Apocrypha, as contained in the Vulgate, those books are partly in the old translation, and partly in a translation made by Jerom himself. But it must not be inferred that modern manuscripts, or printed editions of the Vulgate, contain either Jerom's translations, or Jerom's corrections in the same state, in which he delivered them. Latin manuscripts were no less exposed to alteration

in the middle ages, than they were in the early ages of Christianity. Even the two editions of the Vulgate, which were printed at Rome in 1590 and 1592, both of them under Papal authority, and both of them pronounced authentic, differ materially from each other, in sense, as well as in words. But the modern state of the Latin Vulgate is a subject, which is foreign to the present Lecture; though the fact, which has been just stated, may teach us this useful lesson, that nothing but sacred criticism can preserve the Bible in its pristine purity.

We must now again direct our attention to the East, and proceed from the Latin to the Syrian church. For this church, at an early age of Christianity, a translation had been made, of the Old Testament from the Hebrew, and of the New Testament from the Greek. And this translation, which is called the *Old Syriac* version, soon became, and still remains, the established version of the Syrian church.

But there was another Syriac version of the New Testament, which has likewise descended to the present age: and it is this Syriac version which properly belongs to an history of criticism, because it was afterwards collated with Greek manuscripts. It is called the *Philoxenian* version, from Philoxenus, bishop of Hierapolis, under whose auspices it was made by Polycarp, his rural bishop. It was undertaken at the beginning of the sixth century, from motives at present unknown, though not improbably from a desire of having a translation of the New Testament, which should approach to the original even more closely,

than the old or common version. For the Philoxenian version adheres to it, even with servility. And this quality, instead of forming an objection to it, constitutes its chief value. In the translation of works, which are designed for amusement, something more must be attempted, than mere fidelity. But in works intended for divine instruction, a translation cannot be too close. And, whenever ancient versions are applied to the purposes of criticism, even a servile adherence to their original augments the value of them. An ancient version, except in places where that version has been altered, is regarded as the representative of the Hebrew or Greek manuscript, from which that version was taken; consequently, the more closely such manuscript is represented, the more accurately shall we know its readings, and hence the more precisely shall we be enabled to judge, when the authenticity of readings is disputed.

To render this close translation still more conformable with the original, it was collated with Greek manuscripts in Egypt, at the beginning of the seventh century. The person who undertook this collation was Thomas, bishop of Germanicia; and he not only corrected the Syriac text from those manuscripts, where he thought that correction was necessary, but at other times he noted their various readings in the margin. As these various readings were taken from manuscripts of the Greek Testament, which were probably much older, than the oldest now extant, they are of course important to sacred criticism. A copy of this revision or edition of the Philoxenian version,

with the Greek readings in the margin, is now in the Bodleian Library ; and it has been printed by Dr. White, the Hebrew Professor at Oxford, with short, but very useful notes.

The collation of the Philoxenian version is the last effort in sacred criticism, which was attempted in Egypt : nor does any part of Asia, since that period, present us with a similar undertaking. In six years from the date of this collation, commenced the Era, and soon afterwards the devastation, of the Arabs. The Jewish school at Tiberias, with another, which had been established at Babylon, continued, it is true, to preserve a precarious existence. It is true also, that learning revived under the Caliphs of Bagdad ; but it was not the learning of the Bible. The Christians of the East remained in subjection and ignorance ; and even the Jews were compelled at last, to abandon the schools, to which they were so long attached.

If we turn our attention from the East to the Greek empire at this period, we shall find it equally devoid of materials for our present inquiry. Indeed the criticism of the Bible does not appear to have ever taken root in Greece : and the metropolis of the Greek empire, as far as religion was concerned, seems to have been wholly engaged with the controverted points of dogmatic Theology.

If we go onward to the West of Europe, the prospect is still gloomy : for after the death of Jerom, we find no one among the Latin fathers, who could lay claim to the title of critic. Some dawnings of this science occasionally indeed broke through the general

darkness ; and the corruptions, which then were creeping into the Latin Vulgate, from the removal especially of marginal glosses into the text, were noticed by some men of superior sagacity, who at the same time endeavoured to apply a remedy for the evil. Alcuin, secretary to Charlemagne, at the beginning of the ninth century, and one of the most learned men of that age, undertook to revise the Vulgate, from the Hebrew in the Old Testament, and from the Greek in the New. Another revision of the Vulgate was undertaken at the end of the eleventh century, by Lanfrane, archbishop of Canterbury. And about fifty years afterwards a third revision was attempted in Italy by Cardinal Nicolaus, who made the same complaint of the Vulgate, which Jerom had made of the old version, "*quot codices tot exemplaria.*" At length these complaints became so general as to give rise to the *Correctoria Biblica*, in which the false readings of the Vulgate were corrected by a comparison, partly with the originals, and partly with more ancient manuscripts. But our countryman, Roger Bacon, who acknowledges the evil, and describes some of its causes, appears to have been dissatisfied with many of those corrections.

While the criticism of the middle ages, in England, France, and Italy, was confined to the Latin Vulgate, the south of Spain produced a race of critics in the Hebrew Bible, who might contend with those of any age or nation. When the learned Jews of Tiberias and Babylon were compelled to take refuge in Europe, they chiefly settled in that part of Spain,

which was inhabited by the Moors, who spake the language then become vernacular in the countries, from which the Jews were driven. Hence the south of Spain became, during the middle ages, the centre of Hebrew learning. It is sufficient to mention the names of Abn Ezra, Moses Maimonides, and David Kimchi, who were all born in Spain in the twelfth century, and laid the foundation of that Hebrew learning, which afterwards extended to Germany, and was thence propagated by the invention of printing throughout the rest of Europe.

Reuchlin, or Capnio, the father of Hebrew learning among Christians, was born at Pfortsheim in Suabia in 1454. Being a man of rank, as well as of learning, he operated not only by precept, but by example: and at the end of the fifteenth century, it became the fashion in Germany to study the Old Testament in Hebrew. For this study an opportunity was afforded by the circumstance, that the Hebrew Bible was one of the earliest printed books, the first edition having been printed in 1488, and parts of it, as the Psalms, and the Pentateuch, still earlier. The Catholic clergy at Cologne opposed indeed, to the utmost of their power, the cultivation of the Hebrew language, which they considered as replete with danger, not only to the Latin Vulgate, but to the church, of which they were members. Nor were their fears ungrounded. The revival of Grecian literature about the same period, of which Capnio was likewise one of the chief promoters, increased the dangers of the church of Rome: and Luther began his reformation before Capnio died.

The preceding review of the progress, which was made by sacred criticism, during the early and the middle ages, is sufficient to supply the student in Divinity with general notions on this subject, and to furnish him with a clue to future inquiries. More than this it is hardly possible to perform in a public lecture, in which a limit must be assigned to minuteness of investigation, or the attention of the audience would soon be exhausted. In fact, minuteness of investigation must be reserved for the closet; and all that now remains for the lecturer to perform, in respect to the critical labours of the early and the middle ages, is to mention the works, from which a more ample knowledge of those critical labours may be derived.

Of the labours of Origen in amending the text of the Septuagint, Montfaucon, the editor of the *Hexaplorum Origenis quæ supersunt*, has given a full account in the preface, entitled, *Præliminaria in Hexapla Origenis*, which is divided into eleven chapters, according to the subjects, of which it treats. Another work, which ought to be consulted, though it was published before Montfaucon's edition, is that of Humphrey Hody, who was Greek Professor at Oxford in the beginning of the last century. This work is entitled, *De Bibliothecæ Textibus originalibus, versionibus Græcis et Latina Vulgata, libri quatuor*, and was printed at Oxford in 1705. Among the writers on the Septuagint version, no one has displayed either more knowledge of the subject, or more critical sagacity, than Hody. The fourth and last part of this work, is that which relates to the Hexapla.

Of the similar labours of Lucian and Hesychius, in amending the text of the Septuagint, there is no writer either ancient or modern, from whom any particular account can be derived. Their editions are no longer in existence : nor have even fragments remained of them. Readings, derived from those editions, are undoubtedly contained in manuscripts of the Septuagint : but we have no means of distinguishing them from other readings. We only know, that those editions did exist, and were in high repute : and for this information, little as it is, we are chiefly indebted to Jerom, who has occasionally mentioned them, especially in his Preface to the Chronicles, and in his Preface to the four Gospels.

Of the industry bestowed by the learned Jews of Tiberias on the criticism of the Hebrew Bible, the most complete information is afforded by John Buxtorf, who was born in Westphalia about forty years after the death of Capnio, and after having studied at several German universities, was at last Professor of the Oriental languages, at Bâle or Basel in Switzerland. To his work on this subject he gave the title of Tiberias : it was first printed at Basel in 1620, and reprinted in 1665 with additions by his son, John James Buxtorf. No Christian has ever possessed so great a share of Jewish literature, as John Buxtorf : his Tiberias is indispensably necessary for the understanding of the Masora, and indeed all the other writers on this subject have derived their materials from Buxtorf, among whom we may particularly mention Bishop Brian Walton, who has given an

account of the Masora in the eighth chapter of the Prolegomena prefixed to the London Polyglot.

Of the industry employed by Jerom on the Latin version, the first source of intelligence is Jerom's own works, of which the Benedictine edition by Martianay was printed at Paris in five volumes folio between the years 1696 and 1706 : but the last, the most complete, and the best arranged edition, was published by Vallarsi at Verona, between 1734 and 1742 in eleven volumes folio. The information, which relates to our present subject, must be chiefly sought in the first volume of Martianay's edition, and in the ninth and tenth of Vallarsi's : for these are the volumes, which contain the *Bibliotheca divina Hieronymi*, with the dissertations of the editors on Jerom's translation and correction of the Scriptures. But to form a due estimate of the excellencies or the defects in those translations and corrections, it is further necessary to consult the Prolegomena of Walton, Mill, and Wetstein, with Simon's Critical History, and the Introduction of Michaelis.

On the criticism of the New Syriac or Philoxenian version, which was displayed at the beginning of the seventh century by Thomas, bishop of Germanicia, the first, though very imperfect, account was given in the second volume of the *Bibliotheca Orientalis* by Assemani, who derived his intelligence from Syrian writers. More particular information may be derived from a treatise entitled *Dissertatio de Syriacarum novi fœderis versionum indole atque usu*, published in 1761, by Dr. Gloucester Ridley, who possessed the manu-

scripts of the Philoxenian version, which are now at Oxford, and from which Dr. White printed his edition. But I know of no work, in which the subject is so fully discussed as in the Introduction of Michaelis.

For the efforts, which were made in the ninth and following centuries to correct the Latin Vulgate, the above-mentioned work of Hody must be again consulted. And for the merit of those learned Jews, who distinguished themselves in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, must be consulted *Wolfii Bibliotheca Hebræa*, which was published at Hamburg between 1715 and 1733 in four quarto volumes.

The description, which has been given in this Lecture, has been given, as the subjects occurred, without regard to any other, than chronological order. But from the sixteenth century to the present period, the labours of the learned are so connected in the subjects of their inquiry, that it is necessary to keep that connexion in view: and that connexion would be lost, if the subjects were intermixed. Though chronological order therefore will still be preserved in each single description, the subjects themselves must be described separately.

The subject of the next Lecture will be the Criticism of the Greek Testament.

10 11
17 21

LECTURE V.

THE Criticism of the Greek Testament is a subject of the very first importance to every Christian: and though a knowledge of the language, in which it was written, is necessary for the *exercise* of that criticism, yet even without such knowledge some notion may be formed of the efforts of the learned, to place the documents of Christianity on a firm foundation. The importance of this subject must be manifest to every one, who considers, that the criticism of the Greek Testament contains the elements of that analysis, by which we gradually discover the truth of our religion.

To determine the *mode* of analysis, which is necessary for this purpose, of analysis, which shall bring with it conviction, let us suppose a man of liberal education, of sound understanding, and of serious disposition, who in his religious opinions, for want of proper instruction on that subject, has remained unsettled, but would willingly assent to the truth of Christianity, provided certain propositions, necessary to establish that truth, were clearly explained to him. A man of this description, if a person endeavoured to convince

him from the New Testament, would argue in the following manner. "The book, which you lay before me, professes indeed to contain a faithful account of what was done and taught, both by the founder of Christianity, and by others, who assisted in the propagation of it. But you cannot expect, that I should allow its pretensions to be valid, till you have assigned sufficient reasons that they *are* so; and these reasons involve several propositions, which must be distinctly stated, and distinctly proved. That our attention may not be distracted by discussing different subjects at the same time, let us, in the first instance, confine ourselves to the Epistles, which you ascribe to St. Paul, who, as you assure me, not only became a zealous promoter, from a zealous enemy of Christianity, but was vested even with divine authority for that purpose. On this divine authority you found a set of doctrines, which you require me to receive through the medium of your interpretation, and declare at the same time, that if I do not receive them, the consequences will be the most dreadful, that imagination can conceive. Now I am perfectly willing (the supposed person might continue to say) I am perfectly willing to assent to truths of such importance; but I must previously know that they *are* truths, or I have no foundation for my assent. For the present I will wave the question, whether your *interpretations* be right or wrong; though I am well assured, that something more is requisite to a right understanding of those Epistles, than is possessed by many, who venture to explain them. But whatever be their *meaning*, you must first con-

vince me, that St. Paul was the *author* of them, or you leave them devoid of all religious obligation. And I expect, that your proof be conducted, not with lofty declamation, or deep denunciation against unbelief; but by sober sense, and plain reason. For though I am ready to place implicit confidence in *St. Paul*, as soon as you have proved, that he was a teacher sent from God; though I am ready to have unbounded faith in *divine* doctrines, as soon as I know, that they *are* divine; yet I cannot transfer this unbounded faith to any *modern* preacher of the Gospel, however great his pretensions, whether from learning, or from sanctity. When you therefore assure me, that St. Paul had a divine commission, and that he wrote the Epistles in question, I expect these assertions, on your part, to be supported by argument: for *your* authority goes as far as your arguments go, and no further."

If the theologian, to whom this supposed person addressed himself, were a man accustomed to biblical investigation, and had sought a *basis* for his faith, such theologian would reply, "I will undertake to produce arguments, which shall convince any reasonable man, that Paul, the apostle of Jesus Christ, was really the author of the Epistles ascribed to him: and when this point has been established, we have then a foundation, on which our superstructure may rest without danger." But before you undertake this task, the objector may still reply, there are certain preliminaries, which must be settled between us, or we shall never come to any definite conclusion. You must not take the English translation, as the work, which is to be

proved authentic; for the term *authentic translation* is a term without meaning. You may say a *correct* translation, or a *faithful* translation; but the term *authentic* applies only to the *original*, it applies only to the *Greek* Epistles, as written, or alleged to be written, by St. Paul himself. Now that the Greek manuscripts of those Epistles very frequently differ, as well from each other, as from the printed editions, is a fact, which it would be useless to deny, and absurd to overlook. *Which* therefore of the Greek manuscripts, will you take into your hand, when you assert, “*these* are the Epistles, which proceeded from the pen of St. Paul.” This is no easy matter to determine; and yet it *must* be determined, if the question of authenticity be examined with that precision, which the importance of the subject demands. This supposed conversation will render our present subject familiar to every hearer: it will shew him, where, and what is the key-stone of the arch, which supports the fabric of Christianity.

The first operation, therefore, in respect to the Greek Testament, which must be performed by a theologian, who intends to build his faith on a firm foundation, is to ascertain what copy of the Epistles ascribed to St. Paul, what copy of an Epistle ascribed to any other Apostle, what copy of a Gospel ascribed to this or that Evangelist, has the strongest claim to be received by us, as a true copy of the author’s own manuscript; whoever the author, or authors, may really have been, which must be left to *future* inquiry, or we shall again take for granted the thing to be prov-

ed. Now the investigation of this previous question is a work of immense labour. The Greek manuscripts of St. Paul's Epistles (or, as we should rather say in the present stage of our inquiry, of the Epistles ascribed to St. Paul,) amount, as far as we know them, to more than an hundred and fifty: and the Greek manuscripts of the Gospels, with which we are acquainted, amount to more than three hundred and fifty. But among all these manuscripts there is none, which is so far entitled to precedence, as to be received for the *true* copy, of which we are in search. In fact the truth lies *scattered* among them all: and in order to obtain the truth, we must *gather* from them all. Nor is an examination of these manuscripts, numerous as they are, alone sufficient for the object, which we have in view. The quotations from the Greek Testament in the voluminous writings of the Greek fathers, must likewise be examined, that we may know what *they* found in *their* Greek manuscripts. The ancient versions must also be consulted, in order to learn what the writers of those versions found in *their* copies of the Greek Testament. When all these collections from manuscripts, fathers, and versions, have been formed, and reduced into proper order, we have *then* to determine in every single instance, which among the various readings is probably the genuine reading. And that we may know *how* to determine, we must establish laws of criticism, calculated to counteract the causes, which produced the variations, and, by these means, to restore the *true* copy, of which we are in search.

Now it cannot be supposed that labours, for which, when taken collectively, no single life is sufficient, would be recommended even by a zealot in his profession, as forming a regular part of theological study. Those labours are unnecessary for *us*; they have been already undertaken, and executed with success. But if the industry of our predecessors has removed the burden from *our* shoulders, we must not therefore become indifferent *spectators*, unconcerned whether the burden be *well* or *ill* supported. We must at least inform ourselves of the nature and extent of those labours; or we shall never know, whether the object has been obtained, for which they were undertaken. We must make ourselves acquainted with the causes, which produced the variations in question, or we shall never know, whether the laws of criticism, which profess to remedy that evil, are founded in truth or falsehood.

We must inquire therefore, first, into the causes of the evil, and then into the remedies, which have been applied to it; remedies, which we shall find hereafter to have been applied with great success.

The manuscripts of the Greek Testament, during the fourteen hundred years, which elapsed from the apostolic age to the invention of printing, were exposed, like all other manuscripts, to mistakes in transcribing: and as every copy had unavoidably *some* errors, those errors multiplied with the multiplication of the copies. Letters, syllables, words, were added, omitted, or transposed, from mere *carelessness* in writing, whether the writer transcribed from a

manuscript before him, or wrote, as was frequently the case, from the dictation of another. In the latter case, his *ear* might be deceived by a similarity in the *sound* of different words; in the former case, his *eye* might be deceived by a similarity in their *form*, by different words having the same final syllable, or by different sentences having the same final word. At other times, a transcriber misunderstood the manuscript, from which he copied, either falsely interpreting its abbreviations, or falsely dividing the words, where they were written (as in the most ancient manuscripts) without intervals. Or the fault might be partly attributable to the manuscript itself, in cases, where its letters were wholly or partly effaced or faded.

But the greatest variations arose from alterations made by *design*. The transcribers of the Greek Testament were not bound, like the transcribers of the Hebrew Bible, by rules prescribed to them in a *Ma-sora*, or critical law book. Hence they often took the liberty of *improving*, as they supposed, on that manuscript, of which it was their business to have given only a copy; a liberty similar to that, which is now taken in a printing-office, where a compositor often improves on the manuscript of an author. Hence, a native of Greece, accustomed to hear his own language without an admixture of Oriental idioms, and regarding therefore a Hebraism or a Syraism, in the light of a solecism, would accordingly correct it, not considering or not knowing, that these Hebraisms and Syraisms are the very idioms, which we should ex-

pect from Greek writers, who were born or educated in Judea, idioms therefore which form a strong argument for the authenticity of their writings. At other times, these same improvers, when they remarked that one Evangelist recorded the same thing more fully than another, (a circumstance again of great importance, as it shews there was no combination among the Evangelists,) regarded this want of perfect coincidence as an imperfection, which they deemed it necessary to remove, by supplying the shorter account from the longer. Nor did they spare even the quotations from the Old Testament, whether those quotations were transcripts from the Septuagint, or translations from the Hebrew by the author himself. If they only differed from the *transcriber's* Septuagint, he concluded, that they were wrong, and required amendment.

But the most fruitful source of designed alterations was the removal of marginal annotations into the text. Indeed to this cause may be ascribed the alterations from parallel passages, whenever those parallel passages had been written in the margin. Other marginal notes consisted of explanations, or applications of the adjacent text: and, when a manuscript, with such notes, fell into the hands of a transcriber, he either supposed, that they were parts of the text, accidentally omitted, and supplied in the margin, or considered them as useful additions, which there would be no harm in adopting. In either case he took them into the text of that manuscript, which he himself was writing.

The latter case may indeed be referred to that class of various readings, which derive their origin from wilful corruption, being introduced for the sole purpose of obtaining support to some particular doctrine. That such things *have* been done, and done by all parties, is not to be denied: for we have examples on record. But as we have received our manuscripts of the Greek Testament, not out of the hands of the ancient heretics, but from the orthodox members of the Greek church, we have less reason to apprehend, that they have suffered, in points of doctrine, from heretical influence.

Having thus taken a general review of the causes, which operated, till the invention of printing, in producing the variations of the Greek Text, I have now to undertake the more agreeable office of recording the attempts, which have been made in later ages, to restore it to its original purity.

For this purpose it is necessary to give a description, or history of the critical editions of the Greek Testament; that is, a description of all those editions, which were printed either wholly from Greek manuscripts, or with emendations from Greek manuscripts, or with a critical apparatus, for the purpose of emendation. In this description, an account of the materials employed by each editor, and of the use which he made of them, must form an essential part: for hence only can we determine the value of his edition. We must observe also the influence of preceding on subsequent editions, and trace the progress of the Greek text throughout its several stages.

The description must be divided into two periods. The one commences with the first edition of the Greek Testament, and ends with the Elzevir edition of 1624: the other includes the critical editions, which have appeared from that time to the present. The first period is limited by the Elzevir edition of 1624, because this edition forms an epocha in the history of the Greek text. After having fluctuated, during more than a century in the preceding editions, the Greek text acquired in *this* edition a consistency, which it has retained to the present day. In *this* edition was established the Greek text, which is now in daily use, and is known by the name of the *Textus receptus*. The description therefore of the first period will record the gradual formation of this text, and will furnish an estimate of its excellences or defects. Nor will the description of the second period be less important: for it will contain the rise and progress of that critical apparatus, which now enables us to form a more accurate text, than it was possible to form at an earlier period.

The first printed edition of any part of the Greek Testament, is one by Aldus Manutius, who printed the six first chapters of St. John's Gospel at Venice in 1504; and in 1512 the whole of St. John's Gospel was printed at Tübingen in Suabia. But these impressions, though it is proper to mention them, as the first of their kind, can now be regarded only as literary curiosities. They had no influence on subsequent editions, and therefore are of no importance in a critical history of the Greek text.

The first printed edition of the *whole* Greek Testament is that, which is contained in the Complutensian Polyglot, so called from Complutum, now Alcala, in Spain, where it was printed. The volume containing the Greek Testament, which is accompanied with the Latin Vulgate in a parallel column, is dated the 10th of January 1514. The whole was conducted under the auspices of Cardinal Ximenes, archbishop of Toledo, who employed for that purpose some of the most distinguished Hebrew and Greek scholars of that age, and who spared neither pains nor expense, in procuring Hebrew and Greek manuscripts.

The Greek manuscripts, which were used for this work, are not particularly described by the editors, but are all included under one general character, namely, "*exemplaria—vetustissima simul et emendatissima.*" But as the term "ancient" is only a relative expression; as the accuracy of a manuscript, in its critical sense, depends not on the precision of its orthographical execution, but on the genuineness of its readings; and as all editors are disposed to enhance the value of their materials, the assertion of the Complutensian editors, in respect to their manuscripts, requires the confirmation of internal evidence. But the manuscripts themselves, which were deposited in the university library at Alcala, are no longer in existence. And if manuscripts were sent to them by Pope Leo the Tenth, as the editors assert, from the Vatican Library, no one knows, at present, what they are, or even where they must be sought.


The only means therefore of ascertaining the qual-

ity of the Greek manuscript or manuscripts, from which the Complutensian Greek Testament was printed, are those, which are afforded by the evidence of the Complutensian text itself. And this internal evidence directly contradicts the assertion of the editors in respect to the antiquity of their manuscripts. For wherever modern Greek manuscripts, manuscripts written in the thirteenth, fourteenth, or fifteenth centuries, differ from the most ancient Greek manuscripts, and from the quotations of the early Greek fathers, in such characteristic readings the Complutensian Greek Testament almost invariably agrees with the modern, in opposition to the ancient manuscripts. There cannot be a doubt therefore, that the Complutensian text was formed from modern manuscripts alone.

The only cause of hesitation on this subject was removed about twenty years ago. As the editors had boasted of valuable manuscripts, sent to them from the Vatican Library, it was formerly thought not improbable, that the very ancient manuscript marked in the Vatican Library 1209, and distinguished by the name of *The Vatican Manuscript*, was one of the number. And as only imperfect extracts from this manuscript had been printed till very lately, we had not sufficient data to ascertain the question. But in 1788 Professor Birch of Copenhagen published, in his edition of the four Gospels, complete extracts from this manuscript. Now since the Complutensian is the first printed edition of the Greek Testament, since the text of this edition has had great influence on sub-

sequent editions, and it is therefore important to determine the value of its readings, I have taken the pains to collate the Complutensian edition with those extracts from the Vatican manuscript; but have never found in it a reading *peculiar* to that manuscript. That manuscript therefore could not have been used for the Complutensian edition: for, if it had, the influence of such a manuscript must have been sometimes apparent. And even were this conclusion erroneous, the result would be still the same: for, if it were true, that the Complutensian editors had the use of the Vatican manuscript, yet, if they never followed it, except where it harmonized with modern manuscripts, the effect is the same, as if they had never used it at all. Whatever zeal then may have been displayed, both by Cardinal Ximenes and by the learned men who assisted him, their edition contributed little or nothing toward the restoring of the purity of the Greek text.

The other principal editors of the sixteenth century were Erasmus, Robert Stephens, and Beza. But a description of their editions, and of the gradual formation of that text, which is now in common use, must be deferred to the following Lecture.



LECTURE VI.

IN the preceding Lecture was given an account of the Complutensian edition of the Greek Testament, as far as it could be collected from the imperfect data, which now remain. The next edition, which demands our attention, is the first edition by Erasmus, of which we are enabled to give a much more minute description, because we are much better acquainted, both with the materials, of which it was composed, and with the manner, in which those materials were applied. A minute description of this edition is likewise of much greater consequence, as its influence on subsequent editions was much greater, than that of the Complutensian. It was printed at Basel, or Bâle, in Switzerland in 1516, and was the first-published, though not the first-printed edition of the Greek Testament.

The Greek manuscripts, which were used by Erasmus for this edition, amounted to four, beside a manuscript of Theophylact, containing his commentary on the Gospels, the Acts, and the Epistles, accompanied with the Greek text. Three of those four manuscripts are still preserved in the Public Library at Bâle; but the fourth is at present unknown. It must not however be supposed, that those four man-

uscripts were four copies of the *whole* Greek Testament: for Greek manuscripts contain usually only *parts* of it. Indeed three of Erasmus's manuscripts, when put together made only *one* copy of the New Testament, the first containing only the Gospels, the second only the Acts and the Epistles, and the third only the book of Revelation. From these three manuscripts, constituting one copy of the whole, he printed his Greek Testament; but not from these manuscripts unaltered. Before he sent them to the press, he made many corrections; and these corrections were founded, partly on his fourth manuscript, partly on his manuscript of Theophylact, partly on the authority of the Vulgate, and partly on his own conjecture.

The value of this edition must depend, first on the value of its materials, and secondly on the mode of employing those materials. Now his manuscript of the Gospels, which is one of the three now preserved at Bâle, is so modern a manuscript, that according to Wetstein, it was written in the fifteenth century, and therefore not long before it was used by Erasmus. The manuscript from which he printed the Acts and the Epistles, (another of the three now preserved at Bâle) is likewise a modern manuscript, though according to Wetstein, who examined them both, it is older than the former.

The Greek manuscript of the Revelation, which was used by Erasmus, belonged at that time to Capnio: but all the efforts of the learned to discover where it is now preserved, have been hitherto fruitless. The character, which Erasmus himself has given of this

manuscript, is so high in respect to its antiquity, as to make it almost coeval with the Apostles themselves. "*Tantæ vetustatis*," says Erasmus to Stunica, "*ut apostolorum ætate scriptum videri possit*." But this declaration must be construed with the same latitude, as the similar declaration of the Complutensian editors. For in this very manuscript the Greek text was accompanied with the commentary of Arethas: and Arethas, according to Fabricius, a name of great authority in the literary history of Greek writers, was subsequent to the apostolic age by no less a period, than nine hundred years.

The Greek documents, which Erasmus applied to the correction of the manuscripts, from which he printed his edition, were, his fourth manuscript, and his manuscript of Theophylact. His fourth manuscript, which is the third of the three preserved at Bâle, is at least of respectable antiquity, for it was written in the tenth century, and, as it contains the whole New Testament, except the Revelation, it might have afforded him considerable service. But Erasmus made very little use of it, as he himself relates in his answer to Stunica, because he suspected, though it appears unjustly, that it contained readings derived from the Latin Vulgate. The chief source of his corrections therefore was the text and commentary of Theophylact. But Theophylact was the last of the Greek fathers: he lived at the end of the eleventh century: and *his* quotations from the Greek Testament are not to be compared, in deciding the authenticity of a reading, with the quotation of the *early* fathers. In the book of Revelation, Erasmus had no

other Greek document, than the manuscript, from which he printed. He corrected therefore from conjecture, where that manuscript was inaccurate: and where it was defective, as especially at the end, where the six last verses were wanting, he supplied the defect by Greek of his own making from the Latin Vulgate.

If we may judge from the title-page, Erasmus had likewise at least occasional recourse to the writings of Origen, Chrysostom, and Cyril. But it is hardly possible that Erasmus should have derived *many* readings from their works, especially from the works of Origen and Cyril, in which the quotations from the Bible are indiscriminately scattered, and of which there was no edition at that time provided with those convenient indexes, which now enable a collector of various readings to turn in an instant to any passage of Scripture. In fact *no* edition of those fathers had then been printed in Greek; for the editions of Origen, Chrysostom, and Cyril, which were then in print, were only in a Latin translation.

But there is another source of sacred criticism, of which Erasmus made considerable use, though it is the last source, from which we should suppose that an editor would have drawn, who had objected to the use of a Greek manuscript on the ground of its readings being formed from the Latin Vulgate. One should hardly suppose, that the same editor would have had recourse to the Latin Vulgate, for assistance in the formation of his own text. Perhaps however he acted more from necessity than choice. When he published his Greek Testament, the Latin Vulgate

had for ages been the oracle of the Church of Rome : and to have published a New Testament, without shewing some regard for this oracle, might have exposed him to more embarrassment, than all his learning could have removed.

Lastly, the time which was employed in the execution of this work, bore no proportion to the magnitude of the undertaking. The first application to Erasmus on this subject was made in a letter from Rhenanus bearing date the 17th of April 1515 : and this application was repeated on the 30th of April. Now the edition itself, as appears from the subscription, was finished in the following February. Even therefore were it begun immediately on the second application, which from other circumstances there is reason to doubt, it could not have employed more than nine months, both in the preparation for it, and in the printing of it. And Erasmus had not merely Greek materials to arrange ; he had to correct a Latin version, which he published in a parallel column with the Greek ; he had also to furnish a considerable body of annotations. Nor must it be forgotten, that he was engaged at the same time in the publication of Jerom's works, which alone would have been sufficient to have occupied his whole attention. If it be asked, why Erasmus, under such circumstances, was so precipitate in the publication of the Greek Testament, the answer is, that in this respect Erasmus was not his own master. He had been engaged by Frobenius, a printer and bookseller at Bâle, to publish a Greek Testament for a certain sum, and under certain conditions. And the profits of Frobenius, as a booksel-

ler, depended at that time on expedition ; they depended on his edition being finished, before the Complutensian, already printed, was delivered to the public.

Such is the history of the first edition by Erasmus, of which it was necessary to give a minute description, as it is the basis of all the subsequent editions.

In three years from the publication of the first edition, Erasmus published a second : and as in the mean time he had an opportunity of consulting other Greek manuscripts, or of receiving extracts from his friends, he made numerous alterations in his second edition, which, according to the account of Dr. Mill, amount at least to four hundred. And in 1522 he published a third edition, in which was added the seventh verse in the fifth chapter of St. John's first Epistle, which he had not printed in his two former editions, because it was not contained in his Greek manuscripts.

These three editions were published by Erasmus before he had seen the Complutensian Greek Testament, which, though printed in 1514, remained, through the death of Cardinal Ximenes, more than eight years unpublished at Alcala. But when Erasmus published his fourth edition in 1527, he availed himself of the Complutensian, especially in the book of Revelation, where he had only one manuscript, and that a defective one. According to Dr. Mill's account, in the Prolegomena to his Greek Testament, Erasmus corrected his text of the Revelation in ninety places from the Complutensian edition, but in only twenty-six places in all the other books. The fifth and last edition by Erasmus was printed in 1535 :

but, according to the same authority, it differs in only four places from the preceding.

In the interval, which elapsed between the first and the last edition of Erasmus, nine or ten other editions of the Greek Testament were printed, which were all taken with a few alterations from some one of the editions of Erasmus, with the exception of the edition by Colinæus, which was printed at Paris in 1534. The text of this edition was formed partly from the Complutensian edition, partly from the editions of Erasmus, and partly from Greek manuscripts, which were collated for that purpose. But as the editor, (which was often the case in the early editions of the Greek Testament) gave no account of the sources, from which he derived his materials, it was suspected, that all those readings, which were contained neither in the Complutensian, nor in the Erasmian editions, readings, which according to Dr. Mill amount to more than seven hundred and fifty, had no other foundation, than critical conjecture. It has been since discovered, that those readings were taken from Greek manuscripts: three of them are still preserved at Paris, and have been collated by Wetstein and Griesbach. The edition of Colinæus therefore is entitled to great respect. But partly in consequence of the suspicion just mentioned, partly in consequence of the superior though undeserved reputation of the editions published at Paris, a few years afterwards, by his son-in-law, Robert Stephens, the edition of Colinæus was neglected, it was never re-printed, and has had no influence on the modern editions of the Greek Testament.

No editions have been attended with greater ce-

lebrity, than the editions of Robert Stephens, a learned bookseller and printer at Paris, and father of the still more learned Henry Stephens. His two first editions are as distinguished by the elegant neatness, as the third and chief edition by the splendor of its typographical execution. These qualities greatly contributed toward bringing them into general circulation: and the critical pretensions, which were assumed by the editor, seemed to stamp on them an indelible value. In the preface to the first edition, which was printed at Paris in 1546, says Robert Stephens, "Having obtained from the royal library several manuscripts, which, from their appearance of antiquity, are almost entitled to adoration (*codices vetustatis specie pene adorandos*) I have formed from them this edition in such a manner, as not to print even a single letter, which is not confirmed by the greater, and better part of them." But with all this ostentation, Robert Stephens's first edition is little more, than a compilation from the Complutensian and the fifth edition of Erasmus. His second edition, which was printed in 1549, is in respect to its exterior a close resemblance of the first; nor even in respect to its text is it materially different. But these editions had very little influence on the subsequent editions of the Greek Testament, an influence reserved for the folio edition, which appeared in the following year.

The text of this folio edition, printed in 1550, was once supposed to have been formed entirely on the authority of Greek manuscripts, which Robert Stephens, in the Preface to it, professes to have collated for that purpose a second and even a third time. But it

is so far from having been formed on their authority, that, except in the book of Revelation, it is hardly any thing more than Erasmus's fifth edition reprinted. And even in the book of Revelation, where he often departs from Erasmus, he departs only for the sake of Complutensian readings. In fact Stephens himself has openly contradicted his own declarations: for in the margin of this edition there are more than a hundred places, in which he has quoted *all* his authorities for readings different from *his own*. With this glaring evidence, evidence which requires no collation of manuscripts, but only a superficial view of the edition itself, in order to be perceived, it is extraordinary that credit was ever attached to the pretensions of the editor on the formation of the text.

There is another point of view, from which this edition must be examined, and in which it distinguishes itself from all preceding editions, namely the critical apparatus displayed in the margin. This critical apparatus consists of quotations from the Complutensian edition, and from fifteen Greek manuscripts. Now the Complutensian edition differs from that of Stephens in more than thirteen hundred places, of which Stephens has totally neglected at least seven hundred; and those, which he has noticed, are often quoted falsely. The same objection applies to the quotations from his other documents as far as they have been compared: and Dr. Mill says with great propriety of the collection of readings exhibited in Stephens's margin, "*in pompam magis quam in usum congesta videtur.*"

But the inward defects of this edition were over-

looked for its outward beauties. There was also a religious motive, which operated in its favour. In England, in Holland, and in Switzerland, the edition was esteemed for the sake of the editor, who became a convert to the Protestant cause, and fled on that account from Paris to settle at Geneva, in the neighbourhood of Calvin and Beza.

The next revision of the Greek text was undertaken by Beza, who like Robert Stephens was a native of France, and fled to Switzerland on account of his religion. The critical materials, which he employed, were for the most part the same, as those which had been used by Robert Stephens. But he had likewise the advantage of that very ancient manuscript of the Gospels and the Acts, which he afterwards sent to this University, and which is known by the name of the Codex Bezae. He had likewise a very ancient manuscript of St. Paul's Epistles, which he procured from Clermont in France, and which is known by the name of the Codex Claromontanus. Lastly, he had the advantage of the Syriac version, which had been lately published by Tremellius with a close Latin translation.

But the use, which he made of his materials, was not such, as might have been expected from a man of Beza's learning. Instead of applying his various readings to the emendation of the *text*, he used them chiefly for polemical purposes in his *notes*. In short he amended Stephens's text, in not more than fifty places: and even these emendations were not always founded on proper authority.

We now come to the Elzevir edition of 1624, in

which was established the text, that is now in daily use. The person who conducted this edition (for Elzevir was only the printer) is at present unknown: but whoever he was, his critical exertions were confined within a narrow compass. The text of this edition was copied from Beza's text, except in about fifty places; and in these places, the readings were borrowed partly from the various readings in Stephens's margin, partly from other editions, but certainly not from Greek manuscripts.

The *textus receptus* therefore, or the text in common use, was copied, with a few exceptions, from the text of Beza. Beza himself closely followed Stephens: and Stephens (namely in his third and chief edition) copied solely from the fifth edition of Erasmus, except in the Revelation, where he followed sometimes Erasmus, sometimes the Complutensian edition. The text therefore in daily use resolves itself at last into the Complutensian and the Erasmian editions. But neither Erasmus nor the Complutensian editors printed from ancient Greek manuscripts: and the remainder of their critical apparatus included little more than the latest of the Greek fathers, and the Latin Vulgate.

I have thus finished the first period in the critical history of the Greek text. The time does not permit us to enter on the second. But as almost a year will elapse before these Lectures will be renewed, as in this audience there may be many, who will lose the opportunity of farther attendance, and as the Lecturer

himself from the daily accidents of human life may not live to renew them, it is proper, before we separate, to make some general observations, not only on the Criticism of the Greek Testament, which has been left unfinished, but also on some other branches of Divinity on which, though the description of them is still to come, the theological student should have some decided opinion before he departs.

With respect to the labours of the learned, which belong to the second period in the critical history of the Greek text, it has been their object to obtain a copy of the Greek Testament, which shall come as nearly, as possible, to the original-records. Now, if it is thought desirable to obtain an accurate text for the Plays of Terence or the Odes of Horace, and the prosecution of this purpose be deemed an object for the talents of a Bentley, surely the smallest emendation must be deemed important in that work, which is the source of religious faith. And be it observed, that no emendation from conjecture, no emendation unfounded on documents, or not warranted by preponderating authority is admissible in the Greek Testament. It is true, that the various readings, which affect the sense, bear but a small proportion to the whole number: but who would not choose to read a Gospel or an Epistle rather in *original*, than in *synonymous* expressions.

On the other hand, care must be taken not to magnify this subject beyond the limits of its real importance. To the Theologian, who undertakes to establish the authenticity of the Greek Testament, it is of consequence to ascertain its very words, its very

syllables. But, for the common purposes of religious instruction, the text in daily use is amply sufficient. For, whatever difference in other respects may exist between this text and the Greek manuscripts, or whatever difference may exist among the manuscripts themselves, they all agree in the important articles of Christian faith ; they all declare, with one accord, the doctrine of the Trinity, and the doctrine of the atonement, by Jesus Christ.

On three other branches of Divinity, the Authenticity of the Bible, the Divine Origin of our Religion, and the Doctrines of the Church of England, I must likewise make some general observations.

As it is the object of these Lectures, to exhibit a system of Divinity, which beginning with first principles shall establish propositions in regular progression, it would be a violation of their plan to anticipate subjects of future demonstration, because such anticipation would involve our arguments in a circle. Nor is it my intention to anticipate any truth, for the purpose of employing it in proof of another. But the plan will not be violated, if to those, who will lose the opportunity, either of hearing the arguments themselves, or of learning what authors have best conducted them, I should briefly state the result.

I may venture therefore to assert, that the evidence, by which we establish the fact, that the books of the New Testament were written by the authors to whom they are ascribed, is, to say the least of it, as strong, as the evidence for the facts, that the Orations against Catiline were written by Cicero, or that the Life of Agricola was written by Tacitus. That Mo-

ses was the author of the Pentateuch, I have already shewn in a separate publication : nor is it less certain, that the prophetical books of the Old Testament were written by the persons, whose names they bear. Some books indeed there are, such as the Kings and the Chronicles, of which we know not the authors. But, if they had not been entitled to credit, they would not have been received in the Hebrew Canon : nor would that Canon have been confirmed by the authority of Christ.

That the writers of the New Testament, considered merely as human evidence, as they must be considered in the first instance, are entitled to full credit for all that they have recorded of Christ and his Apostles, appears from the records themselves. The simplicity of the writers, their manifest honesty, their own conviction, where they could not be deceived, and their sufferings, even unto death, in support of that conviction, guarantee the veracity of their accounts. And if the miracles and doctrines recorded in the New Testament be true, the divine origin of Christianity requires no further confirmation.

With respect to that system of doctrines, which is adopted by the Church of England, I must here again appeal to the proofs hereafter to be given, and again state the result. On the strength of this appeal then I can venture to assert, that when the doctrines of the Church of England, as taught in the Liturgy, the Articles, and the Homilies, are duly examined, they will be found in all respects conformable with the Sacred Writings. To dissent therefore, in this country, from the doctrines of the Established Church, is to

dissent without a real cause. Indeed there are many, who dissent without knowing the difference between our doctrines and their own, nay without knowing whether the doctrines be different, or the same. But this dissent is dangerous in every view. It is dangerous to the person, who adopts false notions in religion, it is dangerous to his neighbour, it is dangerous to the State. The religious dissensions in the Greek Empire, by diminishing its strength, prepared its downfall by the Turks : and God grant, that the religious dissensions among ourselves, which unavoidably produce dissensions in the State, may not ultimately effect the downfall of Britain.

Lastly, as knowledge is of no value, unless it be applied to some useful purpose, let us apply our knowledge of religion to the amendment of our thoughts and actions. May those who are placed in authority be careful to set a good example ; and may the younger members be as careful to follow it. In this place especially, two of our principal duties are, attention to study, and regularity of deportment. Let us all then resolve, both young and old, to observe particularly the duties, which immediately belong to us, that our faith, and our preaching may not be vain. So shall we all become one fold under one Shepherd, Jesus Christ, the righteous, to whom with the Father and the Holy Ghost be ascribed all power, might, majesty, and dominion, now and forevermore.

A

COURSE OF LECTURES,

CONTAINING A

DESCRIPTION AND SYSTEMATIC ARRANGEMENT

OF THE SEVERAL

BRANCHES OF DIVINITY :

ACCOMPANIED WITH

AN ACCOUNT, BOTH OF THE PRINCIPAL AUTHORS, AND OF

THE PROGRESS, WHICH HAS BEEN MADE AT

DIFFERENT PERIODS

IN

Theological Learning.

BY HERBERT MARSH, D. D. F. R. S.

MARGARET PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY.

PART II.

CAMBRIDGE:

PUBLISHED BY WILLIAM HILLIARD.

.....

Hilliard & Metcalf...printers.

1812.

PREFACE.

IN the six following Lectures, which were given in the Easter Term of 1810,* the *first* branch of Theology, or the *criticism* of the Bible, is continued and concluded. It is hardly necessary to say any thing further of the *plan*, on which these Lectures are conducted, as it was fully explained in the first and second Lectures. It may be useful however to remind the reader, that their object is not to *supersede* the study of other works, but to direct the theological student in the *use* of other works. Their object is to teach him *how* to study Divinity, and then, as he gradually proceeds, to inform him of the most *distinguished* writers on the several subjects. In the *arrangement* of those writers no attention is paid either to the alphabetical order of their names, or to the size of their works. Their position is regulated solely by a regard to the departments, and divisions of departments, to which the writers respectively belong. The arrangement therefore is purely *systematic*. Whether the system *itself* is founded on just principles, is a question which must be left to the decision of the learned.

* I must except however Lecture XII, which, though here *printed*, was not *spoken* with the other five. Indeed the title-pages of books, with which it is replete, make it rather a subject of examination in the closet, than of delivery to a public audience.

Cambridge,
Dec. 15, 1810.

CONTENTS.

LECTURE VII.

	Page
<i>Criticism of the Greek Testament from the formation of the Textus Receptus to the Edition of Wetstein</i>	5

LECTURE VIII.

<i>The same Subject continued to the Edition of Griesbach</i>	25
---	----

LECTURE IX.

<i>Description of the Authors, who have illustrated the criti- cism of the Greek Testament according to its several Departments</i>	43
---	----

LECTURE X.

<i>Criticism of the Hebrew Bible</i>	64
--------------------------------------	----

LECTURE XI.

<i>The same Subject continued to Kennicott's Edition.</i>	80
---	----

LECTURE XII.

<i>Description of the Authors, who have illustrated the criti- cism of the Hebrew Bible, according to its several De- partments</i>	97
---	----

LECTURE VII.

THE Lectures, which were given in the preceding Easter-term, contained a plan of theological study, in which the several branches were so arranged, that a knowledge of the one should gradually lead to a knowledge of the other. To recapitulate those branches would be unnecessary at present, as the Lectures themselves are now in print, and were indeed published especially for the purpose of enabling those, who have lately entered on their academical studies, to make themselves acquainted with the subjects already explained. Taking therefore for granted, that every one, who is desirous of following the whole chain of argument, and of comprehending the whole series of propositions, has duly informed himself of what has gone before, I shall resume, without further preface, the thread of the discourse in the place, where it was broken off in the last Lecture.

The History of the Criticism employed on the Greek Testament, which was divided into two periods, the one ending with the year 1624, the other continuing from that time to the present day, was con-

ducted only to the end of the former period, when the text of the Greek Testament acquired, in the first Elzevir edition, a consistency, which it has in general preserved. That is, the editions of the Greek Testament printed since the year 1624 have, with a few exceptions hereafter to be mentioned, been copied word for word from the Elzevir edition of that year : whence the text of that edition has acquired the title of *textus receptus*.

The gradual formation of this text out of the primary editions by Erasmus and the Complutensian editors, with the stages, through which it passed before its final settlement, was sufficiently described in the fifth and sixth Lectures to enable the hearer to form a competent judgment, in regard to its critical correctness, or, in other words, in regard to the question, whether it approaches as nearly to the autographs of the sacred writers, as we are able, and therefore in duty bound to advance it. Now the further we proceed, the more clearly shall we perceive the necessity of greater improvement ; and the history of the latter period, on which we now enter, will fully confirm the inference deduced from the history of the former.

The subject, which demands our first attention in the history of the latter period, is the celebrated London Polyglot, a work, which confers immortal honour, as well on the nation at large, as on the learned men who were engaged in it ; whose merit indeed is the more conspicuous, as it was undertaken and completed at a time, when the study of theology in this country was immersed in the metaphysical depths of puri-

tanical disquisition. It was projected, and with the assistance of several other distinguished scholars, was executed by Brian Walton, formerly of Peter-House in this University. It consists of six folio volumes: and the printing of them was finished in the year before Cromwell died.

As an appendage, was added in two more folio volumes that inestimable work, the *Lexicon Heptaglotton*, by Edmund Castle of Emmanuel College, Arabic Professor in this University, and Walton's chief assistant in the Polyglot itself. As a general description of this splendid performance would be foreign to the present Lecture, I must refer my hearers, who wish for further information, as well on the London Polyglot, as on the Antwerp and Paris Polyglots which preceded it, to the *Bibliotheca sacra* of Le Long. We are at present concerned only with the text of the Greek Testament, and with the critical apparatus, which accompanied that text. Now the text itself, (which is contained in the fifth volume) is a re-impression of the folio edition by Robert Stephens, which Walton adopted in preference to the Elzevir text, because he embodied in his own work the various readings in Stephens's margin, which being adapted to Stephens's text might often be no various readings to any other. The importance therefore of the London Polyglot, as far as it relates to our present history, is confined to the *materials*, which it afforded for the purpose of future emendation.

The materials derived from *Greek* authorities comprise a collection of extracts from sixteen Greek

manuscripts, in addition to the readings which had been quoted by Stephens. For the collation of these manuscripts, as also on many other accounts, Walton was greatly indebted to Archbishop Usher. They are described at the head of the collation in the sixth volume by Walton himself: and a farther account of them is given in the Prolegomena to Mill's Greek Testament.

But the extracts from Greek Manuscripts were neither the sole nor the chief materials, which the Polyglot afforded for the emendation of the Greek text. We have already seen, that the *ancient versions* of the New Testament are another source of various readings: and this source was opened more amply and more usefully in the London Polyglot, than in any of those, which had preceded. In addition to the Latin Vulgate, it contains the Syriac, the Arabic, and the Ethiopic versions of the New Testament, with the Persian in the Gospels. And these oriental versions are not only arranged in the most convenient manner, for the purpose of comparing them with the Greek, but they are accompanied with literal Latin translations, that even they, who are unacquainted with the oriental languages, might still have recourse to them for various readings, though indeed with less security, as every translator is liable to make mistakes. For a more particular account of those oriental versions, and for the mode of applying them to the criticism of the Greek Testament, I must refer my hearers to the Introduction of Michaelis, where the subject is treated with equal fulness and perspicuity.

As the temper of the times, in which the Polyglot appeared, was ill-adapted to calm investigation, we need not be surprised that it met with a partial opposition. Dr. John Owen, one of the most distinguished among the puritanical Divines under the government of Cromwell, soon attacked it in his "Considerations on the Prolegomena and Appendix of the late Biblia Polyglotta," which he gave as an addition to two other tracts printed at Oxford in 1659. In the same year it was answered by Walton in a pamphlet entitled "The Considerator considered; or a brief View of certain Considerations upon the Biblia Polyglotta, the Prolegomena and the Appendix thereof, wherein amongst other things the certainty, integrity, and divine authority of the original texts is defended against the consequences of Atheists, Papists, Anti-scripturists, &c. inferred, from the various readings, and novelty of the Hebrew points, by the author of the said Considerations." The Restoration, which soon followed, put an end to the controversy; and within a few months after Charles the Second's return, Dr. Walton was promoted to the see of Chester. The prejudices, excited by Owen's pamphlet, and the false conclusions, which he drew from that variety of readings unavoidably resulting from a multiplication of copies, did not indeed immediately subside: but those prejudices and apprehensions were at least mitigated by the endeavours of Dr. Fell, who published, as he relates in his Preface, an edition of the Greek Testament for that purpose.

But before we proceed to Dr. Fell's edition, the

order of time requires that we should notice a critical edition, which was published at Amsterdam in the year after the London Polyglot. It is known by the name of the edition of Curcellæus, and is one of the most beautiful, as well as one of the most correctly printed, among the small editions of the Greek Testament. The editor does not appear, when the work was printed, to have seen the London Polyglot. Indeed it is hardly possible that he should: for though this edition bears the date of 1658, and the Polyglot that of 1657, yet, as the Preface, which is always the last thing printed, is dated the eighth of January, the work itself must have been printed in the year preceding. It contains however a selection of readings sufficiently copious for the time and circumstances of the publication, a selection derived partly from former collections, partly from printed editions, and partly from manuscripts collated on purpose for the edition in question. These manuscripts are described by the editor in his Preface, which on other accounts deserves our attention, especially for its excellent remarks in vindication of such literary labours. It is one of the Elzevir editions, and contains precisely the same text, as the other editions, which issued from that press.

The edition of the Greek Testament, which was published by Dr. Fell, then Dean of Christ Church, and shortly afterwards also Bishop of Oxford, was printed in 1675 in one volume octavo. Dr. Fell of course availed himself of the collections already formed, in the London Polyglot, and the edition of Curcel-

læus; which he augmented by the addition of readings from twelve Bodleian, four Dublin, and two Paris manuscripts. He further added the extracts from twenty-two Greek manuscripts, which Caryophilus had collated at Rome, by order of Pope Urban VIII. for an edition of the Greek Testament, which was *intended* to be, but never *was* published. The extracts however were printed by themselves, and in sufficient time to enable Dr. Fell to apply them to the purpose of his own edition. He likewise added various readings from manuscripts of the Coptic and Gothic versions of the New Testament, which were supplied by Dr. Thomas Marshall, Rector of Lincoln College. Dr. Fell's edition therefore contained a more ample apparatus, than any preceding edition: and it was reprinted, twice at Leipzig, and once at Oxford, the last of which is known by the name of Gregory's edition. But Gregory's edition, though of greater magnitude than its prototype, contains no accession of *critical* materials.

We now come to a period in the history of sacred criticism, which may be considered as the commencement of its manhood. Bishop Fell, notwithstanding the superiority of his own edition, was so sensible, that much more remained to be performed, in order to obtain a genuine text, that he determined to promote a new edition. He was likewise so well aware of the labour, which it would cost, and the many years, which it would employ, to collect, arrange, and apply the materials, which he perceived were wanting, that he deemed his own life insufficient for the pur-

pose, and resolved therefore to delegate the task to some biblical scholar, whose age might afford an expectation of living to complete it. He selected for that purpose Dr. John Mill, then Fellow of Queen's College in Oxford, and afterwards Principal of Edmund Hall. The history of this edition is related at large by Dr. Mill himself in his *Prolegomena*. The preparation of the materials, and the printing of the work, employed not less than thirty years. It was published at Oxford in 1707: but Dr. Mill survived the publication of it only a few weeks.

This noble edition contained, not only a much larger collection of readings from Greek manuscripts, than any former edition, but also what was totally wanting in former editions, a copious collection of quotations from the New Testament in the writings of the Greek Fathers, which are of great importance, especially the quotations made by the early Fathers, in ascertaining the authenticity of the Greek text. The extracts from the Coptic and the Gothic versions, which appeared in Bishop Fell's edition, were revised and augmented; and the various readings, both of the Vulgate, and of the oriental versions, were selected from the London Polyglot. The variations observable in the early printed editions were likewise noted. But, with all this critical apparatus, the learned editor made no alterations in the text, which he printed, as it was given in the London Polyglot, from the folio edition of Robert Stephens. He left to future critics the application of the materials which he provided, though he frequently delivered his own opinion, in the *Prolegomena*, and in the Notes.

We are greatly indebted to Dr. Mill for having supplied us with such ample means of obtaining a more correct edition of the Greek Testament. But his labours were misunderstood and misrepresented by his contemporaries. The appearance of so many thousand various readings (they are said to amount to thirty thousand) excited an alarm for the safety of the New Testament: and those very materials, which had been collected for the purpose of producing a correct, an unadulterated text, were regarded as the means of undermining its authority. The text in daily use, originally derived from modern manuscripts, and transmitted through Stephens and Beza into the Elzevir editions, was at that time supposed to have already attained its highest perfection; and was regarded in the same light, as if Erasmus had printed from the autographs of the sacred writers. The possibility of mistakes in transcribing the Greek Testament, the consequent necessity of making the copies of it subservient to mutual correction, and hence the inference, that the probability of obtaining an accurate copy is increased by the frequency of comparison, did not occur to those, who were offended at Dr. Mill's publication. They were not aware, that the genuine text of the sacred writers could not exclusively be found in any modern manuscript, from which the first editor of a Greek Testament might accidentally print: they were not aware that the truth lies scattered among them all, and must be collected from them all. Still less were they aware, that those very readings, which excited their apprehensions, were the

means, not only of ascertaining the genuineness of words and phrases, but also, as will be shown hereafter, of proving the authenticity of whole books.

Three years had not elapsed, when Dr. Whitby, the well-known and justly esteemed *commentator* on the New Testament, published in opposition to it, an elaborate work, entitled *Examen variantium Lectionum Johannis Millii*, which was first printed in London in 1710, and was afterwards annexed to Whitby's Commentary on the New Testament. In this Examen the author argues, as if every printed word were precisely the same, as it was originally written; he asserts that in *all* places the reading of the common text may be defended, *in iis omnibus lectionem textus defendi posse*. And this palpably false position, set forth in the title-page itself, he made the basis of a severe and bitter criticism on a work, which he was unable to appreciate.

The well-meaning but ill-judged remarks of Whitby were soon applied by Anthony Collins in his Discourse of Free Thinking, to a very different purpose: for he quoted the Preface to Whitby's Examen, in order to shew, that the very text of the Greek Testament was uncertain and precarious. But the arguments of Collins against Divine Revelation, and the mistaken notions of Whitby, on which those arguments were founded, were soon confuted by the most acute critic, not only of this nation, but of all Europe. I mean Dr. Richard Bentley, who replied to Collins under the assumed title of Phileleutherus Lipsiensis. This reply of Bentley was first printed in 1713, the

same year with Collins's Discourse : it has frequently been reprinted ; it has been translated into several of the foreign languages, and should be studied by every man, who is desirous of forming just notions of biblical criticism. Indeed Dr. Francis Hare, afterwards Bishop of Chichester, made his public acknowledgments in a pamphlet printed in the same year, entitled " The Clergyman's Thanks to Phileleutherus."

That Dr. Mill's edition however had its defects, is certainly not to be denied : but they were chiefly defects, which were inseparable from the nature of the undertaking, and from the circumstances, in which the editor was placed. Among the manuscripts collated for Mill's edition were many, which could not be collated by Mill himself : and if the extracts from such manuscripts are any where defective or erroneous, the fault is not the editor's, but the collator's. And if the opinions, which he has frequently expressed on the genuineness of readings, are sometimes inaccurate, we must recollect, that he was the first editor, who undertook a critical edition of the Greek Testament on so large a scale. And if those opinions had been more frequently inaccurate than they are, we should further remember, first, that he produced the evidence on which those opinions were founded, thus enabling the reader to judge for himself, and secondly that he never suffered his opinions to influence the text. The greatest defect in Mill's Greek Testament consists in the quotations from the oriental versions, which Mill did not understand, at least not suf-

ficiently to collate them. He had recourse therefore to the Latin translations of them in the London Polyglot, and consequently erred, whenever those translations were not sufficiently exact. But these defects, with the similar defects in the edition of Bengelius, hereafter to be noticed, have been all corrected by Professor Bode of Helmstadt, in his work rather harshly entitled, *Pseudo-critica Millio-Bengeliana*.

Three years after the publication of Mill's Greek Testament at Oxford, it was reprinted at Amsterdam under the direction of Ludolph Küster. Whatever readings were given in the Appendix to the Oxford edition, as coming too late for insertion under the text, were in this second edition transferred to their proper places: and the critical apparatus was augmented by the readings of twelve Greek manuscripts, some of which indeed had been previously, but imperfectly collated.

In the year following, namely in 1711, Gerard of Mastricht published (likewise at Amsterdam) an octavo edition of the Greek Testament, with readings selected, not from Mill's, but from Fell's edition, and a small accession of new matter, consisting of readings from a manuscript in the Imperial Library at Vienna. As the editor gave only the initials of his name and title, and the edition was published by Henry Wetstein, a printer and bookseller at Amsterdam, it improperly acquired in this country the name of Wetstein's edition: and hence the octavo edition by Gerard of Mastricht is sometimes confounded with the edition of Professor John James Wetstein, which was published forty years afterwards in two volumes folio.

The editions hitherto described in the present Lecture have all contributed to augment the stock of *materials*; but they left the *text* itself unaltered. The first editor, who applied Mill's critical apparatus to the emendation of the Greek text, was Dr. Edward Wells, Rector of Cotesbach in Leicestershire, who published an edition of the Greek Testament at Oxford, in separate portions, and at different times between 1709 and 1719. It is accompanied with the common English version, corrected according to the Greek readings preferred by the editor. It is further accompanied with a paraphrase and annotations, on which account it is generally classed, not among the editions of the Greek Testament, but among the commentaries on it: and in this view I shall have occasion to speak of it, in the second branch of Theology, as a very useful work. But as it exhibits a corrected text of the Greek Testament, it claims also a place in the present description, though subsequent improvements in sacred criticism have in a great measure superseded the emendations of Dr. Wells.

In 1729 was printed in London another edition of the Greek Testament, with a new text, and an English translation, in which the editor *professed* to have founded his alterations on the authority of Greek manuscripts. It was soon discovered that those professions were false; and the edition has been long consigned to merited oblivion.

But in 1734 a very *respectable* attempt to improve the sacred text was made by Bengel, or, as he is commonly called in England, Bengelius, Professor at the

University of Tübingen in Suabia. In that year he published a quarto edition of the Greek Testament, to which he prefixed an *Introductio in Crisin Novi Testamenti*, and subjoined an *Apparatus criticus*. But the prejudices of that age in respect to sacred criticism, of which we have seen an instance in Whitby's *Examen*, restricted Bengelius in the exercise of his judgment, and imposed on him a law, which defeated in numerous instances the very object of his revision. If the best Greek manuscripts, with the most ancient Fathers and Versions, agree in supporting any particular reading, we must conclude that it is the *genuine* reading, whether that reading were contained, or not, in the manuscripts of Erasmus or the Complutensian editors, whether that reading were contained, or not, either in *their* editions, or in any which *succeeded* them. But such was the importance, which a reading was *then* supposed to derive from having been once in print, and so necessary did this stamp of authority appear, in order to legalise its claim to admission, that no reading was adopted by Bengelius, however great its *critical* authority, unless it had already received the sanction of the *press*. He himself says, "*Ne syllabam quidem, etiamsi mille manuscripti, mille critici juberent, antehac non receptam, adducar ut recipiam.*" But when he came to the Apocalypse, he departed from this rule: and in the *other* books of the New Testament he endeavoured to make compensation by placing under the text—the readings, which he thought the most worthy of notice, and classing them according to their value by the means of

Greek numerals. With respect to his critical apparatus, it was chiefly taken from Mill's Greek Testament, to which however he made some important additions, consisting of extracts from above twenty Greek manuscripts, and from several of the ancient Latin versions, to which were added, for the first time in this edition, some extracts from the Armenian version.

But the edition of Bengelius was shortly superseded by the more important edition of John James Wetstein, who was born and educated in the place, where Erasmus had published his editions of the Greek Testament. In his twentieth year, while a student at Basle, he published a treatise, *De variis Lectionibus Novi Testamenti*: and, when he had finished his studies, he visited the principal libraries of France and England, in search of Greek manuscripts, which he every where collated with great assiduity. The fruits of his researches, containing observations, not only on Greek manuscripts, but on the quotations of the Greek Fathers, and on the ancient versions, were published four years before the edition of Bengelius, being printed at Amsterdam in 1730, by the title, *Prolegomena ad Testamenti Græci editionem accuratissimam, e vetustissimis codicibus manuscriptis denuo procurandam; in quibus agitur de codicibus manuscriptis Novi Testamenti, scriptoribus qui Novo Testamento usi sunt, versionibus veteribus, editionibus prioribus, et claris interpretibus; et proponuntur Animadversiones et Cautiones, ad Examen variarum lectionum Novi Testamenti necessariae*. The bare recital of the title-page

is sufficient to shew the importance of the subjects discussed, and to indicate the expectations, which were excited from an edition of the Greek Testament thus announced by an author so distinguished, as Wetstein, by his learning and talents.

But the edition itself, from various causes, which it is here unnecessary to relate, was retarded more than twenty years. It was at length published in 1751 and 1752, in two folio volumes, at Amsterdam, where Wetstein was then Professor in the College of the Remonstrants. It is divided into four Parts, the first containing the Gospels, the second containing the Epistles of St. Paul, the third containing the Acts of the Apostles with the Catholic Epistles, and the fourth containing the Apocalypse. *Each* of these four Parts is accompanied with Prolegomena, in which the Greek manuscripts are described, that are *quoted* in each Part: and Wetstein's motive to this four-fold division was, that it corresponds with the usual contents of the Greek manuscripts, which seldom comprise the whole New Testament, but contain, some of them the four Gospels only, others only St. Paul's Epistles, others again the Acts of the Apostles with the Catholic Epistles, and lastly, others the Apocalypse alone, though two or more of these portions are sometimes found united in the same manuscript, while on the other hand there are manuscripts, in which the portions are still smaller. The Prolegomena to the first Part, in addition to the description of Greek manuscripts, contain an account of the ecclesiastical writers, and of the ancient versions, which are quoted in

this edition. These Prolegomena, with the *Animadversiones et Cautiones* at the end of the second volume, must be studied by every man, who would fully appreciate the work in question, of which it is impossible to give an adequate notion in the compass of the present Lecture.

The *text* of this edition is precisely the same with the *Elzevir* text, and hence it is called on the title-page *Novum Testamentum Græcum editionis receptæ*. Though Wetstein very considerably augmented the stock of critical materials, though he drew from various sources, which had hitherto remained unopened, though he collated, not by other hands, but by his own, and though few men have possessed a greater share either of learning or of sagacity, yet no alteration was made in the Greek text. He *proposed* indeed alterations, which he inserted in the space between the text and the body of various readings, with reference to the words which he thought should be exchanged for them: and where a reading should, in his opinion, be omitted without the substitution of another, he prefixed to it a mark of *minus* in the text. But these proposed alterations and omissions are in general supported by powerful authority, and are such, as will commonly recommended themselves to an impartial critic. Though among the various readings he has occasionally noted the conjectures of others, he has never ventured a conjecture of his own: nor has he made conjecture in any one instance the basis of a proposed alteration.

The charge therefore, which has been laid to

Wetstein, of proposing (not making) alterations in the text for the mere purpose of obtaining support to a particular creed, is without foundation. Whether an editor is attached or not to the creed of his country, whether he receives pain or pleasure, when he discovers that a reading of the text is supported by *less* authority than a various reading, are questions, with which the reader is only so far concerned, as they may affect the *conduct* of the editor in his office of *critic*. The question of *real* importance is, Does the editor, whether orthodox or heterodox, suffer his religious opinions to influence his judgment, in weighing the evidence for and against any particular word or passage. Now men of *every* religious profession are exposed to the temptation of adopting what they *wish* to adopt, and of rejecting what they *wish* to reject, without sufficient regard to the evidence *against* the one, and *in favour* of the other. Hence greater caution is certainly requisite in our admission of emendations, which favour the editor's religious creed, than in the admission of readings *unconnected* with that creed. That is, we must be more careful to scrutinize, whether such emendations are *really* supported by greater authority, than the readings, which it is proposed to reject. But then we must endeavour in this investigation to abstain, on *our* parts, from the fault, which we suspect in the editor. We must not suffer a bias in an *opposite* direction to mislead our *own* judgment, to magnify or diminish authorities, as they are favourable or unfavourable to the readings, which we *ourselves* would adopt. Now I have been

long in the habit of using Wetstein's Greek Testament; I have at least *endeavoured* to weigh carefully the evidence for the readings, which I have had occasion to examine; yet I have *always* found that the alterations proposed by Wetstein were supported by *respectable* authority, and in general by *much better* authority, than the correspondent readings of the text. The merits therefore of Wetstein, as a *critic*, ought not to be impeached by ascribing to him undue influence in the choice of his readings. His merits, as a critic, undoubtedly surpass the merits of his predecessors: he *alone* contributed more to advance the criticism of the Greek Testament, than all who had gone before him: and this task he performed, not only without support, either public or private, but during a series of severe trials, under which a mind of less energy than Wetstein's would infallibly have sunk. In short, he gave a new turn to the criticism of the Greek Testament, and laid the foundation, on which later editors have built. That mistakes and oversights are discoverable in the work detracts not from its general merits. No work is without them: and least of all can consummate accuracy be expected, where so many causes of error never ceased to operate.—Such are Wetstein's merits as a *critic*. As an *interpreter* of the New Testament, in his *explanatory* Notes, he shews himself in a different and less favourable light: but *this* subject must be deferred till we come to the *second* Branch of Theology.

The emendations, which Wetstein had *proposed*, were *adopted* by Mr. Bowyer, a learned printer in

London, who inserted them in the text of his edition published eleven years afterwards. And as these emendations were founded on the authority of Greek manuscripts, Mr. Bowyer gave to his edition the following title, *Novum Testamentum Græcum, ad fidem Græcorum solum Codicum Manuscriptorum nunc primum expressum, adstipulante Johanne Jacobo Wetsteno, &c.*

The history of our second period has now been conducted to the year 1763. The remaining and most *important* part of it will be given in the next Lecture.

20

LECTURE VIII.

THE preceding Lecture having concluded with the account of Wetstein's emendations adopted in Bowyer's edition, our attention must now be directed to the literary labours of Dr. Griesbach, Professor of Divinity at Jena in Saxony. The first display of his critical ability was made in a short treatise on the manuscripts of the four Gospels, which were used by Origen, entitled, *De Codicibus quatuor Evangeliorum Origenianis*, published in 1771 at Halle in Saxony, where Griesbach had studied, and where he afterwards published his editions of the Greek Testament.

In 1774 he published a Synopsis, or Harmony of the three first Gospels, with an amended text, and a selection of various readings; to which were added, likewise with an amended text and a selection of readings, the Gospel of St. John, and the Acts of the Apostles. In the year following he published in the same manner, the Epistles and the Apocalypse. And, as the Synopsis, though in itself a very useful work, and deservedly re-published, yet formed a contrast with the other books of the New Testament, he printed in

1777 the three first Gospels entire. Such were the component parts of what is called Griesbach's first editio of the Greek Testament, of which it was necessary to give a short account, though our examination of Griesbach's merits as a critical editor, must be reserved for the description of his second and more important edition.

It may be useful however to observe that Griesbach's object was not to *supersede* the edition of Wetstein, which in many respects retains its original value. But as the purchase of two folio volumes, which were daily growing scarcer and dearer, was impracticable for students in general, who yet *ought* to be provided with *some* means of information on the existing state of the Greek text, he determined for that purpose to prepare a portable edition, which might suit the convenience of every reader. In the critical apparatus of *such* an edition could be expected only a *selection* of the most *important* readings, and a *particular* citation only of the *chief* authorities. It was sufficient that the choice was made with judgment. Both the readings and the authorities were selected from Wetstein's edition: but they were revised and augmented by subsequent collations, of which the principal were supplied by Griesbach himself. And as the notion, that the Elzevir text required no amendment, had gradually subsided since the editions of Bengelius, Wetstein, and Bowyer, the selection of various readings, and the authorities, on which they were founded, were applied by Griesbach to the emendation of the text. With what *success* the application

has been made, we shall consider hereafter, when we come to the *second* edition, of which the first volume was printed after an interval of *twenty*, and the second after an interval of *thirty* years.

In the mean time the stock of critical materials was very considerably augmented by the editions of Matthæi, Alter, and Birch, of which it is the more necessary to give some account, as the materials, which they provided, were all transferred into Griesbach's second edition.

But before we proceed to the description of *their* editions, the order of time requires us at least to notice an edition of the Greek Testament, which, though it did not furnish any new *materials*, contained a new *revision of the text*, and is therefore entitled to a place in the present history. I mean the edition of Dr. Harwood, of which the first volume was published in 1776, the second in 1784. Now this learned editor, instead of applying, like Wetstein, Bowyer, and Griesbach, the *whole* of the critical apparatus already provided, selected the Codex Bezae as his chief authority in the Gospels and the Acts, and the Codex Claromontanus in St. Paul's Epistles. But no *single* manuscript, however ancient or respectable, can determine the question, whether a reading be genuine : for *this* determination must be made by the *comparative* evidence of *all* our authorities. Dr. Harwood's revision therefore is of little or no value.

The edition of the Greek Testament, published by Matthæi, who was Professor, first at Moscow, and afterwards at Wittenberg, was printed at Riga, in

twelve octavo volumes, at different times between 1782 and 1788. This very learned editor, who was educated at Leipzig under the celebrated John Augustus Ernesti, commenced his work under various disadvantages, which had material influence on his formation of the Greek text. When invited from Leipzig to Moscow by the Empress Catharine, he had not directed his attention to the peculiar department of *sacred* criticism, and was therefore unacquainted with the progress, which had been made in this branch of learning. And when the numerous manuscripts of the Greek Testament, which he found at Moscow, especially in the library of the Synod, suggested the thought of publishing a new edition, he had no longer access to the works, which might have furnished the necessary knowledge. Neither the edition of Wetstein, nor even that of Mill could be procured in his new situation : and the only collection of various readings supplied there by any former editor, was that of Bishop Fell, as reprinted in Gregory's edition. When he attempted therefore emendations in the received text, his emendations were chiefly founded on the authority of the manuscripts, which he himself collated at Moscow.

Now the Russian Church being a daughter of the Greek Church, the Moscow manuscripts were of course collected from Constantinople, and other parts of the Greek empire. They belong therefore to that particular class, which modern critics have called the *Byzantine* edition, and which cannot be entitled to the *exclusive* privilege of ascertaining what is genuine or

spurious. The Greek Fathers who lived at Alexandria, the Greek manuscripts which accord with their quotations, and those ancient versions which harmonize with both, have *at least* an *equal* claim to our attention. Nor ought we to decide before we have heard the evidence of a *third* class of manuscripts, containing the Greek text accompanied with the ancient Latin version. The application therefore of the Moscow manuscripts *alone*, after Mill and Wetstein had supplied such a fund of materials derived from *other* sources, was an undertaking both injudicious and useless. It is true, that when Matthæi collected his own materials, he had not access to those of Mill or Wetstein : yet he knew at least of their *existence*, and ought not to have amended without them. But having *done* so, and having thus incurred the censure of men more experienced in sacred criticism, especially of Michaelis and Griesbach, he resolved to defend himself, by *vilifying* the sources, from which, when he began to publish, it was not in his *power* to draw. To the class of manuscripts, to which the Codex Bezaë, the Codex Claromontonus, and others of high antiquity belong, he gave in his Preface to St. John's Gospel the appellation of *editio scurrilis* : nor are softer epithets applied by him to the critics, who ventured to defend such manuscripts. The antipathy, which he thus acquired, deterred him, even after his return to Germany, which was before the publication of the four last-printed volumes, from making that use of Wetstein's edition, which it was *then* in his power to do, and which he probably *would* have done, if he

had possessed it at the *commencement* of his labours. It is much to be lamented, that so distinguished a scholar should have been led, either by necessity or by choice, to make so partial an application of critical materials. Whatever opinion be formed of the *relative* value attached to the different classes of Greek manuscripts, whether the opinion of Michaelis and Griesbach on the *one* hand, or of Matthæi on the *other* hand be the true one, the *fact*, that Matthæi undertook a revision of the Greek text on the authority of *one* set of manuscripts, must remain undisputed. And since no impartial judge can admit, that the genuine text of the Greek Testament may be established, as well by applying only a *part* of our materials, as by a judicious employment of the whole, the edition of Matthæi is only so far of importance, as it furnishes new materials for future uses; materials indeed, which are accompanied with much useful information, and many learned remarks.

About the same period, namely in 1786 and 1787, Professor Alter at Vienna published an edition of the Greek Testament in two thick octavos. The text of this edition is neither the common text, nor a revision of it, but a mere copy from a single manuscript, and that not a very ancient one, in the Imperial Library at Vienna. The various readings, which are not arranged as in other editions, but are printed in separate parcels as first made by the collator, are likewise derived from Greek manuscripts in the Imperial Library. And the whole collation was augmented by extracts from the Coptic, the Slavonian, and the Latin

versions, which are also printed in the same indigested manner, as the *Greek* readings. Alter's edition therefore contains *mere* materials for future uses.

While Matthæi was employed at Moscow and Alter at Vienna, Professors Birch and Alder were engaged by the late King of Denmark to travel into Italy, and Professors Moldenhawer and Tychsen to travel into Spain, in search of *further* materials for the criticism of the Greek Testament. For this purpose they examined the principal libraries in Venice, Florence, Bologna, and Rome, with the library of the Escorial in Spain. The produce of their researches, as far as relates to the four Gospels, was published by Professor Birch at Copenhagen in 1788, in a quarto volume, designed for the first volume of an edition of the Greek Testament: and in the Prolegomena to this volume was given a detailed account of the collated manuscripts. In the *text* of this edition no alterations were made. It contains therefore only *materials* for emendation: and if these materials had been printed by themselves, the same benefit would have accrued to the public at a smaller expense. Indeed the various readings to the other books of the New Testament *were* printed by themselves, though not before 1798, the publication of the *second* volume of the Greek Testament, to which the editor proposed to annex them, having been prevented by the fire at Copenhagen, which destroyed the royal printing-office. Now these extracts, with those printed in the former volume, contain some very important additions to our stock of critical materials. A complete collation is

given of that distinguished manuscript, which is known by the name of *the Codex Vaticanus*, and which till that time, namely in the New Testament, had been only partially examined. Another very important addition consisted in the extracts from a Syriac version, written in a peculiar dialect, which Adler, who collated it at Rome, calls the dialect of Jerusalem. This ancient version, which Adler has minutely described in his *Versiones Syriacæ*, published at Copenhagen in 1789, is chiefly remarkable for its agreement with our Codex Bezaë. Indeed there are eleven readings, hitherto thought peculiar to this manuscript, which are all found in that ancient version. And as the manuscript, to which it has the nearest affinity *after* the Codex Bezaë, is the Codex Vaticanus, its critical value is decided.

In addition to the *new* sources, which were opened in the interval between Griesbach's first and second edition, must be noticed some publications, which contributed to augment or improve the knowledge *already* acquired. Thus the Philoxenian version, which Wetstein had imperfectly collated in manuscript, being printed by Dr. White at Oxford in 1778 (namely the four Gospels, for the other books were deferred more than twenty years,) enabled Griesbach to correct various mistakes in the former collation, and make to it considerable additions. Similar advantages were derived from the publication of some ancient Greek manuscripts, of the Codex Alexandrinus by Woide in London in 1786, of the Codex Boernerianus by Matthæi at Meissen in 1791, and of the Codex Bezaë by Dr. Kipling at Cambridge in 1793.

But after all the *materials* collected for the purpose of obtaining a correct edition of the Greek Testament, materials for which all the known libraries in Europe had been searched, and which it had employed nearly three centuries to obtain, there was still wanted an *editor* of sufficient learning, acuteness, industry, and impartiality in the weighing of evidence, to apply those materials to their proper object. Dr. Griesbach, by his *first* edition of the Greek Testament, had already afforded convincing proofs of his critical ability: and hence the learned in general, especially in his *own* country, regarded him as the person, who was best qualified to undertake this new revision of the Greek text. Indeed the subject had formed the business of his life. Like Wetstein, when he had finished his academical studies, he travelled into France and England, for the purpose of collating manuscripts of the New Testament. But as the stock of materials was *then* very considerably larger, than when *Wetstein* commenced his literary labours, it was not so much his object to *increase*, as to *revise*, the apparatus already provided. For this purpose he re-examined the most ancient manuscripts, wherever doubts might be entertained, and it was important to ascertain the truth. The peculiar readings, which distinguish one class of manuscripts from another, and are the basis on which that classification is formed, were likewise objects of particular attention. But he in general disregarded the mass of readings, which are common to most manuscripts, as serving rather to encumber, than to improve our critical apparatus. At the same time,

whenever uncollated manuscripts presented themselves to his notice, he neglected not to extract what was worthy of attention. The fruits of his researches, with his remarks on the examined manuscripts, he published in two octavo volumes printed at Halle in 1785 and 1793 under the following title: *Symbolæ criticæ, ad supplendas et corrigendas variarum Novi Testamenti lectionum collectiones: accedit multorum Novi Testamenti codicum Græcorum descriptio et examen*. This work contains the principles, on which Griesbach has founded his critical system; and consequently should be studied by every man, who attempts to form an estimate of his critical merits.

As the quotations from the Greek Testament, which are scattered in the writings of the most ancient Greek Fathers, are of great importance in ascertaining the genuineness of disputed passages, he undertook a new and complete collation of the works of Origen, which he also published in his *Symbolæ criticæ*, accompanied with the quotations of Clement of Alexandria, which differed from the common text.

Further, as the testimony of the most ancient Latin versions, such as those, which have been published by Blanchini and Sabatier, are, in many cases, important to the Greek text, he undertook a new collation of those ancient versions. Of the Sahidic version, or the version in the dialect of the Upper Egypt, he quoted the readings, which had been furnished by Woide, Georgi, and Münster. Of the Armenian version a new collation was made for him by Bredenkamp of Bremen: and the Slavonian version was collated

for him, both in manuscript, and in print, by Dobrowsky at Prague. Nor must we neglect to mention the fragments of two very ancient Greek manuscripts, preserved at Wolfenbüttel, which Knittel had published with his Fragment of the Gothic version.

Such were the materials, which Griesbach applied to his second and last edition of the Greek Testament, in addition to the apparatus, which was already contained in Wetstein's edition, and which was subsequently augmented by the editions described in this Lecture. The *first* volume of Griesbach's second edition, containing the four Gospels, was published in 1796; the *second* volume, containing the other books of the New Testament, was published in 1806. The *place* of publication was Halle, the same bookseller, who had purchased the copy-right of the *first* edition, having purchased also the copy-right of the *second*. And as a *part* of the impression, (which was taken off on a better paper sent by his Grace the Duke of Grafton) was destined for sale in England, the name of London as well as of Halle was put on the title-page. But, what is more important than either the *paper* or the place of *publication*, it was *printed* at Jena under Griesbach's *immediate* inspection.

There is a question however in reserve, of still greater consequence than the extent or the value even of the *critical* materials; and that is, Have those materials been *properly applied* to the emendation of the Greek text? That they were *conscientiously* applied, is admitted by every man, to whom Griesbach's character is known. His scrupulous integrity, as a man

and as a scholar, is sufficient guarantee for the honest application of them. Nor have his contemporaries ever questioned either his learning, or his judgment, if we except Matthæi, who wrote under the influence of personal animosity. Of the emendations, which he has introduced, there are many, which had received the approbation even of the *early* editors, Erasmus and Beza; others had been approved by Mill; others again by Bengelius; and most of them by Wetstein and Bowyer. That on the other hand, there are many, on which the opinion of Griesbach differs even from that of Wetstein, may be explained from the operation of three causes, which it is here necessary to assign.

In the *first* place, the augmentation of the critical apparatus since the death of Wetstein, and the consequent alteration in the relative evidence for different readings to the same passage, must in *some* cases have made an alteration in their respective claims to authenticity. *Another* difference was occasioned by the circumstance of Wetstein's entertaining a suspicion, that the Codex Alexandrinus, the Codex Bezae, and some other very ancient manuscripts contained a Greek text, which had been altered from the Latin version. That this suspicion is ungrounded, has been clearly shewn, both by Griesbach in his *Symbolæ criticæ*, and by Woide in his Preface to the Codex Alexandrinus. And it is manifest, that, when we are weighing our authorities, our decisions will be greatly affected by the rejection on the one hand, or by the admission on the other, of such manuscripts,

as those, which I have just mentioned. But the *third* cause was more powerful in its operation, than either of the preceding: and as this third cause forms the basis of Griesbach's critical system, it must be more fully explained.

In determining the *quantum* of evidence for or against a particular reading, the authorities used to be rather *numbered* than *weighed*; so that, if a reading were contained in *thirty* manuscripts out of *fifty*, the scale was supposed to turn in its favour. It is true, that under similar circumstances, more importance was attached to *ancient*, than to *modern* manuscripts: but the modes of *estimating* that importance were so various, that the same premises not unfrequently led to different conclusions. Nor was due attention paid to that necessary distinction between the antiquity of a *manuscript*, and the antiquity of its *text*. Wetstein, in his *Animadversiones et Cautiones*, annexed to his Greek Testament, went a great way toward the reducing of sacred criticism to a regular system. But much still remained to be performed, for which we are indebted to Semler, who laid the foundation, and to Griesbach, who raised the superstructure.

From a comparison and combination of the readings exhibited by Wetstein it was discovered, that certain *characteristic* readings distinguished certain manuscripts, fathers, and versions; that *other* characteristic readings pointed out a *second* class; *others* again a *third* class of manuscripts, fathers, and versions. It was further discovered, that this three-fold classification had an additional foundation in respect to

the *places*, where the manuscripts were written, the fathers lived, and the versions were made. Hence the three classes received the names of *Recensio Alexandrina*, *Recensio Constantinopolitana* or *Byzantina*, and *Recensio Occidentalis*: not that any *formal* revision of the Greek text is known, either from history or from tradition, to have taken place, at Alexandria, at Constantinople, or in Western Europe. But whatever *causes*, unknown to us, may have operated in producing the effect, there is no doubt of its *existence*: there is no doubt that those characteristic readings are really contained in the manuscripts, fathers, and versions, and that the classification, which is founded on them, is founded therefore on truth. Hence arises a *new* criterion of authenticity. A majority of *individual* manuscripts can no longer be considered, either as decisive, or even as very important on this subject. A majority of the *Recensions*, or as we should say of printed books, a majority of the *Editions*, is alone to be regarded, as far as *number* is concerned. The testimony of the individual manuscripts is applied to ascertain what *is* the reading of this or that Edition: but the question of *fact* being once determined, it ceases to be of consequence what *number of manuscripts* may be produced, either of the first, or of the second, or of the third of those Editions. For instance, when we have once ascertained that any particular reading belongs both to the Alexandrine and to the Western, but not to the Byzantine Edition, the authority of that reading will not be weakened, even though it should appear on counting the manuscripts.

that the number of those, which range themselves under the Byzantine Edition, is ten times greater, than that of the other two united. We must argue in this case, as we argue in the comparison of *printed* editions, where we simply inquire, what are the *readings* of this or that edition, and never think of asking for the purpose of *criticism*, how *many copies* were struck off at the office, where it was printed. The *relative value* of those three editions must likewise be considered. For if any one of them, the Byzantine for instance, to which most of the modern manuscripts belong, carries with it less weight than either of the other two, a proportional deduction must be made, whether it be thrown into the scale by itself, or in conjunction with another.—Such are the *outlines* of that system, which Griesbach has applied to the criticism of the Greek Testament. The subject is so new, and at the same time so intricate, that it is hardly possible to give more than a *general* notion of it in a public Lecture. It requires long and laborious investigation: but it is an investigation, which every biblical scholar will readily undertake, when he considers, that it involves the question, What is the genuine text of the New Testament?

As the classification of manuscripts, fathers, and versions, with all its concomitant circumstances, supplies us with the rules of *external* evidence, an examination of the *causes* which produced the variations of the text, suggests the laws or canons of *internal* evidence. Thus a knowledge of the fact, that transcribers have in general been more inclined to *add* than to

omit, suggests the canon, that, where different readings are of unequal lengths, the shorter is *probably* the genuine. Again a knowledge of the fact, that transcribers were disposed to exchange the Hebraisms of the New Testament for purer Greek, suggests the canon, that, when of two readings the one is *oriental*, the other *classical*, the former is the genuine reading, the latter a correction. Further, as it is more probable that an *easy* reading should be substituted for a *hard* one, than the contrary, the latter, as far as internal evidence goes, deserves the preference. And whether alterations be ascribed to design or to accident, we must consider, when we meet with several readings to the same passage, which of them might most easily have given rise to the others. For, if by supposing that *one* in particular is the ancient reading, we can account for the origin of the rest, and the same supposition, when applied to *any other*, affords not a similar solution, the reading, to which it *does* apply, acquires from this circumstance an argument in its favour.

But neither *external* nor *internal* evidence can be estimated alone. They must be weighed *together*: and we must be careful to ascertain the momentum, which belongs to each. Sometimes the *external* evidence is at variance with the *internal*: at other times the sources of external evidence are at variance among themselves: and in all these cases very extensive knowledge, and the most strict impartiality are necessary for the adjustment of their respective claims.

That Griesbach has fulfilled the duties, which in

these respects he owed to the public, that his diligence was unremitted, that his caution was extreme, that his erudition was profound, and that his judgment was directed by a sole regard to the evidence before him, will *in general* be allowed by those, who have studied his edition, and are able to appreciate its merits. That his decisions are *always* correct, that *in all cases* the evidence is so nicely weighed as to produce unerring results, that weariness of mind under painful investigation has *in no instance* occasioned an important oversight, that prejudice or partiality has *no where* influenced his general regard for critical justice, would be affirmations, which can hardly apply to *any* editor, however good or great. But, *if* at any time he has erred, he has at the same time enabled those, who are competent judges, to decide for themselves, by stating the contending evidence with clearness and precision. Emendations founded on conjecture, however ingenious, he has introduced not in a single instance: they are *all* founded on quoted authority. Our attention is even solicited and directed to that authority, the *adopted* readings being always printed in *smaller* characters than the rest of the text, and with reference to the *rejected* readings, which are printed in the inner margin in the *same* letters with the text, while both of them refer to the respective evidence, which is produced below. If readings are added, where none existed before, or are withdrawn without substitution, the changes are marked with equal clearness, and are equally supported by critical authority. When the evidence is not sufficiently de-

cisive to warrant an alteration in the text, the readings worthy of notice are placed in the inner margin, with different marks expressive of their different claims.

Whoever proposes to use this edition (and it should be used by every biblical scholar) will find in the Prolegomena a more complete description, both of the critical apparatus, and of the mode of applying it. I have been already so diffuse on this subject, that it is time to close it. But let not the attention, which has been given to it, be given in vain. The edition thus minutely described is the most important, which has been hitherto published: nor is it probable, that during the lives even of the youngest of my hearers any other critical edition should supersede it. From the exertions, which have been already made, it is not likely that new materials of much importance should be brought to light: and even if there should, it is still less likely, that *another* such editor should be found to arrange and digest them.

Having thus finished the *history* of the Greek text, I shall describe in the next Lecture the criticism of the Greek Testament, according to its several *departments*; and at the same time shall enumerate the authors, which respectively belong to them.

The result of Scholz's

by Dr. J. J. Griesbach

1803

23 1/31

LECTURE IX.

IN the account of the plan, which I proposed to observe throughout the course of these Lectures, they were represented as a BOOK OF DIRECTIONS, from which in the first place might be learned the *order and connexion*, in which Theology should be studied, and in the next place might be derived a knowledge of the *authors*, who have best explained the several subjects. With this knowledge of authors it was further proposed to unite “a knowledge of the advancement or decline of theological learning, a knowledge of how much or how little has been performed in the different ages of Christianity.”

Agreeably to this plan I have hitherto treated the *criticism* of the Bible, which was shewn in the second Lecture to be the *primary* branch of Theology. During the early and the middle ages, it was described in the order of time, as critics and criticism successively presented themselves to our view. But as authors have multiplied since the invention of printing beyond all comparison with former periods, perspicuity required a separation of the subjects in the de-

scription of the three last centuries, though the order of time has still been preserved. The criticism of the *Greek Testament*, which demands our peculiar attention, was selected as the *first* object: and the history of the Greek text from the Complutensian edition in 1514 to that of Griesbach which was finished in 1806, has employed more than three Lectures. But though the labour and the researches necessary for this description have been no less extensive, than for a dissertation adorned with all the pomp of learning, it has been my chief endeavour to give as plain and as popular an account, as the subject would admit. I have rather studied to excite a taste for biblical criticism, by presenting it in an easy and acceptable form, than to assume the garb of erudition, which, by magnifying the difficulties of the task, might have deterred my hearers from engaging in it. Nor did the plan, which I proposed to adopt *generally* in these Lectures, require more than an introductory narrative, though perhaps in the present instance the *execution* of the plan has in some measure exceeded the original *design*. Whether *more* or *less* has been performed, than was expected, it is necessary in the present Lecture to fulfil *another* part of the general plan, and to give some account of the authors, who have illustrated the criticism of the Greek Testament, according to its several departments.

But before we enter on the proposed enumeration, we must guard against the difficulties and contradictions, arising from the different lights, in which biblical criticism has been viewed by different writers. It

was observed in the second Lecture, that the operations of *criticism* and the operations of *interpretation* are so distinct, that they ought not, however subdivided, to be placed in the same class. But this distinction is so far from being generally observed, that *many* if not *most* English writers, use the term “biblical criticism” in so extensive a sense as to include also *biblical interpretation*, especially when the interpretation relates to the original languages of the Bible. It is true, that no inconvenience will arise from this application of the term, if care be taken to keep *separate* the subjects, which it is thus made to *comprehend*. But though *some* writers, who use the term in this extensive sense, (for instance Dr. Gerard) have made the proper distinctions, there are *other* writers, who, in consequence of their using *one name* for *different things*, have treated them indiscriminately, and thence have perplexed both themselves and their readers. To prevent such confusion I have in these Lectures invariably used the term “biblical or sacred criticism” in its proper and confined sense, namely as the sum and substance of that knowledge, which enables us to ascertain the genuineness of a disputed text. That *this* is the sense in which the term is here used, appears not only from the explanation of it in the *second* Lecture, but from the constant application of it in all the *subsequent* Lectures.

The operations of *criticism* having been thus distinguished from those of *interpretation*, we may now deduce an additional argument in favour of that priority, which has been given to the study of the for-

mer. Throughout the description of *this* branch of Theology, no position has been *taken for granted* out of any *other* branch. But when we enter on the *second* branch, or the *interpretation* of the Bible, we shall be *frequently* obliged, unless our inquiries are superficial, to refer to the *criticism* of the Bible. We shall frequently be obliged to determine the true *reading* of a passage, before we can determine its true *meaning*. “*Interpretationem* veram frustra quærimus, ubi de verâ *lectione* dubitamus.” This very just observation is made by Dr. Kennicott in his *Dissertatio generalis*, who immediately adds, “*Statuatur vera lectio, et hanc presse sequatur vera interpretatio.*” Since then an *interpreter* of the Greek Testament should be *previously* acquainted with the *criticism* of the Greek Testament, and so much knowledge in respect to the *criticism* of the Greek Testament, as is necessary to form a tolerable judgment of the text, may be acquired even *before* we enter on the business of interpretation, we can no longer hesitate on the question, where our theological studies should begin.

Let it not be objected, that the laws of criticism can hardly be understood, and much less applied to a passage of the Greek Testament, by those, who are not already able to construe it. These Lectures are addressed in particular to an audience, where it may be safely pre-supposed, that every one is already able to *construe* the Greek Testament, able therefore, both to comprehend the nature of the various readings, and to understand what is meant, when he is informed, that such and such readings are supported by such

and such authorities. But to *construe* and to *interpret* a passage are two distinct things. To the latter something more is wanted, than a readiness at the former: otherwise the English translation, which is Greek construed into English, would be sufficient without other assistance. It is true, that the further we advance in the *interpretation* of the Bible, the better we shall be qualified to *criticise* on the Bible. But does it follow, that, because the *highest excellence* in criticism is not to be obtained till we are conversant with another branch of Theology, we must therefore defer the study of its *principles*, till that other branch is completed? Has it not been shewn, that without criticism this other branch never *can* be completed? We must distinguish between the *acquirement* of knowledge, and that readiness, that certainty in the *application* of it, which can only be obtained by long experience.

It is surely desirable even at the *commencement* of our theological studies to be provided with the best critical edition of the Greek Testament, as being the edition most *likely* to contain the *genuine text*. And as this edition not unfrequently differs from the common text, which we ought in no case to reject *without reason*, it is our primary duty to obtain as much information, as may enable us to form *some* judgment on the question, whether there is reason or not for the proposed alterations. For this purpose it is not required, that we should undertake the drudgery of collating either manuscripts, fathers, or versions. This *labour* of criticism is performed to our hands: we

have only to learn what others have already *done*, and to *understand* what has been done, that we may know whether it is *well* or *ill* done. The more *convenient* and *expeditious* mode of studying theology is certainly to take for granted on the bare assertion of those, who are supposed acquainted with the subject, that such and such readings are genuine, and that such and such readings are spurious. It is likewise a more convenient and expeditious mode of studying *mathematics*, when a pupil confiding in the assertion of his tutor, that the properties ascribed to the conic sections are founded in truth, proceeds to Newton's Principia, without learning to *demonstrate* those properties. And this confidence, this deference to the judgment of others is not uncommon, in Mathematics as well as in Divinity. But neither in the one case, nor in the other, will this confidence be attended with *conviction*. Now the *avowed* object of these Lectures is to *produce* conviction. If it only be desired, in the shortest possible time to learn enough of Divinity to pass an examination, the well-known publication of Dr. Arthur St. George is much better fitted for the purpose.

Even that portion of sacred criticism, which in its *application* belongs to the third branch of Divinity, or the authenticity of the Bible, is in its *principles* so connected with verbal criticism, that the basis, on which they rest, is nearly one and the same. From the criticism of *words* we ascend to the criticism of *sentences*, from the criticism of *sentences* to the criticism of *chapters*, and from the criticism of *chapters* to the criticism of *whole books*. To illustrate this as-

cent, an example of each will be sufficient. If we turn to Griesbach's Greek Testament at Matth. xxviii. 19. we shall find the passage thus worded: Πορευθεντες μαθητευσατε παντα τα εθνη βαπτιζοντες αυτους εις το ονομα του Πατρος, και του Υιου και του αγιου Πνευματος, where the whole difference from the common text consists in the omission of the particle *ουν*. This omission is founded on the authority, not only of many ancient Greek manuscripts, but of the ancient Greek Fathers, Origen, Athanasius, Basil, Chrysostom, and Cyril, who are expressly quoted for this purpose. From the criticism of the particle *ουν*, which is probably spurious, we ascend to the criticism of the whole passage, which is undoubtedly genuine. For if Origen, who was born in the century after that in which St. Matthew wrote, found the passage in *his* manuscript of the Gospels, with the exception only of a particle, and the Greek Fathers of the fourth century found it worded in the same manner in *their* manuscripts, we have as strong a proof of its authenticity, as can be given or required in works of antiquity. *This* passage therefore, which includes the three persons of the Trinity, rests on a very different foundation from that of the similar passage in the fifth chapter of St. John's first Epistle, a passage, which no ancient Greek manuscript contains, and which no ancient Greek Father ever saw.

From the criticism of *sentences* we ascend to the criticism of *chapters*. It is well known, that attempts have been made to invalidate the testimony which the two first chapters of St. Matthew's Gospel bear to the

doctrine of the incarnation, by contending, that those chapters were not original parts of St. Matthew's Gospel, but were prefixed to it by some other person, at some later period. Now, if we turn to the second volume of Griesbach's *Symbolæ criticæ*, where he quotes the readings of the Greek Testament from Clement of Alexandria and Origen, we shall find a quotation from the *first* chapter of St. Matthew's Gospel, and a reference to the *second*, made by Celsus the Epicurean philosopher, which quotation and reference are noted by Origen, who wrote in answer to Celsus. "Hinc patet (says Griesbach very justly) duo priora Matthæi capita Celso nota fuisse." Now if Celsus, who wrote his celebrated work against the Christians in the time of Marcus Aurelius, and consequently little more than an hundred years after St. Matthew himself wrote, yet found the two first chapters in *his* manuscript of St. Matthew's Gospel, those chapters must either have been *original* parts of St. Matthew's Gospel, or they must have been added at a time so little antecedent to the age of Celsus, that a writer so inquisitive, so sagacious, and at the same time so inimical to Christianity, could not have failed to *detect* the imposture. But in this case he would not have quoted those chapters as parts of St. Matthew's Gospel. Consequently the truth must lie in the *other* part of the dilemma, namely that those chapters are *authentic*.

From the criticism of *chapters* we may further ascend to the criticism of *whole books*. If we again consult Griesbach's collection of readings from Clem-

ent of Alexandria and Origen, we shall find that these very ancient Fathers had not only manuscripts of the Greek Testament, but manuscripts of the *same* Greek Testament, which we possess at present; not indeed the same throughout in words, but the same in their general contents, the same in the leading doctrines of the Christian Faith. In *this* manner does the study of sacred criticism contribute to the discovery of those means, by which we gradually establish the truth of Christianity.

After these preliminary observations, we may enter on the enumeration of the authors, who have illustrated the criticism of the Greek Testament, according to its several departments.

Of *general* and *elementary* treatises, there is none, which is more to be recommended, either for perspicuity or correctness, than the institutes of Biblical criticism, published at Edinburgh in 1808, in one volume octavo, by Dr. Gerard, Professor of Divinity at Aberdeen.

A knowledge of the *editions* of the Greek Testament may be taken from Le Long's *Bibliotheca sacra*. Le Long, who was one of the Fathers of the Oratory at Paris, published his *first* edition of this work at the beginning of 1709 in two *octavo* volumes: and before the end of that year a new edition of it appeared at Leipzig with additions by Dr. Boerner. In twelve years from the publication of the first edition, Le Long had further augmented his work by such an accession of materials, as to increase it to two *folio* volumes, which were published at Paris in 1723, two

years after the death of the author. The first volume of this *folio* edition contains an account of the then-known manuscripts of the Hebrew Bible, with the editions of it to the beginning of the eighteenth century; an account of the then-known manuscripts of the Greek Testament, with the editions of it to the same period; an account of the oriental and other ancient versions, both of the Old and New Testament; and lastly an account of the translations of the Bible into the modern languages. Works of this description are of great utility to the biblical scholar: but new editions of them, or at least *supplements* to them are frequently wanted, to register the accessions, which are continually made to the stock of biblical literature. After an interval of more than fifty years, Dr. Andrew Masch, Superintendent of the diocese of Stargard at New Strelitz, selected for publication those parts of the Bibliotheca sacra, which relate to the *printed editions*; namely the editions of the Hebrew Bible, of the Greek Testament, of the ancient versions, and of the modern Latin versions. In fact those parts were made only the basis of a publication, which may be considered rather as a new *work*, than as a new *edition*. It was published at Halle in six quarto volumes, the first in 1778, the last, which contains the chronological index, in 1790. *All* the editions of the Greek Testament, to the time of its publication, are enumerated in the first volume, and the *principal* editions are described. This volume is the standard book, whence subsequent writers have chiefly derived the accounts which they have given of the

editions of the Greek Testament: and it is composed with so much care and accuracy, that we may in general depend on it. But little or no information can be derived from it in respect to the *critical* history of the Greek text, though it is of great value in respect to the *external* history of the editions.—In this respect, the principal editions of the Greek Testament are very well described in Dibdin's Introduction to the Greek and Latin Classics. A neat and correct account of some of the principal editions is likewise given in Butler's *Horæ Biblicæ*. A short account of the editions of the Greek Testament to the year 1790 is also given in the last edition of Fabricii *Bibliotheca Græca*, at the end of the fourth volume. A view, though an imperfect one, of the principal editions of the Greek Testament is annexed by Dr. Harwood to his *own* edition. In the sixth volume of that very useful publication, the *Bibliographical Dictionary*, is a very copious catalogue of the editions of the Greek Testament accompanied with instructive remarks. Many other catalogues might be added; but it will be sufficient, if we close the account with the *Bibliotheca biblica serenissimi Wuertenbergensium Ducis, olim Lorkiana*, published by Adler at Altona in 1787. It is a catalogue of great merit, and great utility.

Of the *manuscripts* of the Greek Testament, as far as they were known an hundred years ago, a description is given in the folio edition of the *Bibliotheca sacra*. But the number of manuscripts, which have been collected since that period, is so great, and our knowledge of manuscripts in general has so increased,

that only a small part of the necessary information can now be derived from that work : for the last edition of the *Bibliotheca sacra*, as was before observed, contains no account of manuscripts. To obtain a *complete* knowledge of all the collated manuscripts of the Greek Testament, we must consult the Prolegomena or Prefaces to the editions of Mill, Wetstein, Matthæi, Birch, and Griesbach, with Griesbach's *Symbolæ criticae*. Wetstein's Prolegomena have been published separately in an octavo volume in 1764, at Halle, by Dr. Semler, Professor of Divinity in that University, who accompanied the edition with many valuable notes. But there is no work, from which a *general* knowledge of the manuscripts of the Greek Testament can be derived in so easy a manner, as from the Introduction of Michaelis, of which the second volume contains a descriptive catalogue alphabetically arranged. It would be tedious to enumerate the accounts, which have been published of *single* manuscripts : nor can it be *necessary* at present, as references to such publications may be seen under their respective heads, in the descriptive catalogue just mentioned, either in the author's text or in the translator's notes. But the description of the Codex Alexandrinus, which is given by Woide in the Preface to his edition of it, so surpasses all other descriptions, which have been given of *single* manuscripts, that it merits particular notice. On this account it was printed separately at Leipzig two years afterwards, with notes by Spohn, under the title, *Woidii Notitia Codicis Alexandrini*.

Of the *ancient versions* of the Greek Testament, as far as relates to the printed editions of them, a very full account is given in the second Part of Masch's edition of the *Bibliotheca sacra*. But for a *critical* knowledge of those ancient versions, we must have recourse to the Introduction of Michaelis, where the table of contents prefixed to the second volume will immediately shew where each of them may be found. Indeed the description, which Michaelis has given of the *ancient versions* and of the *manuscripts* of the Greek Testament, is that which constitutes the most distinguished merit of his Introduction. I of course mean the fourth and last edition; for the *first* edition, though still produced in catalogues and lists of theological books, is in these respects of no value whatever.

The *quotations from the Greek Testament* in the works of ecclesiastical writers have been the subject of long and serious controversy. While the Elzevir text was considered as perfect, every deviation from that text was consequently regarded as a deviation from the truth. Whenever it was observed therefore, that a Greek Father quoted the Greek Testament in words, which were not precisely the same as the Elzevir text, it was inferred that in those quotations there was something wrong. And since it is not probable, that the manuscripts used by the Greek Fathers in the second, third, and fourth centuries, should be less conformable than *modern* manuscripts with the autographs of the sacred writers, the differences between those quotations and the Elzevir text were as-

cribed to the *carelessness* of the Fathers, in quoting from their manuscripts. But as it is no longer believed, that the common reading may *always* be defended, the supposition, adopted to account for the deviations in question, has lost its chief support. Examples of inaccuracy may indeed be discovered in *every* writer, whether ancient or modern. But we are only concerned with the *general* practice of the Fathers: we only want to know, whether we may in general, or upon the whole, conclude from their quotations to what was contained in the manuscripts, from which they quoted. When we meet with quotations from our English Bible in the writings of English Divines, we *in general* consider their quotations as fair representations of our English text, though examples of inaccuracy might be easily produced, arising either from their being incorrectly *remembered*, or incorrectly *transcribed*. In like manner, when we meet with quotations from the *Greek* Bible, whether of the Old or New Testament, in the writings of the Greek Fathers, there appears to be no reason for our refusing to consider those quotations as fair representations of their respective copies of the *Greek* text, unless particular circumstances in particular examples interfere to warrant our making an exception. We must likewise recollect, that the Greek Fathers were frequently engaged in controversy, which rendered accuracy in *quotation* peculiarly necessary: for neglect on this point, which could not fail to be detected, would immediately have put arms into the hands of their adversaries. If Justin Martyr in his

Dialogue with Trypho, a work written to convince the Jews that Jesus was the Messiah, had been careless in his quotations from the Greek Bible, the *detection* of their inaccuracy would have defeated the very object he had in view. Again if Origen, in his Answer to Celsus, or Cyril of Alexandria, in his Reply to Julian the Apostate, had been incorrect in their quotations from the Greek Testament, what greater triumph could the enemies of Christianity in those ages have desired, than the exposure of such mistakes. With respect to Justin Martyr, I once had occasion to collate his quotations from the Septuagint with the text of the Codex Vaticanus. The result of this collation, with observations on the subject, is contained in a publication, which was printed seven years ago at Cambridge. At present therefore I shall only observe that Justin's quotations from the Septuagint were found to agree much more closely with the Codex Vaticanus, than the Codex Vaticanus itself agrees with *another* manuscript of the Septuagint, which is next in importance to it, the Codex Alexandrinus.

No man has placed the subject of quotations from the Greek Testament in so clear a light as Griesbach, first in the treatise mentioned in the preceding Lecture, *De Codicibus quatuor Evangeliorum Origenianis*; and secondly in his work entitled, *Curæ in historiam textûs Græci epistolarum Paulinarum*, published at Halle in 1777. The Introduction of Michaelis may likewise be consulted in the chapter appropriated to this subject, though it is less excellent than the chap-

ters which relate to the Greek manuscripts, and the ancient versions. With respect to the Fathers in general, the most information comprised in a small compass is afforded in the *Bibliotheca patristica*, by Dr. John George Walch, Professor of Divinity at Jena, who published it there in 1770 in one volume octavo. It relates to the lives, the writings, the editions, and the various uses of the Fathers, and likewise enumerates the authors, who have explained the particular subjects of inquiry. A more detailed and copious account of their *writings* is contained in Cave's *Historia Literaria*, of which the best edition was printed at Oxford in 1740 and 1743 in two volumes folio. Of the *Greek* Fathers the most ample account is given in the seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth volumes of the new edition of *Fabricii Bibliotheca Græca*. The editor of this work, Professor Harles of Erlangen, has given a short but useful account of the Greek Fathers in the last volume of his *Introductio in Historiam Lingue Græcæ*, which was published at Altenburg in Saxony in 1795. Of the writings of the *Latin* Fathers, and of the different editions of them, the most ample and the most accurate account is given in a work printed at Leipzig in 1792 and 1794 in two large octavos, entitled *Bibliotheca historico-literaria Patrum Latinorum*, by Mr. Schoenemann, one of the librarians at the University of Goettingen. Whoever is desirous of entering into the *controversy* on the quotations of the Fathers will find every thing that can be said *against* them in a work written by Daillé, a French Protestant Clergyman, which was

published at Geneva, first in French in 1632, and afterwards in Latin, at several times, by the title *Dallæus de usu Patrum*. And every thing, which can be said in *favour* of the Fathers is contained in the following work, *Casti Innocentis Ansaldi, Ordinis Prædicatorum, de authenticis sacrarum scripturarum apud sanctos Patres lectionibus, libri duo*; which was published at Verona in 1747 in one volume quarto.

Before I dismiss the subject of quotations, I must notice the difference in the *degrees* of evidence afforded by the Fathers, according to the *language* in which they wrote: and it is the more necessary, as there are several writers, especially in England, who have not perceived the difference. *Direct* testimony to the authenticity of readings in the *Greek* Testament, is afforded only by the *Greek* Fathers, who alone quoted the words of the original. The quotations of the *Latin* Fathers were taken from the *Latin version*, and consequently bear *immediate* evidence to this *version*, or to its readings as contained in *their* copies of it. If therefore we have reason, in any particular place, to believe that this version has been altered or interpolated, the circumstance that Latin writers may be found who *agree* with it in that place in opposition to the Greek manuscripts, is evidence of no value whatsoever. For it is manifest, that wherever a version is *corrupt*, the reading produced from it cannot be genuine.

The three grand sources of various readings to the Greek Testament having been thus explained, with reference to the principal authors, it is necessary

to take *some* notice of *another* source, namely emendation from conjecture. Where a passage is manifestly faulty, and we have only *one* copy of the work, or where, if we have more, they *agree* in the erratum, we have no other means, by which we can even *attempt* to restore the genuine reading, than conjecture. But in the Greek Testament our means of correction from *authority* are so ample, that conjecture is unnecessary : and, if unnecessary, it is injurious, especially in a work, where, if the words might be altered from conjecture, a door would be opened to every species of corruption. For this reason, neither Wetstein proposed, nor Griesbach received, an alteration of words from conjecture. But though it is not allowable in the Greek Testament to alter *words* from conjecture, we are at full liberty to apply it, in regard to the *stops*. For the most ancient manuscripts afford no evidence on this head : and where stops are added, as in modern manuscripts and printed editions, they are founded only on the *judgment* of the writers or editors, which we are at liberty to exercise, as well as they. In *this* respect the critical conjectures, annexed by Mr. Bowyer to his edition of the Greek Testament, and afterwards published with considerable additions in a quarto volume in 1782, are of real value. The remarks above-made in respect to the stops, apply also for the most part, to accents and marks of aspiration.

It now only remains to mention the principal authors, who have written on the *utility*, and the *application* of various readings. The first author, who wrote

systematically on this subject, was Professor Pfaff, of the University of Tübingen in Suabia, whose *Dissertatio critica de genuinis Novi Testamenti lectionibus* was printed at Amsterdam in an octavo volume in 1709. It was published at the commencement of the controversy about the various readings to Mill's Greek Testament: and its principal object was to confute two opposite and equally false positions, the one maintained by the *adversaries* of our religion, that the various readings undermined the authority of the text, the other maintained by its well-meaning but *injudicious friends*, who argued for the perfection of the Elzevir text. The admirable work of Bentley, which was published four years afterwards on this subject, has been noticed in a former Lecture. Another systematic treatise on the subject of various readings is the *Tractatio critica de variis Lectionibus Novi Testamenti caute colligendis et dijudicandis*, published at Halle in a quarto volume in 1749, by Dr. Christian Benedict Michaelis, father to the author of the Introduction to the New Testament. This work goes more into the detail of the subject; it gives rules for the application of the readings, according to their several sources; and is of particular value in respect to the readings of the oriental versions. To the second volume of Wetstein's Greek Testament, which was printed three years afterwards, were annexed the *Animadversiones et Cautiones*, which were mentioned in a former Lecture, and were re-published by Dr. Semler at Halle in 1766, under the title, *Wetstenii libelli ad crisin atque interpretationem Novi*

Testamenti. The *Apparatus Criticus*, which accompanied the edition of the Greek Testament by Bengelius, has likewise been separately published in a quarto volume in 1763 with considerable additions.—Much valuable information may be derived from each of these writers, though it cannot be expected, that they should be unanimous on every point. The criticism of the Greek Testament has made such rapid advances within the last sixty years, that several positions have been found untenable, which had been adopted without reserve, while others have been adopted, of which the earlier writers were uninformed. To obtain a perfect knowledge of it in its present and most correct state, we must study, again and again, the Prolegomena to Griesbach's Greek Testament. Nor should we neglect, if we are able to procure it, Griesbach's *Commentarius criticus in textum Græcum Novi Testamenti*, of which the first Part was published at Jena in 1798. Whether this work has been continued, I am unable from the present interrupted communication with Germany to declare. But, as far as it goes, it admirably elucidates the criticism of the Greek Testament in every passage, and clearly explains the mode, in which Griesbach's system must be applied.

Lastly, let it be observed of verbal criticism, that the value of the labour, which has been employed in collecting various readings, depends neither on the greatness of their number, nor on the diversity of their meaning. If the readings are *numerous*, which alter the sense, they afford the *means* of correction, in

proportion as it is *wanted*. On the other hand, if such readings are *few* in number, the discovery, that they *are* so, is sufficient to pay the *cost* of that discovery.

Having thus exhausted the criticism of the *New Testament*,* I shall proceed in the next Lecture to the criticism of the *Old Testament*.

* As I did not mention in the preceding Lecture Dr. Knapp's edition of the Greek Testament, which was published at Halle in 1797, in one volume octavo, and this edition, as well as Griesbach's, contains a revision of the Elzevir text, it may appear to be a neglect, if it is left wholly unnoticed, though it is very little known in this country. The date of the title-page shews, that it was published a year after the *first* volume of Griesbach's last edition, and nine years before the second; consequently that the learned editor could avail himself of Griesbach's researches as far as the end of St. John's Gospel and no further. Nor are any *authorities* quoted in this edition, either for the readings introduced in the *text* (which are not distinguished, as in Griesbach's edition, by a difference of character,) or for that selection of readings, which the editor thought worthy of notice in the margin. This statement is not intended as a censure, brevity being necessary for the editor's object, which was to furnish the German students with a cheap *pocket* edition. But for the purposes of *criticism* Griesbach's edition must remain the *standard* edition.

An account of re-impressions, or of publications copied from Griesbach's last edition, though it enters into the province of the bibliographer, has no place in a history of the Greek text.

Dr. White's edition of the common text (Oxford 1808, in two volumes octavo,) accompanied, as well with the readings, which Griesbach thought only *equal* to the common text, as with those, which Griesbach thought decidedly *preferable*, and therefore adopted in his own, will more properly come under consideration in the *third* branch of Divinity, when we inquire into the *integrity* of the Greek text.

LECTURE X.

TO ascertain the accuracy of the Hebrew text in the Old Testament, we must proceed by a method similar to that, which was applied to the Greek text in the New Testament. We must consider the *causes*, which have produced the variations in the Hebrew manuscripts, and then the *remedies*, which have been employed to correct them.

As in the Greek Testament so in the Hebrew Bible the various readings have arisen, partly from *accidental*, partly from *designed* alteration. Under the former head may be reckoned, in the first place, the casual omission, addition, exchange, or transposition, of letters, syllables, and words, which no transcriber, however careful, can wholly avoid. The eye is frequently deceived by a similarity in the *form* of different letters. This cause has operated more in the Hebrew Bible, than in the Greek Testament: for the Hebrew letters resemble each other more than the Greek letters. At one time the whole difference consists in the acuteness or obtuseness of an angle; at other times, either on the length, or the straitness of a

line, distinctions so minute, that even when the letters are perfect, mistakes will sometimes happen, and still more frequently when they are inaccurately formed, or are partially effaced. In fact this is one of the most fruitful sources of error in the Hebrew manuscripts, as will appear to every one, who takes only a cursory view of Dr. Kennicott's Bible.

Again, as likeness of *form* occasions mistakes in *reading*, so likeness of *sound* occasions mistakes in *hearing*, when a copyist writes as another dictates. And this cause is likewise more powerful in Hebrew than in Greek, on account of the gutturals, which are less distinguishable, than the sounds of any other class. Another kind of exchange from dictation, which is peculiar to the Hebrew, was the custom of *reading*, in certain cases, differently from what was *written*. For instance, the word Jehovah, which expresses the Being, the Essence, and the Eternity of the Deity, was considered by the Jews as a word too sacred for human utterance: and therefore, whenever they met with this word in the Bible, they read for it another word, expressive not of *God*, but of *Lord*. Hence the latter is frequently found in one Hebrew manuscript, when the former is found in another. Hence also in the Septuagint the word Jehovah is never expressed by Θεός, but uniformly by Κύριος.

Other accidental variations arose from what is called the homœotelson, or the recurrence of the same word after a short interval, which may occasion the omission of the words which lie between. Sometimes abbreviations, sometimes numerical marks were

falsely decyphered: at other times, if the words of the copied manuscripts were written without intervals, they were improperly divided. Lastly, as it was not uncommon to add letters at the end of a line in the Hebrew manuscripts, in order to fill up the space where it was too small for the following word, (it not being usual to write Hebrew words partly in one line partly in another) those *supplementary* letters were sometimes mistaken for letters of the *text*, especially if they were such, as were capable of representing some Hebrew word.

It appears then, that the causes of *accidental* variation must have operated more powerfully in the transcribing of Hebrew, than in the transcribing of Greek manuscripts. On the other hand there is reason to believe, that the *designed* alterations, which have been made in the Hebrew text of the Old Testament, are less numerous, than the similar alterations, which have been made in the Greek text of the New Testament. Indeed it is obvious from Dr. Kennicott's collation, that such alterations have been inconsiderable since the introduction of the Masora. But as no circumspection could *wholly* prevent the liberties, which for various reasons transcribers were inclined to take, those reasons, or causes of alteration, must be distinctly examined. And this examination is the more necessary, as *before* the introduction of the Masora, which cannot be dated higher than the fourth or fifth century, those causes had nothing to counteract them. It is true, that the oldest of the Hebrew manuscripts, *now* extant, are younger by some centuries, than the

Masora. But as these must have been copied from more ancient manuscripts, and those again from manuscripts, which were written *before* the learned Jews of Tiberias, or the Masorets, as they are called from the work which they established, had erected a guard against future innovation, the effects of previous alteration must have still continued to be partially felt, and consequently must have been transmitted to the present age.

Let it not however be imagined, that the alterations, of which we are now speaking, were *intentional corruptions* of the sacred text, or, in other words, alterations introduced with the consciousness, that they *were* corruptions. Such conduct were incompatible with that profound veneration, which the Jews in every age have entertained for the Hebrew scriptures. It is true that such conduct has been *ascribed* to them. The charge *originated* with some of the early Fathers in their controversies with the Jews, who sometimes reproached their Christian adversaries with producing passages from the Greek Bible, which differed from the Hebrew. In such cases the Fathers should have critically examined the words, both of the Hebrew and of the Greek: for an ancient translation *may*, and sometimes *does* retain the genuine reading of a passage, where modern copies of the original have lost it. But no such examination appears to have taken place by those, who were the most strenuous in accusing the Jews. Indeed few of them were *capable* of the examination: and they charged their adversaries with wilful corruption, because they had nothing else

to reply. Now accusations made without proof, are entitled to no credit. Jerom, who of all the fathers was perhaps the best judge of this subject, was certainly of opinion, that the Jews had *not* corrupted the Hebrew scriptures : for in contradistinction to the Septuagint he calls the Hebrew Bible *Veritas Hebraica* : and when he made a new translation, he translated, not from the Greek, but from the Hebrew. Nor was Origen, notwithstanding some expressions, which *seem* to indicate the contrary, of a different opinion from Jerom.

The alterations therefore, of which we are now speaking, are such as have taken place from *erroneous judgment*, from a false opinion in the transcribers, that they were supplying defects, or correcting mistakes. They chiefly arose from the custom of writing notes in the margin of Hebrew manuscripts, which notes were in subsequent copies transferred into the text. These notes were of various kinds. Sometimes, if a city mentioned in the Bible had in the course of ages changed its name, the *new* name was added in the margin of the passage. At another time if an ancient name was still preserved, a note was added to express, that the place was so called to that day. At other times observations were made, which related to history or chronology. Annotations of all these kinds may be still traced in the Pentateuch. They have been quoted indeed by the adversaries of our religion for a different purpose : and, as such readings manifestly betray a later hand, than that of Moses, it has been inferred, that the *books*, which contain them, are

spurious. But such readings *may* be explained, as marginal notes removed into the text : and if the arguments for the authenticity of the Pentateuch are conclusive, they *must* be explained in that manner.

Other marginal annotations were drawn from parallel passages, being added, either to supply the shorter description from the longer, or to explain a difficult by an easy passage. Indeed *explanatory* notes appear to have been added from various sources, taken sometimes from Chaldee paraphrases, at other times from commentaries, at other times again from those allegorical interpretations, to which the Jews gave the title of Medrash. Now such annotations being sometimes mistaken, especially by ignorant transcribers, for parts of the text, which had been accidentally omitted, and afterwards supplied in the margin, were in the next copy transferred, as was supposed, to their proper places.—Or readings of this description might sometimes find their way into the text, even *without* the intervention of a marginal note.

Lastly, there is a source of various readings in the Hebrew manuscripts, which appears to have been equally productive with all the other sources put together, namely the difference in the mode of writing certain Hebrew words. It is to be observed, that the letters Aleph, Vau, and Jod are denominated *matres lectionis*, from their utility in instructing the reader of an *unpointed* manuscript how to pronounce the words, in which those letters are contained. But after the introduction of the vowel *points*, the letters Vau and Jod became less necessary, and they were considered

chiefly as props, or *fulcra* (as they are called) to those points, with which they are usually accompanied. When manuscripts therefore were written with points, those letters were sometimes inserted, sometimes omitted, and apparently at the discretion of the copyist. Where they are inserted, the words are said to be *plené scripta*: where they are omitted, the words are said to be *defectivé scripta*. Now variations of *this* kind are only various modes of writing the *same word*, and seem to be no more entitled to a place among *various readings*, than the orthographical differences in the Greek manuscripts, which neither Walton, nor Mill, nor Wetstein, nor Griesbach have thought worthy of notice. But as the cases of the Hebrew and the Greek manuscripts are not *exactly* parallel, as examples *may* occur in which the above-mentioned fullness or defectiveness has resulted from some other cause, than the discretion of a transcriber in regard to a *mater lectionis*, the variations in question must not be *wholly* disregarded, though more attention has certainly been shewn to them, than they deserve.

The principal causes, which produced the variations in the Hebrew manuscripts having been thus explained, we must now examine the means, which have been adopted to obtain a *correct edition* of the Hebrew Bible. In our researches on this subject we must be contented with much less information, than we were able to obtain in our similar researches on the Greek Testament. The *manuscripts*, which were used by the early editors of the Hebrew Bible, and

the *modes*, in which those editors employed their materials, are equally unknown to us: nor have we sufficient data to ascertain the influence of preceding on subsequent editions. We are indeed amply provided with catalogues of Hebrew Bibles, which determine their *chronological* order: but how far the editors were governed by their manuscripts, how far they copied from their predecessors, what rules they adopted in the *choice* of their readings, why some of them preferred a *marginal*, where others chose a *textual* reading, the editors themselves have not informed us, and it is not in our power to learn. To trace therefore the progress of the *Hebrew* text, as we traced the progress of the *Greek* text, throughout its several stages, from edition to edition, is wholly impracticable. All, that can be attempted, is to mention in the first place such of the early editions, as in a critical history are most entitled to attention, and then to consider the steps, which have been taken toward the formation of a critical apparatus.

The first edition of the *whole* Hebrew Bible was printed in 1483 at Soncino, a small town in the neighbourhood of Cremona. It is at present so scarce, that only nine copies of it are known, one of which is preserved in the library of Exeter College, at Oxford. The next edition of the whole Hebrew Bible was published in 1494 at Brescia, and is remarkable for being the edition, from which Luther made his German translation. The edition, which in the next place deserves our attention is the Complutensian Polyglot, of which the parts containing the Hebrew

Bible were finished in 1517. In 1518 Daniel Bomberg published at Venice two editions of the Hebrew Bible, the one in quarto, the other in large folio. The latter was conducted by Felix Pratensis: and as it contains the Hebrew text accompanied with the *Masora*, it is called Bomberg's first *Rabbinical Bible*. The second edition of it, which is more correct, was printed in 1525 under the direction of Jacob Ben Hajim, who had the reputation of being profoundly learned in the Masora, and other branches of Jewish erudition.

The Brescia edition of 1494, the Complutensian edition of 1517, and the last-mentioned Bomberg's edition of 1525, are the three editions, which were principally used in the printing of the subsequent editions.

The editions hitherto mentioned were all printed under the inspection of Jews, or of Jewish Converts. But in 1534 Sebastain Münster, a learned German, who was Professor, first at Heidelberg, and afterwards at Basel, commenced an edition of the Hebrew Bible, which was finished in the following year, at the office of Frobenius, where Erasmus about the same period was engaged in printing his editions of the Greek Testament. In 1536 Sebastian Münster published a second edition, accompanied, not, as the first edition was, with a Latin translation, but with parts of the Masora, and various critical annotations. Three years afterwards Robert Stephens began his quarto edition of the Hebrew Bible, which was finished in 1543: and in the two following years he printed

his duodecimo edition. In 1569 the Antwerp Polyglot began to be printed, of which the four first volumes contain the Hebrew Bible, accompanied with all the ancient versions, which were then known. In 1587 was printed at Hamburg the edition of Elias Hutter. In 1611 the celebrated John Buxtorf printed at Basel his octavo edition of the Hebrew Bible: in 1619 he published his great Rabbinical Bible: and in 1620 he published his *Tiberias*, which was intended to illustrate the Masora, and other additions to his great Bible.

We are now arrived at a period, which forms an epocha in the history of the Hebrew text. Hitherto it was commonly supposed, that *all* the copies of the Hebrew Bible, as well manuscript as printed, contained the *same text* with little or no variation. It is true that the Rabbinical Bibles had the marginal words of the Masora, with references to the correspondent words of the text. But of these marginal words such fanciful notions were then entertained, as prevented their application to any *critical* purpose. We know at present that they are *various readings* to the Hebrew Bible: and Dr. Kennicott relates in his *Dissertatio generalis*, that among a thousand of them (as printed by Van der Hooght) there were only fourteen, which were not found in the *text* of some one of the Hebrew manuscripts collated for his edition. They are various readings therefore in the true sense of the term: they resulted from ancient collations of Hebrew manuscripts, begun probably before the age of the Masora, though first recorded, as well as continu-

ed and augmented, in that work. Indeed the text itself, as regulated by the learned Jews of Tiberias, was probably the result of a collation of manuscripts. But as those Hebrew critics were cautious of introducing *too many* corrections in the text, they noted in the margins of their manuscripts, or in their critical collections, such various readings, derived from other manuscripts either by themselves or by their predecessors, as appeared to be worthy of attention. This is the *real* origin of those marginal or masoretic readings, which we find in many editions of the Hebrew Bible. But the propensity of the later Jews to seek mystical meanings in the plainest facts, induced gradually the belief, that both textual and marginal readings proceeded from the sacred writers themselves, and that the latter were transmitted to posterity by *oral* tradition, as conveying some mysterious application of the *written* words. They were regarded therefore as materials, not of *criticism*, but of *interpretation*.

Under these circumstances it is not extraordinary, that the *Masoretic* readings suggested not the notion of a *diversity* in the Hebrew manuscripts: it is not extraordinary, that Elias Levita, a learned Jew at the beginning of the sixteenth century, should say, (as Buxtorf has translated the Rabbinic original,) "*Post laborem illum, quem præstiterunt Masoretæ, impossibile est ut ceciderit, vel cadere possit mutatio aut depravatio quædam ullo modo in ullos libros biblicos:*" Nor is it extraordinary that Buxtorf, who quotes this passage in the second chapter of his Tiberias, should confirm it by saying of the Hebrew manuscripts, *Omnium lib.*

rorum, qui vel in Asiâ, vel in Africâ, vel in Eurobâ sunt, sine ullâ discrepantiâ, consonans harmonia cernitur. Elias Hutter, in the Preface to his edition, which was published more than thirty years before Buxtorf's Tiberias, had indeed declared, that the editions of the Hebrew Bible, as printed by Bomberg, by Stephens, and in the Antwerp Polyglot, differed from each other in several thousand places, and moreover that the differences in the Hebrew manuscripts were still greater. But either Buxtorf never read this Preface, or his attachment to the Masora prevented him from attending to its evidence. He believed therefore in a *perfect* uniformity of the Hebrew manuscripts: and this perfect uniformity was supposed to have uninterruptedly existed from the times, when the books of the Old Testament were severally written. It was likewise the common opinion in the age of Buxtorf, to which his great authority materially contributed, not only that the Hebrew *letters* had descended unaltered from the time of Moses, but that the vowel *points*, with all their gradations and refinements, were coeval with the letters themselves.

But soon after the publication of Buxtorf's Tiberias a discovery was made, which gave a new turn to the sentiments of the learned, not only in respect to the Hebrew *letters* and *points*, but in regard to the *text itself*. It had been long known, that the Samaritans, originally descended from the ten tribes who revolted in the reign of Rehoboam, and still existing as a separate sect in Samaria and its neighbourhood, possessed the five books of Moses in a form peculiar

to themselves. But from the time of Eusebius and of Jerom, who have noticed this Samaritan Pentateuch, no European appears to have *seen* it till the beginning of the seventeenth century, when Pietro della Valle, during his travels in the East, obtained not only a copy of the Samaritan Pentateuch *itself*, but also a *translation* of it into the Samaritan language. The latter he took with him to Rome : the former he sent to Harlæus de Sancy, one of the Fathers of the Oratory at Paris, who presented it in 1620 to the library of that religious house.

No event in the history of literature has excited more sensation, than the discovery of this Samaritan Pentateuch. It was observed that, though its *letters* are very different from the Hebrew, it contained the same Hebrew *words* as the *common* manuscripts ; and that, though its *text* was in many places different, it manifestly contained the same *work*. It was further observed, that its letters were no where accompanied with vowel points. It was then considered, that, as the Pentateuch is the *only* part of the Bible, which is received by the Samaritans, their copies of it must have been derived, if not from *those of their ancestors*, who seceded from the tribe of Judah, *at least* from some copy, antecedent to the Babylonish Captivity. For if their sacred books had been received from the Jews *after* the Babylonish Captivity, they would not have been confined to the five books of Moses. This argument was strengthened by the reflection, that the animosity between the Jews and the Samaritans commenced immediately on the return of the former from

Babylonia. It was therefore as improbable, that the Samaritans should *then* borrow from the Jews, as it was improbable, that their *forefathers* should have seceded without *some* copies of the Law, which was the rule both of their *civil* and of their *religious* institutions. Finally, as the Jews, who returned to Palestine at the expiration of the captivity, returned with the language of their Chaldean masters, and the *letters* of this language were the letters, in which the Jews have written since that period, the supposition, that, with their language, they exchanged also their *letters*, while the Samaritans *retained* them, appeared more probable, than that the letters of the Jews were *originally* the same with those of the Chaldees, and that the exchange took place on the part of the *Samaritans*. It was inferred therefore, that the *original* alphabet of the sacred writings was not the *Chaldee* but the *Samaritan*: and as the Samaritan letters are not accompanied with points, it was further concluded, that the points *now* used with the Hebrew or Chaldee letters were the invention of a later age.

Such were the reflections suggested by the examination of the Samaritan Pentateuch. Four years had not elapsed from the arrival of the copy of it in the Oratory at Paris, when Ludovicus Cappellus, Hebrew Professor at the French Protestant University of Saumur, composed his celebrated work, *Arcanum punctationis revelatum*. This work contains almost all the arguments, which have been since used against the antiquity of the Hebrew points; and they are stated so fully and clearly, that the subject appeared to be

exhausted in the first essay on it. But as the opinion, that the Hebrew points were of modern origin, was likely, when first advanced, to be regarded as an infringement on the integrity even of the *text*, Cappellus had the precaution to send his work in manuscript to be examined by Buxtorf, who returned it with the request, that it might not be printed. Cappellus then sent it to Erpenius, Professor of the Oriental languages at Leyden, who so approved of it, that with the permission of the author he printed it at Leyden in 1624. Buxtorf made no reply to it: and as he died about five years afterwards, he left it to be answered by his son, who was likewise Professor in the University of Basel. But many years elapsed before the younger Buxtorf had prepared an answer to Cappellus. In the mean time Johannes Morinus, one of the Fathers of the oratory at Paris, attacked the antiquity of the Hebrew *letters* in his *Exercitationes ecclesiasticæ*, printed at Paris in 1631. And as the antiquity of the *letters* appeared more important, perhaps also more defensible, than the antiquity of the *points*, the younger Buxtorf made his first essay in a defence of the Hebrew letters, entitled *Dissertatio de literarum Hebraicarum genuinâ antiquitate*. The precise year when this treatise was *first* published is not known: but in 1645 it received an answer from Cappellus in his *Diatriba de veris et antiquis Hebræorum literis*, in which Cappellus contended, as Morinus had *already* done, that the *true* and the *ancient* letters of the Hebrews were no other than the Samaritan. In 1648 the younger Buxtorf made his reply to Cappel-

lus on the subject of the *points*, in a work entitled, *Tractatus de punctorum vocalium et accentuum in libris Veteris Testamenti Hebraicis origine, antiquitate, et auctoritate, oppositus Arcano punctationis revelato Ludovici Cappelli*. To this work Cappellus prepared an answer entitled *Arcani punctationis Vindiciæ*. But he died before the publication of it: and his son, to whom it was left in manuscript, did not publish it, till many years after the death also of his opponent Buxtorf.

This controversy about the antiquity of the Hebrew *letters and points* must be carefully distinguished from another controversy hereafter to be mentioned, in which Cappellus and the younger Buxtorf were likewise engaged, on *the integrity of the Hebrew text*: for the two controversies, though in some measure connected, and frequently confounded, rest on totally distinct grounds. In the opinion, that the Hebrew or Chaldee character was not used by the Jews till after the Babylonish Captivity, and that the present system of vowel points was introduced in a still later age, the most distinguished Hebrew scholars, with a very few exceptions, have sided with Cappellus.

From the controversy on the *letters and points* we must proceed to the more important controversy, which relates to the *words*. Of *this* controversy, and of the subsequent labours of the learned to provide a critical apparatus for the purpose of amending the Hebrew text, an account will be given in the following Lecture.

LECTURE XI.

WE are now entering on a question of much greater moment, than the antiquity, either of the Hebrew points, or of the Hebrew letters, namely the integrity of the Hebrew *text*. The *letters* may have been *changed*, the *points* may be *new*, yet the *words* may have remained *the same*.

To prevent confusion in this inquiry, we should previously determine the meaning of the expression “*integrity of the Hebrew text*.” The text of an ancient author may be said to have preserved its integrity, if it has descended to the present age in such a state, as *upon the whole* the author gave it. If we go further, and require a *perfect* uniformity in all the copies of an ancient work; before we will grant, that its integrity is preserved, we require more, than it is possible to obtain: for it is impossible to multiply *written* copies of a work, without *some* deviation from the author’s own manuscript. We have seen how- ever that Buxtorf, in the second chapter of his Tiberias, carried his notions on this subject so high, as to deny the existence of variations in the Hebrew text;

and thus, by placing its integrity on a *false basis*, exposed it to the danger of being questioned upon grounds, which constitute no real cause of impeachment.

The *first* person who combated the opinion of Buxtorf on *this* subject, was not Cappellus, but Johannes Morinus, who, as mentioned in the preceding Lecture, was a priest of the Oratory at Paris, the religious house, which possessed the first-known copy of the Samaritan Pentateuch. Of this Pentateuch Morinus gave a short account in the Preface to his edition of the Septuagint, which was printed at Paris in 1628. He gave a more copious account of it, as also of its translation into the Samaritan language in his *Exercitationes ecclesiasticæ in utrumque Samaritanorum Pentateuchum*, published at Paris in 1631, in which he not only maintained (as related in the preceding Lecture) that the Samaritan *letters* were the ancient letters of the Jews, but also, that the Samaritan *Pentateuch*, or the Pentateuch as written with Samaritan *letters*, contains a more ancient and accurate text of the five books of Moses, than the *Hebrew Pentateuch*, or the Pentateuch as written with the common *Hebrew letters*. In 1632 the Samaritan Pentateuch, with its translation into the Samaritan language, was under the inspection of Morinus printed in the sixth volume of the Paris Polyglot: and in 1633 Morinus published the first volume of his *Exercitationes biblicæ de Lebræi Græcique textus sinceritate*, which was reprinted many years afterwards (in 1669) with the addition of a second volume.

The object of these *Exercitationes biblicæ* is to shew that the Hebrew Bible has descended to posterity in a very imperfect state; not that the Jews had wilfully corrupted the sacred writings, but that they had transcribed them so negligently, as to have lost in very numerous instances the original and genuine text. To establish this position, Morinus appealed not to any diversity, which might be found in the Hebrew manuscripts; for a collation of Hebrew manuscripts seemed at *that time* to form no part of the business of a Hebrew critic, whether this omission was owing to the circumstance, that the Hebrew manuscripts were chiefly in the hands of the Jews, or that the prevalent opinion in regard to their general coincidence deterred men from undertaking a task supposed to be useless. Morinus appealed to the differences between the Hebrew and the Samaritan texts in the Pentateuch, and to the differences between the Hebrew and the Septuagint in other parts of the Bible. As he believed that the Samaritan Pentateuch contained a more ancient and correct text, than the Hebrew Pentateuch, he concluded, that the latter was incorrect, where it differed from the former. And, as the Septuagint version was made from manuscripts, which must have been older by a thousand years, than the *oldest* of the Hebrew manuscripts extant in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, or from which any edition of the Hebrew Bible could have been printed, he inferred that the Septuagint version had greater critical authority, than either Hebrew manuscripts or Hebrew editions. But Morinus, in preferring the Greek

version to the Hebrew original, did not consider, that this version has *itself* undergone material alterations. Morinus argued, as if *his* copy of the Septuagint contained the Greek text in its original and unadulterated state. It is only on *this* supposition, that his reasoning from the *antiquity* of that version compared with the age of the *present* Hebrew manuscripts, and the inference, which he thence deduced in favour of the former, to the disparagement of the latter, can have the least foundation. But the supposition is evidently false, as appears both from the testimony of Origen, which was given in a former Lecture, and from a collation of the manuscripts now extant. In fact, before we can safely apply the Septuagint to the emendation of the Hebrew Bible, we must be furnished with a critical edition of the Septuagint itself.—From what has been already stated, it appears that Morinus went as far into *one* extreme, as Buxtorf had gone into the other. But Morinus was not satisfied with going *thus* far: he went still further, and opposed to the Hebrew the authority likewise of the *Latin* version, for which he could have no other reason, than that the Latin is the established version of his own church, the church of Rome. Here then he mixed *religious* with *critical* inquiries, which must always be kept distinct, or every Christian party will at length have a Bible of its own.

In the year following Simeon de Muis, who had written already against the *Exercitationes ecclesiasticæ* respecting the Samaritan Pentateuch, published his *Assertio altera Veritatis Hebraicæ*, against the *Exerci-*

tationes biblicæ, and the objections of Morinus to the integrity of the Hebrew text. But the controversy on this subject was soon afterwards transferred to Cappellus and the younger Buxtorf.

In 1650 was published at Paris the first edition of *Cappelli Critica sacra*. In this work, though the author so far trod in the footsteps of Morinus, that he combated the strict notions of the elder Buxtorf in regard to the integrity of the Hebrew text, he avoided that extreme on the opposite side, into which *Morinus* had fallen. He maintained, and *rightly* maintained, that the Hebrew Bible, like all other works of antiquity, had been exposed to the variations, which unavoidably arise from a multiplication of copies: but he contended not, that the sacred text was thereby rendered uncertain, as a rule of faith and manners. He contended, that the printed editions were not every where so correct, as to warrant the opinion, that emendation is superfluous; but at the same time he admitted that we possessed the *means* of emendation. He considered the ancient versions, when applied under proper restrictions, as *one source* of critical authority in ascertaining the genuineness of disputed passages: but he regarded not, with Morinus, a deviation of the Hebrew from the Septuagint or the Vulgate as a *reason* for supposing, that in such places the Hebrew was incorrect. In short his *principles* of criticism were such, as the best judges have applied to ancient authors in general. Where Cappellus failed, he failed in the *application* of his principles. He was right in asserting, that the Hebrew manuscripts, from which

the Septuagint and other ancient versions were made, had not precisely the same text, as modern manuscripts, or printed editions. But he sometimes ascribed to a diversity of *reading*, what might rather be ascribed to a diversity of *translation*. He was right in asserting, that the authors of the Masora had not established a Hebrew text, which was free from fault: but he was unjust in not acknowledging the services, which they really performed. He was right in asserting, that even the *Masoretic* text had not descended to posterity without variations: but he was unjust to the authors of the Masora in not acknowledging the care, which they took to preserve it. For if their success has not been complete, either in *establishing* or in *preserving* the Hebrew text, they have been guilty only of the fault, which is common to every human effort. Nor was Cappellus enabled by the actual production of Hebrew manuscripts (a defect indeed rather of the times than his own) to confirm several positions, which in themselves were true.

In these various respects was Cappellus open to attack: and his work had not been published a year, when it was assailed by Arnoldus Bootius, a name now buried in oblivion, and which deserves to be mentioned on no other account, than that his attack was published in the form of a letter to Archbishop Usher, to whom Cappellus immediately addressed his *Epistola apologetica, in quâ Arnoldi Bootii temeraria Criticæ censura refellitur*, which was published at Saumur in 1651.

But all other assailants were forgotten in the

younger Buxtorf, who in 1653 published at Basel his *Anticritica, seu vindiciæ veritatis Hebraicæ, adversus Ludovici Cappelli Criticam quam vocant sacram, ejusque defensionem*. If Buxtorf had been contented with pointing out the defects, which really existed in the work of Cappellus, if he had been satisfied with shewing, that Cappellus was sometimes mistaken in the *application* of his principles, if he had only claimed for the Masora, what is really its due, the victory would have been decidedly in his favour. But he failed of success by attempting too much. Educated, like his father, no less in the *prejudices*, than in the *learning* of the Jewish Rabbins, he adhered to those strict notions on the integrity of the Hebrew text, which can never apply to a work of antiquity. And by refusing to admit, what was indisputably true, he contributed to establish at least the *principles* of Cappellus, by the very efforts, which he made to confute them.

Four years after the publication of Buxtorf's *Anticritica*, Bishop Walton, in his Prolegomena to the London Polyglot, declared in favour of the principles asserted by Cappellus, acknowledged the necessity of forming a critical apparatus for the purpose of obtaining a more correct text of the Hebrew Bible, and materially contributed thereto by his own exertions.

A collation of *Hebrew manuscripts*, like those which have been made of the *Greek* manuscripts, was still wanted : but as the necessity of such a collation began now to be acknowledged, attempts to that purpose were gradually made by the subsequent editors of the Hebrew Bible. In 1661 Joseph Athias, a learn-

ed Rabbi and printer at Amsterdam, published a Hebrew Bible (reprinted in 1667) the text of which was founded on manuscripts, as well as on printed editions. And in the Preface, which was written by John Leusden, Hebrew Professor at Utrecht, it is related that one of the manuscripts was nine hundred years old. In 1690 Jablonski, a Lutheran Clergyman at Berlin, published a Hebrew Bible, for which he likewise collated manuscripts, and gave some account of them in his Preface. In 1705 was printed at Amsterdam the edition of Van der Hooght, well known for its typographical beauty, and its convenience for common use. The text was chiefly formed on that of Athias. It has the Masoretic readings in the margin, and a collection of various readings from printed editions at the end. In 1709 Professor Opitz at Kiel published a Hebrew Bible, for which he collated both editions and manuscripts: and in 1720 John Henry Michaelis, Professor at Halle, and uncle to the author of the Introduction to the New Testament, published a Hebrew Bible, for which he collated, beside many printed editions, five Hebrew manuscripts preserved at Erfurt, of which the various readings are quoted at the bottom of the page.—These are the chief among the *critical* editions of the Hebrew Bible, which appeared before the middle of the last century; for though the edition of Reincecius, which was several times reprinted, professes on the title-page to have been formed at least *partly* on the authority of manuscripts, those manuscripts are no where mentioned in it.

Toward the middle of the last century the expectations of the public were considerably raised by the preparations for an edition of the Hebrew Bible by Houbigant, a priest of the Oratory at Paris. Like Wetstein he published his Prolegomena before he published the edition itself. They were first printed in 1746, and were followed in 1753 by a splendid edition of the Hebrew Bible in four volumes folio. The *text* of this edition was copied from the text of Wandering Hooght, divested indeed of points, and of every thing which appeared Masoretic. Its value therefore as a *critical* edition must depend, first on the *apparatus*, which the editor provided for the purpose of amending the Hebrew text, and secondly on the mode, in which he *applied* his apparatus. Now this apparatus bore no proportion to the magnitude of the undertaking. If we except the Samaritan readings, which are printed in the margin of the Pentateuch, it consisted altogether of extracts from only *twelve* Hebrew manuscripts, three of which were preserved in the Royal Library, and nine in the library belonging to the Oratory, of which Houbigant was member. They are described partly in his general Prolegomena, partly in the Dissertation prefixed to the Prophets. He says indeed (Prol. p. cvii.) that he *saw* and had in his *possession* some other manuscripts belonging to the Royal Library: but it does not appear that he ever *used* them. Nor did he make *much* use even of the manuscripts, which he *did* collate. Their various readings are not regularly quoted at the bottom of the page as is usual in critical editions of the Greek

Testament: they are introduced *occasionally* in the notes, which are subjoined to each chapter: and when they *are* introduced, which is not very often, they are introduced chiefly for the purpose of supporting such readings, as the editor himself preferred. The *general* evidence therefore, which a collation of manuscripts affords, is here withheld. In fact the learned editor himself, as appears from what he says in his Prolegomena, attached little or no value to any of the Hebrew manuscripts now extant: and, though he allows them a *place* among the sources of emendation, that place appears, both from his principles, and from his practice, to have been rather *nominal* than *real*. Like his predecessor Morinus, he attached much greater importance to the readings of the Septuagint, and other ancient versions. Like Morinus too, he uniformly preferred the text of the Samaritan to the text of the Hebrew Pentateuch. Now though it cannot be denied, that the Samaritan Pentateuch is of great importance to a biblical critic, though it is probable that many of its readings are preferable to the correspondent readings of the Hebrew, yet to assume, as a *general* principle, that the Hebrew is faulty, or even to be suspected, *because* it differs from the Samaritan, is to regulate our judgment by a *single* evidence, where *other* witnesses are at least entitled to be heard. But there was a *fourth* source of emendation, to which Houbigant had more frequent recourse than to any other, namely, emendation *from his own conjecture*. And here he indulged himself to such a degree, as no sober critic can approve. It is true, that he did not ob-

trude his conjectures on the *Hebrew text*. But he introduced them in his Latin translation, which not only accompanied the Hebrew, but was afterwards printed separately, and is necessarily more read than the original. Though he professed therefore to adopt the *principles* of Cappellus, he had not the *caution*, nor had he the *sagacity* of that eminent critic : and in his opposition to the two Buxtorfs he was most *defective* where *they* were most distinguished. We must not indeed deny the *ingenuity*, which he sometimes displays in his critical conjectures : but if he had *known more*, he would have *conjectured less*. He knew too little of the Masora, to form a judgment of it : and he rejected, as is frequently the case, what he did not fully understand. In short, if we must go into extremes, the extreme of the two Buxtorfs is infinitely wiser and safer, than the extreme of Houbigant : and we had better declare at once, that the Hebrew text *requires* no emendation, than submit the Bible to the critical licentiousness of an editor, who corrects without controul.

In the same year, in which Houbigant's edition was delivered to the public, Dr. Kennicott, then Fellow of Exeter College in Oxford, published his first Dissertation on the state of the printed Hebrew text, in which he endeavoured to shew the necessity of the same extensive collation of *Hebrew* manuscripts, as had been already undertaken of the *Greek* manuscripts : and in support of his opinion he exhibited a specimen of various readings from seventy Hebrew manuscripts preserved in the Bodleian Library. In

1759 he published his *second* Dissertation, on the state of the printed Hebrew text, wherein he also replied to the objections which had been made to his *first* Dissertation. And the utility of the proposed collation being then very generally admitted, a very liberal subscription was made to defray the expenses of the collation. The subscription amounted on the whole to nearly ten thousand pounds, and the name of his present Majesty headed the list of subscribers. Various persons were employed, both at home and abroad: but of the foreign *literati* the principal was Professor Bruns, of the University of Helmstadt, who not only collated Hebrew manuscripts in Germany, but went for that purpose into Italy and Switzerland. The business of collation continued from 1760 to 1769 inclusive, during which period Dr. Kennicott published annually an account of the progress, which was made. More than six hundred *Hebrew* manuscripts, and sixteen manuscripts of the *Samaritan* Pentateuch were discovered in different libraries in England and on the continent: many of which were *wholly* collated, and others consulted in important passages. Several years of course elapsed, after the collations were finished, before the materials could be arranged and digested for publication. In 1776 the *first* volume of Dr. Kennicott's Hebrew Bible was delivered to the public, and in 1780 the *second* volume. It was printed at the Clarendon Press: and the University of Oxford has the honour of having produced the *first* critical edition upon a *large scale*, both of the *Greek Testament*, and of the *Hebrew Bi-*

ble, an honour, which it is still maintaining by a similar edition, hitherto indeed unfinished, of the *Greek Version*.

The *text* of Kennicott's edition was printed from that of Van der Hooght, with which the Hebrew manuscripts, by Kennicott's direction, were all collated. But, as variations in the points were disregarded in the *collation*, the points were not added in the *text*. The various readings, as in the critical editions of the Greek Testament, were printed at the bottom of the page with references to the correspondent readings of the text. In the Pentateuch the deviations of the Samaritan text were printed in a column parallel to the Hebrew; and the variations observable in the Samaritan manuscripts, which differ from each other as well as the Hebrew, are likewise noted with references to the Samaritan *printed* text. To this collation of manuscripts was added a collation of the most distinguished *editions* of the Hebrew Bible, in the same manner as Wetstein has noted the variations observable in the principal editions of the Greek Testament. Nor did Kennicott confine his collation to manuscripts and editions. He further considered, that, as the quotations from the Greek Testament in the works of ecclesiastical writers afford another source of various readings, so the quotations from the Hebrew Bible in the works of *Jewish* writers are likewise subjects of critical inquiry. For this purpose he had recourse to the most distinguished among the Rabbinical writings, but particularly to the Talmud, the *text* of which is as ancient as the third century. In the quotation of

his authorities he designates them by numbers from 1 to 692, including manuscripts, editions, and Rabbinical writings, which numbers are explained in the *Dissertatio generalis* annexed to the second volume.

This *Dissertatio generalis*, which corresponds to what are called *Prolegomena* in other critical editions, contains, not only an account of the manuscripts and other authorities collated for this edition, but also a review of the Hebrew text divided into periods, and beginning with the formation of the Hebrew canon after the return of the Jews from the Babylonish Captivity. Though inquiries of this description unavoidably contain matters of doubtful disputation, though the opinions of Kennicott have been frequently questioned, and sometimes *justly* questioned, his *Dissertatio generalis* is a work of great interest to every biblical scholar. Kennicott was a disciple of Cappellus, both in respect to the integrity of the Hebrew text, and in respect to the preference of the Samaritan Pentateuch : but he avoided the extreme, into which Morinus and Houbigant had fallen. And though he possessed not the Rabbinical learning of the two Buxtorfs, his merits were greater, than some of his contemporaries, as well in England as on the continent, were willing to allow.

That the mass of various readings exhibited in this edition, which greatly surpass in *number* the various readings collected by the industry of three centuries for the Greek Testament, contains but few of *real importance*, is no subject of reproach to the learned editor, who could only produce what his authorities

afforded. Nor is he to be censured for giving *all* that he had, without regard to their relative value. His was the first attempt, which was ever made, to give a *copious* collection of Hebrew readings: and he could hardly have been justified, if he had exercised his own discretion in regard to the portion, which should be laid before the public. He wisely therefore afforded the opportunity to his readers of selecting for themselves: and though his extracts are rarely of much value for the purpose of critical emendation, they enable us, both to form an estimate of the existing Hebrew manuscripts, and to draw some important conclusions in regard to the integrity of the Hebrew text.

The major part of this immense collection consists in mere variations of orthography, in the fulness or defectiveness of certain words, in the addition or subtraction of a *mater lectionis*, of a *Vau* or a *Jod*. And if we further deduct the readings, which are either manifest errata, or in other respects are of no value, the important deviations will be confined within a very narrow compass. In short Dr. Kennicott's collation has contributed to establish the credit of the Masora. We learn from it this useful lesson, that although a multiplication of written copies will, notwithstanding all human endeavours, produce *variations* in the text, the manuscripts of the Hebrew Bible have been so far protected by the operation of the Masora, that all which are now extant, both the oldest and the newest, may be compared with those manuscripts of the Greek Testament, which Griesbach refers to the same edition.

That the integrity therefore of the Hebrew text, from the time when it was fixed by the authors of the Masora, has been as strictly preserved to the *present* age, as it is *possible* to preserve an ancient work, is a position, which no longer admits a doubt. Another question of equal importance is, whether we have sufficient reason to believe, that this Masoretic text is *itself* an accurate copy of the sacred writings. In the examination of *this* question Hebrew manuscripts are of no use ; the oldest now extant are younger by some centuries than the Masora itself : and therefore they cannot furnish the means of correcting the faults, which the Masorets themselves may have committed. For though Ante-Masoretic readings should occasionally be found in Hebrew manuscripts, it would be very uncritical to correct the Masoretic text on their authority alone, unless we might take for granted, what we certainly may not, that every Masoretic alteration was an alteration for the *worse*. But if we cannot appeal to *positive* evidence, we must argue from the evidence, which the nature of the case admits. It is indeed one of those questions, which ought to be holden in the *affirmative*, till we have reason to believe the *negative*. Now the learned Jews of Tiberias, in the third and fourth centuries, must have had access to Hebrew manuscripts which were written before the birth of Christ. We know that they sought and collated them. We know that their exertions to *obtain* an accurate text were equal to their endeavours to *preserve* it. Why then shall we conclude, that they laboured *in vain* ?

Our notions of integrity must not indeed be carried to such an height, as to imply that *no* deviations from the sacred autographs were retained in the Masoretic text, that there are *no* passages in our present Hebrew Bibles, which betray marks of corruption, and still require critical aid. Such passages undoubtedly there are : and we are still in want of an edition of the Hebrew Bible, conducted on the plan of Griesbach's Greek Testament. Kennicott's edition brought us hardly so far in the criticism of the former, as Mill's edition in the criticism of the latter. In the years 1784—1788 John Bernard de Rossi of Parma published four quarto volumes (afterwards augmented by a supplemental volume) of extracts from Hebrew manuscripts, which form a considerable addition to Kennicott's collations : and in 1795 an edition of the Hebrew Bible was published at Leipzig by Doederlein and Meisner, with the most important readings, which had been given both by Kennicott and Dr. Rossi. But we *still* want an edition of the Hebrew Bible, in which the readings of *manuscripts* are united, as in critical editions of the Greek Testament, with judicious extracts from the *ancient versions*. *Such* an edition would supply the materials, which, if carefully used, might enable us in various places to correct what appears inaccurate.

The history of the printed Hebrew text being now brought to a conclusion, it is necessary according to the general plan to describe the authors who have illustrated the criticism of the Hebrew Bible, according to its several departments. This description will form the subject of the following Lecture.

LECTURE XII.

IN the enumeration of the authors, who have best explained the several departments of Hebrew criticism, we may proceed by a method similar to that, which was adopted in respect to the Greek Testament.

As a *general* and *elementary* treatise on the criticism of the Hebrew Bible, Dr. Gerard's *Institutes*, already mentioned in the ninth Lecture, may be again recommended. Though it relates as well to the interpretation, as to the criticism of the Bible properly so called, and both subjects are comprehended under one name, yet, as they are not confounded, it will be easy to select such parts, as immediately relate to our present inquiry.

A knowledge of the *editions* of the Hebrew Bible may be best obtained from the first volume of the *Bibliotheca sacra*, as published by Masch. An account both of the original and of the last edition of this work was given in the ninth Lecture, and therefore it is unnecessary at present to observe any thing more, than what particularly relates to the Hebrew Bible. On

this subject the learned editor is much more diffuse, and much more profound, than in the account, which he has given of the editions of the Greek Testament. In his description of the Hebrew Bible he confines himself not merely to the *external* history of the editions, but occasionally institutes critical inquiries in respect to the formation of their *text*. He has given also a preliminary dissertation *De codicum Hebraicorum diversitatibus*, in which the editions of the Hebrew Bible are divided into two classes, the one called Masoretic, the other Amasoretic. The former class comprises the Hebrew Bibles, which have the marginal readings of the Masora, and is subdivided into two portions, according as those readings are quoted, either wholly, or only in part. The second class comprises those editions, in which the readings of the Masora are unnoticed. An account of the editions of the Hebrew Bible to the year 1730 is given also in the second and fourth volumes of *Wolfii Bibliotheca Hebræa*. De Rossi of Parma has greatly contributed to our knowledge of the early editions of the Hebrew Bibles, both by his *Disquisitio critica de Hebraicæ typographiæ origine*, published at Parma in 1776, and by his *Apparatus Hebræo-Biblicus*, published at Parma in 1782. But all the information, communicated on this subject, as well by De Rossi as by Wolf, has been transferred to the *Bibliotheca sacra* by Masch, either in the first or in the supplementary volume. With no less industry and fidelity has the author of the *Bibliographical Dictionary* (noticed in the ninth Lecture) availed himself of the labours of his

predecessors.—The *critical* editions of the Hebrew Bible are described in Dr. Kennicott's *Dissertatio generalis*: and a critical dissertation on the editions of the Bible, which preceded the London Polyglot, is contained in the fourth chapter of Walton's *Prolegomena*. These *Prolegomena*, to which we shall have frequent occasion to refer, and which contain an inestimable treasure of Oriental literature, were reprinted in octavo at Leipzig in 1777, by I. A. Dathe, Professor of the Oriental Languages in that University, who accompanied that edition with a valuable preface. The *Dissertatio generalis* was likewise reprinted in octavo at Brunswick, in 1783, by Professor Bruns of Helmstadt, who was Kennicott's chief assistant in the collation of Hebrew manuscripts, and who accompanied the edition both with a preface and notes.

Of *manuscripts* of the Hebrew Bible some account is given in the fourth chapter of Walton's *Prolegomena*. In the folio edition of the *Bibliotheca sacra*, published in 1723, a catalogue of the Hebrew manuscripts is given as far as they were then known. In the second and fourth volumes of the *Bibliotheca Hebræa*, the latter of which was published in 1733, a further account is given of the then-known Hebrew manuscripts. To this work should be added *H. F. Kocheri Nova Bibliotheca Hebraica*, published at Jena in 1783 and 1784, in two volumes quarto, as a supplement to that of Wolf. Till the collation was made for Dr. Kennicott's edition our knowledge of Hebrew manuscripts was confined to a very small number. This number however was so increased by that colla-

tion, that they now amount to more than six hundred. They are all enumerated by Dr. Kennicott in his *Dissertatio generalis*; and the learned editor has related in what library each manuscript is preserved, by what mark or number it is there known, what books it contains, in what year it was written, (where a date is annexed to it,) or to what century he himself refers it (where the manuscript has no date,) whether it is written in Spanish or German hand, and (whenever an account of it has been already published) what author or authors may be further consulted. 'The *Dissertatio generalis* therefore is the work, which is always to be examined in the first instance by those, who are desirous of obtaining information on any Hebrew manuscript, which had been collated before 1770, when Kennicott's collation was closed. A valuable supplement to Kennicott's catalogue is contained in the following work, *Apparatus Hebræo-biblicus, seu manuscripti, editique codices Sacri Textus, quos possidet novæque variantium lectionum collationi destinat Jo. Bern. de Rossi. Parmæ, 1782. 8vo.*—But whoever wishes to become more intimately acquainted with the nature of Hebrew manuscripts in general, must consult the following work by Professor O. G. Tychsen, of the University of Rostock in Mecklenburg: *Tentamen de variis codicum Hebraicorum Veteris Testamenti manuscriptorum generibus, a Judæis et non Judæis descriptis, eorumque in classes certas distributione, et antiquitatis et bonitatis characteribus. Rostochii, 1772. 8vo.* In addition to the rules, which it prescribes, for judging of the antiquity, country, writer,

&c. of Hebrew manuscripts, it has digressions on other points of Hebrew literature, which shall be noticed in the sequel.—In determining the antiquity of Hebrew manuscripts, it may be useful likewise to consult a short treatise by Professor Schnurrer of Tübingen, entitled, *De codicum Hebræorum Veteris Testamenti ætate difficulter determinandâ*, printed in his *Dissertationes philologico-criticæ*, which were published at Gotha and Amsterdam in 1790, octavo. They, who are acquainted with German, will find the most perspicuous, and the most systematic account of Hebrew manuscripts in the second volume of Eichhorn's Introduction.—Beside the manuscripts in *Hebrew* letters, sixteen manuscripts of the Pentateuch in *Samaritan* letters were collated for Kennicott's edition, of which an account is given in the catalogue of manuscripts in the *Dissertatio generalis*. It was related in the tenth Lecture, that we first became acquainted with the Samaritan Pentateuch at the beginning of the seventeenth century; that the first known copy of it was deposited in the library of the Oratory at Paris; and that the deviation of its *text* from that of the Hebrew Pentateuch gave rise to a controversy on the subject of their relative value. But an account of the principal authors on this subject will be more properly given, when we come to that department, which relates to the utility and application of various readings.—The Samaritan Pentateuch was first printed in the Paris Polyglot under the inspection of Morinus, and was reprinted by Walton in the London Polyglot. In these editions it is printed in the *Samaritan* charac-

ter. In 1790 the late Dr. Blayney, Hebrew Professor at Oxford, published it, in an octavo volume, in the *Hebrew* character, which had been already used by Houbigant and Kennicott, in printing the *deviations* of the Samaritan text. Dr. Blayney's edition is moreover accompanied with the readings of the Samaritan manuscripts (collated for Kennicott's edition) which differ from the *printed* Samaritan text.

On the *ancient versions* of the Hebrew Bible, which open a second source of various readings, our means of information are very ample. A considerable part of Walton's *Prolegomena* is devoted to this subject: and they are particularly valuable in respect to the *oriental* versions, which are described in the six last chapters. The second book of *Simon's critical History of the Old Testament* is wholly employed on the translations of it, both ancient and modern, though the latter are of no value in a critical history of the Hebrew text, on which account the notice of Lewis's and other histories of our *English* translations must be reserved for the second branch of Theology, the *Interpretation* of the Bible. In Carpzov's *Critica sacra Veteris Testamenti*, printed at Leipzig in 1728, quarto, the second part contains also an account of the translations of the Old Testament. A popular account is given of them in the second volume of *Prideaux's Connexion*: and also in Dr. Brett's *Dissertation on the ancient Versions of the Bible*, of which the second edition was published in London in 1760, and is reprinted in the third volume of Bishop Watson's *Theological Tracts*. The object of this latter work, as the au-

thor declares on the title-page, was to shew the excellent use, that may be made of the ancient versions towards attaining the true readings of the Holy Scriptures in doubtful places. But that, which far surpasses all other works on the *critical application* of the ancient versions, is Eichhorn's Introduction to the Old Testament, in which the latter half of the first volume is devoted to this subject.—The best account of the *editions* of the ancient versions is given in the second part of the *Bibliotheca sacra*, published by Masch. No work contains so many of the ancient versions, and so well arranged, as the London Polyglot.

As the Septuagint is not only the most ancient version of the Hebrew Bible, but is frequently quoted in the Greek Testament, and as it is likewise more familiar to us, than any other ancient version, the Latin only excepted,* the authors, who have written on it, deserve more particular notice. The first writer, who instituted a systematic inquiry into the Septuagint version, was Archbishop Usher, in a work entitled *De Græcâ Septuaginta interpretum Versione Syntagma*, printed in London in 1655, quarto. It is divided in-

* The history of the Latin Version has been already given in the fourth Lecture. It is only the Latin *Vulgate*, made by Jerom from the Hebrew which can be applied to the criticism of the Hebrew Bible. The *old* Latin version published by Sabatier (at Rheims in 1743, in three volumes folio,) being in the Old Testament made from the Septuagint, applies immediately to the criticism of the Septuagint. In the edition of the *Bibliotheca sacra*, Part II, Vol. III, as published by Masch, both versions are fully described. Much information on the subject of the Vulgate may be obtained from Hody's work *De textibus, &c.*

to nine chapters, and relates to the origin of the version according to the account of Aristeas (then supposed to be genuine,) to the time when and the place where it was written, to the alterations which were gradually made in its text, to the corrections of Origen, to the modern editions, and other subjects, with which these are immediately connected. This is a work of great merit ; it displays much original inquiry, and may be regarded as the ground-work of later publications on the Septuagint. In 1661 Isaac Vossius published at the Hague, in quarto, his work entitled *De Septuaginta interpretibus, eorumque translatione et chronologia dissertationes*. Isaac Vossius was such an admirer of the Septuagint, that he ascribed to it more authority, than to the original itself. But he met with a very powerful adversary in Humphrey Hody, then a young man and Fellow of Wadham College in Oxford, who in 1685 published in London, in octavo, his treatise entitled *Contra historiam Aristee de LXX, interpretibus dissertatio : in qua probatur illam a Judæo aliquo confectam fuisse ad conciliandam auctoritatem Versioni Græcæ ; et clarissimi doctissimique viri D. Isaaci Vossii aliorumque defensiones ejusdem examini subjiciuntur*. This very acute and learned writer has clearly proved his position in respect to the writing which bears the name of Aristeas : some feeble efforts were made indeed to defend the authenticity of that writing, especially by Whiston in an Appendix to his *Literal Accomplishment of Scripture Prophecies* : but the opinion of Hody is at present very generally adopted. In 1705 Hody, who was then become

Greek Professor and Archdeacon of Oxford, published the work already quoted in the fourth Lecture, *De Biblîorum textibus originalibus, Versionibus Græcis et Latinâ Vulgata libri quatuor*. This is the *classical* work on the Septuagint;* but there are others which are worthy of notice; especially two publications by Dr. Henry Owen, Rector of St. Olave, Hartstreet, the one *An Inquiry into the present state of the Septuagint Version of the Old Testament*; London, 1769, 8vo; the other *A brief Account historical and critical of the Septuagint Version of the Old Testament*. London, 1787, 8vo. The author, who is himself an excellent critic, treads closely in the footsteps of Hody. The last work especially should be read by every man, who wishes to be acquainted with the history of the Septuagint. The following is likewise a very useful work, as it represents both concisely and perspicuously the several topics, which suggest themselves for consideration on the origin of the Septua-

* As Hody in common with many other learned men considers the Hexapla and Tetrapla as *different works*, and they were represented in the third Lecture as only *different names* of the same work viewed in different lights, it may be necessary to observe, that the latter is the opinion of Eichhorn, and several other very distinguished critics of the present age. It would be foreign to the design of these Lectures to enter into an elaborate discussion on this subject. I will take however this opportunity of correcting an inaccuracy in the same Lecture at p. 68. From what was there said of the column of the Hexapla, which contained the corrected text of the Septuagint with its critical marks, and which was transcribed by Eusebius and Pamphilus, it might be inferred, that the Hexaplarian text of the *Septuagint* has descended to us only in fragments, whereas the observation is true only of the *other* Greek versions, which Origen applied to the emendation of the Septuagint.

*It might be inferred that it is properly
considered 26/2*

gint version. *De origine versionis Septuaginta interpretum: auctore S. T. Muecke, Conrectore Lycei Soraviensis. Zullichoviæ, 1788, 8vo.*—The authors, on some particular subjects, connected with the *utility and application of various readings*, will be noticed when we come to that department.

The *editions* of the Septuagint, are fully described in the second volume of the second part of the *Bibliotheca sacra*, as published by Masch; to which description is prefixed an account of the origin, both of the Septuagint and the other Greek versions of the Bible. It may be proper to observe, that there are *four* principal or cardinal editions of the Septuagint, from one or more of which *all* the other editions of the Septuagint have been copied; namely the Complutensian, the Aldine, the Roman of Sixtus V, and Grabe's edition. The Complutensian Septuagint bears the date of 1515; it was printed from a collation of Greek manuscripts, which the editors highly extol, but of which we have no further knowledge. The Aldine edition was published at Venice in 1518, two years after the death of Aldus Manutius. The text of this edition was likewise formed from several Greek manuscripts, but was interpolated in various places from other Greek versions. The Roman edition of Sixtus V, which appeared in 1587, was copied from the celebrated *Codex Vaticanus*, with the exception of such words as the editors regarded in the light of errata. But as such corrections depended wholly on the *judgment* of the editors, and it is of importance to know the real readings of the *Codex Vaticanus*, Dr. Holmes

in his edition of the Pentateuch has carefully noted the differences, however minute, between the texts of the Roman edition and of the Vatican manuscript. Grabe's edition was taken from the no less celebrated Codex Alexandrinus, and was printed at Oxford in four folio volumes at different times from 1707 to 1720. But though this edition has the Codex Alexandrinus for its *basis*, it is far from being a mere *copy* of that manuscript: for Grabe (also Lee who continued it after Grabe's death) adopted many readings partly from the Roman edition, partly from other manuscripts, where those readings were believed to be genuine. The most convenient edition is that of Breitinger, published at Zürich in 1730—1732 in four quarto volumes: for it contains the text of Grabe's edition with the deviations of the Roman edition in the margin.—Hitherto no collation of manuscripts of the Septuagint had been undertaken upon an *extensive scale*. In 1779 Dr. White, Arabic (now Hebrew) Professor at Oxford, published a letter to the Bishop of London, suggesting a plan for a new edition of the Septuagint. In the same year Mr. Stroth, master of the Grammar school at Gotha, published in the fifth volume of Eichhorn's Repertorium the first part of his *Catalogue of MSS. of the LXX*, which he continued in the eighth and eleventh volumes. In 1788 Dr. Holmes (afterwards Dean of Winchester) published at Oxford proposals for a collation of all the known manuscripts of the Septuagint. The undertaking was promoted by the Delegates of the Clarendon Press; a subscription was made toward defraying the expense; litera-

ry men were engaged in various parts of the continent for the business of collation ; and Dr. Holmes published annually an account of the progress which was made. In 1798 he published at Oxford the Book of Genesis, which was successively followed by the other books of the Pentateuch, making together *one* folio volume, with one title-page, and one *general* Préface. From this general Preface it appears, that eleven Greek manuscripts in uncial letters, and more than an hundred manuscripts in small letters, containing either the whole or parts of the Pentateuch, were collated for this edition. They are all described in the second and third chapters. And as the *text* of this edition is a copy of the Roman edition of 1587, the deviations from it observable in the the three other cardinal editions, the Complutensian, the Aldine, and Grabe's edition, are constantly noted. The quotations, which are found in the works of the Greek Fathers, are likewise alleged : and finally the various readings of the ancient versions, namely of such as were made from the *Septuagint*, for versions made immediately from the *Hebrew* can furnish no various readings for the emendation of the *Greek*. The *plan* therefore of this edition is good : it is that which had been already applied by Mill, Wetstein, and Griesbach to the Greek Testament. Nor is the *execution* of the plan to be less commended : it displays uncommon industry, and apparently great accuracy. The learned editor died in 1806 : but shortly before his death he published the book of Daniel, both according to the *Septuagint* version and that of Theodotion, the latter only

having been printed in former editions, because the *Septuagint* version of *this* book is not contained in the common manuscripts, and was unknown till it was printed at Rome in 1772 from a manuscript belonging to Cardinal Chigi. Since the death of Dr. Holmes, the continuation of this important work has been undertaken by Mr. Parsons, who has properly resumed it with the historical books as they follow the Pentateuch, and from the specimen which he has already given (the Book of Joshua just published) appears well worthy of the task, which has been committed to his care. Every friend of biblical literature must wish to see the completion of this edition.—On the application of the Septuagint version to the criticism of the Hebrew Bible may be consulted the two following works: *F. V. Reinhardi Dissertatio de versionis Alexandrinæ autoritate et usu in constituendâ librorum Hebraicorum lectione genuinâ. Vitembergæ, 1777, 4to.* — *G. C. Knappii Dissertatio de versione Alexandrinâ in emendandâ lectione exempli Hebraici caute adhibendâ. P. I. II. Halæ, 1775, 1776, 4to.*—The authors who have applied the Septuagint to the *explanation* of the Bible will be mentioned under the *second* branch of Theology.

Having already mentioned *two* sources of various readings, *Hebrew manuscripts*, and *ancient versions*, with the writers, from whom the best information may be derived on those subjects, we may now proceed to the *third* source, which consists of *quotations* from the Hebrew Bible, which are found in the works of ancient authors. Philo and Josephus, who wrote in

Greek and used the Septuagint version, if not exclusively, at least chiefly, especially the former, are of very little use in the criticism of the *Hebrew Bible*. The Talmud, and such other *Rabbinical* works as contain quotations from the Hebrew, are alone of any value. The Talmud (a word which signifies literally *doctrine*) may be regarded as the *Corpus doctrinæ Judaicæ*: and as the precepts, which it contains, relate not merely to doctrines properly so called, but to ceremonies as well civil as religious, it has not been improperly termed *Judæorum jus civile et canonicum*. The *text* of it, which is called Mishna, was compiled in the second century by Rabbi Jehuda Hakkadosh; a commentary, called Gemara, was added to it at Jerusalem, and another commentary bearing the same name was afterwards added to it in Babylon. The *text* of the Talmud is sometimes accompanied with the former, at other times with the latter commentary; and the text and commentary together receive the appellation of Talmud of Jerusalem, or Talmud of Babylon, according to the commentary, which is annexed. For the different editions of the Talmud the first and fourth volumes of *Wolfii Bibliotheca Hebræa* must be consulted. That of Surenhusius (Amsterdam 1698—1703, six tom. fol.) contains only the Mishna: but it is accompanied with a Latin translation. The *contents* of the Mishna are described in the second part of the *Antiquitates Hebræorum*, published by Professor Wähner at Göttingen in 1743, in two volumes octavo.—It was observed in the preceding Lecture, that the Talmud was collated for Dr. Kennicott's edi-

tion: several other Rabbinical works were collated, which are mentioned in the *Dissertatio generalis*, and of which a more ample account must be sought in the *Bibliotheca Hebræa*.

The fourth and last source of emendation in the Hebrew text is *critical conjecture*. It was asserted in the ninth Lecture, that the words of the *Greek Testament* ought in *no case* to be altered from conjecture: and this rule has been strictly observed by Griesbach. But in the *Hebrew Bible* there are various reasons against the *total* exclusion of conjectural emendation, though no prudent critic will approve of it, when carried to excess. The causes of *accidental* error in the transcribing of *Hebrew* manuscripts were more numerous, as was shewn in the tenth Lecture, than in the transcribing of *Greek* manuscripts. Hence the very long period, which elapsed between the time when the books of the Old Testament, especially the Pentateuch, were composed, and the time, when even the oldest of the now-existing Hebrew manuscripts were written, may have occasioned in various places the genuine reading to be totally lost. And the circumstance, that all the Hebrew manuscripts now extant belong, as it were, to *one edition*, renders the probability, that in various places the genuine reading is contained in *no* Hebrew manuscript now extant, still greater. The means therefore of correcting from *authority* are less ample, than in the Greek Testament; and consequently conjectural emendation may be allowable in the former, though not in the latter. Besides, conjectural emendation is not liable to the *abuse*

in the *Old Testament*, to which it is liable in the *New*: *conjectura theologica* in the form of *conjectura critica* does not so easily find room in the former, as it does in the latter. Hence Bishop Lowth in his translation of Isaiah (London, 1778, quarto) not only corrected in many places the common Hebrew text on the authority of manuscripts,* but sometimes introduced emendations from mere conjecture. Yet even Lowth has been supposed to have taken this liberty too often, especially by Professor Köcher of Bern in a dissertation entitled *Vindiciæ S. textûs Hebræi Esaie Vatis, adversus D. Roberti Lowthi, Venerandi Episcopi Londinensis, Criticam*, printed at Bern in 1786, and reprinted at Tübingen in 1790. The principles of Houbigant, who carried his conjectures beyond all bounds, have been very ably combated in the following work: *Sebaldi Ravii Exercitationes philologicæ in C. F. Houbigantii Prolegomena in Scripturam sacram. Lugduni Batavorum*, 1785, 4to. Indeed before we have recourse to the desperate remedy of altering an author's words from our *own* conjecture, we should be fully satisfied that no mode of *interpretation* will remove the difficulties, which may present themselves.

* It is worthy of notice, though the remark is foreign to the present paragraph, that Michaelis in his *German* translation of Isaiah, which was made about the same time, and of which nearly one half was printed when Lowth's Isaiah appeared, has in most places, where he has preferred a various reading to the common text, agreed in the choice of that reading with Lowth. This coincidence, without previous concert, between two such eminent critics, argues strongly in favour of the adopted readings. The readings here meant are readings really *existing*, either in manuscripts, or ancient versions: for on the subject of *conjectural* emendations Michaelis and Lowth did *not* agree.

Under the different modes of interpretation may be reckoned also the different modes of *pronouncing*, or, which is the same thing, of *pointing*, the same word. Michaelis, in his German translation of the Hebrew Bible, has frequently recourse to an alteration of the points : but he made it a rule never to alter the consonants, that is, the words themselves, except in cases of extreme necessity.

The last department of Hebrew criticism, which we have to consider, is the *utility and application of various readings*. This department has been rendered very extensive by the turn, which the criticism of the Hebrew Bible took at the beginning of the seventeenth century. We have seen that the elder Buxtorf denied the very *existence* of various readings to the Hebrew Bible. The history of the controversy, which consequently took place between Cappellus and the younger Buxtorf, on the *integrity* of the Hebrew text, was given in the preceding Lecture, where the works were also quoted, which were published at that period. The *Critica sacra* of Cappellus, which has ever remained a standard work, was again published at Halle in 1775—1786 in three octavo volumes, with very valuable Notes by Professor Vogel at Halle, and Professor Scharfenberg at Leipzig. Another very excellent work is the *Critica Sacra Veteris Testamenti*, published at Leipzig in 1795 by Professor Bauer of Altorf. It is in fact a revision of the first section in the second volume of *Glassii philologia sacra*, which relates to the *criticism* of the Bible, as the second section relates to the *interpretation* of it. Glass, who

was Professor at Jena in the seventeenth century, had adopted Buxtorf's high notions of integrity, which are properly modified in Professor Bauer's revision of the work. Carpzov in his *Critica Sacra Veteris Testamenti*, published at Leipzig in 1728, quarto, adheres likewise too closely to those high notions: but if proper allowance be made on this account, it will be found to be a very useful work, and replete with information on the subject of Hebrew criticism.

With the inquiries, which have been instituted on the *integrity* of the Hebrew text, two other questions have been mixed, which have no necessary connexion with it, namely the antiquity of our present Hebrew characters, and our present Hebrew points; for, as was observed in the preceding Lecture, the letters may have been changed, the points may be new, yet the *words* may have remained the same. But the two Buxtorfs, and other writers who have carried to the highest pitch their notions on the integrity of the Hebrew text, have considered this integrity, which in reality relates only to the preservation of the *words*, as including the unchangeableness of the *forms*, in which the words are expressed. They defended the latter therefore with as much warmth as the former: and represented such critics, as Cappellus and Walton, who denied to the shadow what they allowed to the substance, as men impeaching the integrity of the sacred writings. Hence Professor Wasmuth at Rostock published a quarto volume in 1664, entitled *Vindicie Sacræ Hebrææ Scripturæ*, in which he undertakes to defend what he calls *originalis authenticia divi-*

na, tam vocalium et accentuum, quam ipsarum literarum sacri textus Hebræi; and this defence is conducted, as he further says on the title-page, *adversus impia et imperita multorum præjudicia, imprimis contra Cappellii, Vossii F. et Waltoni, autoris operis Anglicani πολυγλωττου, assertiones falsissimas pariter et perniciosissimas*. But in later times these questions have been discussed with greater calmness, in proportion as the defence of them appeared less necessary for the purpose of religion. With respect to the *letters*, the controversy between Johannes Morinus and Cappelus on the one hand, and the younger Buxtorf on the other, has been already related in the tenth Lecture. The opinion of the two former, that the *Samaritan* were the ancient letters of the Jews, was very ably supported by Walton in the third chapter of his *Prolegomena*. On the other hand, Steph. Morinus, a French protestant clergyman, in his *Exercitationes de linguâ primævâ* (published at Utrecht in 1694, quarto,) and Wolf in the second volume of his *Bibliotheca Hebræa*, have defended the antiquity of the *Hebrew* letters. The latest and most useful work on this subject is, *Josephi Dobrowsky de antiquis Hebræorum characteribus dissertatio*. *Pragæ*, 1783, 8vo. This tract contains in a short compass a perspicuous statement of all the arguments, both for and against the antiquity of the *Hebrew* letters: and the conclusion which the author deduces is, that not the *Hebrew*, but that the *Samaritan* was the ancient alphabet of the Jews. That the present *Hebrew* or *Chaldee* character was *not* used by the Jews before the *Babylonish* captivity is an

opinion, which is now almost universally received, and the truth of it seems no longer disputable. But it is still a question whether the Samaritan letters, *in the form in which we now find them in manuscripts of the Samaritan Pentateuch*, were the letters used by the Jews before the Babylonish captivity. Now as letters are continually liable to some trifling alteration, according to the taste or fancy of transcribers, and alterations, though at first insensible, will by frequent repetition, in the course of two or three thousand years, produce such changes, that the *modern* form becomes materially different from the *ancient* one, it is highly probable if we argue from analogy, that the Samaritan letters, which are used in the manuscripts now extant, are in many respects different from those which were used by the Jews and Samaritans before the Babylonish captivity. But *what* was the form of the letters then in use among them, or even by what *name* that alphabet should be called, are questions on which the learned are divided, and on which, for want of data, it is impossible perhaps to come to a decision. Many writers call this alphabet the *old* Samaritan: Professor Bauer in the *Critica sacra* above-quoted calls it Phœnician: Eichhorn in his Introduction calls it Phœnician-Egyptian: Michaelis seems undetermined about the *name*, though he is equally of opinion that the ancient alphabet differed from the present Samaritan, as well as from the Hebrew. A detailed account of the authors, who by the aid of inscriptions and medals have endeavoured to trace the forms of the ancient letters in question, of whom the principal

are Bayer, Caylus, Büttner, and Dutens, would occasion a digression, which however interesting in itself, is not immediately connected with critical theology.

Of the Hebrew *points* the antiquity has been no less contested, than that of the Hebrew *letters*: and here again their advocates have considered their antiquity as so connected with the integrity of the text, that they have argued for the *divine* origin of the Hebrew points. The controversy between Cappellus and the younger Buxtorf on this subject was related in the tenth Lecture, where the works were quoted, which appeared on that occasion. The *Arcanum punctationis revelatum*, first printed in 1624, was reprinted in *L. Cappelli Commentarii et notæ criticæ in Vetus Testamentum*, which were published at Amsterdam in 1689 by his son, who prefixed to it a clear and useful statement of the controversy. In the same work was published also the *Vindiciæ* mentioned in the tenth Lecture. The subject was so exhausted by the original combatants, that from this period the respective advocates, who were numerous on each side, and whom it would be tedious to enumerate, had only to repeat the arguments of their leaders. At length Albert Schultens, Professor of the Oriental languages at Leyden, in his *Institutiones ad fundamenta linguæ Hebrææ*, published at Leyden in 1737 and reprinted in 1756, proposed a *middle path* between the two extremes: and as Schultens was a man of great authority, it will not be improper to quote his words. In the second section, after a statement of the arguments, which had been advanced for and against the antiqui-

ty of the points, he says, “ *Controversia simplicius proposita non ita difficulter componi potuisset, si sola veritas quæsitâ fuisset. Amputa questionis appendices, de hodiernis figuris et nominibus vocalium, de Schevativibus, de accentuum numero et munere multiplici: disquire dein quid verisimilius, adfuerintne inde ab antiquissimis temporibus vocales, an non? Hoc ipsum quoque adhuc restringe, et disputa, an non ibi saltem vocalium notulæ adjunctæ a sacris scriptoribus, ubi summa necessitas id postulabat. Hoc negare non valde verendum; ulterius quid exigere imprudens et bonæ causæ noxium. His finibus si lis hæcce semet coerceat, concordia inter criticos et theologos sponte coibit: et puncta vocalia communi consensu justum illum et naturalem locum obtinebunt, quem iridoles linguæ Hebrææ, quem usus Orientis, inde a primævâ origine, iisdem inter Chaldæos, Syros, Arabes assignavit.*”——In 1769 Michaelis, who had formerly defended the antiquity of the present points, adopted in the second volume of his *Miscellaneous Works* (*Vermischte Schriften*) published in that year, the *middle path* proposed by Schulzens. He admitted on the one hand, that our *present* system of punctuation was invented and introduced by the Masorets: but he maintained on the other hand, that even in the *earliest ages* the Hebrews made at least occasional use of *some* vowel points. —In the thirty-sixth volume of the *History of the Academy of Inscriptions and Belles Lettres* published at Paris in 1775 is a very valuable Dissertation by Dupuy, (directed chiefly against the system of Mascleff and his followers) in which the same *medium* is observed as

by Schultens and Michaelis.—In the eighteenth volume of Eichhorn's Repertorium is a dissertation by Trendelenburg, of which the object is to prove that the ancient Hebrews had *three* vowel marks. And Eichhorn in his Introduction to the Old Testament, §. 62, says, "From the preceding remarks it appears, that we may draw the certain conclusion, that the ancient Hebrews had *vowel marks*, but not the *whole* number of those which are *now* in use, probably only *three*; that the ancient Hebrew authors provided their writings with vowel marks, not indeed throughout, but only *here and there*, in difficult, *ambiguous* passages; and that our *present* system of punctuation was introduced in some *later* age, probably after Hebrew had ceased to be a living language." The question is very clearly stated by Eichhorn: but as these Lectures are not intended to convey dissertations on any single subjects, it would be foreign to their purpose to translate more. The opinion of Schultens, Michaelis, and Eichhorn is now the common opinion of the Oriental scholars in Germany. We must except indeed Professor Tychsen, who has uniformly adhered to the system of Buxtorf. In our own country, Walton, Kennicott, Lowth, and many other distinguished Hebrew scholars have sided with Cappellus. Among the few, who in later times have defended the antiquity of the present points, may be mentioned Dr. James Robertson, Professor of the Oriental languages at Edinburg, who prefixed to his *Clavis Pentateuchi*, published at Edinburg in 1770, a

*Dissertatio de genuinâ punctorum vocalium Hebraicorum Antiquitate.**

Though the integrity of the Hebrew text depends not on the decision of the questions, whether the points be coeval with the letters, or whether the letters themselves were the original letters of the Jews, yet a question of some importance to the criticism of the Bible arose out of the controversy, as conducted by Cappellus and Buxtorf. This question is, whether the *Hebrew Pentateuch* or the *Samaritan Pentateuch* has the greater *critical authority*. Most writers, who have maintained the superior antiquity of the Samaritan to the Hebrew *letters*, have hence concluded that the *text* of the Samaritan Pentateuch is more ancient, and more free from corruption, than the Hebrew Pentateuch. On the other hand, most writers who defend the antiquity of the Hebrew *letters*, prefer

* As the learned of the present age, with very few exceptions, which bear no proportion to the whole number, admit, that our *present* system of Hebrew points (whatever the *ancient* mode of punctuation might have been, or whether Hebrew, while a living language, had points or not) was introduced in a later age, after Hebrew had become a dead language, the question occurs, whether it is not allowable therefore, in learning Hebrew, to discard the points altogether, and to make some pronunciation for ourselves, after the manner, either of Masclef, or of Parkhurst, or in some similar way, especially as the study of the language is thereby rendered considerably easier. This question shall be examined, when we come to the *Interpretation* of the Bible. At present it will be sufficient to observe, that the decision of *this* question is not wholly dependent, as is commonly supposed, on the decision of the *previous* question, whether our present points are ancient, or not. For though it necessarily follows, that they must be *retained* if they are *ancient*, it is *not* a necessary consequence, that they must be *rejected*, if they are *modern*. There may be *other* reasons for retaining them: and it will appear, that those reasons are valid.

at the same time the Hebrew to the Samaritan *text*. The principal advocates of the Samaritan Pentateuch are J. Morinus, in his *Exercitationes ecclesiasticæ* (Paris, 1631, 4to) and his *Opuscula Hebræo-Samaritana* (Paris, 1657, 12mo :) Walton in the eleventh chapter of his *Prolegomena* ; Houbigant, likewise in the *Prolegomena* to his Hebrew Bible ; Kennicott, as well in his *Dissertatio generalis*, as in his *Second Dissertation on the State of the printed Hebrew Text* ; and Dr. Henry Owen in his *Dissertation on the comparative Excellence of the Hebrew and Samaritan Pentateuch*, which is annexed to his above-quoted *Brief Account of the Septuagint Version*. The principal adversaries of the Samaritan Pentateuch are Hottinger, in his *Exercitationes Anti-Morinianæ de Pentateucho Samaritano*, published at Zürich in 1644, quarto ; S. Morinus in his above-quoted *Exercitationes de linguâ primævâ* ; F. J. Schwartz, Professor at Wittenberg, in his *Exercitationes historico criticæ in utrumque Samaritanorum Pentateuchum. Vitembergæ, 1756, 4to* ; and lastly Professor Tychsen, as well in the above-quoted *Tentamen*, as in his *Disputatio philologico-critica, de Pentateucho Ebræo-Samaritano, ab Ebræo eoque Masoretico, descripto exemplari. Butzovii, 1765, 4to*. From the very *title* of this work it appears that Tychsen was resolved to degrade the Samaritan Pentateuch to the utmost. Hottinger indeed, (to whom Walton replied, Prol. XI. 12.) had called the Samaritan Pentateuch *Apographum vitiosum ex Hebræo Autographo* : but Tychsen goes so far as to assert, that it was derived from some *Masoretic* copy of the He-

brew Pentateuch, and not before the tenth century. But Tychsen's arguments were fully confuted by Professor Hassencamp of Rinteln, in a German work* printed at Minden in 1775, octavo.—After all, though the Samaritan Pentateuch has been rescued from the charges of its adversaries, it is no necessary consequence, that it deserves the preference, which is given to it by some of its friends. The Pentateuch in *Samaritan* letters, and the Pentateuch in *Hebrew* letters, emanate from the *same* source : they are *equally* derived from the autograph of Moses. The *difference* in the age between the oldest *Hebrew* and the oldest *Samaritan* manuscripts now extant (on whatever side the scale may preponderate) can bear but a small proportion to the *whole* period, which elapsed from the time of Moses : and during that period the manuscripts in *Samaritan* letters were subject at least to *similar* though not the *same*, alterations, as the manuscripts in *Hebrew* letters. The *purity of the text* depends not on *the shape of the character*, in which it is expressed : the former may be preserved, though the latter be changed, or the former may be changed, though the latter be preserved. Even therefore if the letters *now* used in Samaritan manuscripts were *precisely the same* as those, which were used by Moses himself, we could neither conclude from this *conservation of character* to a *conservation of text*, nor from the *change of character* in the Hebrew manuscripts to

* Its German title, which I add for the sake of those who understand the language, and who may wish to procure the work, is, "Der entdeckte Wahre Ursprung der alten Bibel-Uebersetzungen."

a *change in the text*. But if we may judge from inscriptions and medals, the *original* letters of the Pentateuch have undergone material changes, as well in the *Samaritan*, as in the *Hebrew* manuscripts. Upon the whole then the two Pentateuchs are more nearly equal for the purposes of *criticism*, than the advocates of either have commonly supposed: and wherever their readings are different, the *genuine* reading must be determined by *other* arguments than those, which are founded on a supposed intrinsic superiority of one to the other.

Connected with this subject is the question, which has been agitated, whether a copy of the *Samaritan*, or a copy of the *Hebrew* Pentateuch was used by the person or persons, who made what is called the Septuagint version of the Pentateuch. The decision of this question is of some importance in forming our judgment of readings, where the Hebrew and the Samaritan copies are at variance. For, if the Septuagint version of the Pentateuch was made from the *Samaritan* text, it does nothing more, where it agrees with the *Samaritan* in opposition to the Hebrew, than *repeat*, or *echo*, the evidence of its original; whereas in the places, in which it agrees with the *Hebrew* in opposition to the Samaritan, it affords presumptive evidence, that in *those* places the Samaritan text was *originally* the same as the *present Hebrew* text, and that the error lies in the *present Samaritan* text. Now that the Septuagint version of the Pentateuch was made from a *Samaritan* manuscript, is an opinion, which many writers have entertained. Even Hottin-

ger was of that opinion, though he believed that the Samaritan itself was derived from the Hebrew. But no one has treated this subject so fully as Professor Hassencamp in his *Dissertatio philologico-critica de Pentateucho LXX, Interpretum Græco, non ex Hebræo, sed Samaritano textu converso*, printed at Marburg in 1765, 4to. Professor Tychsen of Rostock in the above-quoted *Tentamen* printed in 1772, attempted to support the opinion, that it was taken from the *Hebrew text*, and moreover from a manuscript, in which the *Hebrew text* (as in the second column of Origen's Hexapla) was expressed in *Greek letters*. This opinion however was very successfully combated by Hassencamp, in the second part of the German work, which has been quoted in a preceding note.

After this description of the several subjects, which are more or less connected with the criticism of the Hebrew Bible, we cannot better conclude than with a caution against *both* of the extremes, into which authors have fallen, with respect to the *integrity* of the Hebrew text. What we *ought* to understand by that expression was explained at the beginning of the preceding Lecture, where it was observed, that an ancient work may be properly said to have preserved its integrity, if it has descended to the present age in such a state as *upon the whole* the author gave it. In order therefore to defend the integrity of the Hebrew text, it is not necessary to maintain with Buxtorf, that there are *no* variations in the Hebrew manuscripts, a thing impossible in itself, and contradicted by fact; nor is it necessary for this purpose to contend, as Professor

Tychsen has lately done in his *Tentamen*, that our Masoretic text is so perfect, as to require not the aid of a critical apparatus. The Hebrew Bible, like the Greek Testament, has been exposed to the variations, which unavoidably result from a multiplication of written copies : and even after the introduction of the *Masora*, it was impossible *wholly* to avoid them : nor can it be supposed that with all the religious care applied by the learned Jews of Tiberias, the text *originally established* by the Masora, was *every where* free from error. Indeed the Jewish writers of the greatest distinction have themselves admitted that the Masoretic text is not infallible, as De Rossi has shewn by some remarkable quotations in the Prolegomena (§. 10.) to his *Varie Lectiones Veteris Testamenti*. We must apply therefore in doubtful passages the same critical remedies, which are applied to all other ancient works. But among those critical remedies, we must be very cautious of introducing that desperate remedy, emendation from *conjecture*, which should never even be *attempted*, till *all other* remedies have failed. Nor must we be less cautious of concluding, that the Hebrew text is at any place faulty, *because* at that place some other text, or some ancient version, to which we choose *a priori* to give higher authority, has a different reading. Indeed if the Hebrew text were so faulty, as Morinus has made it in *theory*, and Houbigant in *practice*, it would be impossible, in *any* sense, to assert, that the integrity of the Hebrew Bible had been preserved. The truth, as usual, lies between the two extremes, of Buxtorf and Tychsen on

the one hand, and of Morinus and Houbigant on the other. Among all the works on this subject, whether English or foreign, I know of none, in which this golden mean is so well preserved as in the following, of which I will subjoin the whole title, as it clearly expresses the design of the author. *Des Titres Primitifs de la Révélation, ou Considerations critiques sur la pureté et l'intégrité du texte original des livres saints de l'Ancien Testament ; dans lesquelles on montre les avantages que la Religion et les Lettres peuvent retirer d'une nouvelle édition projetée de ce texte comparé avec les manuscrits Hebreux, et les anciennes versions Grecques, Latines, et Orientales. Par le R. P. Gabriel Fabricy, de l'ordre des FF. Prêcheurs Docteur Theologien de Casanate, de l'Académie des Arcades. Rome, 1772, 2 tom. 8vo.* This work was published, while the collations were making for Dr. Kennicott, to whose then-intended edition the title refers, though it is not exactly descriptive of it, as Kennicott's edition (though Fabricy supposed it would) contains no quotations from the ancient versions.

Having thus described the first branch of Theology, or the *criticism* of the Bible, according to the plan proposed in the first Lecture, I shall in the next Course describe, on a similar plan, the second branch, which relates to the *interpretation* of the Bible.

26 3/4

A

COURSE OF LECTURES,

CONTAINING

A DESCRIPTION AND SYSTEMATIC ARRANGEMENT

OF THE SEVERAL

BRANCHES OF DIVINITY:

ACCOMPANIED WITH

AN ACCOUNT, BOTH OF THE PRINCIPAL AUTHORS, AND OF
THE PROGRESS, WHICH HAS BEEN MADE AT
DIFFERENT PERIODS

IN

THEOLOGICAL LEARNING.

BY HERBERT MARSH, D. D. F. R. S.

MARGARET PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY.



PART III.

On the interpretation of the Bible.



BOSTON:

PUBLISHED BY CUMMINGS AND HILLIARD.

Hilliard & Metcalf, printers.

1815.

ADVERTISEMENT.

IN presenting to the Public the Six following Lectures, which have been lately delivered before the University of Cambridge, in continuation of Part I. and Part II. already published, it is necessary to explain what is here meant by the term *Part*, lest it should be supposed synonymous with the term *Branch* of Theology, as used in these Lectures. The term *Part* is here applied in the sense only of *Fasciculus*, or portion of Lectures given and published at the *same period*. But the Branches of Theology, as described in the second Lecture, being of very unequal extent, will occupy, some more, others less, than one part or Fasciculus. Thus the *Criticism* of the Bible, which is a very extensive Branch, was continued to the end of Part II. And the *Interpretation* of the Bible, which is a still *more* extensive Branch, not only occupies Part III., but will be continued at least to the end of Part IV.

Cambridge, 10 June, 1813.

CONTENTS.

LECTURE XIII.

	Page.
<i>Of the relation, which the Interpretation of the Bible bears to the Criticism of the Bible.—Difficulty of biblical interpretation.—Some erroneous notions on this subject corrected</i>	5

LECTURE XIV.

<i>Of Words, considered as signs to the reader of what was thought by the writer.—Degrees of difficulty attending the discovery of the notion affixed to any word by the writer.—Sources of intelligence, in respect to the words of the Hebrew Bible, and the Greek Testament.—Of our authorised version ; and the necessity of interpreting from the original Scriptures</i>	24
--	----

LECTURE XV.

<i>Rules for the interpretation of Words.—Consequences of neglecting them in the interpretation of the Bible.—The Interpreter, who explains the Bible by the aid of reason and learning, compared with the Interpreter, who aspires to the possession of higher means.—Important practical difference between the terms “does not err,” and “cannot err.”—Further remarks on the necessity of theological learning, and on the causes of its neglect</i>	42
--	----

LECTURE XVI.

Of the literal and figurative use of words; and of the foundation of this distinction in the origin and formation of language.—Consequences of interpreting words literally, when they are used figuratively.—Necessity of arranging the senses of words in genealogical order 58

LECTURE XVII.

Relation of Allegory to Metaphor.—Metaphorical interpretation an interpretation of words.—Allegorical interpretation, an interpretation, not of words, but of the things signified by the words.—Origin of allegorical interpretation among the Greeks.—This kind of interpretation not warranted by St. Paul 75

LECTURE XVIII.

Adoption and injudicious use of it by the Greek Fathers.—Abuse of it by unbelievers.—The sense of Scripture rendered by it arbitrary and ambiguous.—Allegorical or spiritual interpretation substituted for grammatical interpretation in the twelfth century by the Mystics of the Church of Rome, who have been followed in modern times.—Typical interpretation warranted by the sacred writers.—Definition of a Type; and the consequences of neglecting it.—Types and antitypes multiplied by various interpreters, without end, and without foundation 93

LECTURE XIII.

THE *Criticism* of the Bible having been finished in the last Lecture, we now enter on the *Interpretation* of the Bible, which is the next branch of Theology according to the system explained in the second Lecture. The nature of this system, with the connexion of its several parts, has been already so minutely detailed, that another description of it cannot now be wanted. For, though a knowledge of the preceding Lectures is necessary to a right understanding of what will follow, yet even they, who were not present at the delivery of them, may obtain the required information, as the preceding Lectures are all in print.

But, as Criticism and Interpretation are not unfrequently confounded, it may not be unnecessary, before we enter on the latter, to explain once more its relation to the former. They are so closely connected, that no man can be a good *Interpreter* of the Bible, who is not previously acquainted with the *Criticism* of the Bible. It is Criticism, and Criticism *alone*, which enables us to judge of the

genuineness, whether of single words, or of whole passages, or of whole books. And, when we have thus obtained what we have reason to believe a genuine *text*, we have then a solid foundation, on which we may build our *interpretation* of the text. But till we know what *is* the genuine text, we must remain in a state of uncertainty, whether our interpretation is founded on a rock, or founded only in the sand. The process of theological study is undoubtedly much shortened, by taking for granted what can be *known* only by long and laborious investigation. But in a subject so important as that of religion, which concerns our future as well as present welfare, no labour is too great, no investigation too severe, which may enable us to discern the truth unmixed with falsehood. In this place I am addressing myself immediately to those, who possess the advantages of a learned education, and *chiefly* to those, who receive a learned education, for the purpose of becoming qualified to preach the *Gospel*. From *such* an audience no apology can be required, for applying to the Bible the principles of reason and learning; for, if the Bible could not stand the test of reason and learning, it could not be, what it is, a work of *divine* wisdom. The Bible therefore must be examined by the same laws of Criticism, which are applied to *other* writings of antiquity: and every man, who is set apart for the ministry, should consider it as his bounden duty to study with especial care that *primary* branch of

Theology, the *Criticism* of the Bible. It is a branch, which gives nutriment and life to all the other branches; and *these* will become more or less vigorous, in proportion as *that* branch either flourishes or decays. By cultivating the Criticism of the Bible, we acquire a habit of calm and impartial investigation, which will enable us to enter with greater advantage on the other departments of Theology; we learn to discriminate between objects apparently alike, but really distinct; we learn to sharpen our judgments, and correct our imaginations; we learn to think for ourselves, without blindly trusting to bare assertion, which may deceive, but can never convince; and, while we fortify our faith against the shafts of infidelity, we become proof against the seductions of ignorance and fanaticism. Such are the advantages resulting to an *Interpreter* of the Bible from a previous acquaintance with the *Criticism* of the Bible; advantages unknown to the mere theological empiric, who regards them as useless for no other reason, than because he has never learnt to comprehend them.

But however close the *connexion* may be between Criticism and Interpretation, they are quite distinct in their respective *operations*. By the one we ascertain what an author has actually *written*: by the other we ascertain what is really the author's *meaning*. This distinction we must keep constantly in view, or we shall be in perpetual danger of drawing false conclusions. The *difficulty* indeed, attend-

ant on the *one*, is closely allied with the difficulty attendant on the *other* ; each increases with the *antiquity* of the author. The more ancient an author is, and the more frequently his works have been transcribed, the greater is the probability that no *single* copy has descended to posterity, without numerous deviations from the autograph. And beside the *accidental* mistakes, which are unavoidable in *every* transcript of an extensive work, the transcribers of the *Sacred Writings* had stronger temptation to make alterations by *design*, than can ever take place in the copying of works unconnected with religion. So much the more necessary is a knowledge of Criticism to the student in *Theology*. The same difficulty, which attends the *Criticism* of an ancient work, and which increases in *proportion* to its antiquity, attends also the *Interpretation* of that work, and likewise increases with its age. The further we are removed from the period, in which an author wrote, the more difficult is it to discover, the circumstances in which he was placed, the peculiar object which he had in view, the situation and sentiments of his original readers, and the probable consequent tendency of the author's arguments. If, beside the distance of *time*, we are far removed from him in *place*, if the laws and customs of *his* country had no resemblance to *our own*, if not only his *language* was different, but his *forms* of expression were so little analogous to those which are in use among *ourselves*, as when literally

rendered to imply not unfrequently what the author intended not to say, we must be blind, not to perceive the difficulties, which attend the *interpretation* of that author. We must be blind not to perceive, that, in order to become thoroughly acquainted with him, something *more* is wanted, than a knowledge of our *own* customs, and our *own* language.

Let us apply then these general observations to the Bible. When a work is put into our hands, composed partly in Hebrew, and partly in Hebrew-Greek ; when that work contains historic, legislative, poetic, prophetic, and didactic materials ; when between the earliest and the latest of its compositions an interval elapsed of more than fifteen hundred years, and an interval still greater has elapsed between the latest of its compositions and the present age : when they were written in a country, and under circumstances, very different from our own ; when these several *kinds* of composition, breathing more or less the oriental spirit of the writers, require an attention, as well to *particular*, as to *general* rules of interpretation ; surely no man of common understanding will assert, that *such* a work is *easy* of interpretation. If the meaning of the sacred writers is so easy and so obvious, why has it been deemed necessary in every age to write *Commentaries* on the Bible ? Why has it been deemed necessary in every Christian country to set apart by public authority a class of men, for the purpose of

studying and explaining the Scriptures, and to exempt them from secular employments, that their time might be wholly employed in their *professional* duties? It is an error too frequently instilled, and too readily received, that the qualifications for a good Divine are of small extent and of easy attainment. But let those, who have been seduced into this fatal error, reflect only on the manifold subjects, which should engage the attention of the Clergy, and they will soon be convinced that the knowledge, which they *ought* to possess, is less circumscribed than they imagine. Let them consider that Christianity is founded in miracles, which must be verified, and in prophecies, which must be explained; that the writings, which attest the one, and record the other, must be proved authentic and credible; that to establish this authenticity and credibility a series of *testimony* must be examined commencing with their first publication; that *internal* evidence must be applied to corroborate the *external*; that this internal evidence can be derived only from an intimate knowledge of the writings themselves; and lastly that, to *obtain* this intimate knowledge, we must become acquainted with the languages, in which those writings were composed, and with the various opinions and institutions, which prevailed at different times, among the people and in the country, where and when they were composed. The discourses of *inspired* writers, no less than the discourses of *common* writers, were

necessarily adapted to the comprehension of those, to whom they were immediately addressed ; adapted therefore to *their* modes of expression, and *their* habits of reasoning. If *we* then would understand the inspired writers, as they themselves *intended* to be understood, we must *likewise* be acquainted with those modes of expression, and those habits of reasoning. But this acquaintance can be formed only by those, who have opened to themselves the stores of ancient learning.

Should *argument* however fail to convince us, that a just interpretation of Scripture requires, on the part of the interpreter, an ample share as well of erudition as of judgment, we may appeal to the *experience* of almost every age since the foundation of Christianity. If the interpretation of Scripture were easy and obvious, there would be little or no *diversity* in the explanations, which different commentators have given of the same passage. But if we compare the *Greek* with the *Latin* commentators, we shall frequently find such a variety of interpretation, as would appear almost impossible to be extracted from the same text. If we compare the *Jewish* commentators, either with the *Greek*, or with the *Latin*, we shall find as great a variety, though a variety of a different kind. If we compare our *English* commentators with any of the preceding, we shall find no diminution in the variety of interpretation. Nor do we find uniformity, either among commentators of the same language, or even

among commentators of the same Church. It is true, that in all things relating to *doctrine and discipline*, the Church of Rome preserved during several ages an uniformity of interpretation by the commentary, which was called the *Glossa ordinaria*. But when the revival of learning had opened new sources of intelligence, and the Reformation had restored the right of unfettered exposition, the *Glossa ordinaria* was exchanged for *new* systems of interpretation, from Luther and Melancthon, from Calvin and Beza, from Grotius, and from Spanheim.

Here we may observe, that the *uniformity* of interpretation, in respect to doctrine and discipline, preserved by the *Glossa ordinaria*, has been contrasted with that *variety* of interpretation, which the religious liberty, procured by our Reformers, has introduced among the manifold parties, comprehended under the title of Protestant. It has been urged, that this diversity of *interpretation* has occasioned those *religious divisions*, which have gradually arisen since the period of the Reformation. It has been urged, that both the cause and the effect would have been prevented, if the interpretation of Scripture had remained subject, as in the Church of Rome, to some general and acknowledged rule. Before therefore we inquire into the different *modes* of interpretation, we must examine the *principle*, on which biblical interpretation is conducted, by the Church of Rome on the one hand, and by the

Church of England on the other. It was decreed in the fourth session of the Council of Trent, “ne quis sacram scripturam interpretari audeat contra eum sensum quem tenuit et tenet mater ecclesia, cuius est judicare de vero sensu.” But if the authority, which directs our interpretation, is *itself* liable to error, we can never be certain that it will *exempt* us from error: we can never conclude that, because the interpretations, which are founded on that authority, will agree with each other, they will therefore agree with the truth. Now the *Rule*, by which the Church of Rome decides in the interpretation of Scripture, is that which is commonly known by the name of *Tradition*: and, as the meaning of Scripture is made *subject* to this Rule, the Rule itself is necessarily considered as *independent* of Scripture. It is represented, therefore, as derived from the Apostles through a *different* channel than that of their *own writings*. It is represented as a *doctrina tradita*, handed down by the *Fathers* of the Church, who are considered as the depositories of this Rule; whence it is inferred that the expositions in which *they* agree, are the *true* expositions of Scripture. Now all this is mere matter of *opinion*, and is calculated solely to support the credit of the Church of Rome. There is not the slightest *historical* evidence, that the Apostles transmitted to posterity *any* Rule, but what is recorded in the New Testament. The *Fathers* therefore are precisely on the same footing with respect to the au-

thority of their interpretations, as the commentators of the *present* age. Nor in fact are they *uniform* in their interpretations even in regard to doctrine, notwithstanding the agreement alleged by the Church of Rome; though *some* commentators may be selected, as well ancient as modern, which agree on particular points. The *Regula fidei*, therefore, set up by the Church of Rome, was justly discarded by our Reformers, who contended for the right of biblical interpretation unfettered by the shackles of tradition. But in rejecting the *Regula fidei* of the Roman Church, as an authority *independent* of Scripture, (a rejection which constitutes the vital principle of the Reformation) they did not therefore determine that *no* Rule of Faith should be acknowledged by Protestants. The Confession of Augsburg, the Saxon Confession, the Helvetic Confession, our own Articles, the Articles of Dordrecht, are so many different formularies containing the *Regula fidei* of the respective Churches. Indeed they were absolutely *necessary*, to distinguish as well Protestants in general from the Church of Rome, as the different *parties* of Protestants from each other. But though we have a Rule of Faith, as well as the Church of Rome, and to depart from that Rule is to depart from the *Established Church*, there is a fundamental difference in the *principle* from which the respective Rules derive their authority. Tradition is supposed *independent* of Scripture: and is applied as a criterion, to deter-

mine the *meaning* of Scripture. But whatever be the Rule of Faith adopted by any *Protestant* community, it is so far from being considered as *independent* of Scripture, or as resting on authority derived through *another* channel, that its validity is acknowledged on the *sole condition* of its being a fair and legitimate *deduction* from Scripture. This total and absolute dependence of the *Regula fidei* on the Bible (not the refusal to admit one at all) is that which characterizes *Protestants*.

The preceding remarks on the dependence or independence of the *Regula fidei* on the Bible have been introduced for the purpose of ascertaining the principle on which Protestants should consistently *interpret* the Bible. When our reformers had discarded *Tradition*, as a guide to the meaning of Scripture, it has been asked; By *what* means did they determine, that their *own* interpretations were right, where the Reformers differed, either from the Church of Rome, or from each other? They could not appeal to any *new* Rule of Faith, even if their principles would have allowed it; for in the interval, which elapsed between the secession from Rome and the publication of the Augsburg Confession, no new Rule of Faith *existed*. When Luther therefore and Melancthon interpreted the Bible with a view to the *formation* of that Confession, their interpretation was unfettered by pre-conceived religious opinions; they interpreted the *Bible*, as they would have interpreted any *other* work of

antiquity; and for that purpose they employed the erudition, by which our early Reformers were so highly distinguished. When they abandoned therefore the guidance of *Tradition*, they supplied its place by *Reason* and *Learning*. But these invaluable substitutes, these qualities of sterling worth, have been exchanged in modern times for baser metal; and the Scriptures have been committed to the guidance of disordered imaginations. Nay, our Reformers themselves have been pressed into the service of ignorance and fanaticism; and expressions which they applied to *one* purpose have been grossly misapplied to *another*. Of these expressions therefore it is necessary to give an explanation.

One of these expressions is, “that the Bible is its *own* interpreter.” To understand this expression, as it was meant by our *Reformers*, we must consider, that it was used *in opposition to the Church of Rome*. It was used solely with reference to *Tradition*; it was intended solely to deny, that *Tradition* was the interpreter of the Bible; it was designed to rescue the interpretation of the Bible from an authoritative rule, which would have counteracted the expositions, on which was founded the Confession of Augsburg. But our Reformers did not assert, that the Bible was *so far* its own Interpreter, as to require no explanation *whatever*. If *this* had been their meaning, we might ask; For what reason did both Luther and Calvin think it

necessary to write *Commentaries* on the Bible? To what purpose did Luther enjoin the practice, still observed by his followers, of explaining to the people from the pulpit the Gospel, which had been read at the altar? In fact learning, especially *grammatical* learning, was the *pillar*, by which the edifice of the Reformation was supported: and Melancthon, who composed the Confession of Augsburg, appealed uniformly to the maxim, *Scripturam non posse intelligi theologicæ, nisi antea intellecta sit grammaticæ*. But the meaning of our Reformers, in respect to the Bible being its own interpreter, has been strangely perverted in modern times; and a mere *relative* expression has been so construed, as if they had applied it in a positive and *absolute* sense. An expression, meant only to exclude *Tradition*, has been made a pretence for the exclusion of *Theological Learning*; and the maxim, that the Bible is its own interpreter, has been carried so far in the present, as well as in a former age, that men, who can scarcely *read* the Bible, have dreamt that they are able to *expound* it. Nor is their *inconsistency* less remarkable, than their presumption. For if the Bible is absolutely its own interpreter, there can be no necessity for *their* interpretations: there can be no necessity for *any* class of men employed to study and explain it. Whether we are acquainted with Hebrew and Greek, or know only our mother tongue; whether we are provided with a store of ancient learning, or

our philosophy is confined to the awl and the anvil, we are all equally qualified to understand the Bible. Hence the early reformers, who were among the most distinguished scholars of their age, have been converted into patrons of ignorance: and a Reformation, which was produced by erudition, has been represented as indebted for its origin to the total absence of human learning.

Another expression used by our Reformers, namely, "the *perspicuity* of the Sacred Writings," has been no less abused than the similar expression already noted. When they argued for the *perspicuity* of the Bible, they intended not to argue against the application of *Learning*, but against the application of *Tradition* to the exposition of Scripture. The Church of Rome, on the ground, and indeed *just* ground, that the Bible required *explanation*, contended, that this explanation must be sought in *Tradition*. No! said our Reformers; We *need not* the aid of your Tradition; to *us* the Bible is sufficiently perspicuous *without* it. Here then they made their stand; here it was, that they unfurled the banner of the Reformation. But in rejecting *Tradition* as necessary to make the Bible perspicuous, they never meant to declare, that the Bible was alike perspicuous, to the *learned* and the *unlearned*. If they had, they would never have supplied the unlearned with *explanations* of it. But the '*perspicuity* of the Bible,' is again an expression, which has been so

construed in modern times, as if the genuine principle of Protestantism required us to *reject* what the authors of Protestantism have *provided*. In fact the learned, as well as the unlearned, are in need of continual help, to understand the Bible; men already provided with a store of biblical erudition are perpetually feeling the necessity of *further* information; the more we advance, the more sensible do we become of what we *want* to know; and only *superficial* readers will imagine, that a knowledge of the Bible is a matter of easy attainment. Fortunately for mankind, the passages of Scripture, which we are most *concerned* to understand, are those, which are understood with *the greatest ease*. Neither a critical nor a philological apparatus is necessary to discover the will of God in what relates to our own conduct. However difficult it may be, to penetrate into the councils of the Deity, and to fathom the depth of his *decrees*, the laws, which he has prescribed for the government of *our own* actions, and in which a misunderstanding might be fatal, are intelligible to the meanest capacity. But the *diversity*, which prevails in many articles of *faith* among different Christian communities, shews the difficulty of rightly understanding the passages of Scripture, on which the Articles, wherein we differ, are founded. And if we further consider the *manifold* attainments, which are necessary to understand the original Scriptures in all their various rela-

tions, we shall not conclude, that they are alike perspicuous to the learned and the unlearned. Augustine, who was not in *other* respects an advocate for deep erudition, though few men have surpassed him in acuteness of reasoning, has acknowledged, in a Letter to Volusian, the greatness of the difficulties which attend the interpretation of Scripture. “Non quod ad ea, quæ necessaria sunt *saluti*, tantâ perveniatur difficultate; sed, cum quisque ibi fidem tenuerit, sine quâ *pie recteque non vivitur*, tam multa, tamque multiplicibus mysteriorum umbraculis opacata, intelligenda proficientibus restant, tantaque non solum in *verbis*, quibus ista dicta sunt, sed etiam in *rebus* quæ intelligendæ sunt, latet altitudo sapientiæ, ut annosissimis, acutissimis, flagrantissimis cupiditate descendi hoc contingat, quod eadem Scriptura quodam loco habet, ‘Cum consummaverit homo, tunc incipit.’” In the same epistle he calls the Scripture “*omnibus accessibilis — paucissimis penetrabilis.*” Of the easy and obvious passages, such as relate to our own practice, he says, “Sine fuso ad cor loquitur indoctorum atque doctorum.” But of those, which require the aid of erudition, he says, “Non audeat accedere mens tardiuscula et inerudita, tanquam pauper ad divitem.”

Lastly, let us guard against the prevalent abuse of another position, which was maintained by our Reformers, and likewise in reference to Tradition. When *Tradition* was discarded as a Rule of Faith

independent of the Bible, our Reformers of course maintained, that the Bible *alone* contained all things, which were necessary for salvation. To the Bible *alone*, to the Bible *without Tradition*, did they appeal therefore in opposition to the Church of Rome: and, that all men might be enabled to judge, whether they *rightly* appealed, they wisely insisted, that the privilege of reading the Bible should be *common* to all men. But the Commentaries, which they wrote, *beside* the Confessions of Faith, which they composed, may convince us, that when they put the Bible into the hands of the people, they thought it necessary to add an *explanation* of it. Our Reformers therefore carried *their* opposition to the Church of Rome *beyond* the mere act of giving a Bible without note or comment. The sufficiency of the Holy Scriptures without the aid of *Tradition*, did not imply in *their* opinion the inutility of *all* explanation. Nor, because the Bible contains all things, which are necessary for salvation, did our Reformers conclude, that in giving the Bible *alone*, they did all things, which were wanted on *their* parts, for religious instruction. When *Tradition* was discarded, the Bible *only* became the religion of the Protestant; the Bible *only* was recognized as the *fountain* of religious truth. But so apprehensive were the early Reformers, that the *streams*, which might be drawn from it, would lose the purity of their *source*, and become *tainted* in their progress,

unless care were taken to lead them into proper channels, that these *Reformers* employed the most strenuous exertions, to prevent their flowing, either to *Popery* again, or in any *other* direction, where falsehood might be mingled with the truth. It was chiefly for *this* purpose, that they composed both *Expositions* of Scripture, and those *Confessions* of Faith, to which their followers assented on the ground, that our *Reformers* had *rightly* explained the Scripture. On this ground we assent in particular to our *own* Liturgy and Articles: and if we *neglect* them, we neglect the Faith, to which we profess ourselves attached. On the other hand, as our Liturgy and Articles are avowedly *founded* on the Bible, it is the special duty of those, who are set apart for the ministry, to *compare* them with the Bible, and see that their pretensions are *well* founded. But then our *interpretation* of the Bible must be conducted *independently* of that, of which the truth is to be *ascertained* by it. Our interpretation of the Bible therefore must not be determined by *religious system*: and we must follow the example of our *Reformers*, who supplied the place of Tradition by *Reason* and *Learning*. Let us beware then, as *Protestants*, of undertaking that important office, without due preparation. Would any man undertake to expound the law of the land, without a due preparation in the *study* of the law? Or, if any one thus unprepared *should* venture on the task, would hearers or readers be

found sufficiently credulous to *believe* in his expositions? And shall the law of *God* be treated with greater levity, than the law of *man*?

Here then, I trust, the arguments for theological learning may be *concluded*. It shall be the business therefore of the next, and of the following Lectures, to give directions for the *application* of it. And let us all implore the blessing of Almighty God, while we are conscientiously striving to discover the truth. If we employ the means, which God has provided us for the understanding of the Scriptures, we may hope, that the grace of God will be granted to our honest endeavours. But, if we *neglect* those means, let us not deceive ourselves by the vain expectation, that the Almighty will interpose by *supernatural* means, to supply the defects, which we *ourselves* occasion, when we disregard the *natural* means, which he has already furnished for that purpose.

LECTURE XIV.

THE *first* office of an interpreter is the investigation of single *words*: for he must understand the *elements*, of which a sentence is composed, before he can judge of their *combination*. Now in all languages *words* are only *signs*. When they are spoken, they are signs to the hearer of what was thought by the speaker: when they are written, they are signs to the *reader* of what was thought by the *writer*. The interpretation therefore of any word, whether written by an ancient or by a modern author, must depend on the following question; What notion did the author himself affix to that word, when he committed it to writing? Consequently, all our inquiries into the *meaning* of a word in any particular passage, inquiries which sometimes diverge in numerous directions, must be all brought at last to centre in that single point, *the notion affixed to it in that passage by the author*.

The *discovery* of this notion will be attended with greater or less difficulty, according to the relative situation of the *reader* to the *author*. If the

latter uses the same language, which is spoken by the former, and writes on a *familiar* subject, he will be readily understood, because he employs expressions, of which the meaning is determined by usage equally known to *both parties*. In such cases, the reader, unless he has a previous desire of *perverting* the author's meaning, will commonly understand the words, as they were *intended* to be understood: they will *really* be signs to the reader, of what was thought by the writer. If, instead of writing on a *familiar* subject, he writes on matters of *science*, the difficulty of interpretation will indeed be *increased*; but this additional difficulty will not be of that description, which creates *ambiguity*. The words will still perform their functions with exactness: for the definitions, which are used in science, prevent all misunderstanding. The Elements of Euclid will be understood, in every age and nation, precisely in the same sense, as they were understood by the author. In works composed on *morality* and *religion*, where mixed modes, which are not easily defined, are the objects of contemplation, it is always *more* difficult to ascertain an author's meaning, however attentive he *himself* may have been to the choice of his expressions. But in works of fancy and imagination, where, even in the author's *own* mind, precision and discrimination are frequently overlooked in the combinations of poetic imagery, occasional ambiguity will *unavoidably* take place in the interpretation of his words.

If the work, which we undertake to interpret, is written in a *foreign* language, we shall not only have to encounter the preceding difficulties, according to their several gradations, but the *additional* difficulty of understanding the language itself. If indeed it be a *modern* language, and, beside the assistance derived from grammars and dictionaries, the reader has the advantage of *conversing* with those, whose language it is, the words of that language may gradually become to him as familiar signs, as the words of his *own* language. But if the work, which we undertake to interpret, is written in a *dead* language, an accumulation of difficulty will take place, according to the *extent* or the *scantiness* of the means, which we possess, of discovering the meaning of the words, which are *extant* in that language. *This* is a kind of difficulty, entirely distinct from that, which attends what is commonly called the *learning* of a dead language. A *dead* language, which can be acquired only by grammar and lexicon, is more or less easily *learnt*, according to the paucity or abundance of its *words*, the simplicity or variety of its *inflexions*, and the clearness or intricacy of its *construction*. Hence the Hebrew language is more easily *learnt*, than the Greek: yet the examples, in which it is difficult to ascertain with precision the *meaning* of words, are more frequent in the former, than in the latter. A passage may be easily *construed*,

yet not easily *understood*. When the *structure* of a sentence is involved in no obscurity, we can easily put together, by the help of a Lexicon, a set of words in one language, corresponding to a set of words in another. But the correspondence will not *necessarily* be such, that the meaning, expressed by the *translator*, shall be the meaning intended by the *author*. The meaning of words is purely *conventional*; their connexion with the notions, which they convey, is founded in the *practice* or the *usage* of those, who speak the language, to which the words belong. In a living language this usage is known from *conversation*. But in a dead language it can be discovered only by *reading*: and therefore the fewer *books* we have in that language, the more circumscribed will be our means of discovering what was the usage of it, when it was spoken. Now the Old Testament is the only work, which remains, in the antient Hebrew: nor have we any thing like a Lexicon or Glossary composed, while it was a *living* language. Indeed it *ceased* to be a living language so long ago as the Babylonish Captivity; for Jerusalem was re-built by Jews, who were born in Chaldea, and who returned to the country of their ancestors with the language of their conquerors.

It is a matter therefore of great importance to the interpretation of the Hebrew *Bible*, to know the *sources*, from which we derive our knowledge of the Hebrew *language*. It is true, that we have

the advantage of an English translation, as well in the *Old Testament*, as in the *New* : but no man would wholly confide in a modern translation, who had the means of understanding the original. At any rate, it is of consequence to know how far our translators *themselves* were in possession of those means, because *this* knowledge must determine the degree of *confidence* to be placed in them. Let us consider therefore in the first instance what were the *primary* sources, from which the knowledge of Hebrew was drawn ; and in the next place let us inquire into those, which had the chief influence on our modern translations.

As Chaldee was the language spoken by the Jews of Jerusalem after the Babylonish Captivity, they gradually translated the Hebrew Scriptures, or at least the greatest part of them, into that language. While Chaldee was spoken in the southern part of Palestine, Syriac was the language of Galilee. Now we have a Syriac translation of the whole Hebrew Bible, as well as of the Greek Testament. Since then we have Chaldee and Syriac *translations* from the Hebrew, they are sources, from which we derive a *knowledge* of the Hebrew. It is true that Chaldee and Syriac have themselves long ceased to be spoken, if we except perhaps some villages of Palestine, where it is said, that a remnant of them is still preserved. But we have the means of ascertaining the sense of *Syriac* words from the writings of the Syrian Fathers, especially as some of

them were translated into Greek, and the knowledge of *Chaldee* was long preserved among the Jews, who retained it as a learned language many ages after their final dispersion. Chaldee and Syriac assist also *each other*: for in fact they are not so much different languages, as different dialects of the *same* language. The *chief* difference between them consists in the vowel points, or the mode of *pronunciation*. And though the *forms* of the letters are very unlike, the correspondence between the languages (or rather dialects) themselves is so close, that if Chaldee be written with Syriac letters without points, it *becomes* Syriac, with the exception of a single inflexion in the formation of the verbs.

Another oriental source, from which we derive a knowledge of Hebrew words, is the Arabic. The most ancient among the Arabic *versions* of the Hebrew Bible was made indeed above a thousand years after Hebrew had ceased to be *spoken*. But on the other hand, we have the means of determining with the greatest exactness the sense of *Arabic* words, because Arabic is still a *living* language, and is spoken over a greater extent of country, than almost any *other* language. It is at the same time a kind of classical language: it has authors on almost every subject; and has undergone the investigation of native grammarians and lexicographers. Its importance therefore to the interpretation of Hebrew is apparent. It serves indeed as a

key to that language; for it is not only *allied* to the Hebrew, but is at the same time so copious, as to contain the roots of almost all the words in the Hebrew Bible.

But of all the ancient *versions* of the Hebrew Bible, there is none so important, both to the critic, and to the interpreter, as the *Greek* version, which is known by the name of the Septuagint. Nor is the advantage, derived from the Septuagint, confined to the *Hebrew*. It is a source of interpretation also to the *Greek Testament*: and so *valuable* a source, that none other can be compared with it. The Septuagint version was made in Egypt, under the government of the Ptolemies, for the use of the Jews then settled in that country, who were as much in need of a *Greek* version, as the Jews of *Palestine* were then in need of a *Chaldee* version. The *Egyptian* Jews, to whom Greek was become their vernacular language, were of course desirous of possessing in Greek a faithful representation of the Hebrew Scriptures. But then the structure of the two languages was so widely different, that the translators, adhering to the original, more closely than perhaps necessity required, retained Hebrew *forms* and *modes* of expression, while the *words*, which they were writing, were Greek. The language therefore of the Septuagint is a kind of *Hebrew-Greek*, which a native of Athens might sometimes have found difficult to understand. But, as this version became the Bible of all the Jews, who were dispers-

ed throughout the countries, where Greek was spoken, it became the standard of *their* Greek language. St. Paul himself, who was born in Tarsus, and was accustomed from his childhood to hear the *Septuagint* read in the synagogue of that city, adopted the Hebrew idioms of the Greek version. And when he was removed to Jerusalem and placed under the guidance of Gamaliel, the Hebrew tincture of St. Paul's Greek could have suffered no diminution. The *other* Apostles were all natives of Palestine; as was also the Evangelist St. Mark, and probably the Evangelist St. Luke. *Their* language therefore was Syriac or Chaldee, of which the turns of expression had a close correspondence with those of the *ancient* Hebrew. Consequently, when they wrote in *Greek*, their language could not fail to resemble the language, which had been used by the Greek translators. And, as every Jew, who read Greek *at all*, (which they who *wrote* in it must have done) would read the Greek *Bible*, the style of the Septuagint again operated in forming the style of the Greek Testament. Both the Hebrew Bible therefore and the Greek Testament are so closely connected with the Septuagint, as well in their language as in their matter, that the Septuagint is a source of interpretation, alike important to the one and to the other.

We now come to the consideration of that source, from which we have most *copiously* drawn, and which has had greater influence on our modern trans-

lations, than is commonly supposed. This source is the Latin Vulgate. It has been applied to the interpretation, as well of the *New*, as of the *Old Testament*. But it is of more *especial* use in the latter, because our sources of intelligence in respect to *Hebrew* words, are more circumscribed than in respect to Greek. Its *intrinsic* value also in the Old Testament is greater than in the New. The Latin Vulgate in the New Testament was only *corrected* by Jerom; but in the Old Testament it is a translation made by Jerom himself, and made immediately from the Hebrew. Now Jerom was by far the most learned among all the Fathers of the Latin Church: and in order to make his translation of the Hebrew Bible as correct as possible, he passed several years in Palestine, where he was assisted by learned Jews, belonging to the celebrated college of Tiberias. Indeed the benefit to be derived from the Latin Vulgate, was acknowledged by our early Reformers, in the extensive use which they made of it *themselves*. Wickliffe's English translation was made *entirely* from the Vulgate: and Luther himself, when he made his German translation, translated indeed from the Hebrew and the Greek, but with the *assistance* of the Latin Vulgate. This assistance is visible throughout; and passages have been discovered in Luther's German translation, which agree with the Latin, even where the Latin differs from the Hebrew.

But the use of the Latin Vulgate, in translating from the Hebrew, was at *that* period not merely matter of *convenience*. It was matter also of *necessity*. Without the Vulgate, Luther would not have possessed the *means* of translating from the Hebrew. The knowledge of Hebrew had for ages preceding the period of the Reformation, been confined to the learned among the *Jews*; and when Luther undertook the task of translating from the original Scriptures, this knowledge had begun only to dawn among Christians. The comprehensive grammars and lexicons, to which we have *now* access, are sources of intelligence, which were not *open* to our early Reformers. The elder Buxtorf, one of the *fathers* of Hebrew learning among Christians, was not born till after Luther's *death*; and Luther's only helps in the form of a Hebrew Lexicon, were those of Reuchlin and Münster, extracted from the meager glossaries of the Rabbins. Under *such* circumstances a translation from the Hebrew, without the intervention of the Latin, would have been wholly impracticable.

Here the subject requires a few observations on our *own* authorised version. It was published by royal authority in the reign of James the First, having been then compiled out of *various* English Bibles which had been printed since the time of the Reformation. To judge therefore of our authorised version, we should have some knowledge of those *previous* English Bibles. The first of them was a

translation made abroad, partly by Tyndal, and partly by Rogers, but chiefly by the former. It was undertaken soon after the Reformation commenced in *Germany*, and therefore several years before the Reformation was introduced into *England*. What knowledge Tyndal had of Hebrew is unknown; But he of course understood the Latin Vulgate; and he was likewise acquainted with *German*. Indeed he passed some time with Luther at Wittenberg; and the books, which Tyndal selected for translation into *English*, were always those, which Luther had *already* translated into *German*. Now Luther did not translate according to the order, in which the several books follow each other in the *Bible*: he translated in an order of *his own*, and the *same* order was observed also by Tyndal, who translated *after* Luther. We may conclude therefore that *Tyndal's* translation was taken at least in *part* from Luther's: and this conclusion is further confirmed by the *Germanisms*, which it contains, *some* of which are still preserved in our *authorised* version. Further, when Rogers had completed what Tyndal left unfinished, he added notes and prefaces from Luther. The translation of the whole Bible, thus made by Tyndal and Rogers, was published at Hamburg under the feigned name of Mattheue: and hence it has been called Mattheue's Bible. Subsequent English editions were Coverdale's Bible, Cranmer's Bible, (called also the Great Bible, and sometimes by the names of the printers, Grafton

and Whitchurch,) the Geneva Bible, and Parker's or the Bishops' Bible, which last was published in 1568, and from that time was used in our *Churches* till the introduction of our *present* version. Now the Bishops' Bible, as appears from Archbishop Parker's instructions, was only a revision of Cranmer's Bible: and Cranmer's Bible was only a correction (in some places for the worse) of Matthewe's Bible, that is, of the translation made by Tyndal and Rogers. We see therefore the genealogy of the *Bishops' Bible*; and the Bishops' Bible was made the *basis* of our present authorised version. For the first rule, given by James the First to the compilers of it, was this, "The ordinary Bible, read in the Church, commonly called the Bishops' Bible, to be followed, and as little altered, as the original would permit." But whenever Matthewe's Bible, or Coverdale's, or Whitchurch's, or the Geneva Bible came *nearer* to the original, (that is to the editions of the Hebrew Bible and Greek Testament *then* in use,) the text of these *other* English Bibles was ordered to be adopted. Now as this collation was made by some of the most distinguished scholars in the age of James the First, it is probable, that our authorised version is as faithful a representation of the original Scriptures as *could* have been formed at *that period*. But when we consider the immense accession which has been *since* made, both to our critical and to our philological apparatus; when we consider, that the

whole mass of literature, commencing with the London Polyglot and continued to Griesbach's Greek Testament, was collected *subsequently* to that period; when we consider that the most important sources of intelligence for the *interpretation* of the original Scriptures were *likewise* opened after that period, we cannot possibly pretend that our authorised version does not require *amendment*. On this subject we need only refer to the work of Archbishop Newcome, entitled, "An Historical View of the English Biblical Translations; the expediency of revising by authority our present English Translation; and the means of executing such a revision." Indeed Dr. Macknight, in the second section of his general Preface, goes so far as to say of our authorised version, "It is by no means such a just representation of the inspired originals, as merits to be implicitly relied on, for determining the controverted articles of the Christian faith, and for quieting the dissensions, which have rent the Church."

In excuse however for neglecting the original languages, and trusting to a modern translation, it has been lately urged, that a man may spend his life in the study of Hebrew and Greek, and yet not become master of the originals, while the mere *English* scholar, who is versed in the phraseology of our *authorised version*, may be said to have made no inconsiderable progress in divinity. In answer to this excuse we may propose the following

questions : If, with our present critical and philological apparatus, *we* are unable to discover the meaning of the originals, how could that meaning have been discovered by our *early translators* ? How can *we* make a considerable progress in the knowledge of the Scriptures by reading only a *translation*, if the understanding of the originals is impeded by difficulties, which the very *authors* of that translation must have found much *harder* to surmount ? In the study of the Bible therefore, let those, who are set apart for the Christian ministry, consider well what is required from a good interpreter. Would it not be thought absurd, if a man ignorant of Greek undertook to write a Commentary on Homer, or a man ignorant of Latin to write a Commentary on Virgil ? And is it not *equally* absurd, to comment on the New Testament without a knowledge of Greek, or on the Old Testament without a knowledge of Hebrew ? A knowledge of Greek is, in a greater or less degree, attained by all, who have had the benefit of a learned education. But a knowledge of Hebrew, which is *equally* required from the *foreign* Protestant Clergy, is considered as *less* necessary in this country : and indeed it is *so far* less necessary, as a perfect understanding of the Old Testament is less necessary to a *Christian*, than a perfect understanding of the *New*. Yet we should surely endeavour to obtain at least *so much* knowledge of it, as may enable us to compare with the original our English

translation, and see that the text itself is accurate—before we attempt an *interpretation* of that text.

A further excuse for disregarding the originals and confiding in a modern translation, has been founded in an argument, which to a certain extent is indisputably true. It has been urged, that even if we *do* learn the original languages, we must still confide in a *translator*; and, that whether we look into a *Lexicon*, which gives us the meaning of *single* words, or into a *Translation*, which gives us the meaning of them *all together*, we are dependent on the *Lexicographer* in the one case, as on the *Translator* in the other. But there is a material difference, both in the *kind*, and in the *extent* of the confidence, which we thus repose. If we depend on a *continued* translation, we place a *two-fold* confidence in the translator; a confidence in his knowledge of each *single* word, and a confidence in his right *construction* of them. But our confidence in the *Lexicographer* is only of the former description: we learn to construe for *ourselves*, and thus are enabled to judge, whether others have construed *rightly*. We are enabled also to judge whether the translator has *added* or *omitted*, which we can never know without examining the original. Nor is the confidence, which we place in a *Lexicographer* even for *single* words, by any means so implicit, as when we trust to a *continued* translation. In the latter case, we must *wholly* rely, both on the judgment and on the

fidelity of the translator, being destitute of that knowledge, without which we can form no estimate whatever. But the case is widely different, when we consult a Lexicon. It is not in the *power* of a Lexicographer to impose on us, as a common translator can. In a Lexicon (at least if it is of any value) we frequently find the same word quoted in various passages, which assists us in determining its meaning; if it is a derivative, we become acquainted with the primitive, with which its meaning must have *some* connexion; and if it has *various* senses, (which we should never know from a continued translation,) we may judge from the context and other circumstances, *which* of those various senses is best adapted to any particular passage. If we extend our knowledge to the oriental languages *allied* to the Hebrew, and apply also the Septuagint version, the dependence on our Lexicon will be *further* diminished. We ourselves shall obtain possession of the *sources*, from which the Lexicographer himself must have drawn his materials, and thence we shall be enabled to judge, whether he has properly *applied* them.

Lastly, let us consider the *additional* obligation of studying the original Scriptures, which lies especially on those, who pretend to the title of *Protestant*. To repose implicit confidence in a *translation*, is characteristic of the *Church of Rome*. Let the Church of *Rome* decree of her authorised version, *Ut nemo illam rejicere quovis prætextu audeat*

vel præsumat. But let no *Protestant* apply these words of the Council of Trent to his *own* authorised version, whatever predilection he may have for it himself. It is the privilege of *Protestants* to appeal to the *inspired originals*. We do not believe, that our *translators* were inspired, though the *Jews* believed it of their *Septuagint* translators. The early *Reformers*, especially Luther and Melancthon, thought it one of the most important advantages obtained by the Reformation, that the learned were no longer forced to walk in the trammels of an *authorised version*, but were at liberty to open the *originals*. Nor have the *foreign Protestant Clergy*, from the period of the Reformation to the present age, appealed, either in Academic disputations, or in writings designed for the learned, to any other scriptural authority, than that of the *Hebrew*, and the *Greek*. For those indeed, who were unable to *understand* the originals, they provided translations conducted to the best of their abilities. And since it is infinitely better to read the Scriptures in a *translation*, than not to read them *at all*, the legislature of different Protestant countries has wisely provided for the reading of them in Churches, according to those translations, which were most approved. But the high and decisive authority, belonging to the inspired *originals*, was never supposed by any *Protestant*, at least not by any *real Protestant*, to attach to a *mere translation*; though the Church of *Rome* requires such authority for her

own authorised version. When a *Protestant* government has selected a particular translation, and appointed it to be read in Churches, this selection and appointment has implied only, that such translation was the best which could *then* be obtained. But it did not imply *perfection*, or that no *future* amendment could be required. Indeed we know that the English version, which had been authorised by Queen Elizabeth, was exchanged for *another* version, authorised by James the First. We have therefore a precedent in our own Church, for following the advice of Archbishop Newcome, and *again* revising by authority our English version. But whether we revise it or not, there is *one* inference, which *must* be drawn from the preceding remarks, namely, that we cannot be qualified for the *Interpretation* of the Bible, till we understand the *languages* of the Bible.

LECTURE XV.

THE *sources* of biblical interpretation having been explained in the preceding Lecture, let us now consider what *rules* must be observed in the investigation of words, in order to make them perform the office, for which they were intended, and become signs to the hearer or reader of what was thought by the speaker or writer.

Whether we speak, or whether we write, it is in either case our object to be understood. Every *Author* therefore must be supposed to employ *such* words, for the conveyance of his thoughts, as he believes will excite in his readers the *same* thoughts. Otherwise, he defeats his own object. His words will be *fallacious* signs; they will be signs of *one* thing to the writer, of *another* thing to the reader; and whether they convey a *true*, or convey a *false* proposition, they will not convey, what the reader *wants* to know, the proposition of the author. Hence also he must be supposed to use his words in the same *sense*, in which they are commonly used by the persons, who speak the language, in which he writes. For, if he uses them in any *oth-*

er sense, they will *again* be signs of one thing to the writer, of another to the reader.

To *interpret* therefore a word in any language, (whoever be the author that used it) we must ask in the first instance ; What notion is (or was) affixed to that word, by the persons *in general*, who speak (or spake) the language ? And the *answer* to this question will constitute our *first* rule of interpretation. Now the question, when applied to a *living* language, is *easily* answered, because the usage of a living language is known from conversation. But when it is applied to a *dead* language, of which the usage can be learnt only from books, the answer may involve very *extensive* inquiries. If, for instance, the question be applied to a word in the Hebrew Bible, the answer will involve the use of those sources of intelligence, which were explained in the last Lecture. In like manner, if it be applied to any word in the *Greek Testament*, the answer will involve inquiries into the usage of words, both among the Greeks in general, and among those in particular, who used the peculiar dialect of *Hebrew-Greek*.

But whatever be the *sources*, from which we derive our knowledge of words, whatever be our *means* of answering the question above-proposed, that answer will in general determine our *interpretation* of words, as it determines in general an author's *application* of them. The rules *themselves* therefore, which we are *now* considering, may be

explained, without reference to any particular language. But, on the other hand, we must not forget, that they apply only to the words of an *original*. For when we interpret a *translation*, the words, which we investigate, are signs to the reader of what was thought by the *translator*. They may, or they may *not*, be signs of what was thought by the *author*.

It has been already observed, that authors must in general use their words in the sense, in which they are generally *understood*: and that hence is derived our first rule of *interpretation*. But how, it may be asked, is the rule to be applied, if a word has *various* senses? Is not *such* a word an *ambiguous* sign? And must not the application of the rule be attended in this case with *uncertainty*? Now if a word has *various* senses, it will undoubtedly be a sign of *one* thing in one place, of *another* thing in another place. But it is no necessary consequence, that the word is an *ambiguous* sign. Its senses, however different, may be distinctly marked by the relation of that word to *other* words, with which it is *connected* in a sentence. And as in cases where a word has only *one* sense, that sense is determined by usage, in like manner, where a word has *various* senses, each *single* sense will be determined by usage. But then the question above-proposed must be restricted to the particular case. And instead of asking *indefinitely*, What notion was affixed to the word by the persons in

general, who spake the language, we must ask; What notion did they affix to it, in that *particular connexion*.

Should a doubt however remain, where a word has *various* senses, that doubt may be frequently removed by the application of *another* rule, which is likewise founded on the principle, that words are signs to the reader of what was thought by the writer. As the *general* meaning of words depends on general usage, so their *particular* application may depend on the particular situation of the persons, to whom they were *immediately addressed*. We may lay it down therefore as a *second* rule of interpretation, that the meaning of a word, used by any writer, is the meaning, which was affixed to it by those, for whom he *immediately* wrote. For, if a writer, addressing himself in the first instance to particular persons or communities, does not adapt his expressions to the mode, in which *they* are likely to apply them, he will fail to be understood by the very persons, for whose *immediate* benefit he wrote. When *St. Paul*, for instance, composed an Epistle to any particular community, whether at Rome, at Corinth, at Ephesus, or any other place, he undoubtedly used such *expressions*, as well as such arguments, as he knew would be *understood* by that community. And, as he intended to be understood by *that* community, so and no otherwise did he intend to be understood by all *other* readers, whether in the *first* or in the *nineteenth* century. Now, in

order to *discover* the meaning ascribed to St. Paul's expressions by any particular community to which he wrote, we must make ourselves acquainted with the peculiar *situation* of that community. We must understand the *opinions*, which they maintained on the subjects, on which St. Paul addressed them; or the expressions, which he employed in the *correction* or *confutation* of those opinions, may be understood by *us* in a different manner from that, in which *they* understood his expressions; and consequently in a different manner from that, in which St. Paul *meant* them to be understood. For if he had not expressed himself so as to be understood by *those*, whose religious errors it was his *immediate* object to remove, his immediate object would not have been *attained*.

Again, as the situation and circumstances of the original *readers* afford frequently a clue to an author's meaning, so on the other hand, his *own* situation and circumstances are not *less* necessary to be taken into the account. We may lay it down therefore as a *third* rule of interpretation, that the words of an author must be so explained, as not to make them *inconsistent* with his known character, his known sentiments, his known situation, and the known circumstances of the subject, on which he wrote.

To judge of the *utility* of these rules, let us take a case of interpretation, which is very common, and where the *want* of them is especially felt.

When a word has various senses, it often happens, that more than one of them will *so* far suit the context, as to afford *some* sort of meaning to the passage. In such a case, an expounder of the Bible takes the liberty of exercising his own *discretion*; and this discretion is commonly *so* exercised, as to make the author mean what the expounder *wishes* him to have meant. Instead of considering the situation of the *author*, the expounder contemplates his *own* situation. Instead of considering the situation of those, whom the *author* addressed, the expounder contemplates those, whom he *himself* is addressing. Instead of inquiring into the opinions, which it was the *author's* object to confute, he concerns himself only with *those* opinions, which it is his *own* object to confute. In this manner does he divert the author's meaning from its original purpose; and by torturing his words, or rather the words of his *translator*, he contrives to extract from them a meaning, which they were not intended to convey. But let us ask, in the name of common sense, whether it be *possible* to interpret an author as he *ought* to be interpreted, without due attention to the preceding rules. Suppose, that an ancient author has written on a point of *controversy*. Will any man venture to assert, that such an author can be *understood* by those, who are ignorant of the *subject and circumstances* of the controversy? Take, for instance, the controversial parts of *St. Paul's* writings, and see the consequence of expound-

ing them, without a *knowledge* of the subject and circumstances. What was the *chief* controversy, which engaged the attention of St. Paul? It was a controversy between the *Jewish* Converts and the *Heathen* Converts. The *Jewish* Converts, attached to their former institutions, contended that the Law of Moses should be united with the Faith of Christ. Had this proposition been *true*, the Heathen Converts would have been only *imperfect* Christians; and, in order to obtain the perfection required of them by the *Jewish* Converts, they must have submitted to the rites enjoined by the Levitical Law. The question therefore at issue between them, was simply this; Whether a man could become a *good Christian*, without remaining, or becoming a *Jew*? This question, which was *then* of the highest importance, St. Paul has discussed, especially in his Epistles to the Romans and the Galatians, where he has decided the question in the *affirmative*. But the question, *there* decided, is very different from any question, which *now* agitates the religious world: for no man would *now* suppose, that the best Christians are they, who have been Jews. Yet how seldom do we find an interpreter of St. Paul, who keeps in view the subject and circumstances of *that* controversy, on which St. Paul himself was writing? Men interpret his Epistles, as if he were a writer of the *present* age: and passages, relating solely to the question at issue between *Jewish* and *Heathen* Converts, are so explained,

as if the Apostle had been sitting in judgment, to decide between *Calvin* and *Arminius*.

Here perhaps it will be objected, that as the Christian dispensation was designed for *all* men, there is an *inconsistency* in supposing, that minute inquiries into the transactions of *antiquity* should be necessary, in order to comprehend it. However useful such researches may be in the study of the *Old Testament*, yet to suppose that the *New Testament*, which prescribes not laws and regulations for a *single* nation, but dictates equally to *all mankind*, to suppose that *such* a work should require a knowledge of what happened eighteen hundred years ago, and in another quarter of the globe, before it can be *understood*, may appear *incompatible* with the design of the Deity, in making it the vehicle of his will. Now the object of the Deity is not to be determined by any preconceived opinions, on our part, concerning what he *ought*, or ought *not*, to have done. What he *ought* to have done, can be discovered by no other means, than by inquiring what he *has* done. And, if we find by *experience*, that the understanding of the *New*, as well as of the *Old Testament*, requires extensive knowledge, we must argue *accordingly*. Instead of the gratuitous supposition, that things ought to have been *otherwise*, we must conclude that things *ought* to be, as we find they really *are*; instead of *complaining* about difficulties, we must endeavour to *surmount* them, by obtaining the knowledge,

which God has given us the *means* of obtaining, and which, from its very *necessity*, we may conclude, it is our *duty* to obtain.

It may be further objected, that the situation of *inspired* writers is different from that of *common* writers. This is certainly *true* ; it is true, both in respect to the writers *themselves*, and in respect to the *confidence*, which we may repose in them. We may be previously assured, when a writer is inspired, that every proposition, which he advances, is in strict conformity with the truth. But we must *understand* an inspired writer, as well as a common writer ; or we shall not know what his propositions *are*. And the very circumstance, that his propositions *must* be true, should make us the more anxious to *investigate* their meaning. But *how* shall we investigate their meaning, unless we interpret the words by the rules, which we apply to *other* writings ? Shall we imitate the Church of Rome, and rejecting the aid of human learning, resolve the interpretation of Scripture into the decrees of a Council, on the presumption, that it interprets under the *influence of the Spirit*, and therefore that its interpretations are *infallible* ? Or shall we imitate the modern *Enthusiast*, who *likewise* rejects the aid of human learning, who *likewise* aspires to the influence of the Spirit, and, acting on the same principles as the Church of Rome, determines with equal ease, and with equal confidence in his own decisions ? Or shall we follow the example of our

Reformers, who, when they had rejected *Tradition* as a guide to the meaning of Scripture, suppli-
ed the *place* of that tradition by *reason* and *learn-*
ing ?

It is true, that if we interpret the Scriptures by the aid of *reason* and *learning*, we must resign all pretensions to that infallibility, which is claimed by those, who aspire to the *influence of the Spirit* ; whether that influence is supposed to display itself in the *assurances of an individual*, or in the decrees of a *general council*. But, on the other hand, there are advantages, which compensate for every defect. The man, who interprets Scripture by the aid of reason and learning, without being elated by the supposition of a supernatural interference on *his* account, will apply, no less modestly than industriously, the means which Providence has placed within his reach. While he uses his honest endeavours to discover the truth, he will pray to God for a *blessing* on those endeavours: he will pray for that *ordinary* assistance of the Holy Spirit, without which all our endeavours must be *fruitless* ; but he will not expect that *extraordinary* assistance, which was granted of old, and for *higher* purposes. He may vary indeed from the interpretations of others, and sometimes perhaps from those which he *himself* had adopted at an earlier period, when his knowledge of the subject was more *confined*. If the *final* results of his interpretation should be such, as in points of doctrine to

agree with the deductions, which he had learnt as articles of faith, he will rejoice at the coincidence, and be thankful, that his labours are thus rewarded. But he will feel no enmity to those, whose deductions are *different*; he is too well acquainted with the numerous requisites of a good interpreter, to expect that they should be often *united*; and knowing, that interpreters, differently qualified, and interpreting on different principles, can never *agree* in their results, he will have charity for those, whose opinions are different from *his own*. He will *believe* indeed, like *other* men, that his own opinions are *right*, and consequently, that what opposes them is *wrong*. But the *principle*, on which he argues, that his opinions are right, is very different from the principle, on which either a *general council*, or an *individual enthusiast*, would rest as a basis of the truth. He will not pretend, that he *cannot* err; he will not pretend, even that the *Church*, of which he is a member, cannot err. And, though in point of *fact*, he believes that it *does not* err, yet, as he admits the *possibility*, he feels no enmity to those, who contend, that it *does* err. Though he believes, that he himself has *rightly* interpreted the Bible, and thereon founds his conviction, that his *own* Articles of Faith are *legitimate* deductions from the Bible, he is no less desirous of granting to others, than of obtaining for himself, the privilege of acting from private conviction. The freedom, with which he maintains, that the doc-

trines of his *own* Church are in unison with Scripture, the *same* freedom he allows to those, who claim that unison for *themselves*. He believes indeed, and he *asserts*, that his *own* is the true religion. Yet he thinks it right, that other men should *also* have the liberty of believing and asserting that *theirs* is the true religion. And he submits with humility to that Almighty Being, who alone *cannot* err, to determine, whether he, or they, be *really* in possession of what *each* possesses in his *own* belief.

Such is the interpreter, who explains the Bible by the aid of reason and learning. Let us now consider the interpreter, who aspires to the possession of *higher* means. When a general Council, assembled by the Church of Rome, deliberates on points of faith, the *Holy Spirit* is supposed to guide them in their inquiries, and to exempt their decisions from even the *possibility* of a mistake. Here then lies the grand distinction between the interpretative principle of the Church of Rome, and the interpretative principle of the Church of England. The Church of England, like all other Christian communities without exception, asserts, that its doctrines are in strict conformity with Scripture. But in so doing, it merely asserts the *fact*, that it *does not* err from the truth; whereas the Church of Rome, beside the fact of *not* erring from the truth, claims also the *opinion*, that it *cannot* err from the truth. Now this claim of *opinion*, in addition to the claim of *fact*, makes a difference of infinitely

greater moment, than men in general suppose. It has been frequently said, and very lately repeated, that, as the two Churches act alike in maintaining, each for itself, that it *does not* err, 'tis mere metaphysical subtlety to distinguish between the petty terms of '*does not*,' and '*can not*.' But these terms, insignificant as they may appear, denote nothing less, than two distinct principles of *action*, and principles *so* distinct, that the one leads to charity and toleration, the other to intolerance and persecution. On the *former* principle, which is maintained by the church of England, though we *believe* that we are right, we admit, that we are *possibly* wrong; though we believe that others are *wrong*, we admit that they are *possibly* right; and hence we are disposed to *tolerate* their opinions. But on the *latter* principle, which is maintained by the Church of Rome, the very *possibility* of being right is denied to those, who dissent from its doctrines. Now, as soon as men have persuaded themselves, that in points of doctrine they *cannot* err, they will think it an imperious *duty* to prevent the growth of all *other* opinions on a subject so important as *religion*. Should argument therefore fail, the importance of the *end* will be supposed to justify the worst of means. But the intolerance, thus produced by an imaginary exemption from error, is far from being confined to the Church of *Rome*. The same intolerance is produced in *every* man, who imagines, that he interprets the Scriptures under the especial

guidance of the Holy Spirit. It makes no difference, in this respect, whether such especial guidance is supposed to be vouchsafed to a *general council*, or to an *individual in his private apartments*. The *result* in either case is the same. In either case, the persons who believe themselves so *gifted*, will conclude, that they *cannot err*. In either case, they will deem it impious to *tolerate* what the Spirit, as *they* imagine, has *condemned*. And hence we may justly infer, that the same inquisitorial power, which has been exercised by the Church of Rome, would be exercised by *others*, who set up *similar* pretensions, if the means of *employing* that power were once at their command.

Have we not then sufficient ground for resisting pretensions, no less dangerous to the community, than fallacious in themselves? Can we want further arguments for the interpretation of Scripture by reason and learning? Perhaps indeed I ought not in *this* place to use arguments *at all* in their favour. It may appear *superfluous* to plead for reason and learning in an University like *this*, where mathematical acumen and classical literature go hand in hand. But it is the misfortune of many well-intentioned young men, to have been seduced into a belief, that the acuteness of reasoning, which is wanted in *mathematics*, and the learning, which they employ in the study of the *classics*, may be laid aside as useless, nay, even as an incumbrance, when they transfer their inquiries to *religion*. The

words of *man's* wisdom are *then* exchanged for a supposed demonstration of the *Spirit*. But let us not deceive ourselves on so momentous a subject. Because an inspired *Apostle* has declared, that *his* wisdom was derived from the suggestions of the Holy Spirit, let us not imagine, that *our* wisdom will be dignified by the *same* supernatural aid. Because an inspired *Apostle* has declared, that *his* wisdom was not the wisdom of *man*, but the power of *God*, let us not imagine, that the same divine illumination, the same intellectual light, in which St. Paul *composed* his Epistles, will be infused into a modern *expounder* of them. Nor, because St. Paul has declared, that the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God, let us conclude, that the duty of a Christian requires him to discard from the study of the Bible the assistance of human learning. The wisdom of this world, which St. Paul advised the Corinthians to reject, is very different from that, which is meant by human learning : indeed *so* different, that they, who are *least* acquainted with the latter, are often *best* acquainted with the former. Let us remember also, that they who depreciate human learning, as the means of interpreting the Scriptures, depreciate what was the pillar of the Reformation : that they act contrary, both to the *principles*, and to the *practice* of our Reformers : that they would involve us in mental darkness, and thus bring us back to Popery again.

Lastly, let us inquire, whether the rules of in-

terpretation, which apply to *human* authors, are still applicable, when Scripture is referred to the *Holy Spirit* as its author. Now in whatever manner we suppose that inspiration was *communicated*, and whatever degree of *agency* we ascribe to the *writers themselves*, we shall find, that the *words* of Scripture must be still interpreted by the same rules as those, which apply to the words of merely *human* authors. If the Sacred Writers were *so* inspired, that, while their *knowledge* was suggested to them, the mode of committing that knowledge to *writing* was left to their own discretion, the words which they employed for that purpose, must evidently be interpreted as *their* words, and consequently by the rules above described. Nor will the conclusion be different, if the words were inspired. For if the words *themselves* were dictated by the Holy Spirit, the *choice* of those words must have been determined by the same rules, as if they had been chosen by the *Sacred Writers*. The choice of them must have *equally* depended on their common usage in the intercourse between man and man. If they had *not* been so chosen, they would not have been *understood* by man. They would not have conveyed to the reader what was thought by the author, and the object of revelation would not have been attained.

LECTURE XVI.

THE rules of interpretation, explained in the last Lecture, were founded on the *usage* of words, either general, or particular. Now the *usage* of words in any language means the use of them as determined by the *practice* of those, who *spoke* and *wrote* the language. Lexicographers therefore, when they give the senses of words, accompany those senses with passages from authors, who have *used* them in those senses : and the passages, thus quoted, are considered as authorities or vouchers, that such senses *belong* to those words. When a Lexicon however relates to a *dead* language, the compiler of it is seldom in possession of authors sufficiently numerous and multifarious, to teach him the usage of that language in its *full extent*. Examples of the same word, occurring only in a *few* instances, are common in most of the dead languages, and in none so much as in the Hebrew. But the less frequently a word is *used*, the fewer are the *opportunities* afforded by the language *itself*, of learning what the usage of it is. Nor are the examples uncommon of words occurring only *once* among the authors extant in a dead language. And

in *such* cases, the language itself affords us no other opportunity of learning its usage, than one *single* comparison of a word with others in connexion with it. And though the *majority* of words in a dead language may often occur, yet whenever the number of their *senses* bears a considerable proportion to the *whole* number of examples, the authorities for each *single* sense will be proportionally *reduced*.

To aid therefore our imperfect means of discovering by *observation* the usage of words, we must extend our inquiry beyond the mere relation of words to those who *use* them. We must consider the relation, which words, as signs, bear *immediately* to the notions, of which they are signs : and we must *further* inquire into the *ground* of that relation. For, though the meaning of words is no other than that, in which they have been actually *used*, we must not conclude, that usage is altogether *fortuitous*. Though the connexion between words and their notions is *conventional*, that convention may have been regulated by determinate laws. Indeed the connexion between words and their notions may have originated in *various* causes. But unless the causes are *understood*, we cannot judge of the *effects*. Let us inquire therefore into the *origin* of that connexion, which subsists between words, as *signs*, and the *notions* of which they are signs.

A word may be considered *at present*, either as

something *seen*, or as something *heard* : either as a *written* word, or as a *spoken* word : either as a *visible*, or as an *audible* sign, of its notion. But in the *infancy* of language, it was only an *audible*, not a *visible* sign. A word was *then* a mere sound, or utterance of the voice, conveying to the hearer some notion entertained by the speaker. And, though the invention of *writing* was introduced in so early an age, that all remembrance of that invention is lost in the darkness of remote antiquity, a considerable period must have elapsed before *spoken* words could have acquired a representation in *written* words. Indeed, before any attempt was made to write by the use of *letters*, it is probable that in every country some kind of *hieroglyphic* or *picture-writing* was employed. But representations of *this* kind had no connexion whatever with the use of *letters* : they could not even have *led* to the invention of letters. They were representations not of the *words*, but of the *objects*, to which the words *referred*. They were easy and *obvious* representations, when applied to *external* objects ; nor was the transition *difficult*, when representations were wanted for things *abstracted* from the observation of the senses. Some *resemblance* to a visible object suggested a correspondent *mark* ; as, for instance, when a *circle*, which is a *line* without end, was used in hieroglyphics, to denote a *period* without end. But, as soon as men began to write with those characters, which are called *letters*, they no

longer represented the *objects*, to which the words had reference. The thing *then* represented was the *sound*, or utterance of the *voice*, which *denoted* the object. Letters are elements, which are simply expressive of *sound*; and they were probably suggested by the different forms assumed by the *mouth* in the utterance of each *single* sound. In the most *ancient* languages, each letter was a distinct syllable, or distinct *single* sound; and hence they were easily combined into forms expressive of *combined* sounds. In *this* manner did the *spoken* word acquire a representation in the *written* word; and thenceforward they were so identified, that the word became no less a determinate sign to the reader of what was thought by the writer, than it was previously to the hearer of what was thought by the speaker.

In the *interpretation* therefore of words it is immaterial at present, whether we consider them as *visible*, or consider them as *audible* signs. But there is *another* relation between words and their notions, which has very *material* influence on the *usage* of them in every language. And in order to understand *this* relation, we must consider in what manner it is probable, that language *itself* was originally formed. The *first* notions, which men must have wanted to convey to others by the means of words, were notions excited by objects of the *senses*: and, when words had been provided for *these* notions, the next effort was the invention of words

for notions acquired by *reflection*. But *here* a difficulty occurred, which did not occur in the *former* case. The words, which were first employed in the infancy of language, to denote *external* objects, were probably, more or less, an echo to the sense. The particular *tones*, which were uttered by different *animals*, or were heard in the operations of *inanimate* nature, suggested probably the sounds or words, by which the first attempts were made to express the correspondent objects. And, though an object, which itself was *destitute* of sound, was more easily represented to the *eye*, than to the *ear*, more easily provided with a *picture*, than with a *word*, yet an object, even by its external *form*, or an action, by the mode of its *operation*, might have occasioned in the person, who was forming a *sound* for it, such a formation of the *mouth*, as produced a correspondent utterance. In short, external objects, as well as external actions, might, in various ways, which it is here unnecessary to detail, have suggested the sounds or words, which were originally used to denote them. But when words were wanted for things, which could be neither heard, nor seen, nor perceived by any other of the senses, there was no *clue*, which could lead *directly* to a sound corresponding with the thing to be represented. All notions, acquired by *reflection*, are excluded by their very origin, from any *immediate* resemblance with either *visible* or *audible* signs. They may operate indeed *mediately*, if they operate

on the *passions* : for in that case an *effect* may be produced, either in the *voice*, or in the *gesture*, which may give rise to a sound corresponding with that *effect*, and therefore indirectly with the cause, which produced that effect. But if the notion was so abstracted from all sensible effect, as to produce *no* external mark, which might have suggested a correspondent sound, a sound, or word, must have been provided for it in one of these two ways. Either an *arbitrary* sound must have been invented, without any *attempt* at similitude between the sound and the thing to be represented by it; or some similitude must have been sought between the *abstract notion*, for which a word was *wanted*, and some *other* notion, already *provided with a word*. The latter mode was not only more easy and obvious; but also more consonant with an early state of civilization, when the imagination is always more employed in finding *resemblances*, than the judgment in discovering *differences*. In such cases therefore, it would frequently, and perhaps *commonly* happen, that words already provided for *one* purpose, would, for want of *new* words, be applied to *another* purpose, in consequence of some *resemblance*, whether real or imaginary, between the *primary* and the *secondary* purpose.

In this representation of the origin and formation of language, we see the *foundation* of those distinctions in the senses of words, which are observed in all languages, and which are expressed by

the terms, *proper* and *improper* sense—*literal* and *figurative* sense—*grammatical* and *tropical* sense. When a word is used in that sense, which was *first* annexed to it, the sense, in which it is *thus* used is its *own*, or its *proper* sense. But when a word is wanted for a sense, which has had no word *exclusively* attached to it, and it is necessary therefore to employ some word, which has already a connexion of its own, the word, so used in a sense, which does not *properly* belong to it, is said to be used in an *improper* sense. The *literal* sense of a word corresponds so far to its *proper* sense, that the term *literal*, by referring to the *elements*, of which a word is composed, implies that the word is used in its original simplicity, or its original sense. But as the original sense of a word is frequently lost, especially in its transition from one language to another, some *derivative* sense, occupying the *place* of the original sense, becomes, from *that* time, the *literal* sense. Now the literal sense is no other than the grammatical sense, the term *grammatical* having the same reference to the Greek language, as the term *literal* to the Latin. They equally refer to the *elements* of a word. For a similar reason, the *tropical* sense is no other than the *figurative* sense. As we say in language derived from the Greek, that a *trope* is used, when a word is *turned* from its literal or grammatical sense, so we say in language derived from the Latin, that a *figure* is then used, because in such cases the

meaning of the word assumes a new *form*. The same opposition therefore, which is expressed by the terms *literal sense* and *figurative sense*, is expressed also by the terms *grammatical sense* and *tropical sense*. But the opposition expressed by the terms *proper sense* and *improper sense* is of a different description. When a word is diverted from its *proper* sense, the senses, to which it is applied, are, *all* of them, denominated *improper* senses, of whatever number or kind those senses may be. But though a figurative sense is always an *improper* sense, as being equally a departure from the first sense, an *improper* sense is not always a *figurative* sense. To make a sense *figurative* in the common acceptance of the term, there must not only be a *departure* from the first sense, as in the case of an *improper* sense, but there must at the same time be excited something like an *image* in the mind.

All languages are more or less figurative : but they are the *most* so in their most *early* state. Before language is provided with a stock of words, sufficient in their *literal* sense to express what is wanted, men are under the *necessity* of extending the use of their words *beyond* the *literal* sense. But the application, when once *begun*, is not limited by the bounds prescribed by *necessity*. The imagination, always occupied with resemblances, which are the foundation of figures, disposes men to *seek* for figurative terms, where they *might* have

expressed themselves in literal terms. Figurative language presents a kind of *picture* to the mind, and thus delights while it instructs; whence the use of it, though more *necessary*, when a language is poor and uncultivated, is never laid aside, especially in the writings of orators and poets. The Hebrew language is *highly* figurative, as well in the prophetic as in the poetical parts of the Old Testament. The speeches and discourses of our Saviour are *not less* figurative: and numerous mistakes have been made by a *literal* application of what was *figuratively* meant. When our Saviour said to the Jews, "Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up," the Jews understood the word 'temple' in its *literal* sense, and asked him whether he could raise again in three days what had taken six and forty years to build. They did not perceive, that his language was *figurative*, and that he spake of the temple of his *body*.

But among all the mistakes, which have been made in the interpretation of that figurative language, so frequently employed by our Saviour, there is none, which has led to such important consequences, and has created such dissensions in the Christian world, as that which relates to the body of Christ, at the celebration of the Holy Sacrament. When our Saviour at the Last Supper took bread, and blessed it and brake it, he gave it to his disciples, saying, Take, eat, this is my *body*. In like manner, when he had taken the cup, and given

thanks, he said to his disciples, Drink ye all of it, for this is my *blood* of the New Testament. In the same figurative language he had spoken on a former occasion, when he said, He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood, dwelleth in me, and I in him. And then comparing his body with bread, he added, 'This is that bread, which came down from heaven.' The Jews indeed, as well on *this* occasion, as when he spake of the *temple* of his body, understood him literally, and asked, 'How can this man give us his flesh to eat?' though our Saviour himself, when he said of his body, that it was the bread which came down from heaven, plainly indicated, that he was only *comparing* his body with bread. The Church of Rome has followed the example of the *Jews*, and has *likewise* ascribed a *literal* meaning to words, which were purely *figurative*. But the difficulty which pressed upon the *Jews*, in regard to *literally* eating the body of Christ, is not felt by the Church of *Rome*. The mistake of the Jews consisted in supposing, that our Saviour literally offered them his *body* to be eaten; whereas he *literally* offered his body as a *sacrifice*, and what he offered in *remembrance* of that sacrifice was literally *bread* and *wine*. But the Church of Rome, regarding the ceremony of the Lord's Supper as an actual *representation* of that sacrifice, not as a *commemoration* of it, supposes, that the body and blood of Christ is *literally* presented to the view of the com-

municant. And believing, that Christ himself, by the consecration of the bread and wine at the Last Supper, had literally converted them into his own body and blood, before he said to his disciples, ‘This is my body,’ and ‘this is my blood,’ they conclude, that the miraculous conversion, thus ascribed to Christ himself, (a conversion, which, had it been *necessary*, lay undoubtedly within the reach of *almighty* power,) is equally performed by the *human* power of an officiating priest. But the Church of England, with due attention to that figurative style, so frequently employed by our Saviour on *other* occasions, has interpreted his words on that *solemn* occasion by the rules of analogy, and by the dictates of common sense. We eat the bread in *remembrance*, that Christ died for us; we feed on him only in our *hearts* by faith with thanksgiving. We believe, that the blood of Christ was *shed* for us, and will preserve us to everlasting life. But the cup, which we drink, we drink only in *remembrance* that Christ’s blood was shed for us. The same interpretation of our Saviour’s words was adopted by the Reformers in general, with the exception only of Luther. He firmly indeed resisted the doctrine of Transubstantiation, or an actual change in the *substance* of the elements, as maintained by the Church of Rome. He *so* far took the words of Christ in a figurative sense, as not to believe that the bread and wine, even after the consecration, meant the *same things* as the body and

blood of Christ. He believed that the bread and wine still retained their proper qualities. But he was perplexed by this expression, 'This is my body ; and though conference after conference was holden on the subject, he could never be persuaded to construe that expression consistently with the figurative language which is used throughout ; and he persevered to the last in so strict an interpretation of that expression, as if it meant, This is *really and literally* my body. Having rejected however the doctrine of Transubstantiation, or an actual *change* in the elements, he endeavoured to remove the difficulty, in which he had unnecessarily involved himself, by supposing that, after the consecration, the body of Christ was *united* with the bread ; and this *union* (not conversion) of substance was called *Consubstantiation*. But there was a difficulty still remaining, which occasioned a controversy of long duration after Luther's death. The Divines of Switzerland objected to the Lutherans, that our Saviour could not be every where *corporeally* present, which the doctrine of Consubstantiation implied ; while the Lutherans, on *their* parts, endeavoured to remove that objection, by accounting for the hypostatic union on the ground of what they technically termed 'Communicatio idiomatum,' or the Communication of properties. And since Christ, as God, must be omnipresent in respect to his *divine* nature, they hence inferred, that as this *divine* nature had been united to his *human* nature,

there existed a communication of properties from the former to the latter, which made him *corporeally* present, where he was *spiritually* present. The argument however did not satisfy their opponents, who thought it wiser to *prevent* the difficulty, by an uniformly consistent interpretation of figurative language.

The importance therefore of a due distinction between the *literal* and *figurative* use of words in the interpretation of Scripture, can require no further illustration. But in *all* cases, the *literal* meaning of a word must be the *first* object of our inquiry, because its *figurative* meaning is only an *applied* meaning; and, to judge of the *propriety* of the application, we must understand the nature of the thing applied. If a word has only *one* sense, that sense is of course considered as its *literal* sense. But if it has *various* senses, it then becomes a matter of inquiry, and sometimes of *difficult* inquiry, in what *manner* those various senses shall be *arranged*. Now as the words, which relate to the compound notions of reflexion, are used for the most part with the *greatest* latitude, an examination of the manner, in which the various senses of *such* words may have been *successively formed*, will most easily suggest the general principle, on which the senses of words should be *arranged*. When such a compound notion is altered only by the subtraction of one of its *constituent* notions, or by the addition of one other simple notion, the second state

of that compound notion will so nearly resemble its first state, that the difference will be hardly perceptible; and hence the same word, which expressed it in its *first* state, will follow it to its *second* state. By a similar addition or subtraction, this compound notion enters on a *third* state, differing more from the first, but still resembling the second. In like manner it goes on to a *fourth* and a *fifth* state, each resembling the state *immediately* preceding it, but differing more and more from the *first* state, till at length the word acquires a meaning, which has little or no resemblance with the *primary* meaning. Examples of this description are numerous in every language: and there is no department of interpretation, which affords such scope for the skill of the artist, as the discovery and the due *arrangement* of these several senses. If we put them together in any other order, than that, in which they were *successively formed*, we shall never comprehend *how* the same word could have acquired such a variety of senses; and consequently we shall be exposed to perpetual doubt, whether a word, which admits of one sense, is *capable* of being applied in another. To facilitate the analysis, we should endeavour in the first place to discover, *which* among the various senses could *most easily* have given rise to all the rest: for this must have been the *primary* sense. That which *most* resembles it, must be the *second* in order; and so onward. In this manner we may form a *genealogy* of senses, in which the resem-

blance between each parent and its immediate offspring is distinctly visible, though all resemblance be lost between the ancestor and the latest descendant. No Lexicographer has paid such attention to this *genealogy* of senses, as Schleusner in his *Lexicon to the Greek Testament*, a *Lexicon*, which should be in the possession of every student in *Theology*.

Nor is it enough, that an interpreter of Scripture understands this arrangement of senses, in regard only to the words of the *original*. He must be *equally* attentive to the language, which he employs, as the *medium* of interpretation. For it frequently happens, that *one* language authorises a *figurative* use of words, which is *not* applicable to the words, that *literally* correspond to them in *another* language. If then the latter are substituted for the former, where the former are used in their *figurative* sense, we shall have an interpretation, it is true, but *such* an interpretation, as conveys to the reader what was thought by the *interpreter*, not what was thought by the *author*. Here then we *again* perceive the superiority of the *learned* above the *unlearned* interpreter. The former *extracts* the senses, which attach to the words, and thus produces an *Exposition*. The latter, intent only on imposing his *own* meaning on the words, produces what may be termed rather an *Imposition*. Above all things, let us beware of the false conclusion, that we have discovered the meaning of a word, if

it does but make a passage *intelligible*. For if the meaning of a word had nothing *else* to determine it, than the mere circumstance of its making the passage *intelligible*, the sense of Scripture would be involved in the greatest ambiguity. It *often* happens, that *various* senses may be ascribed to a word, and yet that in *each* case the sentence will be *intelligible*. It is *possible* even, that in each case it will convey a *truth*. But, if it conveys not *that* truth, which was intended by the *author*, it conveys not the truth, with which we are then concerned.

After what has been already said on the *general* nature of literal and figurative language, it cannot be necessary to examine in detail the several *kinds* of figures, which have been enumerated by grammarians and rhetoricians. Indeed the figures of *diction*, as they are called, relate merely to the addition or subtraction of letters or syllables, and have no concern whatever with the *interpretation* of words. Nor have we, in *this* respect, any concern with the figures of *construction*; for they relate to grammatical arrangement, and not to the *meaning* of words. In short, the figure, with which we are chiefly concerned, is *Metaphor*: for it is a figure, which is more frequently employed, than all *other* figures of rhetoric put together. Now, as similitude is the foundation of figurative language *in general*, so is it *especially* of Metaphor. Indeed a Metaphor is *itself* a Simile, though not in the *form* of a Simile.

For instance, if we say of a distinguished Divine, that he supports the established religion, as a pillar supports the incumbent edifice, we make use of a Simile, drawn out in the *form* of a Simile. But if we *contract* the Simile into a *single* position, and give a *metaphorical* sense to the word Pillar, which before was used *literally*, we may *then* say of such a person, that he is a pillar of the Church. On the other hand, as any one who was secretly at work for its *destruction*, might be compared with a man, who was *undermining* an edifice, we should say in metaphorical language, that such a person was *undermining* the Church. But if the mine should at length *explode*, and the Church should *fall*, the defender of that Church might exclaim, again in Metaphor, and again in Truth,

Impavidum ferient ruinae. Horat.

LECTURE XVII.

THE last Lecture having concluded with an explanation of *Metaphor*, our present inquiry must be directed to *Allegory*. But before we attempt the *interpretation* of the *latter*, we should clearly understand its relation to the *former*. Now a *Metaphor*, as the origin of the term imports, is a kind of *transfer*, which takes place whenever a word, belonging *properly* to *one* subject, is transferred to *another* subject, to which it does *not* properly belong. If we apply the word 'pillar' to an *edifice*, we apply it where it *properly* belongs: but if we transfer it to a *person* we apply it where it does *not* properly belong. The *metaphorical* sense therefore, like the figurative sense *in general*, belongs to the class of *improper* senses; and it possesses in an *eminent* manner *that* character of the figurative sense, which consists in presenting an *image* to the mind. When a Statesman is called a pillar of the State, or a Churchman a pillar of the Church, there is presented an image, which exhibits more clearly, as well as more forcibly, what is meant to

be expressed, than *could* have been expressed by a mere *literal* term. But *metaphorical* interpretation always remains an interpretation of *words*; whereas *allegorical* interpretation, as we shall presently find, is an interpretation, not of *words*, but of *things*.

An *Allegory* indeed has been sometimes considered as only a *lengthened Metaphor*; at other times as a *continuation of Metaphors*. But we shall best understand, both the nature of Allegory *itself*, and the character of *allegorical interpretation*, by attending to the *origin* of the term, which denotes it. Now the term ‘*allegory*,’ according to its original and proper meaning, denotes—a representation of *one* thing, which is intended to excite the representation of *another* thing. Every Allegory therefore must be subjected to a *two-fold* examination: we must first examine the *immediate* representation, and *then* consider, what *other* representation it was intended to excite. Now in most Allegories the *immediate* representation is made in the form of a *narrative*: and since it is the object of an Allegory to convey a *moral*, not an *historic* truth, the narrative itself is commonly *fictitious*. The *immediate* representation is of no further value, than as it leads to the *ultimate* representation. It is the *application*, or the *moral*, of the Allegory, which constitutes its *worth*.

Since then an Allegory comprehends two distinct *representations*, the *interpretation* of an

Allegory must comprehend two distinct *operations*. The first of them relates to the *immediate* representation: the second to the *ultimate* representation. The *immediate* representation is understood from the *words* of the Allegory: the *ultimate* representation depends on the immediate representation applied to its *proper end*. In the interpretation therefore of the *former*, we are concerned with an interpretation of *words*; in the interpretation of the latter, we are concerned with the *things signified* by the words. Now, whenever we speak of *allegorical* interpretation, we have always in view the *ultimate* representation, and consequently are then concerned with an interpretation of *things*. The interpretation of the *words*, which attaches only to the *immediate* representation, or the plain narrative *itself*, is commonly called the *grammatical*, or the *literal* interpretation; though we should speak more *correctly*, if we called it the *verbal* interpretation, since even in the *plainest* narratives, even in narratives *not* designed for moral application, the use of words is never restricted to their mere *literal* senses. Custom however having sanctioned the application of the term *literal*, instead of the term *verbal* interpretation, to mark the opposition to *allegorical* interpretation, we must understand it accordingly. But whatever be the term, whether *verbal* or *literal*, which we employ to express the interpretation of the *words*, we must never forget, that the *allegorical*

interpretation is the interpretation of the *things*; of the *things signified* by the words, not of the *words themselves*. If we lose sight of this distinction, the subject of allegorical interpretation will immediately be involved in obscurity. Indeed the numerous difficulties, which have usually attended the treatment of it, have been chiefly owing to this cause. An interpretation of *things* has been treated, as if it were an interpretation of *words*; and this heterogeneous mixture of subject and predicate has occasioned equal perplexity, in the arguments, and in the conclusions.

That the subject of allegorical interpretation, which is of high importance to the Sacred Writings, may be better understood, let us apply the principle, which has been here explained, to a few examples of Scripture. And, as every *parable* is a kind of allegory, let us consider in the first place, that example, which is *especially* clear and correct, the parable of the sower. “A sower went out to sow his seed. And, as he sowed, some fell by the way-side; and it was trodden down, and the fowls of the air devoured it. And some fell upon a rock: and as soon as it sprang up, it withered away, because it lacked moisture. And some fell among thorns: and the thorns sprang up with it, and choked it. And other fell on good ground: and sprang up, and bare fruit an hundred-fold.” Here we have a *plain narrative*, a statement of a few simple and intelligible facts,

such probably as had fallen within the observation of the persons, to whom our Saviour addressed himself. When he had finished the narrative, or the *immediate* representation of the allegory, he then gave the *explanation*, or the *ultimate* representation of it. That is, he gave the allegorical *interpretation* of it. And that this allegorical interpretation was an interpretation, not of the *words*, but of the *things signified* by the words, is evident from the explanation itself. “The seed is “the Word of God. Those by the way-side are “they that hear: then cometh the devil, and taketh “away the Word out of their hearts, lest they “should believe and be saved. They on the rock “are they, which, when they hear, receive the “Word with joy: and these have no root, which “for a while believe, and in time of temptation “fall away. And that, which fell among thorns, “are they, which, when they have heard, go forth, “and are choked with cares, and riches, and pleasures of this life, and bring no fruit to perfection. “But that on the good ground are they, which in “an honest and good heart having heard the Word, “keep it, and bring forth fruit with patience.” Here then we have an evident explanation, not of the *words* employed in the narrative, but of the *things signified* by them. It was the seed *itself*, with which the Word of God was compared. As the seed was choked, which fell among thorns, so the Word of God is choked by the pleasures of the

world: and, as that which fell on good ground produced an hundred-fold, so the Word of God produces in those, who are prepared to receive it. In short, an Allegory with its application constitutes a kind of Simile, in both parts of which the *words themselves* are construed, as on *other* occasions, either literally or figuratively, according to the respective use of them: and then we institute the comparison between the *things signified* in the former part with the *things signified* in the latter part.

Let us now take, as an example of Allegory from the Old Testament, that impressive and pathetic Allegory, addressed by Nathan to David. “There were two men in one city, the one rich, “and the other poor. The rich man had exceeding many flocks and herds. But the poor man “had nothing, save one little ewe lamb, which he “had bought and nourished up; and it grew together with him and with his children; it did eat “of his own meat, and drank of his own cup, and “lay in his bosom, and was unto him as a daughter. And there came a traveller unto the rich “man, and he spared to take of his own flock, “and of his own herd, to dress for the way-faring “man, that was come unto him; but took the poor “man’s lamb, and dressed it for the man, that was “come to him.” When Nathan had finished this narrative, which he had addressed to David, as an allegory, David, not immediately perceiving

the intended application, replied, "As the Lord liveth, the man, that has done this thing, shall surely die: and he shall restore the lamb fourfold, because he did this thing, and because he had no pity." In application then of the narrative to the intended purpose, replied Nathan to David, "Thou art the man. Thus saith the Lord God of Israel; I anointed thee king over Israel, and I delivered thee out of the hand of Saul, and I gave thee thy master's house, and thy master's wives into thy bosom, and gave thee the house of Israel and of Judah; and if that had been too little, I would moreover have given unto thee such and such things. Wherefore hast thou despised the commandment of the Lord to do evil in his sight? Thou hast killed Uriah the Hittite with the sword, and hast taken his wife to be thy wife, and hast slain him with the sword of the children of Ammon."

In the *preceding* examples, the allegorical narratives were accompanied with their explanations; that is, *both* parts of the Simile were introduced. But allegorical narratives are more frequently left to explain *themselves*, especially when the resemblance between the *immediate* and the *ultimate* representation is sufficiently apparent, to make an explanation unnecessary. Of this kind we cannot have a more striking example, than one, which has been frequently quoted, namely, that beautiful allegory in the eightieth Psalm. "Thou hast

“brought a vine out of Egypt: thou hast cast out
“the heathen, and planted it. Thou preparedst
“room for it, and didst cause it to take deep
“root, and it filled the land. The hills were
“covered with the shadow of it, and the boughs
“thereof were like the goodly cedars. She sent
“out her boughs unto the sea, and her branches
“unto the river. Why hast thou broken down
“her hedges, so that they, which pass by the way,
“do pluck her? The boar out of the wood doth
“waste it, and the wild beast of the field doth
“devour it. Return, we beseech thee, O God of
“hosts, look down from heaven, and behold, and
“visit this vine.” In this Allegory was finely
depicted the then-unhappy state of the Jews
contrasted with their former prosperity: and its
application was sufficiently obvious, without any
formal explanation; for the vineyard of the *Lord*
of hosts, was the *house of Israel*. It is indeed an
essential requisite in every Allegory, which is
left to explain *itself*, that the application be easy
and obvious. The subject, designed to be *sug-*
gested must be one that is *familiar* to the reader;
and the several circumstances of the *immediate*
representation, must have a manifest correspond-
ence with those of the *ultimate* representation.
The immediate representation must be *consistent*
also in its several parts. Whatever object be
selected for the comparison, that object must be
kept constantly in view; and we must be careful

that nothing be *affirmed* of it, which does not *properly* belong to it. Otherwise the Allegory itself will displease by its incongruity, and lose its effect in the application.

After these examples from *Scripture*, let me be allowed to quote an instance of Allegory from a *profane* author, especially as it has been made a subject of examination by Quintillian. It is the well-known passage in Horace,

O Navis, referent in mare te novi
Fluctus? O quid agis? Fortiter occupa
Portum.

On this passage Quintillian observes, “*Navim pro republicâ, fluctuum tempestates pro bellis civilibus, portum pro pace atque concordîâ dicit.*” But, though the passage may be *explained* by the substitutions here made, it is not that the *words*, used by Horace, are *synonymous* with the *words*, employed by Quintillian for the explanation; but because the *things signified* by the former may be *compared* with the *things signified* by the latter. It is not that *Navis* can signify a republic, or that *Fluctus* can signify civil wars, or that *Portus* can signify peace. But a ship tossed by the waves may be *compared* with a nation agitated by civil wars, as a ship, lying safely in harbour, may be again *compared* with a nation enjoying the blessings of peace. Here then we have *another* proof, that allegorical interpretation is an interpretation, not of *words*, but of *things*.

From the preceding explanations we are enabled also to reconcile two seemingly *contradictory* assertions on this subject, for which it would be otherwise difficult to account. It is well known, that many of the ancient Fathers were so fond of allegorical interpretation, as to employ it, not only in the interpretation of *allegory*, but also in the interpretation of *history*. In this respect has Jerom complained especially of Origen, "*quod ita allegorizet, ut historię auferat veritatem.*" On the other hand, Ernesti in his *Opuscula philologica et critica*, has a Dissertation entitled, *De Origene interpretationis librorum sacrorum grammaticę auctore*. If Origen then, according to Ernesti, was so distinguished for his *grammatical* interpretation, with what propriety could Jerom complain, that he was so attached to *allegorical* interpretation? Is not grammatical or literal interpretation always considered as *opposite* to allegorical interpretation? How then, it may be asked, could the interpretations of Origen be considered as grammatical by *one* writer, and as allegorical by *another*? Now this seeming mystery will be explained at once, when we consider, that as Allegory comprehends two distinct representations, the interpretation of it comprehends two distinct operations. The one relates to its *immediate*, the other to its *ultimate* representation. The one is an interpretation of *words*; the other of the *things signified* by the words. The *former* is the literal or grammatical; the latter the *allegori-*

cal interpretation. Here then we see very clearly, that both literal and allegorical interpretation, though *opposed* to each other, not only *may* exist together, but actually *do* exist together in the interpretation of every Allegory. And they exist together without any inconsistency, because they relate to *two distinct operations*. The same reasoning applies also to any example of *real* history, if that example be *treated* as allegory, and adapted to some purpose *beside* the narrative, as allegory is in its *ultimate* representation. For in *such* a case we have an *historical* narrative subjected to a two-fold interpretation; of which the first is the *literal*, the second the *allegorical*. And, as these two kinds of interpretation may exist together without contradiction, we can easily comprehend, that the same interpreter may display grammatical *accuracy* in the former, and yet fall into *extravagancy* in the employment of the latter. This was really the case with Origen.

From what has been already stated it appears, that the use of *allegorical interpretation* is not confined to mere allegory, or *fictitious* narratives, but is extended also to history, or *real* narratives. And in this case the grammatical meaning of a passage is called its *historical* meaning, in contradistinction to its *allegorical* meaning. Now there are two different modes, in which Scripture-history has been thus allegorized. According to *one* mode, facts and circumstances, especially those recorded in the

Old Testament, have been applied to *other* facts and circumstances, of which they have been described as *representative*. According to the *other* mode, those facts and circumstances have been described as *mere emblems*. The *formér* mode is warranted by the practice of the Sacred Writers themselves; for when facts and circumstances are so applied, they are applied as *types* of those things, to which the application is made. But the *latter* mode of allegorical interpretation has *no* such authority in its favour, though attempts have been made to *procure* such authority. For the same things are *then* described, not as types, or as *real* facts, but as mere *ideal* representations, like the immediate representation in allegory. By *this* mode therefore is history not only *treated* as allegory, but *converted* into allegory: or, in other words, history is thus converted into *fable*. Now it is by artifices, like these, that the adversaries of Christianity have endeavoured to undermine the truth of *Scripture-History*: and we have lately had a notable example in a distinguished writer of this country. Nor are these allegorical interpreters contented always with their *own* preservations; for *some* of them have attempted to enlist even *St. Paul* into the service of infidelity. They have endeavoured to prove, that the Mosaic history is mere *allegory*, by appealing to that passage in the Epistle to the Galatians, where St. Paul, in reference to the *history* of the two sons of Abraham, says, ‘Which

things are an *Allegory*.' Since then an Allegory is a picture of the imagination, or a *fictitious* narrative, they conclude that St. Paul himself has warranted, by his own declaration, *that* mode of allegorical interpretation, which they *themselves* apply to the subversion of Scripture-history.

If the pretext, which infidelity thus derives from the words of our *authorized version*, had been afforded also by the words of the *original*, we might have found it difficult to reply. But as soon as we have recourse to the words of the *original*, the fallacy of the appeal is visible at once. If St. Paul *himself* had been quoted, instead of the *translators* of St. Paul, it would have *instantly* appeared, that the Apostle did *not* apply, as is supposed by *English* readers, the title of *allegory* to any portion of the Mosaic history. The word Ἀλληγορία has never been used by St. Paul in any one instance throughout all his Epistles: nor indeed does it occur *any* where in the Greek Testament, nor even in the Greek version of the Old Testament. At the place in question, St. Paul did not pronounce the history *itself* an allegory: he declared only that it was *allegorized*. His own words are Ἀτινα ἐστὶν ἀλληγορούμενα, which have a very different meaning from the interpretation of them in our authorized version. It is one thing to say, that a history is *allegorized*: it is another thing to say, that it is allegory *itself*. If we only *allegorize* an historical narrative, we do not of necessity *convert* it into allegory. And

though allegorical interpretation, when applied to history, may be applied, either so as to *preserve*, or so as to *destroy* its historical verity, yet when we use the *verb* ‘allegorize,’ as *St. Paul* has used it, the allegorical interpretation is manifestly of the former kind. Had he meant that the history *was* an allegory, he need not have *allegorized* it: an attempt to *make* a thing what it is *already* would indeed be no less absurd, than superfluous. In short, when *St. Paul* allegorized the history of the two sons of Abraham, and compared them with the two covenants, he did nothing more than represent the first as *types*, the latter as their *antitypes*. Though he *treated* that portion of the Mosaic history in the same *manner* as we treat an Allegory, he did not thereby *convert* it into Allegory. Though he instituted the same *comparison* which we institute in an Allegory between its *immediate* and its *ultimate* representation, yet the subjects of *St. Paul’s* comparison did not thereby acquire the same character with the subjects of an *Allegory*. In the interpretation therefore of the Scriptures, it is essentially necessary, that we observe the exact boundaries between the notion of an *Allegory* and the notion of a *Type*. And it is the *more* necessary, as some of our own commentators, among others even Macknight, misled by the use of the term ‘Allegory’ in our authorized version, have considered it as *synonymous* with *Type*. An Allegory, as already observed, is a *fictitious* narrative: a *Type* is some-

thing *real*. An Allegory is a picture of the *imagination*; a Type is an *historic fact*. It is true, that typical interpretation may in *one* sense be considered as a *species* of allegorical interpretation; that they are so far alike, as being equally an interpretation of *things*; that they are equally founded on *resemblance*; that the *type* corresponds to its *antitype*, as the *immediate* representation in an Allegory corresponds to its *ultimate* representation. Yet the *quality* of the things compared, as well as the *purport* of the comparison, is very different in the two cases. When, for instance, Joshua, leading the Israelites into the Holy Land, is described as a type of our Saviour leading his disciples into the kingdom of heaven; or when the sacrifice of the Passover is described as a type of the sacrifice of our Saviour on the cross; the *subjects* of reference have nothing *similar* to the subjects of an *Allegory*, though the *comparison* between them is the same. And though a type, in reference to its antitype, is called only a *shadow*, while the latter is called the *substance*, yet the use of these terms does not imply, that the former has *less* historical verity, than the latter.

St. Paul therefore has afforded, neither by his *language*, nor by his *arguments*, the slightest pretext for that wildness of allegorical interpretation, which has been applied to the subversion of historical truth. The practice of converting into allegory the narratives of ancient authors was derived

from a very different source. It originated among the *Greeks*; and long before the birth of Christ. The work, on which this species of allegorical interpretation was first employed, was the *Iliad* of Homer: and a collection of allegorical expositions is still extant, which has been published under the title, *Heraclidis Allegoriæ Homericæ*. It is true, that the actions ascribed to the heroes of the *Iliad*, cannot be regarded as *real* history; that they cannot be considered as a journal of events, which actually happened before the walls of Troy. But the author certainly meant, that they should assume the *character* of real events. For unless the descendants of those heroes could have *supposed* at least that they were reading the actions of their ancestors, the *Iliad* would never have become a *national poem*. There was nothing therefore in the *character* of those actions, at all resembling *allegorical* representation, a representation, which not only *professes* to be a picture of the imagination, but a picture introduced merely for the sake of *another* picture, that *resembles* it. Nor were the actions, ascribed even to the *Deities* of the *Iliad*, any other than such, as accorded with the superstition of the age, and to the *original* readers exceeded not the bounds of *credibility*. But when the savage manners of the ancient heroes became offensive to the polished Greeks of later ages, and the mythology of Homer became disgusting to those, who had been educated in the schools of Aristotle and Plato, the

commentators on Homer had recourse to the expedient of *allegorical* interpretation. Unable to defend him by a *literal* exposition, yet unwilling to abandon a national author, whom the Greeks had ever holden in the highest veneration, his philosophic interpreters drew the veil of allegory over the actions of the Iliad, and represented them thus disguised, as the depositories of sublime and mysterious truths.

The example of the Greeks became infectious to the Jews, who, after the age of Alexander, were established among them in numerous colonies, especially in Egypt under the government of the Ptolemies. Hence they learnt, not only the *language* of the Greeks, but their habits of *thinking* and *reasoning*. And, since Judaism appeared foolishness to the Greeks, as did afterwards Christianity, the Jews themselves had the weakness and the impiety, to treat the writings of Moses as the Greeks had treated the writings of Homer. Thus they sacrificed the historic truths recorded by the divine Lawgiver, and converted miracles into allegories, that Moses might appear in the garb of a Platonic philosopher. Philo of Alexandria, who wrote in the early part of the first century, has exhibited in numerous instances the Jewish mode of allegorizing the books of Moses. Educated at Alexandria in the Platonic philosophy, he made this philosophy a rule for the interpretation of Scripture. If then the grammatical or historical meaning of a passage ac-

corded not with the rule, a mystical meaning was sought to supply its place; and facts, which had been recorded by Moses as supernatural events, were transformed into ideal representations, supposed to have no other object, than to convey some religious mystery, or moral truth. The same mode of allegorical interpretation, as Philo himself relates, was employed by the Therapeutæ and the Essenes: and from the Jews it was transferred to the Christian Fathers.

LECTURE XVIII.

WHEN the early Fathers had adopted the mode of allegorical interpretation, which was described at the end of the last Lecture, they applied it to the defence of the Sacred Writings against the objections of the Greek philosopher. But however *well-intentioned* that application might have been, it was ill calculated to serve the cause of Christianity. For, instead of *confuting* their adversaries by an argumentum ad judicium, they only *silenced* their adversaries by a retort of the argumentum ad hominem. Thus, when Celsus, the Epicurean philosopher, had objected to the Mosaic account of the Creation, the Temptation, and the Fall of Man, the answer of Origen, in his treatise against Celsus, was better adapted to a defeat of his immediate opponent, than to a permanent defence of the Bible. It was urged by Origen, that the narratives, to which Celsus had objected, should be explained *allegorically*: and he argued, that Celsus could not consistently *reject* this mode

of interpretation, because it was employed by the Greek philosophers themselves. But, though truth is frequently conveyed in the form of an Allegory, the truth, which is *thus* conveyed, is *moral*, not *historic* truth. The narrative, which *imparts* the Moral, is itself *fictitious*. If therefore a narrative, professedly *historical*, be treated as a narrative purely *allegorical*, the history itself is thereby *abandoned*. That some moral inference may still be *drawn* from it, is nothing to the purpose. Moral inferences are drawn from professed *fables*, which are themselves a kind of allegory. But *their* value is confined entirely to the *application* of them; whereas *historic* facts are recorded for their *own* sakes, and independently of any moral use, which may *afterwards* be made of them. If we ascribe then the character of allegory to an *historical* narrative, we defeat the very purpose, for which the facts, contained in it, were recorded. Besides, if this treatment of an historical narrative is admissible in *one* case, it is admissible in *others*: and thus all history, both sacred and profane, may be diverted from its original intent. For nothing is more *easy*, than such a mode of treatment. We have only to look for some sort of *resemblance* between the fact, to which allegorical interpretation shall be applied, and some *other* fact, (whether near or remote, is of little consequence,) and we obtain at once, upon *these* principles, the immediate and the ultimate representation of an Allegory;

we have at once an *allegorical*, instead of an *historical* narrative. In this manner was the history of our Saviour and the twelve Apostles converted a few years ago by a French writer into a mere Allegory : and persons, whose existence is established by the strongest of all possible evidence, were transformed into ideal representations of the Sun and the twelve signs of the Zodiac. By a similar process were the *miracles* of our Saviour converted into Allegories, in the former part of the last century, by a member of this very University. Indeed *this* writer imagined, that he had not only the example of the *Fathers*, but the example also of *St. Paul* in his favour. And since, according to the words of our *authorised version*, St. Paul had made an Allegory of *one* fact, he thought himself at liberty to make an Allegory of *another*. That St. Paul did *not* apply the title of Allegory to any historic fact, that he afforded not even a *pretext* for this mode of allegorical interpretation, was fully proved in the last Lecture. But it would be difficult, if not impossible, to vindicate the conduct of the Fathers. *Their* mode of allegorizing Scripture was of a very different description from that, which was applied by St. Paul. For instead of applying historical facts, as *types* of other facts, by which the historical verity is *preserved*, they often applied them in such a manner, that the historical verity was *destroyed*. They often explained historical facts, as if real existence no more

attached to them, than to the immediate representation of an Allegory.

We have reason therefore to *complain*, that the early Fathers have afforded by their own conduct a pretext to modern unbelievers for such a mode of allegorical interpretation. It is true, that a mode, which is indefensible *in itself*, can derive no *real* support from the practices of those, to whom authority no more attaches, than to any *modern* interpreter. And whatever confidence the Church of *Rome* may repose in the expositions of her Fathers, we may hence learn, that such confidence is ill bestowed. Indeed the early Fathers, by their injudicious conduct in the interpretation of the Bible, not only affected many parts of its history, but placed the Bible *itself* in a very false and injurious light. Though they silenced, by the aid of Allegory, their immediate opponents, who argued on the *same principles*, yet the very circumstance, that principles, applied to the defence of the *Heathen mythology*, were applied also to the defence of the *Bible*, could produce no other effect, than that of degrading the latter to the level of the former. When a passage of the Bible, conveying professedly an *historical* fact, was defended against the objections of the Heathens by resolving that passage into a mere *Allegory*, the veil, which was thus drawn over it, served only to present it in the same dress, in which the Heathens exhibited the fables of their Gods. The *latter* indeed had some

excuse for their allegorical interpretations; they had *reason* for concealing under the veil of Allegory their ludicrous and indecorous legends. Hence Arnobius, in his treatise *adversus Gentes*, addresses himself to a Heathen in the following manner: *Iste omnes historiæ, quæ tibi turpes videntur, atque ad labem pertinere divinam, mysteria in se continent sancta, rationes miras atque altas, nec quas facile quivis possit ingenii vivacitate pernocere. Neque enim quod scriptum est, atque in primâ est positum verborum fronte, id significatur et dicitur, sed allegoricis sensibus, et subditivis intelliguntur omnia illa Secretis.* But that *Christian* Commentators should in like manner have sought for allegorical senses and hidden meanings in the *Bible*, where the Sacred Writers have recorded the plain and simple words of *Truth*, of *Truth* which has *no* deformity to hide, and *needs not* the veil of Allegory, affords equal matter of surprise and of regret.

Nor is this the *only* evil, which has arisen from such a treatment of Scripture. If the literal or grammatical meaning of a passage may be exchanged at pleasure for an *allegorical* meaning, the meaning of Scripture will be involved in perfect *ambiguity*: it will assume as many different forms, as the fancies of interpreters are multifarious. In *grammatical* interpretation, which is an interpretation of *words*, there are certain *rules* of interpretation, from which we cannot depart. But *al-*

legorical interpretation, which is an interpretation of *things*, is subjected to neither *rule* nor *limit*. As soon as an interpreter has learnt, what things are *literally* signified by the words of a passage, he has nothing else to do, than to let loose his imagination for the discovery of some *other* things, which may *resemble* the things *literally* signified, and then those *other* things will at once be *allegorically* signified. And since the same thing may to *various* interpreters suggest *various* resemblances, the *same* passage may have as many *allegorical* meanings, as there are *persons*, who undertake its interpretation. Hence Arnobius, in continuation of this subject, observes, *Potest aliud aliud, et argutius fingere, et veri cum similitudine suspicari. Potest aliud tertius; potest aliud quartus: atque, ut se tulerint ingeniorum opinantium qualitates, ita singulæ res possunt infinitis interpretationibus explicari. Cum enim e rebus occlusis omnis ista, quæ dicitur Allegoria, sumatur, nec habeat finem certum, in quo rei, quæ dicitur, sit fixa atque immota sententia, unicuique liberum est in id, quo velit, attrahere lectionem, et affirmare id positum, in quod eum sua suspicio, et conjectura opinabilis duxerit.*

But, notwithstanding the numerous objections, to which this mode of interpretation is exposed, it has prevailed, more or less, in almost every age of Christianity. Indeed the very causes, which should have led to the *rejection* of it, are the causes

which have operated in its *favour*. For though a mode of interpretation, which may be applied to *any* purpose, is really fit for *no* purpose, yet, if an interpreter has no *other* means of attaining his purpose, he finds it difficult to withstand the temptation of employing what is always at hand for *every* purpose. The use, which was made of it by the early *Fathers*, and the advantage taken of their injudicious conduct, have been already explained. But allegorical interpretation, when once adopted, was not long confined to the controversies between the Greek *Fathers* and the Greek *philosophers*. It was soon discovered to be equally useful for controversy of *every* description. And hence, if *one* opinion was supported by *grammatical* interpretation, a *different* opinion could be as easily supported by *allegorical* interpretation. But beside the motive of *utility*, there was something attractive in the thing *itself*. The imagination, delighting in allegory, is easily charmed into allegorical *interpretation*, while the dryness of *grammatical* interpretation is, in an equal degree, an object of its aversion. The *former* was recommended also by the *facility* of its application, while the exercise of the *latter* required, on the part of the interpreter, at least *some* share of knowledge and judgment. It is no wonder therefore, that in proportion as learning *declined*, the passion for allegorical interpretation *increased*. And the use of *grammatical* interpretation having been proportionally *diminished*

in the Church of Rome by the substitution of an authorised version for the *original* Scriptures, there at length arose, in the darkness of the middle ages, a race of Fanatics, who rejected grammatical interpretation *altogether*. They were distinguished in the twelfth century by the appellation of the *Mystics*, from their *mystical* mode of interpreting Scripture. These Mystics had an utter *contempt* for human reason, and human learning: they supposed themselves especially guided by the *Spirit*; and hence they compensated, by a kind of *spiritual* interpretation, for that *grammatical* interpretation, which they had never *learnt*. At the same time, the Latin version of the New Testament, in the absence of the Greek original, supplied them with an argument for the rejection of *literal* or *grammatical* interpretation, and the adoption of *spiritual* or *allegorical* interpretation, which the original itself does *not* supply. They appealed namely to that passage in St. Paul's Second Epistle to the Corinthians, which in the Latin Vulgate is translated '*littera occidit, spiritus autem vivificat*;' and in our *own* authorised version, 'the *letter* killeth, but the *spirit* giveth life.' In this passage, the Mystics imagined that St. Paul was drawing a parallel between two different kinds of *interpretation*. Construing therefore '*littera*' by '*literal* interpretation,' and '*spiritus*' by '*spiritual* interpretation,' they inferred, that the Apostle had *condemned* the former, and recommended the ex-

clusive employment of the *latter*. Now the Apostle, according to his *own* words, was drawing a parallel of a *totally different description*: a parallel, which had no concern whatever with *interpretation*. He was drawing a parallel between the *Law of Moses* and the *Gospel of Christ*. The former does *not* afford the means of salvation: the latter *does* afford the means of salvation. This, and this *only*, is what St. Paul meant, when he said, that the one *killeth*, and that the other *giveth life*. It is true, that he applied the term Γράμμα to the former, the term Πνεῦμα to the latter. But then he added *explanations* of those terms, which remove all ambiguity. The Law of Moses he called Γράμμα, as being Διακονία ἐν γράμμασι, as being Διακονία ἐντετυπωμένη ἐν λίθοις. The Gospel of Christ he called Πνεῦμα, as being Διακονία τοῦ Πνεύματος ἐν δόξῃ. Now, as these explanations are not only *Greek* explanations, but *Greek* explanations of *Greek* terms, they are absolutely *incapable* of being transfused into any *version*. They can be *understood* only, with reference to the words of the *original*. It is therefore *impossible*, that any one who expounds this passage from the words of a *translation*, should expound it in the sense of the *Author*. But as the *Mystics*, like other members of the Church of *Rome*, expounded from an authorised version, they fell into an error, which a knowledge of the original would have *prevented*. They fell into the error of supposing, that literal or grammat-

ical exposition not only *might* be, but *ought* to be discharged. And hence they acquired such a *contempt* for every thing not spiritual or allegorical, that the plain and literal meaning of a passage was regarded as a sort of *husk*, or *chaff*, fit only for the carnally-minded, and not suited to the taste of the godly.

But whatever *absurdities* might result from their interpreting the New Testament without a knowledge of Greek, the Mystics were in no danger of *observing* them. And in *other* respects the use of a translation was really *advantageous*. They could more easily *bend* it to their particular purpose: for, in the interpretation of Scripture, the words of a *translation* are always more pliant, than the words of the *original*. The *obscurity*, in which the sense of Scripture was thus involved, so far from being thought injurious, afforded them both pleasure and protection. Mystical interpreters *delight* in obscurity: obscurity is their proper *element*. If a passage is *obscure in itself*, they are in less danger of being thwarted by a *literal* meaning. If they *make* it obscure, they obtain this advantage, that the greater the obstacles, which they can oppose to the *judgment*, the greater is the scope for the exercise of the *fancy*. This fancy has been equally indulged by the Mystics of every age; and however eccentric we may think the expositions displayed in the *Arca mystica*, or Mystical Ark, of Richard of St. Victor, who flour-

ished in the twelfth century, they have been fully equalled by the mystical expositions of these *latter* times. Nor is it by any means a matter of astonishment, that spiritual interpretation should recommend itself to our modern practitioners. No grammatical analysis, no knowledge of Hebrew or Greek, no knowledge of antiquity, no knowledge of the situation and circumstances, either of the author, or of his original readers, is necessary for *this* purpose. *Such* knowledge is wanted only for *grammatical* interpretation. It is wanted only, when the words, which we interpret, are destined to perform the office, for which they were originally *intended*. It is wanted only, when the words, which we interpret, are considered, as signs to the reader of what was thought by the *author*. But the expounder, who regards them as *passive instruments* disposeable at his *own will*, and who employs them, as *machines* for the conveyance of his *own thoughts*, is freed at once from the shackles, which bind the *grammatical* interpreter, and is exempted from all *other* wants, than merely that of knowing what is best adapted to his *own purpose*.

Men, who are little versed in the history of biblical interpretation, and have never witnessed the *wonders*, that are done by the aid of allegory, will be surprised perhaps to hear, that the Supremacy of the Pope has been discovered in the first chapter of Genesis. The interpreter, who made this discovery, was himself a sovereign pontiff, and

one, who exercised that supremacy with *unlimited sway*. It was Pope Innocent the Third; the same, who excommunicated King John of England, and who threatened even the Emperor of Constantinople. For this purpose he addressed to him a Latin Epistle, in which he quoted from the first chapter of Genesis the passage relating to the two great lights, the greater light to rule the day, the lesser light to rule the night. By these two *lights*, said he, are meant the office of *Pope* and the office of *King*; by the *greater* light is meant the *former* office, by the *lesser* light the *latter* office; so that, as the light, which rules the day, is superior to the light, which rules the night, the dignity of *Pope* is superior to the dignity of *King*. Lest this interpretation should appear incredible, I will give the words of the original Epistle. Pope Innocent III. then, having quoted from the Latin Vulgate, *Fecit Deus duo luminaria magna, luminare majus, ut præesset diei, et luminare minus, ut præesset nocti*, subjoined the following interpretation; *Id est, duas dignitates instituit, quæ sunt, Pontificalis Auctoritas, et Regalis Majestas. Sed illa, quæ præest diebus, id est spiritualibus, major est alterâ, quæ noctibus, id est, carnalibus; ut quanta est inter Solem et Lunam, tanta inter Pontifices et Reges, differentia cognoscatur*. Now this allegorical interpretation, absurd as it may appear, is not more absurd, than many, which are vented in the present age,

It is however absurd *enough*: for the comparison is not only unwarranted, but is an actual *inversion* of the truth. The things *spiritual*, and the things *carnal*, to which reference is here made, should have *changed* their position; the luminaries should have been *transposed*. For *spiritual* dominion, whether exercised by the Pope, or by those who *resemble* him, is not a power, that rules *the day*, but a power, that rules *the night*.

Let us now consider *that* kind of allegorical interpretation, which consists in the application of things, recorded in the *Old Testament*, to *similar* things recorded in the *New Testament*. *That* kind may be properly called *typical* interpretation; for it is an application of types to their antitypes. It is warranted by the authority of the Sacred Writers *themselves*. But they have warranted the use of it only to a *certain extent*; and, if we transgress the limits, which *they* have prescribed, we shall be in perpetual danger of taking things for what they were not *designed* to be. To constitute one thing the *type* of another, as the term is generally understood in reference to Scripture, something *more* is wanted than mere *resemblance*. The former must not only *resemble* the latter, but must have been *designed* to resemble the latter. It must have been so designed in its *original institution*. It must have been designed as something *preparatory* to the latter. The type, as well as the antitype, must have been pre-ordained;

and they must have been pre-ordained, as constituent parts of the same general scheme of divine providence. It is this *previous design*, and this *pre-ordained connexion*, which constitute the relation of type and antitype. Where *these* qualities fail, where the *previous design* and the *pre-ordained connexion* are wanting, the relation between any two things, however similar in *themselves*, is not the relation of *type* to *antitype*. The *existence* therefore of that previous design and pre-ordained connexion must be clearly *established*, before we can have authority for pronouncing one thing the *type* of another. But we cannot establish the existence of that previous design and pre-ordained connexion, by arguing only from the *resemblance* of the things compared. For the qualities and circumstances, attendant on *one* thing, may have a close resemblance with the qualities and circumstances attendant on *another* thing, and yet the things *themselves* may be devoid of all connexion. How then, it may be asked, shall we obtain the proof required? By what means shall we determine, in any given instance, that what is *alleged* as a type was really *designed* for a type? Now the only *possible* source of information on this subject is Scripture itself. The only *possible* means of knowing, that two distant, though similar, historic facts, were so connected in the general scheme of divine Providence, that the one was *designed* to pre-figure the other, is the authority

of that Work, in which the scheme of divine Providence is unfolded. Destitute of *that* authority, we may confound a resemblance, *subsequently observed*, with a resemblance *pre-ordained* : we may mistake a comparison, founded on a mere *accidental* parity of circumstances, for a comparison, founded on a *necessary and inherent connexion*. There is no other rule, therefore, by which we can distinguish a *real* from a *pretended* type, than that of Scripture itself. There are no other *possible means*, by which we can *know*, that a previous design, and a pre-ordained connexion *existed*. Whatever persons, or things therefore, recorded in the *Old Testament*, were expressly declared by Christ, or by his Apostles, to have been designed as *pre-figurations* of persons or things relating to the *New Testament*, such persons or things, so recorded in the *former*, are *types* of the persons or things, with which they are compared in the *latter*. But if we assert, that a person, or thing, was designed to pre-figure *another* person or thing, where no such pre-figuration has been declared by *divine authority*, we make an assertion, for which we neither *have*, nor *can have*, the slightest foundation. And even when comparisons are instituted in the *New Testament* between antecedent and subsequent persons or things, we must be careful to distinguish the examples, where a comparison is instituted merely for the sake of *illustration*, from the examples, where such a *connexion* is declar-

ed, as exists in the relation of a type to its antitype.

The consequences of neglecting the precautions here proposed are sufficiently apparent in the history of typical interpretation. Volumes have been filled with types and antitypes, which exist only in the fancy of the writers. Men of lively imagination are continually at work for the discovery of *resemblances*, while judgment and erudition are not *always* at hand, to suggest the *differences*. Things really *discordant* are thus supposed to be *consonant*: and they are united on the ground of *similarity*, when their difference should have led to a *separation*. But, when once they are brought together, however fanciful their resemblance, it is but a small *additional* effort of the imagination, to perceive in the one a *symbol* of the other. And the things, when thus *symbolized*, find an easy transition into types and antitypes. Suppose however, that the resemblance between the things themselves would bear the strictest *inquiry*, yet if the inference be drawn without a proof of previous design and pre-ordained connexion, we may still multiply our types and antitypes without end. Even the self-same type may be provided with various antitypes, according to the different views of the interpreters. For the discovery of types and antitypes is often determined by the religious *party*, to which the interpreter belongs, or by the peculiar *sentiments*, which the interpreter enter-

tains. Thus Cardinal Bellarmine, in his treatise *De Laicis*, discovered, that the secession of the Protestants under Luther was typified by the secession of the Ten Tribes under Jeroboam ; while the Lutherans with equal reason retorted, that Jeroboam was a type of the Pope, and that the secession of Israel from Judah typified, not the secession of the Protestants under Luther, but the secession of the Church of Rome from primitive Christianity. But to whichever of the two events the secession under Jeroboam may be supposed the most *similar*, (if similarity exists there *at all* beyond the mere *act* of secession) we have no authority for pronouncing it a *type* of either. We have no *proof* of previous design, and of pre-ordained connexion between the subjects of comparison : we have no *proof*, that the secession of the Israelites under Jeroboam was designed to pre-figure any *other* secession whatever. This single example is sufficient to show what abuse may be made of typical interpretation : and though examples might be easily multiplied, by quotations from various authors, the precautions already given will serve to secure us from error, without further inquiry into the errors of *others*.

The subject of allegorical and typical interpretation having been thus concluded, our next inquiry must be directed to the interpretation of *prophecy*. For the interpretation of *prophecy* is so far

connected with *typical* interpretation, as types are *prophetic* of their antitypes. But the interpretation of prophecy opens such a field of investigation, and involves so many important considerations, that it must be reserved for another season.

END OF PART III.

Boston Bookstore.

CUMMINGS & HILLIARD, at No. 1, Cornhill, Boston, and at their Bookstore in Cambridge, have lately published the following valuable works, viz.

CUMMINGS' GEOGRAPHY & ATLAS.

THIS introduction to Ancient and Modern Geography was first published in May 1813, since which (now eighteen months) about 7000 copies have been disposed of. It has received the decided approbation of the best judges, and has been introduced into the first schools and academies in Boston, and most of the other principal towns in New England. Several hundreds have gone into the Middle States, especially into New York, where the demand for it is fast increasing. As farther recommendation it may be stated, that scholars will hereafter be examined in Ancient and Modern Geography according to the plan of this work, for admission into Harvard College at Cambridge.

This Geography is accompanied with an Atlas of *eight Modern and four Ancient Maps*, bound either together, or separate, as may best suit the convenience of scholars and teachers.

CUMMINGS' TESTAMENT.

N. B. *Cummings & Hilliard* have just published an edition of the *New Testament* in a clear, plain type, with an *Introduction*, giving an account of the *Jewish and other sects*; with *Notes*, illustrating *obscure passages*, and explaining *obsolete words and phrases*; to which are added *Rules* for pronouncing *Scripture Proper Names*, a catalogue of the *Proper Names* in the Testament correctly accented according to Walker, and four maps of the countries, through which our Saviour and his apostles travelled; for the use of *Schools, Academies, and Private Families*.

VALPEY'S GREEK GRAMMAR.

Cummings & Hilliard have also just published the first American edition of *Valpey's Greek Grammar*, a work in great estimation, and extensive use in England, and which in the opinion of good judges is better calculated for general use, than any before published in this country. The arrangement of the Grammar is simple, the Syntax is full and particular, and much light is thrown on the subject of Accents and derivation. There are added an explanation of grammatical terms, and a Synopsis of parsing, designed early to initiate the learner into a correct and regular mode of parsing each word, without constant application to the instructor for direction.

Locke's Essays	Walker's Rhetorical Grammar
Bigelow's Plants of Boston	Evans' Sermons
Bichat on the Membranes	Wilson's Sacra Privata
Adams' Lectures on Rhetoric	Wellbeloved's Devotional Exercises
Alison on Taste	
Allen's Biographical Dictionary	Fitzosborne's Letters

New Publications continued.

Collectanea Græca Majora	Rational Sports
Do. Minora	Horace in London
Æsop's Fables in Greek	Junius' Letters
Livy	Bishop Watson's Address to Youth
New Testament with Notes and Maps	Channing's Sermon on the Duties of Children
Geography of New Testament with Maps	Byron's Poetical Works compl.
Lowth's English Grammar	A few Weeks in Paris during the residence of the allied sove'ns
Evenings at Home	Henry's Chemistry, &c. &c.
Mrs. Edgeworth's Early Lessons	

Cummings & Hilliard have also constantly on hand the best assortment of works on Divinity, Medicine, and Law; a variety of Latin and Greek Classics, new and second hand; works on Taste; all kinds of School Books; books of Devotion and Piety; Children's books, &c. among which are the following:

Latin Classics.

Ainsworth's Dictionary
 Young's Do.
 Entick's Do.
 Adam's Latin Grammar
 Bigelow's Abridgment of Do.
 Chever's Accidence
 Latin Tutor
 Bigelow's Introduction to Making Latin
 Clarke's Do.
 Delectus
 Latin Primer
 Corderius
 Historiæ Sacræ
 Viri Romæ
 Narrationes Excerptæ
 Eutropius
 Æsop's Fables
 Erasmus
 Nepos
 Selectæ è Profanis
 Wilson's Sallust
 Livy
 Cicero's Orations
 Grotius de Veritate
 Cæsar's Commentaries
 Virgil
 Horace

Greek Classics.

Græca Majora
 Græca Minora

Valpey's Greek Grammar

Gloucester Do.
 Smith's Do.
 Moor's Do.
 Jones' Do.
 Portroyal Do.
 Schrevelius' Lexicon
 Greek Testament
 Xenophon
 Homer
 Longinus
 Neilson's Greek Exercises
 Huntingford's Do

Miscellaneous.

Stewart's Philosophical Essays
 Stewart on the Mind
 Lempriere's Classical Dictionary
 ——— Biographical Do.
 Smellie's Philosophy of Nat. Hist.
 Cowper's Translation of Homer
 Pliny's Letters
 Gillie's Greece
 Beloe's Heroditus
 Artist's Manual
 Paley's Works
 Priestley's Lectures
 Life of Washington
 Murray's Grammar
 Lewis and Clarke's Expedition
 Hume's Hist. of England, Continued by Bisset and Smollet
 Boswell's Johnson, &c. &c.

A

COURSE OF LECTURES,

CONTAINING A

DESCRIPTION AND SYSTEMATIC ARRANGEMENT

OF THE SEVERAL

BRANCHES OF DIVINITY :

ACCOMPANIED WITH

AN ACCOUNT, BOTH OF THE PRINCIPAL AUTHORS, AND OF THE
PROGRESS, WHICH HAS BEEN MADE AT
DIFFERENT PERIODS,

IN

THEOLOGICAL LEARNING.

BY HERBERT MARSH, D. D. F. R. S.

MARGARET PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY.

PART IV.

On the Interpretation of Prophecy.

BOSTON :

PUBLISHED BY CUMMINGS AND HILLIARD,

Boston Bookstore, No. 1 Cornhill.

Univ. Press.....Hilliard & Metcalf.

1819.

CONTENTS.



LECTURE XIX.

Page.

CONNEXION between the interpretation of types, and the interpretation of prophecy. *A type is a species of prophecy. Of the difference between real and imaginary types. Prophetic character of a real type. The principles, here applied to the interpretation of types, illustrated by two examples, the one relating to Baptism, the other to the Lord's Supper. Digression on the Sacrament of Baptism as connected with Regeneration, occasioned by the present controversy on that subject. Additional remarks on the previous design, which is essential to the character of a real type. Revelation alone can afford an explanation of types. False reasoning about their obscurity. Prophecies delivered by words subject to the same difficulties as prophecies delivered by things. Of the qualifications necessary for an interpreter of Hebrew prophecy.* - - 1

LECTURE XX.

The general principles of interpretation, which were explained in Lecture XIII—XVII, applicable to the interpretation of prophecy. Whether the inspiration of suggestion, which is absolutely necessary in prophecy, creates a difference in the principle of interpretation. The prophecies relating to the Messiah selected for particular examination, not only on account of their importance, but because they involve almost every question of real interest in the subject of prophecy in general. Connexion between

<i>these prophecies and the truth of our religion. Frequent appeals to these prophecies, both by Christ, and by his Apostles, as prophecies, which testified of Christ, and which were fulfilled in his Divine Mission. Prophecies of this description must be prophecies, which relate to the coming of Christ, according to their literal and primary sense</i>	Page. 20
---	-------------

LECTURE XXI.

<i>The importance of literal prophecies relating to the Messiah further considered. Various examples of such prophecies quoted and explained</i>	36
--	----

LECTURE XXII.

<i>An inquiry into the foundation of secondary senses, ascribed to Hebrew prophecy. Of the difficulties, with which that notion is attended. The primary and secondary senses of a Hebrew prophecy have no analogy to the double meaning observable in various examples of heathen oracles. Nor have they any resemblance to the double sense of an allegory. Bishop Warburton's system of primary and secondary senses considered. The existence of secondary senses can be previously established by no system whatever. In every single instance they depend entirely on the authority of Christ and his Apostles. Explanation of this position. Some passages of the Old Testament, which are quoted in the New Testament, are applied, neither as prophecy in a primary sense, nor as prophecy in a secondary sense, but merely in the way of accommodation</i>	55
--	----

LECTURE XIX.

As we proceeded in the last Lecture from the interpretation of allegory to the interpretation of types, so we may now proceed from the interpretation of types to the interpretation of prophecy. There is indeed a *natural connexion* between the one and the other : for since a type is not an *accidental*, but a *designed* prefiguration of its antitype, it is virtually a *prediction* of its antitype. Nor is the resemblance between types and prophecy confined to the things themselves ; it extends also to the *principles*, by which they must be *interpreted*. The principles, which apply to the interpretation of types, having been already explained, it is unnecessary to repeat them *in detail* : but it will be proper to take a *general view* of them, that the analogy of the former to the present subject may be distinctly seen.

To constitute a type, something more is requisite, than a mere *resemblance* of that, which is called its antitype. For one thing may *resemble* another, when the things themselves are totally *unconnected*. But it is the very essence of a type, to have a necessary

connexion with its antitype. It must have been *designed*, and designed from the very beginning, to prefigure its antitype; or it partakes not of that character, which belongs to a real type; a character, which implies, not an accidental parity of circumstances, but a pre-ordained and inherent connexion between the things themselves. Where *this* character is wanting, there is wanting that relation of type to antitype, which subsists between the things of the Old Testament, and the things of the New. And the only mode of distinguishing the cases, where this relation *actually* exists, from the cases where it is only *supposed* to exist, is to examine what things in the Old Testament have been represented by Christ and his Apostles as *relating* to things in the New. For then we have *authority* for such relation: then we *know*, that one thing was designed to prefigure the other. But *without* such authority, it is absolutely *impossible*, that we should obtain the knowledge, which is necessary on this subject. There are no *human* means, by which we can discover, that what has happened at one period, or in one nation, was originally *intended* to point out something similar, which should happen at another period, or in another nation. The *reality* of such previous design, the *reality* of a fore-ordained connexion between a type and its antitype, must depend therefore entirely on the authority of Christ and his apostles.

Having ascertained the mode, by which alone we can discover the *existence* of a type, we may in the next place consider its *prophetic character*. When two apparently independent events, distant from each other many hundreds, or even some thousands of years, are so connected in the general scheme of Divine Providence, that the one was *designed* to indicate the other, the one is no less *prophetic* of the other, than a *verbal* declaration, that the thing, which forms the antitype, would in due season be accomplished. Whether a future event is indicated by *words*, or indicated by *other* tokens, the connexion of that event with the words in the one case, or the tokens in the other, will be equally a fulfilling of prophecy. We cannot have a more remarkable, or a more important example, than that of the paschal lamb, as applied to the death of Christ. For not only was the paschal lamb sacrificed for the sins of the Jews under circumstances *resembling* those, under which our Saviour was sacrificed for the sins of the world, but we have the authority of Scripture itself for the assertion, that the sacrifice of the paschal lamb was from the very beginning *designed* to indicate the sacrifice of Christ on the cross. When John the Baptist first saw our Saviour, he exclaimed, "Behold the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sins of the world." St. Paul is still more particular : for he says, Christ, "our *passover* is sacrificed for us : " and St. Peter declares, that we were redeemed "with the precious

blood of Christ, as of a *lamb* without blemish and without spot, who verily was *fore-ordained*, before the foundation of the world." From a comparison of these passages we learn, not only that the two sacrifices *resembled* each other, but that the sacrifice of the paschal lamb was *originally intended*, to designate the sacrifice of Christ. The former sacrifice therefore has all the qualifications, which are necessary to constitute a type. And since the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper was instituted by Christ himself in remembrance of his death and passion, the ceremony, which was a type of the one, may be considered as a type also of the other.

Again, as the sacrifice of the paschal lamb, by prefiguring the *death* of Christ, has reference to the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, so the Sacrament of Baptism was likewise prefigured by an event of great importance in the history of the Jews. St. Paul, in his first Epistle to the Corinthians, (x. 1.) says, "Brethren, I would not that ye should be ignorant, how that our fathers were under the cloud, and all passed through the sea, and were baptized unto Moses in the cloud, and in the sea: and did all eat the same spiritual meat, and did all drink the same spiritual drink; for they drank of that spiritual Rock, that followed them, and that Rock was Christ." In this passage it is evident, that St. Paul considered the being baptized unto Moses, as typical of being baptized unto Christ. The Jews,

who admitted proselytes by baptism, appear to have *generally* considered the passage of their forefathers through the Red Sea, not as a mere insulated historical fact, but as something representative of admission to the divine favour *by baptism*. They said, that “they were *baptized* in the desert, and admitted into covenant with God before the *law* was given.” (See Whitby in loc.) On the authority of St. Paul the Church of *England* also considers that event as a type of baptism: for in the baptismal services we pray in the following words, “Almighty and everlasting God, who—didst safely lead the children of Israel thy people through the Red Sea, figuring thereby thy holy Baptism.” The *circumstances* also, which attended the type, accord with the circumstances attending the antitype. When the followers of Moses, having forsaken Egypt, passed through the Red Sea, in their progress to the Holy Land, that passage was to them an entrance, not only into a new temporal, but into a new *spiritual* state. In like manner, the followers of *Christ*, when they have forsaken sin, and passed through the laver of baptism, on their progress to the kingdom of heaven, have *also* entered into a new *spiritual* state. “Know ye not (saith St. Paul in his Epistle to the Romans, vi. 3.) that so many of us as were baptized unto Jesus Christ, were baptized unto his death?”—and therefore that we “should walk in *newness of life*?” “As many of you (saith St. Paul

again in his Epistle to the Galatians, iii. 27.) as have been *baptized* unto Christ, have *put on Christ*." And when he gave an account of his own conversion, in the speech which he made to the Jews of Jerusalem, he used the following words, which, though addressed to him by Ananias, he sanctions by his own repetition of them. "Arise and be baptized, and wash away thy sins, calling on the name of the Lord." (Acts xxii. 16.) And this washing away of sin, in the sacrament of Baptism, the same Apostle in his Epistle to Titus (iii. 6.) has called "*the washing of regeneration*." Here then we have *another* instance of type and antitype, ratified by the authority of a divine Apostle, in all their various relations.

Resting on such divine authority, the Church of England has adopted this example with all the circumstances, which are warranted by St. Paul: and since in this particular instance our Church has been lately subjected to severe and unmerited censure, the occasion requires a few additional remarks in its defence. Our twenty-seventh Article declares, that "Baptism is not only a sign of profession, and mark of difference, whereby Christian men are distinguished from others, that are not christened, but it is also a sign of regeneration or new birth, whereby as by an instrument, they that receive Baptism rightly, are grafted into the Church, the promises of forgiveness of sin, and of our adoption to be the sons of God by the Holy Ghost, are visibly signed and sealed." In

the several services for Baptism, as also in the service for Confirmation, Regeneration is represented as an *essential part* of Baptism. It is the inward grace of that, of which water is the outward sign. Nothing can be clearer on this subject than our Catechism, which expressly declares, that whereas the outward visible sign in Baptism is "Water wherein the person is baptized," so the inward spiritual grace, is "a death unto sin, and a *new birth* unto righteousness." If then we detach regeneration from baptism, we not only fall into the absurdity of making the outward act a visible sign of *nothing to be signified*, but we destroy the Sacrament of Baptism as a Sacrament, altogether. It is *essential* to a Sacrament, that the outward act be accompanied with an inward grace. If Baptism, therefore, as *some* pretend, is nothing more, than "an outward work of man upon the body," it is a perfect *mockery* of religion to retain it as a ceremony in our Church : for if *such only* be Baptism, it has no more to do with the concerns of *religion*, than the common ablutions of domestic life. Vain is the pretence of those, who assert, that we imitate the Church of Rome, in believing, that grace is conferred at baptism merely *ex opere operato*, (as it is called in the Canons of the Council of Trent.) The grace of God *accompanies* the outward act : but the outward act is not the *efficient cause* of it. The twenty-seventh Article compares indeed Baptism with an instrument, by which the promises of God to forgive

our sins are visibly signed and sealed. But, not to mention, that in every legal instrument the signing and the sealing is accompanied with the declaration of its being our own act and deed, and that this *mental* assent is the thing, which gives *force* to the signature and the seal, the comparison in question is limited by the very words of the Article to those, who “receive Baptism *rightly*.” And Baptism, according to the *general* rules of our Church, is *not* received rightly, unless, either by ourselves or by our sureties, we make professions of Repentance and Faith. “What is *required* (says our Catechism) of persons to be baptized? Repentance, whereby they forsake sin; and Faith, whereby they stedfastly believe the promises of God made to them in that Sacrament.” Conformably with this doctrine of our Catechism, godfathers and godmothers, in the name of the child to be baptized, make a public declaration, *before* the baptism itself is administered, that they renounce sin, and believe in the promises of God. And whereas these previous declarations are made by the godfathers and godmothers at the public baptism of infants, the same previous declarations are made by the parties themselves, in the ministration of baptism to such as are of riper years. In the exhortation also to this service, the Priest says, “Doubt ye not, therefore, but earnestly believe, that he will favourably receive these present persons, truly *repenting*, and coming to him by *faith*.” Repentance and Faith, therefore,

expressed either by ourselves or by our sureties, are the causes which operate in producing that spiritual grace, which is conferred at baptism. Thus St. Paul, when he spake of washing away sins at baptism, spake at the same time of "calling on the name of the Lord." But how under such circumstances can we call on the name of the Lord, except by professions of repentance and faith? * In like manner, when we receive the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, it is not the *bread*, which we eat, nor the *wine* which we drink, any more than the *water*, which is used in baptism, which *confers* the spiritual grace, but the *repentance* and *faith*, which accompany the eating of the bread and the drinking of the wine. Our Articles are very clear and precise on this subject. The

* If it be objected, that in the short service, which our Church has provided for the *private* baptism of infants, there are no expressions of faith and repentance, though by our Catechism they are *required* of persons to be baptized, we may answer, that we seldom meet with a general rule, without *some* exception for extreme cases. In the words of the rubric, this short service is to be used only "when *need* shall compel:" and if the child *lives*, it must afterwards be brought to Church, when the same professions of repentance and faith are made as in the other services. These professions therefore are only *deferred*, and deferred from the urgency of the case. On the other hand, if the child *dies*, we trust that the Almighty takes the will for the deed, since the intended professions of faith and repentance *would* have been carried into effect, if the opportunity had been afforded by the life of the child being spared.

twenty-eighth Article says, “To such as *rightly, worthily*, and with *faith* receive the same, the Bread, which we break, is a partaking of the Body of Christ: and likewise the cup of blessing is a partaking of the blood of Christ.” On the other hand, says the twenty-ninth Article, “The *wicked*, and such as be *void of a lively faith*, although they do carnally and visibly press with their teeth the Sacrament of the body and blood of Christ, yet in no wise are they *partakers* of Christ.” The relation therefore both of the outward sign to the inward grace, and of the inward grace to that which is required to obtain it, is so distinctly marked, that one should hardly suppose it possible to mistake the meaning of our Articles. There is an act of the mind, and there is an external token of it: for *every* act of the mind must have *some* external token. But neither here nor in other cases does the real virtue of the act *consist* in the token. Each of our Sacraments has its *own* external token: but in *both* of them are the acts of the mind acknowledgments of Repentance and Faith. Unless therefore it is superstition to believe, that the grace of God accompanies Repentance and Faith, there is no superstition in believing, that the grace of God accompanies, as well the Sacrament of Baptism, as the Sacrament of the Lord’s Supper. And since that *peculiar* grace, which is called *Regeneration*, is a grace, which is conferred on us only *once* in our lives, (for it is a different thing from *renovation*) the Sacrament, which

we *receive* only once in our lives, and which then admits us to the *Christian Covenant*, would appear to be the appointed means of *conferring* that grace, even if St. Paul had not declared it. But that St. Paul *has* declared it cannot admit a doubt. Unless Regeneration had *belonged* to Baptism, the Apostle would not have called the act of Baptism “the washing of Regeneration,” or the laver of Baptism “the laver of Regeneration.” For there is nothing *beside* Baptism, to which the term “washing,” or rather the term “laver,” which is a better translation, can possibly apply. It is strange therefore, that such efforts should now be made to *detach* Regeneration from Baptism : though we must acknowledge, that in the estimation of those, who make such efforts, the separation is highly useful. For, as soon as Regeneration is detached from *Baptism*, it may be employed on *other* occasions : it may be made the instrument of conversion at a *later* age : and thus the pangs of the new birth may become tokens of admission to that holy state, which the converts are taught to expect in vain from a Sacrament deprived of its spiritual grace. But strange as this doctrine may appear, it is yet *more* strange, that men should detach Regeneration from Baptism, and still *pretend to be Churchmen*. There is no possible *artifice*, by which the words of our *baptismal* services can be distorted from their real meaning. In the words of our Public Baptism of Infants, the Priest thus addresses the congregation,

immediately after the baptism is completed. "Seeing now, dearly beloved brethren, that this child *is* by baptism regenerate, and grafted into the body of Christ's Church," &c. And the thanksgiving, which immediately follows, begins thus, "We yield thee hearty thanks, most merciful Father, that it *hath pleased thee to regenerate* this infant with thy Holy Spirit." Unless therefore the expression "it *hath* pleased God to regenerate" is synonymous with the expression "it *shall* please God to regenerate," unless the *past* is the same with the *future*, it is impossible to deny, that they, who wilfully and deliberately detach regeneration from baptism, impugn *essentially* the doctrine of our established Church, inasmuch as they impugn it in one of our *Holy Sacraments*.*

Having thus illustrated two very remarkable types of the Old Testament, the one applying to the Sacra-

* As it is impossible to explain away the strong expressions, which have been here quoted, an attempt of another kind has been made, namely, to shew that they are *inconsistent* with a prayer in the former part of the service, which contains the following passage: "We call upon thee for this infant, that he, coming to thy Holy Baptism, may receive remission of his sins by spiritual regeneration." But there is no inconsistency in believing, that what was only a subject of *prayer* at the commencement of the service, was a grace *already obtained* at the close of the service. The grace conferred at Baptism is the *effect* of Repentance and Faith: and the professions of Repentance and Faith are made *after* the prayer for regeneration, but *before* the declaration, that the child *is* regenerate. The prayer therefore, and the declaration, are *perfectly consistent*.

ment of Baptism, the other to the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, we may now proceed with that *analogy*, which subsists between the interpretation of types and the interpretation of prophecy. Whatever be the *mode*, in which a prophecy is conveyed, whether it be conveyed by *words*, or conveyed by *things*, the connexion between that conveyance, and the event in which we seek the completion, must be clearly established, or the very *existence* of the prophecy will remain unproved. But it appears from the arguments already used, that an event in the history of the Jews, or a ceremony performed in the temple of Jerusalem, cannot be regarded as typical, and consequently not as *prophetical* of any rite performed in the Church of Christ, unless it was determined by the Deity, that such event should happen, or such ceremony be instituted, with a *view* to what the Deity foresaw would take place in later ages. Where *no* such connexion exists between a *former* event or ceremony, and a *later* event or ceremony, the former can in no wise be considered as typical, and consequently not as *prophetical*, of the latter. The histories of Greece and Rome afford various examples of events at one period, which *resemble* the events of another period. But we do not therefore regard them as types and antitypes. And *why* do we not regard them as such? Because we perceive no *connexion* between them : because we perceive nothing more than, that the things are *similar* : because we have no *evidence*, that in the general

scheme of Divine Providence, the one was *intended* to represent the other. *This* evidence can be afforded only by *revelation* : and therefore we never seek for types and antitypes except in the *Sacred Writings*. But then, for this very reason we must make the *Sacred Writings* the basis, and the *sole* basis, on which we build our theories of types, and typical prophecy. We have therefore no warrant to conclude, that the events or ceremonies of one period were designed by the Deity to be typical, and therefore prophetical, of the events or ceremonies of another period, unless (as in the two examples which I selected as an illustration of types) Revelation itself has *declared* them to be such.

It has indeed been objected by the advocates of a more extensive scheme, that an explanation of types in the Bible itself is in general not to be *expected*. It has been urged that their very nature requires *obscurity* and *concealment* : and consequently that an *explanation* of them would be inconsistent with their original design. But the explanation, for which we must have recourse to Scripture, is not an explanation to be sought in the *Old Testament*, or an explanation accompanying the *type*. It is an explanation to be sought in the *New Testament*, or an explanation accompanying the *antitype*. That such explanations, in various instances, *are* given in the New Testament, no one can deny. Who, for instance, would deny that the sacrifice of the paschal lamb is *declared* in

the New Testament to be a prefiguration of the death of Christ. And if it was deemed necessary to explain one type, where could be the expediency, or the moral fitness, of withholding the explanation of others? Must not therefore the *silence* of the New Testament, in the case of any *supposed* type, be an argument against the *existence* of that type? If it was agreeable to the design of typical representation, that they, to whom the type was *originally* given, should remain ignorant of its real tendency, or of the thing, which it was meant to *prefigure*, it must have been agreeable to the same design, that, as soon as the prefigured antitype had *taken place*, its relation to the type should be *clearly revealed*. The observance of a type is *superseded* by the accomplishment of the antitype. It is necessary therefore that we should *know* the exact period of that accomplishment : or we shall know not the period, when the observance of the type should *cease*. Whatever advantage therefore the Jews might have derived from their remaining in ignorance, that certain ceremonies performed in the temple of Jerusalem were only shadows of better things to come, yet when those better things *were* come, it was of the highest importance, that the mystery should be removed, and the types explained. But revelation alone could *give* the explanation. For that one thing was *designed* to prefigure another, can be known only to Him who designed it, and to those, to whom he has vouchsafed to reveal it.

When we proceed to the interpretation of prophecies delivered in *words*, we shall find no less caution necessary, than in the interpretation of prophecies delivered by *things*. We must not imagine that in *every* instance, where the words of a Hebrew prophet appear to bear some *resemblance*, or to be *applicable* to events which are passing in the *present* age, they were therefore designed to be *predictions* of those events. If we argue from mere *similarity*, without taking other things into consideration, the consequence will be, that wherever the meaning of a passage is in itself sufficiently general to admit of more applications than one, various interpreters will compare it with various events, and they will all declare, that the passage is a prophecy of that particular event, to which they themselves apply it. Indeed we know by experience, that passages in the writings of the Hebrew prophets have been applied to as many different events, as the interpreters themselves are numerous. Yet each interpreter is confident of his own explanation : and is persuaded that all other interpreters are mistaken. In this manner is the *sure* word of prophecy, as St. Peter very justly calls it, exposed to suspicion, on the part of those, who are inclined to question the truth of our holy religion.

But though the difficulties attending the interpretation of the Hebrew prophets are confessedly great, those difficulties are not insurmountable. And if the interpretation of prophecy is *really* subject to deter-

minate rules, the conclusions, to which such rules must eventually lead, will be no less certain, when those difficulties are overcome, than if they had never existed. The sole difference consists in the labour, in the skill, and in the time, which are wanted in the one case, but not in the other. If it be objected therefore, that the sacred oracles are ambiguous, because the explanations of them are various, we may confidently answer, that the fault is in the interpretation, and not in the text. It is no wonder that in the explanations of the Hebrew prophets we should discover inconsistency, when an office, for which so many qualifications are required, is undertaken by men, in whom those qualifications are wanting altogether.

In the first place, it is impossible to enter into the true spirit of Hebrew prophecy, without a knowledge of the Hebrew language. The style of *history* is for the most part, so plain and simple, that a narrative of events delivered in one language may be adequately expressed in *other* languages. The same observation applies to the *didactic* parts of Scripture : the rules, which are necessary for the guidance of our own conduct, requiring of themselves so much plainness and perspicuity, as to be equally expressible in *every* language. But the *prophetic* style of Scripture is of so peculiar a kind, that it is always difficult, and sometimes impossible to express in English what is expressed in Hebrew. Even in poetry, which is more easily rendered than prophecy, it is no easy

task to transfer the spirit of the original into the words of a translation. Words in one language may have a *literal* correspondence to words in another language; while they are incapable of being employed in the same *figurative* sense. The usage of the two languages, which alone can determine the meaning of words, may be alike in one respect and different in another. But, if the words of a translation convey only a *literal* sense, where the words of the original convey a *figurative* sense, the words of the author and the words of the translator will convey two *different* senses. Hence the same prophecy may be differently understood, according as it is interpreted from the words of the original, or interpreted from the words of a translation. Now the style of prophecy would in *any* language be more figurative than that of history: and in *Hebrew* prophecy it is so much the *more* figurative, as the oriental languages themselves more abound in metaphor, than the languages of Greece and Rome.

Another cause of difference in the interpretation of Hebrew prophecy is, that while one interpreter considers the situation and circumstances of the writer whose works he explains, another interpreter expounds without the least regard for what is necessary to be known, in order to discover his author's meaning. Hebrew writers, who lived at different periods, from five hundred to fifteen hundred years before the birth of Christ, are all viewed in the self-

same light : and the light, in which they are thus viewed, is moreover the light, in which the language of the translator would be viewed, if that language were the language of the author. Hence the notions, which the Hebrew writers affixed to their own words, are exchanged for notions, which the interpreter, differently circumstanced, affixes to the words of a translation. Again, while one interpreter investigates the words of his author with grammatical precision, and attempts only to discover what the words themselves convey, another interpreter, either regardless or incapable of grammatical analysis, employs his ingenuity in torturing the words of his author, or rather of his author's translator, till he has brought them to speak, what he had previously determined, that they *should* speak.

Since then so many causes are incessantly operating to produce variety in the interpretation of prophecy, we need not wonder, if the effects correspond with the causes. But the very consideration of those causes is sufficient to remove the charge of ambiguity from the sacred text, and to fix it, where it belongs, in the interpretations alone.

LECTURE XX.

HAVING examined the *causes*, which produce the variety observable in the expositions of Hebrew prophecy, we might in the next place inquire, whether it is not possible to assign such *rules* of interpretation, as may be the means of greater harmony in our commentaries on that subject. But the *general* rules for the interpretation of the Bible, which have been fully explained in former Lectures, are applicable, as well to the *prophetic* books, as to *other* parts of the sacred volume. For in *every* instance we must consider the words, which we interpret, as signs to the reader of what was thought by the author.

There is indeed *one* distinction to be made between the interpretation of prophecy, and the interpretation of history; a distinction founded on a difference of inspiration. The inspiration of prophecy *must* be different from that, which would at least be *sufficient* for the inspiration of history. If an historian records events, which have either come within his own knowledge, or of which he has the means of

obtaining correct information, he cannot want *that* kind of inspiration, which is called an inspiration of *suggestion*. And exemption from *error* is in such cases sufficiently secured, if the Holy Spirit, while it leaves the historian to act for himself, as long as the record is true, is *ready* to interpose, whenever there is danger of a *deviation* from the truth. But widely different is the case of *prophecy*. An inspiration of *suggestion* is there absolutely necessary: for it lies not within the *power* of unassisted man to discover what persons will be born, or what transactions will take place, after a lapse of some hundreds of years. It is true, that our own *reason* enables us to argue from the past to the future. A comparison of causes with their consequences at a *former* period may warrant the conclusion, that a recurrence of the same *causes* will probably lead to a recurrence of the same *consequences*. And when those causes actually *have* recurred, we may predict with some probability, that the time is not far distant, when also the *consequences* will recur. If, for instance, we compare the *present* situation of our Church with its situation at a former period, we must have our apprehensions, and perhaps our forebodings. But such forebodings are very different from that knowledge, which enables men to foresee, not merely the consequences of causes *now* operating, but such distant events, as are wholly *unconnected* with any thing, which is passing in the present age. When, for in-

stance, Isaiah foretold the coming of Christ, he foretold not only a very distant event, but an event, to which he could not possibly argue from the state of the Jews, at the time, when he wrote. A foreknowledge of *such* events can be obtained by no other means, than by an immediate communication from God himself.

Let us apply then the principles of interpretation, as explained in a former Lecture, to the two different cases of history and prophecy. When we interpret the words of a sacred historian, and consider those words, as signs to the reader of what was thought by the author, we may regard the *historian himself* as the author. But when we interpret a *prophecy*, we must distinguish between the *author*, and the *writer*. For when the knowledge of the writer is communicated to him by an immediate suggestion of the *Holy Spirit*, we must consider the *Holy Spirit*, as the author of that knowledge, which the prophet, as a writer, communicates to the reader. But then this knowledge might be communicated to the prophet in two different ways, either of which lay within the reach of Almighty power. The understanding of the prophet might be opened in a supernatural manner, so as to give him an *insight* into future events, while the *record* of those events, or the mode of committing them to *writing*, was left entirely to himself. In this case, though the *prophecy* has the Holy Spirit for its author, yet the *words* of the

prophecy are the words of the *prophet*. And if the prophet was the author of the words, those words must be signs to *us* of what was thought by the prophet. On the other hand, the *words* also, as well as the things *signified* by the words, might have been communicated to the prophet. In this case he was the mere *instrument* of communication to the reader; and the Holy Spirit must then be regarded as the author, as well with respect to the *words*, as with respect to the *things*. But whether the words were chosen by the prophet, or chosen by the Holy Spirit, the *principle*, on which they were chosen, must in either case have been the same. In either case, the choice of them must have depended on the connexion, which the usage of the Hebrew language had established between *words*, and the things *signified* by those words. If they had *not* been so chosen, they could not have been signs to the *reader* of what was thought by the *author*, whether we refer them to the prophet, or refer them to the Holy Spirit. Whoever was the author of a passage, which we propose to interpret, we must conclude, that he used his words in *such* senses, as he supposed would be ascribed to them by his *readers*. For if he used them in *other* senses, he would not inform, but *mislead*. Consequently, whether we interpret prophecy, on the supposition that the words were chosen by the *prophet*, or interpret prophecy on the supposition that the words were chosen by the *Holy Spirit*, we must on

either supposition apply the same *rules* of interpretation.

After these *general* remarks on the interpretation of prophecy, let us proceed to the *particular* consideration of the prophecies, which relate to the Messiah. Various reasons may be assigned for selecting *these* prophecies, as subjects of our special attention. In the first place, they are more *important*, than all other prophecies put together. Whether we can discover in the writings of the Hebrew prophets a description of the events which are passing in the present age, is a question of little moment. But the prophecies relating to the Messiah are of such importance, that they affect the very *truth of our religion*. And in the next place, an inquiry into those prophecies includes the consideration of almost every thing which relates to prophecy *in general*. It includes the questions of *primary* senses, and *secondary* senses, of prophecy. It includes also the question, which has been so much agitated under the name of *accommodation*. When we examine therefore the prophecies, which relate to the Messiah, we examine every question of real interest in the subject of prophecy at large.

Let us begin with an inquiry into that *connexion*, which subsists between the truth of our religion, and the prophecies relating to the Messiah. It is evident from the writings of the New Testament, that both our Saviour and his Apostles appealed to the proph-

ecies of the Old Testament, as affording a principal proof of his divine mission. In a conversation with the Jews in the temple of Jerusalem, relating to this very subject, our Saviour directed them to "search the Scriptures" (John v. 39): and then he added, "they are they, which *testify* of me." Now the writings of the *New Testament* were not then in existence: consequently our Saviour could have meant only the Scriptures of the *Old Testament*, and therefore the *prophecies* of the Old Testament. When he addressed the twelve Apostles on his last journey to Jerusalem, (Luke xviii. 31.) he said, "Behold, we go up to Jerusalem, and all things, that are written by the *prophets* concerning the Son of man, shall be accomplished." When he shewed himself, after his resurrection, to the two disciples, who were journeying to Emmaus (Luke xxiv. 25.) he said to them, "O fools, and slow of heart, to believe all that the prophets have spoken! Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into his glory? And beginning at Moses and all the prophets, he expounded unto them in all the Scriptures the things concerning himself." When he afterwards appeared in Jerusalem to the eleven Apostles, he addressed them in a similar manner, (Luke xxiv. 44.) "These are the words, which I spake unto you, while I was yet with you, that all things must be *fulfilled*, which were written in the law of Moses,

and in the prophets, and in the psalms, concerning me.”

The same appeal, which was made to the prophecies of the Old Testament by Christ himself, in proof of his divine mission, was made also by the Apostles of Christ. When Philip, after his call to the Apostleship, met with Nathaniel, he said, (John i. 45.) “We have found Him, of whom Moses in the law, and the prophets did write, Jesus of Nazareth, the son of Joseph.” When St. Peter addressed the Jews after the miracle performed in the temple by himself and St. John, he reminded them (Acts iii. 18.) how “those things, which God before had shewed by the mouth of all his prophets, that Christ should suffer, he hath so *fulfilled*.”—“And he shall send Jesus Christ, which before was preached unto you, whom the heaven must receive until the times of the restitution of all things, which God hath spoken by the mouth of all his *prophets*, since the world began.” Then observing that Moses had prophesied of Christ, he concluded by saying, “Yea, and *all* the prophets, from Samuel, and those that follow after, as many as have spoken, have likewise foretold of *these days*.” Again, in his address to Cornelius, St. Peter declared of Christ, (Acts x. 43.) “To Him give all the prophets *witness*, that through his name whosoever believeth in him shall receive remission of sins.” And in the first chapter of his first Epistle (v. 10.) speaking of the salvation wrought by Jesus Christ, he said,

“Of which salvation the *prophets* have inquired and searched diligently, who prophesied of the grace that should come unto you : searching what, or what manner of time, the Spirit of Christ, which was in them, did testify, when it *testified beforehand* the sufferings of Christ, and the glory, that should follow.”

The appeals of St. Paul to the prophets of the Old Testament, as bearing witness to the coming of Christ, are still more numerous, than those of St. Peter. At the very beginning of his Epistle to the Romans, he calls himself “an Apostle, separated unto the gospel of God, which he had promised afore by his *prophets* in the Holy Scriptures, concerning his Son Jesus Christ our Lord.” In the third chapter of the same Epistle, he speaks of the righteousness of God, manifested by Jesus Christ, as being “*witnessed* by the law and the prophets.” And at the close of the same Epistle he declares of the preaching of Jesus Christ, that it “now is made *manifest*, and by the Scriptures of the *prophets*, according to the commandment of the everlasting God, made known to all nations for the obedience of faith.” In his second chapter of the Epistle to the Ephesians he declares, that Jesus Christ is the corner-stone of that building, which is founded on “the Apostles and *Prophets*.” When he was accused before Felix, he replied, (Acts xxiv. 14.) “After the way, which they call heresy, so worship I the God of my fathers, believing all things,

which are written in the law, and in the *prophets*.” And when he pleaded before Agrippa, against the same accusation of the Jews, he said, (Acts xxvi. 22, 23.) “ Having therefore obtained help from God, I continue unto this day, witnessing both to small and to great, saying none other things, than those, which the prophets and Moses did say should come; that Christ should suffer, and that he should be the first, that should rise from the dead, and should shew light unto the people, and to the Gentiles.” Lastly, when he was come to Rome, and had assembled before him the chief of the Jews in that city, “ he expounded and testified of the kingdom of God, persuading them concerning Jesus, both out of the law of Moses, and out of the prophets.”

Nor are the passages, already quoted, the only passages in the New Testament, in which an appeal is made to the prophets, as testifying of Jesus Christ. The Evangelist St. Mark *begins* his Gospel with an appeal of this description. “ The beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, as it is written in the prophets, Behold I send my messenger before thy face, which shall prepare thy way before thee.” And Zacharias, the father of John the Baptist, being “ filled with the Holy Ghost,” (Luke i. 67.) pronounced the following blessing at the circumcision of his son, who was destined to be the forerunner of the Messiah. “ Blessed be the Lord God of Israel; for he hath visited and redeemed his people, and hath

raised up a horn of salvation for us in the house of his servant David, as he spake by the mouth of his holy prophets, which have been since the world began."

From these repeated appeals to the prophets of the Old Testament, it appears, that their testimony is represented in the New Testament as a principal argument for the divine mission of Christ. Search the Scriptures, says our Saviour, for "*they testify of me.*" In *me*, says our Saviour, are the prophecies "*fulfilled.*" Jesus of Nazareth, says St. Philip, is the person, of whom the *prophets did write.* To Jesus Christ, says St. Peter, *gave the prophets witness.* The preaching of Jesus Christ, says St. Paul, was *made manifest by the Scriptures of the prophets.* The fact, therefore, that Jesus was the Messiah, is evidently *founded* on the predictions of his coming in the writings of the Hebrew prophets.

It is true, that our Saviour appealed also to his *miracles*, in proof of his divine mission. When John the Baptist heard in prison the works of Christ, he sent two of his disciples, and said unto him (Matth. xi. 3.) "Art thou He, which should come, or do we look for another." Jesus answered, and said unto them, "Go, and shew John again the things, which ye do hear and see. The blind receive their sight; the lame walk; the lepers are cleansed; the deaf hear; and the dead are raised up." Now the power of working miracles affords an unquestionable proof, that the person, possessed of that power, has authori-

ty from God. To perform a miracle is to suspend or counteract in that instance the general laws of nature. And these are laws, which no one but the *author* of them has the power of suspending, or counteracting.*

* We must distinguish between a power producing effects which are *really* preternatural, and “a power which produces effects which might *seem* preternatural to those, who have no knowledge of the means.” In Mechanics, and in Optics, experiments may be made, which to those, who are unacquainted with the principles, must appear *wonderful*. But in such experiments, wonderful as they may appear to the illiterate, the laws of nature are neither suspended nor counteracted. On the contrary, those very experiments are the *results* of the laws of nature. They have no resemblance therefore to a miracle, in any *degree* whatever, or in any *sense* whatever. In our Saviour’s miracles, there was neither mechanical, nor optical, nor any other deception; but a *real suspension* of the laws of nature. And that any *other* power, than the *Almighty* power, which both made those laws, and governs the world by them, should be able to alter the constitution and course of nature by a *suspension* of those laws, is, as far as I can judge, absolutely incredible. The *Jews* indeed, who did not deny the reality of our Saviour’s miracles, ascribed them to the operation of *evil spirits*: and Celsus, in his attack on the Christian religion, ascribed them to the operation of *magic*. The Jewish argument, that *evil spirits* can work miracles, and therefore that the miracles of our Saviour are no proof of his *divine* authority, was revived in the former part of the last century, during the controversy on the *argument* from miracles. And even a late Prelate of our own Church, whose words are quoted at the beginning of this note, has very incautiously subscribed to the Jewish doctrine, that *evil spirits* have the power of working miracles: a doctrine which tends to *destroy* the argument from miracles, since the performance of a miracle, if it does not *in itself* imply divine authority, cannot

When our Saviour therefore appealed to his miracles, he appealed to them as a proof, as a *legitimate* proof, that he was armed with *divine* authority. And his miracles alone (independently of other arguments, which establish his *own* true Divinity) would be sufficient to prove, as Nicodemus declared, that he was "a teacher sent from God." But that *connexion*, which subsists between the covenant made with the Jews through Moses, and the covenant made with all mankind through Christ, would be entirely lost, were it not for the intervention of the *prophecies* relating to the Messiah. These prophecies form the *link*, which connects the two covenants. By these prophecies are we enabled to comprehend the *whole* scheme of Divine Providence, and to understand in what manner it was *gradually* unfolded for the redemption of mankind.

That Jesus of Nazareth therefore was the promised Messiah, is a fact, which we must be able to establish, or we shall fail of establishing that comprehensive scheme of Divine Providence, which includes the two covenants in one general system. And we shall otherwise be unable to *account* for those repeat-

possibly do so by any accidental circumstances, whether of benevolence or of any other attribute, which may *accompany* the miracle. These remarks I should not have made in a Lecture relating to *prophecy*, if the passage, to which this Note refers, had not been disputed on the authority of Bishop Horsey. But the *further* consideration of this question must be deferred, till miracles themselves become the immediate subjects of our inquiry.

ed and solemn appeals to the Hebrew prophets, on the part, both of Christ, and his Apostles. Christ himself has commanded us to *search* the scriptures, that we may know how they *testify* of him. We must be able therefore to *find* what he has commanded us to *seek* : or the command will have been given in vain. His *Apostles* have further declared, that he is the person, of whom the prophets did write ; that he is the person, to whom the prophets gave witness ; that he is the person, whose preaching was made manifest by the prophets. Unless therefore we could shew in what manner the prophets *did* testify of Christ, the *declarations*, that they did so, would serve only to confound us. And the argument for the truth of our religion, which we now derive from prophecy, would weaken, instead of confirming, the argument derived from miracles.

The Hebrew prophets therefore must *manifestly* have borne testimony to the coming of Christ. And this testimony must have been so decisive, as to admit of no ambiguity, no question, whether their predictions relate to the person of Jesus Christ, or not. There must be prophecies therefore in the Old Testament, which strictly, literally, and directly predict the coming of our Saviour. There must be something more than passages, which may be *accommodated* (as it is called) to his life and character. Passages from *classic* authors are frequently accommodated, or, in other words, *applied* to a present event,

as *descriptive* of that event. But *such* applications are founded on a mere *accidental* parity of circumstances. In such cases, there is no *previous* design on the part of the quoted author; there is no connexion, *foreseen* on his part, between the quoted words and the event, to which they are applied. Though they are *descriptive* therefore of the event, they are not *predictive* of it.

There must likewise be something more in the writings of the Hebrew prophets, than passages, which predict the coming of Christ in a sense, which is sometimes called *remote*, at other times *secondary*, at other times *mystical*. A prophecy which relates to our Saviour in a mere *remote* or *mystical* sense, can hardly come within that description of prophecy, by which the preaching of Christ was made *manifest*. Nor is this the only inconvenience, to which we are thus exposed. For, if we adopt the notion, that the prophecies in general, which relate to the Messiah, have *two* senses, a primary and a secondary, we involve prophecy itself in such uncertainty, as to deprive it of the character ascribed to it by St. Peter, who called it the *sure* word of prophecy. I do not mean to assert, that *no* prophecy in the Old Testament has a secondary sense: but I mean to assert, and shall hereafter endeavour to prove, that the *system*, by which prophecies of the Old Testament are *in general* supplied with a double meaning, is untenable. Nor do I mean to assert, that there are *no*

passages of the Old Testament, which are quoted and applied in the New Testament to events, of which they neither *are*, nor were *meant* to be, prophetic. The writers of the New Testament were at liberty to make such applications of passages from *Hebrew* authors, as we make ourselves from *Greek* and *Latin* authors. But if we extend the doctrine of accommodation even to those passages, where the sacred writers have both *declared* them to be prophetic, and have employed them as *arguments* founded on prophecy, the doctrine of accommodation, so understood, amounts to nothing less, than a *rejection* of prophecy. And even with regard to *secondary* senses, if it were true, that the passages *in general*, which have been quoted in the New Testament as prophetic of Jesus Christ, were prophetic of him, not in their primary and literal sense, but merely in some secondary or mystical sense, the evidence for our religion, which is founded on prophecy, would be much less satisfactory, than we have reason to believe it.

Under *such* circumstances, it becomes a matter of the highest importance, that we should be able to produce a sufficient number of passages from the Old Testament, which predict the coming of Christ in their plain, literal, and proper sense. For such passages *alone* can possess that *decisively* prophetic character, which the declarations of Christ and his Apostles have taught us to *expect*. It shall be the

business therefore of the next Lecture to collect, and explain, such passages. And when we are satisfied about the existence of prophecies, which have *strictly* and *literally* foretold the coming of Christ, we may safely inquire in another Lecture, into the foundation of *secondary* senses.

LECTURE XXI.

IT appears from the preceding Lecture, that, when, agreeably to our Saviour's directions, we search the Scriptures of the Old Testament for passages, which testify of Christ, for passages which in the words of St. Peter *give witness* to Christ, and by which in the words of St. Paul the preaching of Christ is made *manifest*, we must search for passages, which relate to our Saviour, according to their plain, literal, and proper sense. If the words of a Hebrew prophet, though *applicable* to a certain event, were not originally written with *reference* to that event, they cannot be considered as *prophetic* of that event. No passage therefore of the Old Testament, which from mere *accidental* similitude, may be accommodated or applied, like a passage from a classic author, can be included among those passages, for which our Saviour commanded us to search, as for passages, by which he was *testified*. Nor can we, in the *first* instance, include those passages, which, though they *do* relate to our Saviour, relate to him only in some *secondary* sense. For we have no means of *discovering*, that a prophecy of the

Old Testament really *has* any other meaning, than that, which the *words themselves* convey by their own proper import, except where some *other* meaning has been *affixed* to them, either by *Christ* or by his *Apostles*. In whatever case a passage of the Old Testament, which, according to its plain and literal sense, relates to some *earlier* event in the Jewish history, is yet applied, either by Christ, or by an Apostle of Christ, to what happened in *their* days, and moreover is *so* applied as to indicate that the passage is *prophetic*; of that passage we must conclude, *on their authority*, that, beside the plain or primary sense, it has also a remote or secondary sense. But, in arguing from that authority to the existence of a secondary sense, we must be careful not to argue in a *circle*. When we are searching the Scriptures for prophecies, which *testify* of Christ, we are searching for that, by which his divine authority is to be *established*. We are searching for the *means* of establishing that authority. If therefore *while* we are thus searching, we have recourse to passages, which *depend* on that authority, to passages, of which, *without* that authority, we should not even *know*, that they were prophetic of our Saviour, we previously take for *granted* the thing, which is hereafter to be *proved*. We argue from premises, which are only so far valid, as the *inference* is valid, which we *deduce* from those premises. In other words, we prove, as well the premises by

the inference, as the inference by the premises. Consequently, when we search the Scriptures of the Old Testament for prophecies, which testify of Christ, we must, in the *first* instance, confine our search to those prophecies, which relate to him in a strict and literal sense. And the divine authority of Christ being *thus* established, in conjunction with the argument from miracles, we may *then* with *consistency* consider the prophecies, which relate to him in a *secondary* sense.

Such then being the importance of those prophecies, which relate to the Messiah according to their strict and literal sense, I trust that this Lecture will not be considered as tedious, if, instead of producing only one or two examples by way of *illustration*, I extend the inquiry to *many* such examples. But to prevent mistakes about the meaning of any passage, which is said to be *literally* prophetic of the Messiah, it is necessary to *define* the term, and to explain what is generally understood by *literal interpretation*. When we consider the senses of *single* words, we consider whether they are used in a *literal* sense, or used in a *figurative* sense; whether they are used in a *grammatical* sense, or used in a *tropical* sense; whether they are used in their primary and proper sense, or used in an improper or acquired sense. But when we speak of the literal or grammatical interpretation of a *whole sentence*, we do not thereby understand that every *single* word in that sentence

is to be construed according to its proper, literal, and grammatical sense. Even in the plainest *narratives* we often meet with *single* words, which are used in a figurative sense. Yet if no *mystical*, or *allegorical* meaning is affixed to those narratives, in *addition* to the plain facts, which the words themselves were intended to record, those narratives are still said to be taken in a *literal* sense. In like manner, if a passage, instead of recording a *past* event, is the record of a *future* event, that passage is said to be *literally* understood, if the application of it is *confined* to that one event, however figurative the sense may be of any *single* word, or words, employed in that passage. This explanation is so much the more necessary, as Hebrew prophecy abounds with figurative terms.

Let us now consider the *examples*, which strictly and literally relate to the Messiah, though in some of them we shall find many *single* words, which are highly figurative. But I must previously express my obligations on this subject to Bishop Chandler, whom I have chosen for my guide in the selection of those prophecies, which *literally* predict the coming of Christ. Indeed a *better* guide on this subject we cannot have. No man has more clearly perceived the *importance* of literal prophecy relating to the Messiah; no man has taken greater pains to determine the question, what is literal prophecy, and what is *not*; nor has any one surpassed him in that

kind of erudition, which is necessary for such an inquiry. Since then we may be contented with the examples, which Bishop Chandler has given of literal prophecy, I will now produce them, accompanied with such brief remarks, as the prophecies themselves suggest.*

Beginning with the last prophet in the Old Testament, and concluding with the prophet Isaiah, he takes his first example from Malachi iii. 1. "Behold, I send my messenger, and he shall prepare the way before me : and the Lord, whom ye seek, shall suddenly come to his temple, even the Messenger of the Covenant, whom ye delight in ; behold he shall come, saith the Lord of hosts." This prophecy is the more remarkable, as *two* persons are introduced into it ; namely, the Lord, who shall come to his temple, and the Messenger, who shall prepare his way. When two or more persons are mentioned, there is always less probability, that the agreement between the description and the event should be *accidental*, than when only one person is mentioned. And in the

* A minute and critical examination of every expression, used in the prophecies here quoted, would be contrary to the plan of these Lectures. In fact, it is a *deviation* from that plan, (as explained in the first Lecture.) to produce so many examples relating to one subject, and nothing but the great importance of this subject could justify such a deviation. We are at present concerned with the *principles* of interpretation : and examples only so far accord with the plan, as they serve to *illustrate* those principles.

present case the description not only corresponds with the persons of our Saviour, and John the Baptist, but corresponds with *no other two* persons in the whole Jewish history. It must therefore be a *prophecy* of our Saviour and John the Baptist: a prophecy of our Saviour and John the Baptist, according to its plain and literal meaning: and it is quoted as such by our Saviour himself, Matth. xi. 10.

The second example is taken from Malachi iv. 5, 6. "Behold, I will send you Elijah the prophet before the coming of the great and dreadful day of the Lord. And he shall turn the heart of the fathers to the children, and the heart of the children to the fathers, lest I come and smite the earth with a curse." This prophecy our Saviour himself applies to John the Baptist, Matth. xvii. 12, 13. Some commentators indeed have supposed, that he applied it only in a *secondary* sense, because when John the Baptist was asked, "Art thou Elias?" he saith, "I am not." John i. 21. But though *John the Baptist* was not literally Elias, or Elijah, the *prophecy* might literally relate to him; for the literal interpretation of a *whole sentence* does not exclude the figurative use of *single words*. In all countries, and in all languages, it is common to affix the names of known and distinguished characters to persons resembling them in a later age: and there were various points, in which John the Baptist resembled the prophet Elijah. They were alike in courage: they were alike in zeal for

the restoration of pure religion : they were alike in the austerity of their manners. Truly therefore might John the Baptist be called another Elijah. And though he was not *literally* Elijah, though he was Elijah only in a *metaphorical* sense, yet we have already seen, that the metaphorical use of *single terms* does not prevent a *whole passage* from being a *literal prophecy*.

The third example, which is a very important one, is taken from Haggai ii. 6—9. “For thus saith the Lord of hosts ; Yet once, it is a little while, and I will shake the heavens, and the earth, and the sea, and the dry land. And I will shake all nations, and the Desire of all nations shall come, and I will fill this House with glory, saith the Lord of hosts. The silver is mine, and the gold is mine, saith the Lord of hosts. The glory of this latter house shall be greater, than of the former, and in this place will I give peace, saith the Lord of hosts.” It is well known, that the *second* temple of Jerusalem was *in itself* far inferior in glory to the *first* temple, or the temple of Solomon. The greater glory therefore of the second temple could have been no other, than that, which it derived from the advent of the Messiah. The Jews themselves have always understood this passage of the Messiah, though, when the Messiah was come, they refused to acknowledge him, because he did not answer in *all* respects to the expectations, which they themselves had formed. But

whatever doubts they might have entertained during the *life* of our Saviour, whatever expectations they might have formed, while the second temple was *still standing*, one should have supposed, that the destruction of that temple by the Romans, with the total failure of the attempts, which have been made to rebuild it, would have convinced the Jews of later ages, that the Messiah, whom they expected, as the glory of the second Temple, could have been no other, than Jesus Christ. There is no longer *room* for an expectation of the Messiah : there is no *possibility* of a future Messiah being the glory of the second Temple. For the second Temple is destroyed, and destroyed as the true Messiah predicted.

The fourth example is taken from Zech. ix. 9. "Rejoice greatly, O daughter of Zion ; shout, O daughter of Jerusalem : behold thy *King* cometh unto thee ; he is just, and having *salvation* ; lowly and riding upon an ass, and upon a colt, the foal of an ass." There is no other event in the Jewish history, to which this prophecy *can* be applied, than to the entrance of our Saviour into Jerusalem : and the Evangelists accordingly apply it to that purpose. It is therefore a plain and literal prophecy of Jesus Christ. For of whom but of Jesus Christ, can it be said, that he is both just and having *salvation* ? Of whom but of Jesus Christ, can it be said, that he entered Jerusalem in the manner described, and was at the same time entitled to the appellation of *King* ?

The fifth example is taken from Zech. xii. 10. "I will pour upon the house of David, and upon the inhabitants of Jerusalem, the spirit of grace and of supplications : and they shall look upon me, whom they have pierced, and they shall mourn for him, as one mourneth for his only son, and shall be in bitterness for him, as one, that is in bitterness for his first-born." This passage is quoted by St. John in his account of the crucifixion, and is there represented as prophetic of our Saviour's being pierced with a spear by one of the Roman soldiers. An objection indeed has been made on account of the difference in the personal pronouns ; the words of Zechariah being "They shall look on *me*, whom they have pierced," whereas the words quoted by St. John (xix. 37.) are, "They shall look on *him*, whom they pierced." But there are Hebrew manuscripts, in which the text of Zechariah agrees with the text of St. John ; and even if there were not, the first person is so frequently exchanged for the third person in quotations, that one cannot allow the exchange in question to form any serious ground of objection. The prophet was hardly speaking of *himself* ; and that he could allude *only* to our Saviour, appears from a comparison of this prophecy with the corresponding prophecy in Isaiah (liii. 5.) "he was wounded for *our* transgressions." For if the *simple fact*, that one of the Roman soldiers pierced our Saviour's side, does not *of itself* determine the prophecy as belonging to our Saviour, the *cir-*

cumstances of the case must confine it to him alone. Here can be no *accidental* parity of circumstances; for there is no other person, beside our Saviour, to whom the words of the prophet *can* be applied. He is assuredly the only one, whose side was pierced for *our* transgressions: he is assuredly the only one, of whom it can be said, that he bare *our* sins in his own body on the tree.

The sixth example is taken from Daniel ii. 44. "And in the days of these kings shall the God of heaven set up a kingdom, which shall not be destroyed; and the kingdom shall not be left to other people, but it shall break in pieces, and shall consume all these kingdoms, and shall stand for ever."

There is no necessity for dwelling long upon *this* prophecy. There is only *one* kingdom, of which we can say, "it shall not be destroyed." There is only one kingdom, of which we can say, "it shall stand for ever." And that kingdom is the kingdom of Christ.

The seventh example, which is likewise taken from the book of Daniel (vii. 13, 14.) is a similar prophecy of the Messiah, though with considerable amplification. "I saw" (says Daniel) "in the night-visions, and behold one like the Son of Man came with the clouds of heaven, and came to the Ancient of days, and they brought him near before him. And there was given him dominion, and glory, and a kingdom, that all people, nations, and languages should

serve him : his dominion is an everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away, and his kingdom that, which shall not be destroyed."

That this prophecy was literally and strictly fulfilled in the person of our Saviour, and that it neither *has been*, nor ever *can be*, fulfilled in any one else, is so obvious, that explanation is unnecessary. Of no *temporal* prince can it be said, that *all* nations and languages shall serve him. Of no *human* being can it be said, that his dominion is an *everlasting* dominion.

The eighth example is the celebrated prophecy of Daniel relating to the seventy weeks. Ch. ix. 24—27. "Seventy weeks are determined upon thy people, and upon thy holy city, to finish the transgression, and to make an end of sins, and to make reconciliation for iniquity, and to bring in everlasting righteousness, and to seal up the vision and prophecy, and to anoint the most Holy. Know therefore and understand, that from the going forth of the commandment, to restore and to build Jerusalem, unto the Messiah the Prince shall be seven weeks, and threescore and two weeks. The street shall be built again, and the wall even in troublous times. And after threescore and two weeks shall Messiah be cut off, but not for himself. And the people of the Prince, that shall come, shall destroy the city and the sanctuary : and the end thereof shall be with a flood, and unto the end of the war desolations are determined.

And he shall confirm the covenant with many for one week : and in the midst of the week he shall cause the sacrifice and the oblation to cease ; and for the overspreading of abominations he shall make it desolate, even until the consummation, and that determined, shall be poured upon the desolate.”

No prophecy has been subjected to greater controversy, than this : and the modes of computing the chronological parts of it are almost as various as the interpreters are numerous. An examination of the various opinions, which have been entertained on this very difficult subject, cannot now be attempted, as it would require a dissertation of itself : nor is it *necessary* for our present purpose. From whatever event we date the computation, or in whatever manner we explain the threescore and two weeks, after which Messiah shall be cut off, the description of the *thing itself* so accords with the circumstances of our Saviour's death, that we cannot apply it to any one else. He was cut off, but not for himself. And before the seven weeks, which were added to the threescore and two weeks, had likewise elapsed, that is, before seven times seven years had elapsed *after* the time when Messiah was cut off, the people of the prince, that should come, that is, the Romans under the command of Titus, destroyed the city and the sanctuary. And that the prophecy of Daniel was accomplished according to its strict, literal, and primary sense, is evident from the definition of *time*, with which it is accom-

panied. A prophecy, in which the *period* of its accomplishment is determined, is *incapable* of a two-fold application.

The ninth example is taken from the prophet Micah, ch. v. 2. "But thou Bethlehem Ephratah, though thou be little among the thousands of Judah, yet out of thee shall *He* come forth unto me, that is to be ruler in Israel, whose goings forth have been of old from everlasting." Nothing can be clearer, than that this prophecy was strictly and literally fulfilled in the person of our Saviour. No one ever doubted that our Saviour was born at Bethlehem, a town near Jerusalem, a town belonging to the tribe of Judah, and anciently called Ephrath or Ephrata, which name the prophet Micah retains, in order to distinguish the Bethlehem of Judah from another Bethlehem in the *north* of Palestine. That Bethlehem of Judah, though formerly a place of some importance, was little better than a village at the time of our Saviour's birth, is a fact universally known. That our Saviour was a *ruler* in Israel, appears from the tenor of his whole life. And he is unquestionably the only one, who ever appeared in the form of man, of whom we declare, that his goings forth were "*from everlasting.*"

The tenth example is taken from the prophet Habakkuk, (ii. 3, 4.): and the eleventh from the prophet Amos (ix. 11, 12.) But as the application of these two prophecies to the Messiah is *less* obvious, than that of the other examples, let us proceed to the

twelfth and last example, which is the most important of all.

This example is taken from the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah, and properly begins at the third verse. "He is despised and rejected of men ; a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief. And we hid as it were our faces from him : he was despised, and we esteemed him not. Surely he hath borne our griefs, and carried our sorrows : yet did we esteem him stricken, smitten of God and afflicted. But he was wounded for our transgressions ; he was bruised for our iniquities. The chastisement of our peace was upon *Him*, and with *his* stripes we are healed. All we, like sheep, have gone astray : we have turned every one to his own way ; and the Lord hath laid on *Him* the iniquity of us all. He was oppressed, and he was afflicted ; yet he opened not his mouth. He is brought, as a lamb to the slaughter : and, as a sheep before her shearers is dumb, so he openeth not his mouth. He was taken from prison and from judgment ; and who shall declare his generation ? For he was cut out of the land of the living : for the transgression of my people was he stricken. And he made his grave with the wicked, and with the rich in his death, because he had done no violence, neither was any deceit in his mouth. Yet it pleased the Lord to bruise him ; he hath put him to grief. When thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin, he shall see his seed, he shall prolong his days, and the pleasure

of the Lord shall prosper in his hand. He shall see of the travail of his soul, and shall be satisfied. By his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many: for he shall bear their iniquities. Therefore will I divide him a portion with the great, and he shall divide the spoil with the strong: because he hath poured out his soul unto death, and he was numbered with the transgressors, and he bare the sin of many, and made intercession for the transgressors."

In the chapter of Isaiah, which has been just quoted, we have a plain and literal description of our Saviour's sufferings, death, and burial: indeed no less plain and literal, than any historical narrative could be, which was written after the events themselves had taken place. And that this literal description is really *literal prophecy*, is a matter, which cannot be questioned. The only way to prove, that it is history, and not prophecy, would be to prove the whole chapter an *interpolation* in the book of Isaiah. Now one should hardly suppose, that it was interpolated by the *Jews*, to whom it is a serious *obstacle*. But if it *is* an interpolation, the Jews alone could have been the authors of it. Had it been interpolated by *Christians*, it would never have been admitted by the Jews into *their* copies of the Hebrew Bible. Yet it has been *universally* admitted: for not a single Hebrew manuscript was ever discovered *without* this Chapter. If the Jews however *did* interpolate this Chapter, we cannot *possibly* suppose, that the inter-

polation was *subsequent* to the death of Christ. They would surely not have been so *absurd* as to *fabricate* evidence against themselves, though their veneration for the sacred oracles prevented them from *expunging* what already existed there. If therefore the Chapter is an interpolation *at all*, it must have been interpolated before the events described in it had taken place. But if the Chapter was written *before* the events, described in it, had taken place, it is still an example of literal prophecy, whether it proceeded from Isaiah, or proceeded from some *other* prophet. And it is immaterial whether we call the writer of this prophecy by the name Isaiah, or call him by any other name. But in fact there is no more reason to doubt the authenticity of this Chapter, than of any other in the whole book. Nor have the Jews themselves, when pressed with this prophecy, though they acknowledge the difficulties to which it exposes them, ever attempted to *evade* those difficulties by pretending that Isaiah was *not* the author of it.

Now there is no person in the whole of the Jewish history, from the time of Isaiah to the destruction of Jerusalem, to whom this prophecy is applicable, except to our Saviour : and to *Him* it is applicable in every point. Of whom but of our Saviour can it be said, that he hath borne *our* griefs, and carried *our* sorrows? Of whom but of our Saviour can it be said, that he was wounded for *our* transgressions, and bruised for *our* iniquities? Of whom else could it be

said, that he was stricken for the transgression of his *people*, and that his soul was an offering for *sin*? In fact that single sentence, “ he was numbered with the *transgressors*, he bare the *sin* of many, and made *intercession* for the transgressors,” is the sum and substance of the history, which the Evangelists have given of our Saviour’s passion. An objection indeed has been made to *that* part of the prophecy, where it is said, “ he made his grave with the wicked, and with the rich in his death.” For though our Saviour *died* with the wicked, he did not make his *grave* with the wicked : nor was he literally buried *with* the rich. But the objection does not affect the Hebrew original ; it affects only our English translation. Bishop Lowth has more correctly rendered the passage in the following manner : “ His grave was *appointed* with the wicked ; but with the rich man was his tomb.” This translation removes the first difficulty, but not altogether the second. The *most* accurate translation is the Latin translation of Professor Dathe : “ *Destinatum* quidem ei erat sepulchrum cum impiis, sed in morte suâ divitibus *similis* fuit.” This translation perfectly accords with the circumstances of our Saviour’s death and burial. In consequence of being *crucified* in company with malefactors, he was so far *destined* to have also his *grave* with them ; for, according to the common course of things, he would, after being crucified with them, have been also *buried* with them. On the other hand, though he was not

buried *with* the rich, being laid in a sepulchre where no one had lain before, yet he was buried after the *manner* of the rich, being laid in a tomb, which a man of the highest rank among the Jews had prepared for his own family. Thus we see, that *every* part of this remarkable prophecy was strictly and literally fulfilled in the person of our Saviour.

To the examples already quoted from Bishop Chandler's Defence of Christianity, might be added *other* prophecies, which literally apply to our Saviour, and to no one else. But it will be sufficient to add *one* more example, which is an example of great importance. In the ninth chapter of Isaiah, says the prophet; "Unto us a Child is born, unto us a Son is given; and the government shall be upon his shoulder; and his name shall be Wonderful, Counsellor, The mighty God, The everlasting Father, The Prince of Peace. Of the increase of his government and peace there shall be no end, upon the throne of David, and upon his kingdom to order it, and to establish it with judgment and with justice, from henceforth even for ever." Here we have a description, which is quite inapplicable to any *temporal* prince. Whatever allowances be granted for oriental hyperbole; whatever deductions be made on this account from the grandeur of this description, there is *one* part at least, which must be taken *literally*. When Isaiah declared, that of his government there should be *no end*, the expression is too *precise*, to admit any *latitude* of interpretation. This part therefore *must* be interpreted *liter-*

ally. But of what *temporal* Prince can we say, that his government has *no end*? There are also *other* reasons, which prevent its application to any temporal Prince among the *Jews*. The prophecy was delivered in the reign of Hezekiah, to whom indeed a son was born; but a son, who was neither Counsellor, nor Wonderful, nor the Prince of Peace. For “Manasseh made Judah and the inhabitants of Jerusalem to *err*, and to do worse than the *heathen*, whom the Lord had destroyed before the children of Israel.” (2 Chron. xxxiii. 9.) And his government had not only an *end*, but a *melancholy* end: for the King of Assyria “bound him with fetters, and carried him captive to Babylon.” Nor did many years elapse, before Jerusalem itself was levelled with the ground. And if we examine the *later* period of the Jewish history, if we endeavour to find in this sublime passage a description, either of Judas Maccabæus, or of Simon, or of Hyrcanus, or of any other prince of the Asmonæan race, the prophecy is again inapplicable. For those princes were not of the house of David: and to the house of David was that prophecy restricted. It applies therefore to the person of the Messiah, and of the Messiah alone.

The examples, which have been quoted in this Lecture, afford sufficient proof, that the Hebrew prophets have strictly and literally foretold the coming of Christ. How far, and in what respect, they have foretold his coming in a *secondary* sense, shall be the subject of inquiry in the next Lecture.

LECTURE XXII.

THE examples, which were quoted in the preceding Lecture, are sufficient to shew, that, if agreeably to our Saviour's directions, we search the Scriptures of the Old Testament for passages, which testify of Him, our researches will not be fruitless. For the examples, quoted in that Lecture, are prophecies, which testify of Christ, according to their plain and literal meaning. We may now, therefore, without anxiety, inquire into the foundation of *that* sense, which is sometimes called the *remote* sense, at other times the *mystical* sense, at other times the *secondary* sense, of prophecy. For let the result of an inquiry into *secondary* senses be what it will, the prophecies, which testify of Christ according to their *primary* sense, are sufficiently numerous, to supply us with arguments for the truth of our religion.

In conducting the proposed inquiry, we must examine the two following questions. First, we must examine what the difficulties *are*, which attend the notion of secondary senses *in general*. And then we

must examine, whether, notwithstanding those difficulties, there are not *some* prophecies of the Old Testament, which really *have* a secondary sense.

In the first place then, let us consider the *difficulties*, which attend the notion of secondary senses *in general*. With respect to single *words*, there are few, which do not admit of more senses than one: and it frequently happens, that the *same word*, in different passages, is used in very *different senses*. But then it must be observed, that in *each* of these passages, the word has its determinate meaning: and that it is not allowable to exchange at pleasure the sense, which attaches to the word in *one* case, for the sense, which attaches to it in *another*. If it were, the words of an author would be understood in a very different sense from that, which he *himself* affixed to them; they would not be signs to the reader of what was thought by the author; and the object of his writing would be defeated.

On the other hand, though perspicuity is *in general* the first duty of an author, there are cases, where the object, which he has in view, can be attained only by *ambiguity*. It may be an author's *design* to write enigmatically: and this object will be best promoted by the selection of such words, as admit of two different senses in one and the same place. Words so chosen, and so placed, are then *designedly* used in a *double* sense. But in such cases, though the *words* are used in a double sense, and the author's meaning

is so far ambiguous, there is in general a *limit* to the ambiguity. If the author intended nothing more, than a common enigma, it is a thing, which admits of a *solution*. We may discover, not only what the two senses *are*, in which the ambiguous term is used, but also in what *manner* each of those senses, according to the author's design, is to be *applied*. And even where the author intended to leave the reader, or hearer, entirely in the *dark*, with respect to the proper application of the two senses attached to the ambiguous term it is seldom a question what those senses *are*. When, for instance, a heathen oracle was delivered in such ambiguous terms, as to make it accord with a future event, whether that event proved favourable, or unfavourable, to the person, who *consulted* the oracle, the ambiguity consisted, not in any doubt about the *senses themselves*, between which the person had to choose, but in the want of a clue, to *determine* his choice.

There is no analogy, therefore, between the ambiguity observable in the two preceding cases, and the double sense of prophecy, as the term is understood, in reference to the *sacred* writings. When we interpret a prophecy of the Old Testament, which, besides its *literal* meaning, is supposed to contain a *mystical* meaning, or, in other words, a prophecy, which is supposed to contain, both a *primary*, and a *secondary* sense, the grand difficulty is to ascertain what that secondary sense really is. We are not in

want of a clue, to determine our choice between two senses *already known* ; but we want a clue, which shall lead us from the knowledge of *one* sense to a discovery of the *other*. The *primary* sense of a Hebrew prophecy is ascertained by a grammatical analysis of the Hebrew *words*. But no such grammatical analysis will assist us, in discovering the *secondary* sense of a Hebrew prophecy. Indeed most writers, who treat of *secondary* senses, contend, that those secondary senses were unknown to the *prophets themselves* ; and that Divine Providence so ordered it, that the very persons, who committed to writing the words, which were dictated by the Holy Spirit, did not perceive *the whole extent of their meaning*. But if words, employed in a Hebrew prophecy, were intended to convey a sense so remote from the *common* acceptation of the words, that even the prophet, who *wrote* the words, did not perceive the sense intended, the same divine authority, which *communicated* the prophecy, must interpose, to *explain* the prophecy. For, *without* such divine interposition, it would be absurd to suppose, that *we* could discover the meaning of a prophecy, which the *prophet himself* was unable to discover. If we say, that a prophecy relating to the Messiah may be understood by *us*, though not by the *prophet*, because we have the advantage of having seen its *accomplishment*, we argue, though unconsciously, from a *petitio principii*. When it is previously known, that a

prophecy *does* relate to the Messiah, they, who live to see its accomplishment, will undoubtedly have a more comprehensive view of the subject, than they, who lived in a *preceding* age. But, when the question is in *agitation*, whether a certain passage of the Old Testament, which, according to its literal meaning, does *not* apply to the Messiah, has also a mystical meaning, which *does* so apply, we take for granted the thing to be proved, if we *begin* by arguing about its *accomplishment*. We must ascertain the *existence* of the prophecy, before the *accomplishment* of the prophecy can be matter even of *inquiry*. It is true, that the words, in which the prophecy is delivered, may be of such *general* import, as not to excite the notion of any one *particular* event; but that a particular event may happen in a future age, which so accords with the words of the prophecy, as to enable us to perceive a connexion between the words and the event, which was not perceived *before* the event. And, if a prophecy can be *interpreted* by no other means than by *history*, or by the actual arrival of that very event, to which the prophecy relates, the prophecy must in that case be *fulfilled*, before the prophecy can be *understood*. But then it must be observed, that throughout the whole of this reasoning the *existence* of the prophecy is *pre-supposed*. We *set out* with the supposition, that a certain passage was originally *designed* to be prophetic of *some* future event: and then comparing a *particular* event

with the description given in that passage, we argue from the similarity between the event and the description, that the one is *connected* with the other. But in whatever case we must *previously examine*, whether a passage of the Old Testament really *was* designed for prophecy, or not; in other words, wherever the *existence* of a prophecy must be previously established, something *more* is requisite for *that* purpose, than a mere correspondence between the passage in question, and the event, to which we apply it.

Now, if we consider the peculiar character of prophecy in a *secondary* sense, we shall find that the *existence* of every such prophecy must be established, before we can *begin* to argue about its accomplishment. And to conduct *such* a proof is not quite so easy, as many writers have imagined. In *this* respect, there is a material difference between prophecy in a *primary* sense, and prophecy in a *secondary* sense. The *primary* sense of a prophecy is the *literal* sense of the passage, by which the prophecy is conveyed. And this sense we obtain by a grammatical analysis of the words. But when we attempt to discover a *secondary* sense, we attempt to go *further*, than the words will carry us. Beside the plain and primary sense, which the words of the prophecy *do* convey, we seek for some remote, or mystical sense, which the words of the prophecy *do not* convey. Consequently we undertake what we *ourselves* have not the means of performing.

It is true, that many writers have endeavoured to shew the *practicability* of the attempt by comparing the double sense of *prophecy* with the double sense of *allegory*. Every allegory has two senses; one of which is a *literal* sense, the other an *allegorical* sense. And a knowledge of the *first* sense leads us to a discovery of the *second* sense. Why therefore (it is said) may we not ascribe a double sense to prophecy? And, if a prophecy *has* a double sense, may we not argue from the *first* to the *second* sense, in the same manner, as we argue from the first to the second sense in *allegory*? This is the common argument in favour of that system, which provides a double meaning for the prophecies of the Old Testament, the one relating to the *Jewish*, the other to the *Christian* dispensation. But the argument, though very specious, and employed by very eminent writers, will appear on examination to be altogether untenable. It is founded on a supposed *analogy* between the double sense of prophecy, and the double sense of allegory; whereas, the two things, instead of being analogous, are totally *dissimilar*. When we interpret a *prophecy*, to which a double meaning is ascribed, the one relating to the Jewish, the other to the Christian dispensation, we are in either case concerned with an interpretation of *words*. For the same words, which, according to one interpretation, are applied to *one* event, are, according to another interpretation, applied to *another* event. But, in the

interpretation of an *allegory*, we are concerned only in the *first* instance with an interpretation of words: the *second* sense, which is usually called the *allegorical* sense, being an interpretation of *things*, as was fully proved in the Lecture on that subject. An allegory is commonly delivered in the form of a narrative, as in those two incomparable allegories, our Saviour's parable of the sower, and Nathan's parable to David. And the interpretation of the *words* gives nothing more, than the plain and simple narratives themselves; whereas the *moral* of the allegory is learnt by an application of the *things*, signified by those words, to *other things*, which resemble them, and which the former were intended to *suggest*. There is a *fundamental* difference therefore between the interpretation of an *allegory*, and the interpretation of a *prophecy* with a double sense.

If we proceed with the parallel, we shall find other differences, which destroy the analogy altogether. In the interpretation of prophecy we are concerned with *historic* truth: in the interpretation of allegory we are concerned with *moral* truth. And this difference leads again to a still greater difference. For since the object of allegory is *moral* truth, the narrative, which conveys the allegory, is commonly *fictitious*, as in the two examples already quoted. But in the interpretation of *prophecy*, whether we consider the primary, or consider the secondary sense, we are wholly and solely concern-

ed with *real* events. Lastly, in the interpretation of an allegory, we have a *clue*, which leads us from one sense to the other. Sometimes the allegory is accompanied with an explanation: and even where an allegory is left to explain *itself*, the application of one sense to the other must be easy and obvious, or the object of the allegory will be defeated. If the immediate representation, which is suggested by the *words* of the allegory, has not a manifest correspondence with the ultimate representation, or the *moral* of the allegory, we lose the very thing, which constitutes its *worth*. In every allegory therefore there is, and *must be*, a clue, which leads from one sense to the other. But in the interpretation of a *prophecy*, to which a double meaning is ascribed, we have no clue whatever, which can lead us from the primary to the secondary sense. The *primary* sense is suggested by the *words* of the prophecy. But the *secondary* sense is suggested, neither by the *words* of the prophecy, nor by the *things*, which those words signify. It is a hidden, a remote sense; indeed so hidden, and so remote from the literal sense, that it is supposed to have been *unknown* even to the prophet, who committed the prophecy to writing.

Yet, with all these impediments, the system of primary and secondary senses received such an accession of strength from the celebrated author of the Divine Legation, that many subsequent writers have agreed with him in the opinion, that the system, as

he explained it, is proof against every objection. According to this explanation, the existence of secondary senses in Hebrew prophecy is founded on the supposition of their "logical propriety and moral fitness." The secondary sense of a prophecy is there represented, as having the same relation to the primary sense, which an antitype has to its type. But, if the primary and secondary senses of prophecy are subservient to the same end with types and antitypes, it is inferred, that they rest on the same foundation. As the Jews, for instance, when they sacrificed their paschal lamb, were not aware, that this was a type, prophetic of the sacrifice of Christ, so it is argued, that there might be *verbal* prophecies of the same event, though the *literal* meaning of those prophecies no more suggested that event to the Jews, than the *type*, by which it was prefigured. And the *moral fitness*, as well of primary and secondary senses on the one hand, as of types and antitypes on the other, is argued on the following ground. The Law being only a preparation for the Gospel, the Jews were kept in *ignorance* about the real tendency of types, till those types were superseded by the accomplishment of their antitypes: for, if they had *previously* understood the meaning of those types, they might have neglected the Law, before the fulness of time was come. A fore-knowledge of its intended abolition, a fore-knowledge, that it was only a shadow of better things to come, might have induced them to

disregard the *preparatory* Dispensation, even during the period, while it was destined to *last*. But the same reason, as is further argued, for which the Jews were kept in ignorance about the meaning of *types* relating to the Messiah, must have operated also in the case of *verbal prophecy* relating to the Messiah. The same veil of obscurity, which was thrown over the former, is supposed therefore to have been *necessarily* thrown over the latter, in order to preserve *consistency* in the several parts of the Jewish Dispensation. And to this purpose nothing is supposed to have been better adapted than the use of *secondary* senses ; because these senses are so remote from the literal sense, that they occurred not to the prophets themselves. Lastly, to the objection, that secondary or mystical senses may be multiplied without end, while the literal or primary sense of a passage can be only *one*, it is answered, that, when the system is *so* explained, the secondary sense has no less its limit, than the primary sense, the one being determined by a reference to the *Christian* dispensation, as the other is determined by a reference to the *Jewish* dispensation.

Such is the sum and substance of that ingenious system, which was proposed by the celebrated author of the Divine Legation. But, if we examine it closely, we shall find, that it labours under difficulties, which are not easily surmounted. In the first place, the tendency of this system is to destroy *en-*

tirely the notion of prophecies, which relate to the coming of Christ according to their *literal* sense. But we have already seen, not only how *important* it is to shew the existence of such prophecies; we have further seen, that many such prophecies really *do* exist. That the tendency of this system is to destroy the notion of literal prophecy, appears from the very *purport* of the system. The logical propriety and moral fitness, which are supposed to have operated in one case, must be supposed to have operated in another. The whole system would be destroyed by the allowance of *exceptions*. If *concealment* was the object of secondary senses, that object would be *defeated* by every prophecy, which foretold the coming of Christ in a *literal* sense. And accordingly we find, that the author *himself*, in his Doctrine of Grace, speaks of the prophecies which relate to the Messiah, as relating to him *generally* in a secondary sense. But in a part of his Divine Legation he appears so sensible of the importance of *literal* prophecy, that he allows the existence of *some* such prophecies, and even argues against Grotius, who *denies* their existence. At the same time, being aware, that prophecies, however *few*, which predict the coming of Christ according to their *primary* sense, are so many *obstacles* in the way of a system, which is founded in obscurity, he endeavours to remove those obstacles by saying, that whatever prophecies *do* relate to the Messiah in their primary sense, are de-

livered in such *figurative terms*, as to produce the same obscurity, which is produced by *secondary senses*. But this attempt to remove the acknowledged obstacles is by no means satisfactory. For however figurative the use of *single words* in any passage may be, yet if the passage *itself* is interpreted literally, as the primary sense requires, we shall still obtain a *determinate* sense. We shall obtain the sense, conveyed by the *words* of the passage : and the meaning of each word, whether literal or figurative, will be ascertained by the context. Let the *terms* therefore of any passage be as figurative, as the argument may require, yet the primary sense of that passage can never be subject to the same obscurity, which envelops a mystical or secondary sense. It is impossible, that a sense, which the words of the passage *do* convey, should be equally concealed from the view of the reader, with a meaning, which the words of the passage *do not* convey. The system in question therefore is *irreconcilable* with the notion of prophecies, which predict the coming of Christ in a *primary* sense. And the consequences of *rejecting* that notion are sufficiently apparent from the preceding Lecture.

Another difficulty, under which the system labours, is this ; that the *existence* of a thing is argued from the supposed *propriety* of the thing. But there are hundreds of things, of which we might plausibly shew, that they would *properly* have taken place, not one

of which ever *has* taken place. Even therefore if it be *granted*, that a passage of the Old Testament, which literally relates to *one* event, has a moral fitness for relation to *another* event, that moral fitness will not establish the *existence* of such relation. But let the inference be allowed, and the existence of the secondary sense *admitted*, it will still be of no *use* to us, unless we have the means of *discovering* that sense. And how shall we *discover* that sense by the logical propriety or moral fitness, which we ascribe to it? These are qualities, which attach to so *many* things, that they can never lead to the discovery of any *one* thing. If we say, that the secondary sense is determined by a reference to the Christian Dispensation, there are again so *many* objects of reference in the Christian Dispensation, that we shall be still at a loss for the *particular* application. In the application of *secondary* senses we are concerned, not with the comparison of some event with a sense already *known*, but with the comparison of some event with a sense, which is to be *discovered*, and discovered by its *relation* to that event. Consequently, if different interpreters select *different* events for the objects of comparison, as they undoubtedly will, unless they abide by some common authority, they may agree in the opinion, that a passage of the Old Testament *has* a secondary sense, but they will *differ* in opinion with respect to the question, what that secondary sense *really is*.

II.

After all then, it appears that there is no *system whatever*, by which we can either establish the *existence* of secondary senses, or by which, on the *supposition* of their existence, we can discover their real *meaning*. We must be contented, therefore, as at the beginning of the preceding Lecture, to resolve the question of secondary senses, into a question of *authority*. In whatever case a passage of the Old Testament, which, according to its strict and literal sense, relates to some earlier event in the Jewish history, is yet applied, either by *Christ*, or by an *Apostle* of Christ, to what happened in *their* days; and moreover, is *so* applied, as to indicate, that the passage is *prophetic*; of such passage we must conclude on *their* *authority*, that beside its plain and primary sense, it has also a remote or secondary sense. The difficulties, which no human system can remove, are in such cases removed by Divine Power; the discoveries, which human reason attempts in vain, are there unfolded by divine intelligence; and the same divine authority, which *communicated* the prophecy, interposes to *explain* the prophecy. Though we *ourselves* are unable to discover any other meaning in a Hebrew prophecy, than that which the words themselves convey by their own proper import; yet, when we have *such* authority for the opinion, that beside the plain or primary sense, which the words convey to *us*, they

have also a remote or hidden sense, which the words do *not* convey to us, it would be presumptuous to question the *existence* of that sense, by opposing the result of our own researches to the decisions of unerring wisdom.

Notwithstanding the difficulties therefore, which attend the notion of secondary senses *in general*, we must allow, that there are *some* passages of the Old Testament, which really *have* a secondary sense. But, since in every instance, where a passage of the Old Testament *has* a secondary sense, the existence of that secondary sense depends *entirely* on the divine authority, which has *ascribed* it to the passage, we must wholly *confine* the application of a secondary sense to those particular passages, to which a secondary sense has been ascribed by divine authority. There is no supposed logical propriety, no supposed moral fitness, which can either establish the existence, or lead to the discovery, of such senses. It is authority, and authority *alone* ; though we may fairly presume from the very exercise of such authority, that in every instance where a secondary sense is applied by such authority, there is a moral fitness for the application. But then the application does not *depend* on such moral fitness : it depends on the authority itself. And since this authority is confined to *individual cases*, the doctrine of secondary senses is reducible to *no system*. As in the relation of types to antitypes we cannot go beyond those particular examples, which

are ratified by divine authority, so in *every* instance the same divine authority must be produced, before we can recognise, in a prophecy of the Old Testament, both a primary and a secondary sense.

Indeed, if we once transgress the limit prescribed by *this* authority, it will be difficult to find *any* limit to the introduction of secondary senses. For since the secondary sense of a passage is a sense, which the words do not convey *of themselves*, it is manifest that, as soon as we begin to trust in our *own* interpretation, we shall interpret without rule or guide. Though no passage can have more than *one* grammatical meaning, yet, as soon as we begin to indulge ourselves in the invention of *mystical* meanings, it is impossible to say, where we shall stop. We shall come at length to that wantonness of interpretation, which is displayed by most of the Jewish Commentators, and by many among the Christian Fathers. We have already seen, that there is no analogy between the interpretation of prophecy and the interpretation of allegory, unless indeed it should so happen that an allegory was meant to be *prophetic*, which however is not its usual character. But such was the fondness for allegorical interpretation, that instead of confining it to *allegory itself*, both Jewish and Christian Commentators have extended it to history and prophecy, where it is wholly inapplicable. When allegorical interpretation is employed where it properly belongs, namely, in the interpretation of a real allegory, there is always a

connexion between the literal and the allegorical sense. There is always a *clue*, which leads us from one sense to the other. But if we endeavour to find an allegorical sense, either in *history* or in *prophecy*, we endeavour to find a sense, with which the literal sense is wholly unconnected. The sense therefore will be supplied by mere imagination: and not only will different interpreters invent different senses, but even the *same* interpreter may invent as many as he pleases. Indeed there have been Jewish Commentators, who have boasted, that they could discover seventy Midrashin, or mystical meanings in one sentence. *Some* limit therefore is absolutely necessary: and enough has been already said to shew, that the *only* limit, in which we can confide, is the limit assigned by the authority of Christ and his Apostles.

This appeal to authority, as the foundation of secondary senses, is consistent also with the plan, which is adopted in these Lectures. For it has been *already* shewn, that there are prophecies, which foretel the coming of Christ, according to their literal and primary sense. By *these* prophecies, united with the argument from miracles, we establish the divine authority of Christ and his Apostles, *independently* of secondary senses. When we appeal therefore to their authority *in proof* of secondary senses, we are not liable to the charge of arguing in a circle. Such a charge applies only to those, who, while they undertake to prove the truth of our religion from *prophecy*,

yet argue only on the supposition of *secondary* senses. For, as the *existence* of secondary senses depends on the authority of Christ and his Apostles, we cannot *argue* from those senses to the truth of our religion without taking for granted the thing to be proved. But, on the other hand, though we cannot apply them to that particular purpose, there are other purposes, to which they *may* be applied. For though they prove nothing *by themselves*, yet when combined with those prophecies, which relate to the Messiah in their *primary* sense, they serve at least to illustrate that unity of design, which connects the Jewish with the Christian Dispensation.

If we further undertake to examine, *what particular* passages of the New Testament afford examples of prophecy applied in a secondary sense, we shall find it to be a question, in which there ever *has* been, and probably ever *will* be a diversity of opinion. For not only are commentators at variance on the question, what are *literal* prophecies of our Saviour, and what are not, but even they who are agreed on this previous question, are still at variance as to the question, what *appellation* shall be given to those passages, which are *applied* to the period of our Saviour's ministry, and yet literally belong to *another* period. That there *are* such passages we cannot doubt: and we may allege, as an instance, that passage in the thirty-first Chapter of Jeremiah, which is applied to the massacre of the children at Bethlehem.

The words of Jeremiah are, "A voice was heard in Ramah, lamentation, and bitter weeping: Rahel weeping for her children, refused to be comforted for her children, because they were not. Thus saith the Lord, Refrain thy voice from weeping, and thine eyes from tears: for thy work shall be rewarded saith the Lord, and they shall come again from the land of the enemy." This passage evidently relates to the carrying away of the Jews into captivity, and their future return. For it appears from the fortieth Chapter of Jeremiah, that *Ramah* was the place, to which Nebuzaradan, the captain of Nebuchadnezzar's guard, first brought his captives from Jerusalem. According to its *literal* meaning therefore it is obviously a prophecy of a totally different event from the massacre of the children in Bethlehem by order of Herod. Nor do we perceive how it can be a prophecy of this event even in a *secondary* sense. For not only were Ramah and Bethlehem two distinct places, the one lying as far to the north as the other to the south of Jerusalem, but the consolation, afforded to Rahel, that her children should come again, was a consolation, which could not be afforded to the mothers of the murdered children in Bethlehem. A comparison therefore of the sorrow, expressed in the one case, with the sorrow, which was felt in the other, appears at least to constitute the sole ground of application. Such applications of passages in the Old Testament to events recorded in the New, various

writers, for instance Bishop Kidder in his *Demonstration of the Messiah*, and Dr. Nicholls in his *Conference with a Theist*, have called by the name of *accommodation*. But other writers have asserted that even *such* passages are prophecies, at least in a *secondary* sense, of the event, to which they are applied. The very passage, which we have been just considering, is introduced with the words, "Then was *fulfilled* that which was spoken by Jeremy the prophet." Hence it has been inferred, that St. Matthew, who quoted the passage, regarded it as a prophecy at least in *some* sense, since the use of the term "fulfilled" implies a *prediction* of that event, in which it was fulfilled. And if in the *opinion* of an inspired Apostle any passage of the Old Testament was a *prediction* of that event to which he himself applied it, we must conclude, that such passage really *was* a prediction of that event, though we ourselves could not have discovered it. To diminish however the difficulties, which we should still feel on such occasions, a distinction has been made by some Commentators, especially by Professor Dathe in the Notes to his Latin translation of the Hebrew Bible, between quotations introduced with the formula, "Then was fulfilled," and quotations introduced with the formula, "This was done that it *might* be fulfilled." Though quotations therefore of the latter kind are quotations of *prophecies*, relating either in a primary or in a secondary sense, to those very events, to


which they are applied, quotations of the former kind are supposed to have been intended for nothing more, than what is called an *accommodation*, or an application of a passage to a corresponding event. And this distinction has really a foundation in the practice of the Jews themselves. For Surenhusius in his third Thesis *De formulis allegandi*, has quoted Rabbinical expressions corresponding to the expressions of the New Testament, "Then was fulfilled," and "this was done that it might be fulfilled." And it appears, that the latter expression only was used with passages, which were quoted by way of argument, or *proof*. But if the term *accommodation* be applied, as it is by some writers, to passages of the Old Testament, which are quoted in the New Testament with the strong expression, "this was done that it might be fulfilled," the use of it in such cases is neither warranted by the practice of the Jewish writers, nor can be consonant with the design of the sacred writers themselves. Passages so introduced must be regarded as real prophecies, at least in a secondary, if not in a primary sense. To use therefore the term accommodation for the passages *in general*, which are taken from the Old Testament, and applied to the events of the New, is to carry the principle of accommodation to an extent, which it will not bear. Nor can the term "secondary sense" be applied in that general manner: for there are certainly prophecies in the Old Testament, which relate to

the Messiah in a *primary* sense. Indeed, if *all* the passages, which are quoted as prophecies in the New Testament, were mere accommodations, they would cease to be prophecies altogether. They would not be prophecies even in *name*. And though passages, which are prophetic in a *secondary* sense, are still prophecies, yet if *all* the prophecies relating to the Messiah predicted the coming of Christ in a mere mystical or secondary sense, we should not have that *sure* word of prophecy, which both our Saviour and his Apostles have taught us to expect.

Let us now recapitulate, and place in one point of view, the preceding inquiries into the prophecies relating to the Messiah. *Many* of these prophecies relate to him according to their literal and primary sense. From *these* prophecies, in conjunction with miracles, we can argue to the divine authority of Christ and his Apostles. Their authority being thus *established*, we can *appeal* to that authority, as evidence, that any passage of the Old Testament, *literally* relating to some event under the Jewish dispensation, but quoted by them as a *prophecy* of some event under the Christian dispensation, is a prophecy of that event in a *secondary* sense. But as *not all* the passages of the Old Testament which *literally* relate to events under the Jewish dispensation, are in their application to events under the Christian dispensation applied in the *same manner*, we must endeavour to distinguish the cases, in which the Sacred

Writers themselves *intended* to give examples of prophecy, from the cases, in which they *meant* only to quote for the purpose of similitude or illustration. In the former, we have examples of prophecy in a secondary sense: in the latter alone, we have examples of accommodation.

END OF PART IV.









Washburn 1774-5-7 Spiller

Thurman 1776-1780

Montrose 1782-96- Bryan

Allen 1786-87 Harris

Washburn 1788 Copeland

11 1/2

12

11

1

...	18	...
Finna	1825	...
S. Co.	1835	...
Coleraine	184	...
R. Stephens	1848-49-50	...
Bogga		
Wheeler	1848	...
Watson	1854	...
Challenger	1858	...
Fell	1875	...
(Gregory		
Wick	1707	...
Kilcor	1710	...
Watson	1711	...
Wells	1729-30	...
Bongak	1734	...
Wetstone	1734	...

